[Pages S3871-S3906]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

Russia's Nuclear Doctrine

The Senator from new York in a recent speech in Texas warned darkly
that NATO enlargement might lead to nuclear war. With all due respect
to my good friend, I think his assertion is incorrect and alarmist.
He and other opponents of NATO enlargement have underscored Russia's
disproportionate reliance on its nuclear forces, sometimes even
resorting to scare tactics.
It is well known that the dissolution of the Soviet empire and
Russia's transition to a market economy required jolting changes within
Russia. Since 1990 Russia's economy has contracted by perhaps 40
percent and has only recently established and shown the first signs of
recovery.
Partly as a result, Russian military spending contracted
substantially. Russia's number of combat-ready divisions has also
declined.
Beyond these measures, non-payment of wages and other factors have
dampened morale among officers and enlisted personnel. The war in
Chechnya showed the cumulative toll on Russia's forces.
Given this decline in Russia's conventional forces, it is
understandable that Russia has apparently placed a heavier reliance on
nuclear weapons. But this change became evident as early as 1992, when
Russia declared that it would no longer abide by its previous policy of
``no first use'' of nuclear weapons.
There are many signs that ``no first use'' had been more of a
propaganda tool than an actual reflection of Soviet policy, but the
declared abandonment of this policy was significant. The move away from
``no first use'' gained a higher profile when it began to be discussed
in public in 1997.
The Senator from New York and other proponents of NATO enlargement
have recently charged that this increased reliance on nuclear forces
was a consequence of Russia's fear of NATO's enlargement. This analysis
is simply not credible.
First, as noted earlier, NATO's enlargement results in no significant
increase in NATO's military capability relative to Russia.
Second, it is hardly likely that NATO's enlargement, begun in 1994,
could have triggered a change in Russian policy that began in 1992. The
fact is that opponents of NATO enlargement have constructed this
argument retroactively.
The same is true for those who have attributed delays in Duma
ratification of START II to NATO enlargement. Well before NATO
enlargement was proposed, Duma critics of START II based their
opposition on other arguments, from the cost of compliance with START
II to the loss of national pride.
NATO enlargement became another useful argument for confirmed
opponents, but hardly the cause of their opposition.
In any case, the Russian government is now moving to push
ratification of START II through the Duma, perhaps by the end of June--
another sign that NATO enlargement is no impediment to constructive
relations with Russia or progress on arms control.
So, I would sum up by reminding my friend, the Senator from New York,
of four key facts:
First, Poland's accession to NATO will not be creating a
geographically new move of the Alliance to Russia's borders. It has had
a strategically important border with Russia in the north for nearly
fifty years, plus one in the south with Russian-ruled territory.
Second, there is absolutely no comparison with the allies'
trimuphalist behavior toward defeated Germany after World War One and
the reaching out of the United States and its NATO partners to Russia
after it lost the Cold War.
Third, NATO has conclusively demonstrated through its movements of
troops and equipment away from Russia's borders, and by concluding and
carrying out significant arms control agreements, that it in no way
threatens Russia.
Finally, it is completely false--even irresponsible--to assert that
NATO enlargement is driving the world toward nuclear war. Cooperation,
not confrontation is occurring on many fronts.
Russia need have no fear from NATO enlargement.
Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I believe NATO expansion is in the best
interest of the United States. Also, expanding NATO will be in the
interest of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary and for that
matter--world peace.
The United States' security is intrinsically tied to the security of
all of Europe. An enlarged NATO will only extend the influence of peace
and prosperity to these three deserving countries. Also, as Poland, the
Czech Republic, and Hungary continue to grow and flourish, their
acceptance into the NATO Alliance will only further integrate Western
values and will lock in the practices of democracy. Locking democracy
into this region is in the

[[Page S3872]]

United States interest and we should never shirk from our
responsibility and duty to see that democracy is spread throughout the
world.
While many foreign policy issues don't make the headlines and gather
press, I do want to add to the record three opinion editorials from a
few Colorado newspapers. I ask unanimous consent that an April 21st,
1998 editorial from the Daily Sentinel, a paper from Grand Junction
Colorado, an April 28th, 1998 editorial from the Denver Post, and an
April 5th, 1998 editorial from the Rocky Mountain News be printed in
the Record at the end of my statement.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. ALLARD. Let me highlight a few comments from these editorials.
The Daily Sentinel writes,

Adding Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic to NATO
rewards three countries for their efforts against communism
during the Cold War. More importantly, expanding the western
alliance to include the three former Soviet bloc captive
nations not only is in the best interests of NATO and the
United States, but it unequivocally proclaims to the rest of
the world that the fate of Central Europe will no longer be
in the hands of whatever despots come along, be they Nazis,
Communists or something else.

The Denver Post states,

The Post believes adding these three nations will
contribute to stability in Eastern Europe and thus to world
peace. . . . Any student of the 20th century has to admire
the freedom-loving spirit displayed by the Hungarians, Poles,
and Czechs, often against great odds. . . . their current
governments are stable and they are worthy partners of NATO.

Lastly, from the Rocky Mountain News,

NATO enlargement is the Western world's way to show that
the Cold War is over and that we welcome these countries to
freedom. The new threats we face can only be met by forming
new alliance to ensure that these democracies do not fall
prey to nationalistic or terrorist regimes. The Czech
Republic, Poland, and Hungary know life without freedom and
now deserve freedom and security that only NATO can provide.

For me this sums up many of the reasons why I believe adding these
three countries to NATO will strengthen, stabilize, and promote peace
for the United States and Europe. I urge my colleagues to support this
NATO expansion.

Exhibit 1

[From the Daily Sentinel, Apr. 21, 1998]

Congress Should OK Expansion of NATO

Sometime very soon, perhaps by the end of the week, the
Senate will vote on whether to ratify a treaty that would
allow Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to join NATO. It
should vote decisively to allow the expansion.
Much has been said about the fact that the expansion will
offend Russia because it will appear that NATO is expanding
to the Russian doorstep. Clinton administration officials
attempting to defuse that argument have declared that NATO is
a peaceful alliance ``not arrayed against Russia'' or anyone
else.
Such statements are, of course, necessary to deal with
global politics. And they are misleading. NATO's purpose is
to protect its western European members and the United States
against outside aggression, including the possibility of a
reawakened Russian bear decades down the road.
It's true that the Cold War is over but it's equally true
that NATO was founded primarily to stem the expansionist
proclivities of Soviet Russia.
Moreover, the three nations in question all challenged
Soviet domination during that period, and each paid a heavy
price in some form of Soviet retaliation--Hungary during the
1950s, Czechoslovakia in the 1960s and Poland in the 1980s.
In discussing the NATO expansion, few people note that
rejecting the membership of these three countries would be an
even greater offense to them than their inclusion in NATO
would be to Russia.
Additionally, while Russia is no longer communist, there is
still reason to be suspicious of its expansionist tendencies
which have gone on almost continuously since the days of
Peter the Great. Two of the leading candidates to succeed
Boris Yeltsin as president are nationalists who have hinted
at trying to reassert Russian control over some of the old
Soviet states which are now independent nations.
Adding Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to NATO
rewards three countries for their efforts against communism
during the Cold War. More importantly, expanding the western
alliance to include the three former Soviet bloc captive
nations not only is in the best interests of NATO and the
United States, but it unequivocally proclaims to the rest of
the world that the fate of Central Europe will no longer be
in the hands of whatever despots come along, be they Nazis,
Communists or something else.
____

[From the Denver Post, Apr. 28, 1998.]

Admit 3 More to NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization may well be
history's most successful military alliance. Since its
formation in the early days of the Cold War, not one square
inch of any member country has been lost to external
aggression. That record has not been lost on nations that
were once members of the rival Soviet-led Warsaw Pact.
This week, the U.S. Senate will vote on whether to admit
three of those former rivals--Hungary, Poland and the Czech
Republic--to NATO. The Post believes adding these three
nations will contribute to stability in Eastern Europe and
thus to world peace. But we would urge the administration and
Senate to be extremely cautious about any more applicants,
some of whom seem likely to embroil NATO in their domestic
difficulties.
Any student of the 20th century has to admire the freedom-
loving spirit displayed by the Hungarians, Poles and Czechs,
often against great odds. The 1956 Hungarian revolution, the
1968 Prague Spring and the rise of Solidarity in Poland bore
eloquent witness to the ideals of their peoples. Their
current governments are stable and they are worthy partners
of NATO.
The Clinton administration has wisely stated it has ``no
reason, no intention and no plan'' to station nuclear weapons
in the new member states. Added to NATO but left in a
nuclear-free condition, the Czech Republic, Poland and
Hungary should be able to resume their historic role as a
buffer zone between Germany and Russia and should thus be a
stabilizing influence in Eastern Europe.
Beyond those three candidates, however, NATO should be very
wary about further expansion. Already Romania, Slovenia,
Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania are eyeing admission and
Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Slovakia are waiting in ther
wings.
Some of these nations (Slovenia, Macedonia) are relatively
new with little experience at democracy. Others, like Romania
and Albania, had long histories of dictatorship alternating
with instability. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are
democratic and stable, but their location between Russia and
the Baltic Sea makes them all but indefensible by nonnuclear
means. Admitting Ukraine, Belarus or other former Soviet
republics would be provocative to Russia.
In short, we support admission of Hungary, Poland and the
Czech Republic to NATO. But there needs to be a great deal of
thought, discussion and diplomacy before any more invitations
are issued to join this exclusive club.
____

[From the Rocky Mountain News, Apr. 5, 1998]

Should NATO Grow?--Enlargement of Alliance Will Truly Signal the End of
the Cold War

(By Senator Wayne Allard)

The Cold war is over and many have argued that we can now
begin to dismantle our defenses and look inward. I believe
Secretary of State Albright said it best when testifying
before the Armed Services Committee on April 23, 1997, ``[I]f
you don't see smoke, that is no reason to stop paying for
fire insurance.''
The United States nor the world face the imminent threat of
the Soviet Union, but this is no time to relax. United
States' interests are still threatened by local conflicts;
internal political and economic instability; the reemergence
of ethnic, religious, and other historic grievances;
terrorism; and the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons.
Soon, the U.S. Senate will debate and vote on the
invitation of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Just because we
are in a time of relative peace, we can not stop from being
engaged in a fight for peace and freedom. I believe expanding
NATO is the best way to ensure peace and stability.
First, NATO is and has always been a force for peace and
prosperity. Enlarging NATO will only enhance the U.S. and
European security and stability. Throughout our history, the
U.S. has been closely linked to the stability of Europe, and
that has not changed. The U.S. has been through two World
Wars and a Cold War in Europe. However, since NATO was
formed, not one major war or aggression has occurred against
or between member states (except for Argentina's invasion of
the British Falkland Island).
An enlarged NATO can do for all of Europe what it has done
in Western Europe by strengthening the emerging democracies,
creating conditions for continued prosperity, preventing
local rivalries, diminishing the race for arms buildups and
destabilizing nationalistic policies, and fostering common
security interests. Enlargement will truly signal the end of
the Cold War by no longer validating the old Stalinistic
lines but will secure the historic gains of democracy in
Central Europe.
Second, enlargement of NATO will further the integration of
Western values into Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
Their invitation and movement into NATO will lock in Central
Europe's practices of democracy. Enlargement will promote
American-led multinational defense structures and prevent the
renationalization of these democracies. As enlarged NATO will
fill the security vacuum created with the fall of the Soviet
Union, subduing fear that the area will begin to divide
nationalistically and begin to look like the former
Yugoslavia.
However, just the possibility of membership into NATO has
given these countries the incentive to peacefully resolve
their border disputes. Since 1991, we have seen 10

[[Page S3873]]

major accords settling these differences and much of this is
credited to the opportunity to join NATO. Even if old
disputes resurface, NATO membership will help keep the peace,
just as NATO has done in relation to the problems between
NATO members Greece and Turkey.
Third, there has been concern about the Russian response to
NATO enlargement. Russian leaders have expressed their
dislike of NATO enlargement, in part due to the misperception
that the Alliance poses a threat to Russia's security. NATO
is not, and never has been an offensive Alliance, but one of
defensive purposes only. We must respect the Russian
concerns, but as my predecessor Senator Hank Brown has
written, ``[W]orking closely with Russia in an attempt to
allay their concerns makes sense. slowing or altering NATO
expansion * * * hands the Russian government a veto pen.''
This would be a tragic mistake.
An enlarged and strengthened NATO promotes security and
stability in an area of Europe that is vital to Russian
security. The invited states must clearly know that they are
no longer considered Russian ``eastern bloc nations'' but an
integral part of the circle of democratic nations. Plus,
unlike the Warsaw Pack, the decision by the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland to join NATO was made by each individual
country, without any coercion or force from any current NATO
member.
Fourth, with any expansion there are costs. A bulk of the
cost is to modernize and reform militaries and make them
operable with NATO. However, being that the U.S. already has
the world's premier armed forces, the bulk of the cost will
be incurred by our European allies and the three invited
nations. They are voluntarily joining and understand the
commitments asked of being a NATO member.
The United States' percentage of burden sharing for the
NATO budget will go down with the addition of the three
countries. Also, the U.S. is not obliged to subsidize the
national expenses of any of the the three invitees to meet
its NATO commitments. Adequate defense systems always costs
money but alliances make it less expensive because costs are
shared and countries join together to meet the challenges.
NATO enlargement is the Western world's way to show that
the Cold War is over and that we welcome these countries to
freedom. The new threats we face can only be met by forming
new alliances to ensure that these democracies do not fall
prey to nationalistic or terrorist regimes. The Czech
Republic, Poland, and Hungary know life without freedom and
now deserve freedom and security that only NATO can provide.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for
Senate ratification of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of
1949 on Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. This is
the fourth time that the Atlantic alliance, which rose from the ashes
of World War II, has decided to expand. And each time, expansion has
served the same purpose--to expand the area in Europe within which
peace, stability, freedom and democracy could flourish. The NATO
Alliance was remarkably successful throughout its initial decades.
Today we are considering a step designed to ensure that the success
continues into the next century. This is not a decision that NATO, the
U.S. or the Senate takes lightly. It is a more serious issue which goes
to the heart of the question of how the U.S. can best promote our
interest in peace and stability in the post-Cold War era. After all,
these new members will enjoy all the benefits and bear all the
responsibilities which apply to the current members of this mutual
defense alliance. The U.S. will be obliged to consider an attack on
Warsaw, Budapest or Prague in the same manner we are not obliged to
consider an attack on London, Paris or Bonn. Having fought in two wars,
I am most cognizant of the solemnity of the obligation we will be
undertaking through the ratification of this agreement.
The 1990s, which witnessed the end of the Cold War and the demise of
the Warsaw Pact, brought about a fundamental transformation in Europe.
Where once we saw Europe divided into hostile, ideologically-opposed
camps, we now see a continent increasingly united by a commitment to
the principles of democracy and free market economics.
Initially I had two principal concerns about the proposed enlargement
of NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic--the cost to
the U.S. and the impact on relations with Russia. In the nearly ten
months since NATO made the official decision to offer membership to
these three nations, I have continued to examine these two areas and
will summarize, very briefly, my conclusions.
In December of last year NATO completed a review of the estimated
increases in the costs to NATO's commonly-funded budget resulting from
enlargement. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's report describes
how NATO conducted its review and calculated its cost estimate.

NATO first identified the military requirements of
incorporating these three new members into the Alliance.
Teams of experts were then dispatched to each country to
evaluate facilities, infrastructure, and current capabilities
to meet NATO's projected military requirements. With this
information, NATO then developed a cost estimate for bringing
the current capabilities into line with NATO requirements.
The NATO studies concluded that the cost of enlargement will
total $1.5 billion over the next ten years. Thus, according
to NATO, the additional U.S. payment to the common-funded
budgets will average approximately $40 million per year over
ten years.

This amount does not seem to me to be excessive, given the U.S. stake
in continued security and stability in Europe. Obviously, in addition
to these commonly-funded costs, there will be considerable additional
costs to the new members themselves, which each of them has pledged to
meet. Yes, the United States may decide to help these new NATO members
modernize their military forces; just as we have provided such
assistance to many of our current NATO allies through, for example, the
provisions of loans or loan guarantees, for the purchase of U.S.-made
military equipment. However, Mr. President, that is a separate decision
for the U.S. government, one that is neither required by nor prohibited
by our decision to support enlargement. The responsibility for ensuring
that their militaries are capable of meeting their obligations to the
common defense rest with the new members themselves.
It hardly needs repeating that cooperative relations between Russia
and the U.S., and Russia and NATO, serve the interests of the U.S. and
the Alliance. I am convinced that NATO enlargement and the development
of a NATO-Russia relationship are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, since
NATO made clear its intention to expand, NATO and Russia have concluded
the ``NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and
Security'', signed last May. This agreement is designed as a means of
regularizing and formalizing consultative procedures between NATO and
Russia.
Further, NATO is a purely defensive alliance, and a threat to no
nation. The peace and stability within Europe promoted by the Alliance
benefits the entire continent, including Russia. It may be unreasonable
to expect Russia to approve of NATO expansion. But neither is Russia's
unhappiness over the expansion likely to become the determining factor
in Russian behavior toward the U.S. and the Alliance.
In summary, Mr. President, I believe that these two major issues
arising from NATO expansion have been satisfactorily addressed. I will
support NATO expansion and hope that the Senate will ratify the
expansion agreement by an overwhelming margin.
Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Managers'
amendment to the Resolution of Ratification, and of the Resolution of
Ratification itself.
Even though the Berlin Wall has crumbled and the Soviet Union has
dissolved, NATO remains vital. It is the cornerstone of stability for a
continent that is under massive transition. The nations of central and
eastern Europe have established democratic forms of government and have
deregulated their economies. The accession of Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic is the best way to bolster their fledgling democracies
and market economies thereby making their newly-won freedom
irreversible.
Let there be no mistake: our engagement with Europe since NATO was
formed in 1949 has not been without its costs and not without its
risks. Our engagement with the new democracies of Central Europe will
not be without costs and risks either. The expansion of NATO will most
likely antagonize Russia.
More importantly, as a military alliance, we risk obligating the
United States military to defend the citizens of distant and unfamiliar
lands. In the end, though, we have found it difficult to stay out of
these conflicts. Just about anywhere in the world where there is
conflict, our military is there.
I believe that disengagement from Europe, as history has repeatedly

[[Page S3874]]

shown, would have far-reaching consequences. Therefore, I believe that
we have no choice but to go forward with our current commitment to an
expanded NATO. The Senate should vote to approve the Resolution of
Ratification.
But, like many senators, I remain concerned at the potential
financial costs of expansion. As a member of the Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee, I am concerned that the Administration has not yet come
to terms with the price of supporting NATO expansion or more generally
with the costs of America's position as the sole superpower.
As was the case with Bosnia, there is reason to believe that the
Administration is underestimating the costs of expansion in order to
make ratification more palatable in the Senate.
Without pouring additional funds into the defense budget, NATO
expansion costs that are unaccounted for may hinder the Defense
Department's ability to carry out missions in other vital areas of the
world and at the same time to modernize the force.
We have heard a number of cost estimates in the course of this
debate. We must keep in mind that the new member nations, as the
primary beneficiaries of expansion, must devote the resources necessary
to shoulder their fair share of the common burden.
And I know that nothing would undermine the support of this body for
NATO, or that of the American people, faster than a perception that the
new members, or existing members, for that matter, were not living up
to their responsibilities in this regard.
I am also concerned about another aspect of NATO expansion--one that
has received less attention than the broader strategic issues, but one
that is critical to the long-term success of an expanded alliance--
namely intelligence and counterintelligence matters.
Here too, after a careful review, I have concluded that the long-term
national interests of the United States are best served by a vote in
favor of the Resolution. But I would like to encourage Senators to take
the time to review the report that I will describe shortly, which is
available in classified form in S-407.
An unclassified summary can be found in the Foreign Relations
Committee report, Executive Report 105-14, on the Resolution of
Ratification.
This report was prepared by the Intelligence Committee staff at the
direction of Senator Kerrey, the Committee Vice Chairman, and myself,
and submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations and to the Senate
at large.
It contains the staff's assessment of the intelligence implications
of NATO expansion.
The report is the culmination of the committee's work over the past
year monitoring the progress of the accession process set in motion by
the Alliance's decision last July to formally invite Poland, the Czech
Republic, and Hungary to join NATO.
The staff has routinely reviewed the state of the accession
negotiations, a process that concluded in December 1997 with the
signing of the accession protocols. Committee members and staff have
met numerous times with NATO negotiators as well as representatives
from the acceding states, both in European capitals and in Washington,
D.C.
In preparation for the Senate vote on advice and consent, committee
staff held numerous briefings with U.S. and NATO intelligence
officials; reviewed documents prepared by the Intelligence Community;
and posed numerous questions for the record.
The committee directed the Executive branch--the Central Intelligence
Agency, Department of Defense, National Security Agency, Federal Bureau
of Investigation, and Department of State--to submit a formal report on
the intelligence implications of enlargement.
Committee staff also met with members of the Alliance's Interagency
Working Group on NATO Enlargement (IWGNE) to discuss integration
efforts in the intelligence field.
Finally, committee members and staff traveled to national capitals of
the three aspiring members to gain a more detailed, first-hand
knowledge of how the civilian and military services of these countries
operate, and whether adequate procedures are in place for the sharing
of sensitive information with current NATO members.
Once again, I would remind my colleagues that the classified
committee staff report is available in S-407 for Senators who may wish
to read it.
The Committee has also prepared an unclassified summary of the
report's major findings, and I would like to share with my colleagues
the highlights.

overview

The United States, along with its NATO allies, believes that
membership in NATO cannot be granted piecemeal.
NATO has thus determined that there will not be a two-tiered security
structure within the Alliance. If and when the three accede to full
NATO membership, they will share in all rights and obligations, and
will be entitled to share in Alliance secrets.
The work undertaken bilaterally and through NATO is geared to
ensuring that the three invitees take the necessary steps over the
transition or pre-accession period to demonstrate that they can and
will guard NATO secrets appropriately once they join in April 1999.
In assessing the reliability of Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic in guarding NATO secrets, the following factors are critical:
1. the strength of democratic reforms, with a focus on ministerial
and legislative oversight of intelligence services and activities;
2. the degree to which the three countries have succeeded in
reforming their civilian and military intelligence services, including
the ability of the services to hire and retain qualified Western-
oriented officers, and the evolution of political and public support
for these services;
3. Russian intelligence objectives directed against these countries,
including any disinformation campaigns designed to derail, retard, or
taint their integration with the West;
4. counterintelligence and other security activities being pursued by
the three countries, and the adequacy of resources devoted to these
efforts; and
5. the work underway between the three invitees and NATO to ensure
that security standards will be met by the time the three join the
Alliance.

committee findings

As a result of their investigations, the committee staff arrived at a
series of key findings.
Their report includes general findings, findings derived from the
experience of our respective intelligence agencies working together in
both bilateral and multilateral fora; and findings relating to the
counterintelligence threat, the pace of reform and the NATO work
program for intelligence issues.

general findings

Perhaps most important, the report makes a point that is obvious but
nonetheless bears repeating: any intelligence sharing relationship
inevitably involves some risks.
Nevertheless, I believe that the intelligence relationships with
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will be, on balance, a net plus
for U.S. and NATO interests. As many of my colleagues are aware,
cooperation with the three countries on intelligence issues began
before the idea of NATO enlargement itself took root.
In that respect, sharing intelligence in the NATO context will build
on a pattern of bilateral cooperation which has existed for nearly a
decade.
Based on the information provided to the Committee, Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic have proven to be reliable in handling
operational information and capable of guarding classified
information--some of it extremely sensitive.

the multilateral context

In the multilateral context, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic
have participated in the Implementation Force and the Stabilization
Force operations in Bosnia, and have cooperated actively with U.S.
intelligence to provide critical force protection information.
The three countries have demonstrated a solid record in the area of
information and operational security within the NATO Partnership for
Peace Program.
In addition, all three countries value their bilateral links to the
U.S. and wish to expand them. They view multilateral intelligence
cooperation in NATO as a complement to, not a substitute for, these
bilateral intelligence relations.

[[Page S3875]]

the counterintelligence threat

The single most critical intelligence issue we face in inviting
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO is the
counterintelligence question.
It is an unavoidable fact that past associations with Soviet
intelligence services, together with proximity to Russia, make these
countries vulnerable to hostile intelligence activity.
Over time, personnel and generational changes, training, and more
robust counterintelligence programs by the three countries should
reduce further this vulnerability. But for the time being, the threat
is there.
The problem is not one of attitudes. The legacy these countries
inherit from 44 years of Soviet domination makes them suspicious of
Russian policies and motives.
Indeed, for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the problem is
not complacency about the foreign intelligence threat, but ensuring a
capability to counter it.
Lastly, and to put this issue into perspective, we should recall that
Russian and other intelligence efforts to penetrate NATO will continue,
irrespective of new Alliance members.

the record of reform

With respect to the critical issue of reform, all three countries
have made significant strides in restructuring, reforming, and
redirecting their intelligence services.
More needs to be done to attain greater experience in parliamentary
oversight of the services, to secure acceptance by politicians of the
need for these services to maintain political neutrality, to retain and
promote experienced officers with Western orientation, and to enhance
computer security.
As professionalism increases, morale will improve, and the
intelligence services will be looked upon as contributing to common
security interests. Adequate funding and visible support from the
political leadership will be essential to this process.

the nato work program

The three invitees are continuing to work with NATO in preparation
for their final accession.
In cooperation with NATO to date, in a variety of interactions with
the U.S. and other current NATO allies, including the sharing of
sensitive information through the Partnership for Peace program, IFOR/
SFOR, and in bilateral intelligence cooperation, the three invitees
have demonstrated solid records in the area of information and
operational security.
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have undertaken significant
steps to conform to NATO security standards and have enhanced personnel
and information security practices.
Looking toward accession in April 1999, from a NATO perspective, the
intelligence aspects of NATO enlargement appear to be on track. Indeed,
the intelligence planning in NATO is currently ahead of the other NATO
programs which must be readied for the April 1999 accession date.
NATO and U.S. officials have been reviewing the capabilities and
intentions of the three governments to handle sensitive information,
and the extent to which the military and intelligence services of these
former Warsaw Pact members have distanced themselves from their former
mentors.
The NATO Intelligence Board has worked closely with NATO's Office of
Security to ensure adequate security measures are developed with new
members.
The specific criteria that the Alliance is using to ensure that NATO
practices and regulations become standard operating procedures for the
three new invitees are based on established security guidelines
developed for the Alliance and approved by the member states. Each of
the three NATO invitees has thus far achieved or exceeded each
criterion set before it, according to the Executive Branch.

intelligence committee condition

Based on these findings, I together with Senator Kerrey have proposed
a condition to the resolution of ratification of the Protocols to the
North Atlantic Treaty, which is included in the Managers' amendment now
before the Senate.
The purpose of the condition is to monitor the progress that the
three aspiring members are making in adopting NATO practices and
regulations as standard operating procedures in their own intelligence
services, and in enhancing their overall procedures for protecting
intelligence sources and methods.
To monitor the progress in meeting NATO standards during the
transition period up to April 1999, as well as to provide a benchmark
following formal accession, the condition requires the President and
the Director of Central Intelligence to provide the appropriate
committees of Congress with three ``snapshots''--two before and one
after formal accession of these countries to the alliance.
The President is required to report by 1 January 1999, on behalf of
all the interested agencies, the progress made by the three countries
in meeting NATO membership security requirements.
The Director of Central Intelligence is also required to report on or
before 1 January 1999, and again not later than 90 days after the date
of formal accession of these countries to NATO, on the latest
procedures and requirements established in these countries for the
protection of intelligence sources and methods, including a comparison
of the overall procedures and requirements for such protection in these
three countries with those in other NATO member states.
I believe that this condition sets forth a balanced approach to
monitoring the progress of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic
toward meeting the intelligence and security-related requirements for
full NATO membership.
In what I believe is the unlikely event that a serious problem arises
with respect to one or more of the prospective members, the reports due
on January 1, 1999 will provide both the Senate and the Executive
Branch with an opportunity to address and resolve any such problem
before final accession.

final assessment

I would like to close with the following.
In developing an overall assessment of the security risks associated
with the inclusion of the three new invitees in NATO, the issue is not
only how to ensure that these three countries protect NATO secrets, but
also to ensure that the new members, and NATO at large, devote
sufficient attention and resources to address the overall non-NATO
intelligence threat to the Alliance.
To reiterate, based on the information provided to the Committee, the
governments of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary have
demonstrated both an intent and an ability to protect the classified
military and intelligence information that would be routinely provided
them as members of the Alliance.
While past associations make these countries vulnerable to Russian
intelligence activity, over time, personnel and generational changes,
training, and more robust counterintelligence programs by the three
countries should reduce further this vulnerability.
As I noted earlier, cooperation on intelligence issues began before
the idea of NATO enlargement took root. In that respect, sharing
intelligence in the NATO context builds upon a pattern of cooperation
of nearly a decade.
As with other aspects of NATO integration, it will take some time and
technical advice and assistance from other NATO members for the
governments of these three countries to totally overcome the legacy of
their communist past.
As a critical element of such a program, the three governments must
devote adequate resources to support professionalized intelligence and
counterintelligence services, and must demonstrate their political
support for these services' role in safeguarding the democratic
political order.
Lastly, by the time the three invitees join NATO, a decade will have
passed since the collapse of their communist regimes.
Contacts with the U.S., other allies, and NATO, coupled with
continuing modernization programs and priority assistance efforts from
current NATO members, should help to ensure that all three countries
satisfy membership security requirements by the time of their accession
to NATO in April 1999.
In closing, I would like to thank the Chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee, Senator Helms, and the

[[Page S3876]]

Ranking Member, Senator Biden, for including the Shelby-Kerrey
condition as part of the Managers' amendment, and for their leadership
in ensuring the thorough and expeditious consideration of this historic
resolution.
Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise today to offer my support for the
Resolution of Ratification currently pending before the Senate. I do so
with less enthusiasm than I wished, and more doubts than I prefer.
I will vote yes because Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary will
strengthen NATO's resolve and improve the chances that a post-Cold War
NATO will be the same stabilizing force for peace it has been for the
past half-century. I will vote yes because the requirements for NATO
membership, such as civilian control of the military and democratic
rule, especially domestic laws that protect minority rights, make it
more likely that external conflicts are resolved peacefully. I will
vote yes because the benefits of doing so appear, on balance, to
outweigh the potential liabilities.
My vote of support is also based on my belief that denying the Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Poland entry after their expectations have been
raised so high would do more harm than good. Further, I believe these
three countries - on account of their passionate understanding of what
life is like under the iron fist of a dictator--will stiffen the
resolve of NATO to be a force for peace. NATO has no will to fight
unless consensus can be achieved amongst all members, and it is the
will to fight which will do the most good in deterring future military
conflicts.
Too often during this debate I have heard the argument of some
advocates who presume enlargement as a necessary insurance policy
against the risk of Russia becoming an expansionist military threat
again. These proponents often speak as if the circumstances of 1998
closely resembled those in Europe when NATO was created.
This vision is flawed. It is flawed because it misrepresents the
comparative conditions of 1949 and 1998. It results in the
subordination of other more important foreign policy goals such as
assisting the Russian transition to democracy, reducing nuclear
weapons, and confronting the threat posed by proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction to the less important task of adding three new
members to a Cold War military alliance.
Consider what President Truman and Congress faced in the wake of the
Second World War. In 1949, when they led America into the North
Atlantic Alliance, only thirty years separated them from the end of the
Great War, the war which was supposed to end all wars. Only twenty
years had separated the end of this terrible war and the beginning of
the next. Twenty years. Imagine what our attitudes would be if a war as
savage and futile as World War I had been concluded on November 11,
1968, and then in 1988, the enemy we had vanquished rose to the attack
again.
Both those wars were within memory's reach of President Truman and
the Congress on April 4, 1949 when the Washington Treaty was signed.
Europe lay in ruins. Their economies had been destroyed. Food and
medical supplies were in short supply. Political uncertainty and
instability were the order of the day. The Red Army was threatening in
the east and their belligerence well established by the Communist coup
d'etat in Prague in February 1948 and the Berlin Blockade which began
in June 1948.
All of this combined to justify the creation of a powerful military
alliance. It is worth noting that even with these factors, NATO at
first had no military structure. Only after the Korean War began in
June 1950, did the idea of a worldwide communist offensive gain
credibility. This led to the establishment of a NATO military force,
the major element of which is the Allied Command Europe. In December
1950, General Dwight Eisenhower was appointed the first Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (SACEUR). The command's headquarters--the Supreme
Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) - was located in Brussels.
President Truman was 65 years old in April 1949 when the Washington
Treaty was signed. But certainly he must have remembered the day in
mid-January 1919 when he was bivouacked near Verdun, France awaiting
the demobilization orders needed before he could go home. In Paris,
U.S. President Wilson, English Prime Minister Lloyd George, and French
President Clemenceau had begun their discussions of terms and
conditions for peace.
In a letter to his fiance, Bess Wallace, Truman had written:

It's my opinion we'll stay until uncle Woodie gets his pet
peace plans refused or okayed. For my part, and I'm sure
every A.E.F. (American Expeditionary Force) man feels the
same way, I don't give a whoop (to put it mildly) whether
there's a League of Nations or whether Russia has a Red
government or a Purple one, and if the President of the
Czecho-Slovaks wants to pry the throne out from under the
King of Bohemia, let him pry, but send us home . . . For my
part I've had enough vin rouge and frog-eater victuals to
last me a lifetime.

Mr. President, in our modern age of see and invade-all journalism,
this letter would probably have surfaced to embarrass Truman when he
entered national politics a decade later. However, it is also likely
that cameras manned by brave men and women would have broadcast 1919
street scenes of Berlin, Moscow, Paris, Warsaw, Budapest, Vienna, and
Prague. I believe these scenes would have made Americans less anxious
to withdraw from the devastating instability of starvation, demobilized
and poorly led Armies, and the sudden collapse of the old order of the
Kaiser, the Romanovs, Hapsburgs, and Ottomans.

Yet only thirty years after he wrote this letter, Lieutenant Truman
had become President Truman, and he faced a world that looked not all
that different from 1919. As he considered what policy would guarantee
the peace after 50 million lives had been lost in the Second World War,
he saw a Europe as devastated as it had been in the First. He saw a
threatening Soviet Union in the east. Withdrawal, pacifism, and
demilitarization were the failed policies of the 1920's and 1930's.
Political engagement and military strength were logical and correct
alternatives. Forty years later, as communism collapsed and our former
enemies embraced democracy, Truman's vision and path was vindicated.
Mr. President, too many proponents of expansion have tried to cast
this vote as a vote about our future engagement in the world. I am not
persuaded by the preposterous either/or arguments used by these
proponents. You are either for NATO expansion or you are for repeating
the mistake we have made twice in this century to withdraw from Europe.
You are either for NATO expansion or you are for appeasing the
Russians. You are either for NATO expansion or you are for allowing
instability to reign supreme on the European continent.
What nonsense. If NATO were to disappear tomorrow--as it almost did
by refusing to become engaged in Bosnia--America would not withdraw
from Europe. We are becoming more and more connected through travel,
trade, and telecommunications. Any comparison of the political,
economic, and social conditions of 1998 and 1919, or 1998 and the
1930's should be greeted with raised eyebrows and laughter.
Mr. President, many times during this debate I have heard my
colleagues say that NATO has been the most successful military alliance
in history. I do not disagree with their assessment. But the statement
leads me to ask a question: why has NATO been so successful and what
does that mean for the future of the Alliance?
Ultimately, NATO was successful during the Cold War not for any
military operation, but for its military power and the willingness to
use it. For nearly 50 years, NATO has served as the vanguard of peace
and security in Europe. For forty of those years, NATO forces stood
ready to engage in the defense of Europe from the very real threat
posed by Warsaw Pact forces on the other side of the Iron Curtain. The
reason NATO was able to maintain the peace and never had to fight a hot
war in Europe came from the recognition by our adversaries that NATO,
despite the horrors of a potential superpower conflict, was prepared
for real military action.
Equally as important as the will to act, NATO commanders understood
the importance of maintaining a formidable capability to fight.
Throughout the Cold War, NATO's military forces were highly motivated,
superbly trained,

[[Page S3877]]

and equipped with the latest weapons and technology that made the
Alliance a force to be reckoned with.
Beyond the success of the Cold War, I believe that NATO has survived
in the post-Cold War era, despite many predictions to the contrary,
because it was prepared to change to reflect new realities. First, NATO
has begun the difficult task of restructuring and downsizing its force
and command structure. As we in the Congress are well aware, following
three rounds of U.S. base closures, making the necessary decisions to
downsize the military is politically difficult. NATO deserves credit
for what it has accomplished in this area, but more work will be needed
in the future.
NATO has also been successful because of its willingness to address
the challenges of the post-Cold War world. NATO has made significant
progress in tackling difficult new issues such as arms control,
regional ethnic instability, and creating partners out of former
enemies. In this final area, the Partnership for Peace program has made
tremendous progress in encouraging civilian control of the military and
promoting military transparency, each of these essential in creating
greater confidence between nations.
Each of these steps have contributed to transforming NATO into the
Alliance that we have today, an Alliance that serves the interests of
each of its members and promotes cooperation and stability. However, as
NATO officials admit, the Atlantic Alliance must continue to evolve. We
must ask ourselves: what must NATO do now if it is to be relevant in
the future?
First, NATO must continue with the difficult work of reforming its
force and command structure to reflect changes in its mission and
strategic concept. Second, as during the Cold War, NATO must maintain a
credible force and the will to use that force when diplomacy fails.
These are the core elements of the Alliance that must be carried into
the future.
But I believe NATO must also be prepared to take on new missions. It
will have to be ready to address future threats to regional stability
like Bosnia in an efficient and timely manner. Mr. President, the true
lesson of the Dayton Accords is that sometimes force, or the credible
threat of force, precedes diplomacy. I do not believe the Dayton
Accords would have been possible had NATO not reached consensus to
respond militarily, albeit late, to Serbian aggression in Bosnia. I
hope we have learned the lesson of Bosnia, and I hope these three new
members will help strengthen our will to react to Bosnia-style
aggression in the future. The recent memory of the Solidarity movement,
the moral leadership of President Vaclav Havel, and the impact of the
1956 uprising in Hungary will be extremely beneficial contributions to
the diplomatic decision-making that occurs in Brussels. We may find the
newest members of the Alliance will soon play a critical role in
leading NATO into the future.
Mr. President, having addressed the history and future of the
Alliance, let me restate that I will vote in favor of this Resolution
of Ratification because I believe that NATO enlargement is a positive
step forward for the three invitees and for the future of the NATO
alliance.
The enlargement of NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic is a statement of the success of their transition to free-
market democracies. Each of these countries have experienced the
peaceful transitions of democratic government, established the rule of
law in the interaction of people and institutions, and implemented
strong civilian control of their militaries. We should not forget the
difficulty with which each of these countries has made these changes,
nor should we underestimate the political leadership that was necessary
to make the decisions involved in transforming from a command-style
economy to free-market democracy.
Mr. President, NATO membership, along with eventual membership in the
European Union, will re-establish their contacts to the West and help
solidify the political reforms in place today. Furthermore, the
benefits of collective defense will limit the need to reconstitute
national defenses and allow for continued focus on strengthening their
economies and rebuilding the infrastructure necessary to compete in the
global economy.
I also believe that these countries will benefit from NATO
enlargement through the promotion of regional stability. The prospect
of NATO membership has already caused Central European nations to re-
examine their relationships with one another and to address age-old
political and ethnic disputes. The resulting treaties and bi-lateral
agreements will lessen the chance of border and ethnic conflicts in the
region after these three nations become full members of the Alliance.
Mr. President, I also believe NATO will benefit from the inclusion of
new members. Each of these countries will bring a unique set of
capabilities to the Alliance. To be sure, each still needs to make
significant progress in bringing their militaries up to NATO standards,
but they are not starting from zero. Initial estimates show that
following their own military restructuring, these countries will bring
an additional 280,000 troops to the Alliance; this will undoubtedly
boost NATO's ability to perform future missions.
An example of this enhanced capability for NATO can be seen in the
contribution each of these three countries have made to the IFOR/SFOR
mission in Bosnia. Poland is currently providing SFOR an airborne
infantry battalion, the Czech Republic has provided an engineering
company and is maintaining a mechanized infantry battalion, and Hungary
has contributed an engineering battalion. Hungary has also leased the
Taszar airbase to the United States which provides a critical point of
entry for U.S. forces into Bosnia. I am confident that when these
countries become full members of NATO, we can expect that they will
continue to provide a strong commitment to NATO operations.
In my duties as Vice Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I joined
with my colleagues in reviewing the security consequences of bringing
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the Alliance.
In directing this review, Senator Shelby and I did not for a moment
suspect the sincerity or the commitment of these countries to be loyal
members of the Alliance. But because some of their intelligence
professionals and other military and civilian personnel had served in
similar positions when their countries were dominated by the Soviet
Union, we felt duty-bound to examine how well these countries would
meet NATO security requirements, especially with regard to handling
NATO classified information and protecting intelligence sources and
methods. We determined that, even in these narrow security terms, the
new members will be a major net gain for the Alliance. They have the
expertise and the dedication to protect the information which NATO will
share with them, and they bring intelligence capabilities to the
Alliance which will make NATO stronger.
To help measure and assist the transition of the new members to NATO
security standards, Senator Shelby and I proposed a condition to the
resolution of ratification which would require two reports: one to be
rendered by the President next January on the progress of the new
members in meeting NATO security requirements, and another to be
rendered in phases by the Director of Central Intelligence identifying
the latest security procedures and requirements of the new allies and
assessing how they compare with those of other NATO members. In my
view, these reporting requirements are prudent and should help the
expanded Alliance more quickly reach a common security standard.

Mr. President, I am encouraged by the prospect of membership for
these three countries. However, this is a major change in U.S. policy,
and a very real commitment that should not be entered into without a
full understanding of its meaning. The American people must understand
that membership in NATO for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
carries with it all of the commitments of the 1949 Washington Treaty.
In particular, by ratifying this change to the Washington Treaty, the
United States extends full Article V protection to each of these
countries.
Article V states:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more
of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an
attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if
such an armed attack occurs,

[[Page S3878]]

each of them . . . will assist the Party or Parties so
attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert
with the other Parties, such actions it deems necessary,
including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the
security of the North Atlantic area.

The quantitative result of this treaty is that the United States has
pledged to defend an additional 15% of European territory in the event
of an attack. The qualitative result is that we as Americans pledge to
send our young soldiers to defend Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest.
However, let me state, Mr. President, my firm belief that enlargement
of the Alliance will in fact reduce our chances of having to fight a
war in this region of the world. By solidifying democratic reforms,
encouraging regional cohesion through the Partnership for Peace
program, and limiting the need for national defenses, we will promote
cooperation and limit the threat of war.
Like many of my colleagues, I also have concerns about the costs
associated with NATO enlargement. Wide discrepancies in the assumptions
on which the various cost estimates have been based have left us with,
at best, an incomplete view of what enlargement will cost current and
future members. I am hopeful that after the vote, the Administration
will continue to work closely with Congress to address our remaining
concerns regarding costs. At a time in which our military is being
called on to protect against threats to U.S. security interests
throughout the world, we must carefully scrutinize additional spending
commitments.
Mr. President, I am concerned with the slowness with which the
European Union has moved to address the needs of the new democracies in
Central and Eastern Europe. I strongly encourage the EU to catch-up to
NATO by quickly completing negotiations over their own expansion. In
the long-run, the success of the former-Soviet bloc countries will
hinge more on their ability to access the economic benefits of the EU
than membership in NATO.
While I support NATO enlargement for these three countries at this
time, we must also ask how do we define our future foreign policy
priorities. For the past year, members of the Administration have
worked tirelessly to ensure ratification of NATO enlargement. I believe
it is time for the United States to shift our foreign policy focus: our
number one priority must become the successful transition of Russia to
a stable, free-market democracy. I for one am very optimistic about the
prospects for Russia.
I think at times we suffer from the inertial effects of Cold War
thinking that limit our ability to see the world for what it is today.
Just as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are not the Warsaw
Pact, Russia is not the Soviet Union. Russia no longer poses the
immediate threat to our survival as expressed in Cold War rhetoric of
Josef Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev. It is a new era, and we should use
this opportunity to our utmost ability to work with Russia to ensure
the establishment of the rule of law, to assist with the ethical
privatization of state owned enterprises, to promote the continued
development of the democratic process, and to realize meaningful
progress on arms control.
We already have positive examples of what cooperation with Russia can
accomplish. Mr. President, few may realize the Bosnia mission is the
first time in which NATO troops have participated in an actual military
engagement. Few would have guessed during the dangerous days of the
Cold War that NATO's first military mission would have occurred with
Russian soldiers working alongside American soldiers not as the enemy,
but as partners. The Bosnia mission demonstrates the potential we have
when we work with a democratic Russia to solve disputes. Another
positive sign is that in recent months the Russian government has
stepped up its participation in the Partnership for Peace program and I
am hopeful about the possibility for continued dialog through the
Permanent Joint Council as established under the Russia-NATO Founding
Act. Mr. President, I encourage both the Congress and the
Administration to address the future of U.S.-Russian relations with the
same vigor with which we have worked to achieve NATO enlargement.
At no point in the future do I want to look back to this unique point
in history and have to ask if we could have done more to ensure a
peaceful, democratic Russia. Mr. President, I encourage all of us to
take a long-term view of history. We should consider how the world has
changed from the chaos and danger that led President Truman to create
NATO in 1949 to the sweep of democracy that liberated Central and
Eastern Europe from communist control. We should consider how these
same nations have transformed themselves into stable democracies ready
to become full members of the Atlantic Alliance. And finally, we should
consider how we want the world to look in fifty years, and then set our
priorities to ensure our children will have the benefit of living in
that world.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I rise to express my strong support for
the protocols of accession to NATO, specifically for Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic. NATO expansion is clearly in the security
interests of the United States and the NATO alliance as a whole.
We have an opportunity in the Senate today to make a truly a historic
vote that will shatter, once and for all, the artificial division of
Europe that occurred at the end of the Second World War. By expanding
this alliance to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, we
will further erase the Cold War lines of division and broaden the scope
of protection of this defensive military alliance which has played the
central role in maintaining peace and stability in Europe since the end
of World War II. Now, if history is any guide, it ensures and enhances
the prospects for peace, prosperity, and harmony throughout Europe.
It is important to remember that NATO is a defensive, not offensive,
strategic military alliance. Although the new member countries were
once considered so-called ``allies'' of the former Soviet Union, their
so-called alliance had more to do with the presence of Soviet troops
within their countries than any commitment to Soviet values or ideals.
Bringing them into the NATO alliance is not a charge against Russia and
should not be so construed. To the contrary, we are recognizing that
the people of these countries are now our allies. We pledge to come to
their defense if they are attacked by a non-member country, and they in
turn make the same pledge to support all other NATO countries who may
be attacked by a non-member party.
Mr. President, in the nearly 50 years of its existence, NATO has
provided the military security umbrella that has permitted old enemies
to heal the wounds of war and to build strong democracies and
integrated free economies. Expanding NATO to include the emerging
democracies of Eastern Europe will, I hope, produce the same results.
That is, stronger and freer economies whose people can live in the same
harmony as do the people of France and Germany.
Communism has collapsed. The Soviet Union is no more. This is not to
say, however, that Europe no longer faces any security threats. I think
that would be shortsighted. Threats continue to exist in Europe, and
many of these threats are more difficult to identify and combat. Ethnic
strife in many parts of Eastern Europe; the instability which we face
daily with Iraq; terrorism; the list is long. These are all verifiable
threats to which the United States and other NATO member countries must
be prepared to respond and defend. By adding Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic to the NATO alliance, we are broadening and
strengthening our ability to combat and defend against these threats.
Mr. President, I would also note that the prospect of NATO
enlargement has already begun as seen by the process of harmonization
in Central and Eastern Europe. Hungary has settled its border and
minority questions with Slovakia and Romania. Poland has reached across
an old divide to create joint peacekeeping battalions with Ukraine and
Lithuania.
Without question, an expanded NATO will make the world safer simply
because we are expanding the area where wars will not happen. As
Secretary of State Albright testified last year before the Foreign
Relations Committee, and I quote, ``This is the paradox at NATO's
heart: By imposing a price on aggression, it deters aggression.'' At

[[Page S3879]]

the same time, we gain new allies, new friends who are committed to our
common agenda for security in fighting terrorism and weapons
proliferation, and to ensuring stability in places such as the former
Yugoslavia.
There is no doubt in my mind that had Soviet troops not in 1945
occupied Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, and installed puppet
governments, the debate over whether these three countries should be
members of NATO would have long ago been resolved in their favor.
The people of these countries have yearned for freedom, democracy,
and peace for more than 40 years, as evidenced by Poland particularly.
The blood in the streets of Budapest in 1956, the demonstrations of the
people in Prague in 1968 who confronted Soviet tanks, and the public
confrontations of Solidarity throughout Poland beginning in the 1970s
all laid the foundation for the collapse of communism, which we have
seen in our lifetime.
Now as they begin to build institutions of democracy and free
enterprise, as they move to further integrate their economies with the
rest of Europe, they should participate in the collective security of
the continent. I think this will bind these countries closer together
far into the future and ensure stability and peace throughout the
continent.
Mr. President, there have been expressions of concern by some people
that expanding NATO is a mistake because it would somehow be perceived
as a threat, a threat to Russia. I find that argument hard to accept.
In my opinion, NATO has never been a threat to Russia. Even during the
height of the Cold War, no one seriously considered that NATO
threatened the Soviet Union. Quite the contrary. NATO stood to defend--
defend--against any potential military threat to its members. There is
a difference between defense and offense. And NATO is designed for
defense. It was never designed as an alliance of aggression--rather, it
is an alliance against aggression.
I think the same holds true today, Mr. President. The people of
Russia, who are slowly trying to emerge from the darkness and terror of
70 years of communism, have nothing--I repeat, nothing--to fear from
NATO. Our goal is not to isolate Russia; but to engage and support her
in her efforts to develop a lasting democracy and a free market.
The people in the evolving democracies of Poland, the Czech Republic,
and Hungary have earned the right to become full partners in Europe and
full partners in NATO. I hope my colleagues will support the dreams,
hopes, and aspirations of these people who have struggled for freedom
for so long, after so many decades in which they have lived without
hope. They have that opportunity today.
Finally, Mr. President, I would like to commend these countries for
the rapid progress which they have made nurturing democracy and
building stable economic development based on free market principles.
While some would argue that they have not evolved far enough, I would
simply say that they are light years from where they were when the
Berlin Wall fell and that democracy and the free market is an evolving
process. They are well on their way; bringing them into the NATO
alliance will only serve to help them along.
The people of these nations have dedicated themselves to these
democratic ideals, and it is incumbent upon us to support them in their
quest. Mr. President, I strongly support expanding the NATO alliance to
include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic and hope that the Senate
speaks loudly and strongly on this issue today.
Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Mr. President, a strong North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) is an important vehicle for maintaining security in
Europe. For half a century NATO has been critical to maintaining
security in Europe. Largely because of NATO, Europe has enjoyed more
than 50 years without war among its major powers, the longest period in
modern history. Because of this success, European countries that at one
time were in a competing alliance, are now clamoring to join NATO.
Today we have a historic opportunity to extend the NATO umbrella to
additional European countries, and to expand the benefits that the
alliance has created.
Dr. Brzezinski of the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, made a
compelling case for NATO expansion and its importance to the United
States. He said:

For me, the central stake in NATO expansion is the long-
term historic and strategic relationship between America and
Europe. NATO expansion is central to the vitality of the
American-European connection, to the scope of democratic and
secure Europe, and to the ability of America and Europe to
work together in promoting international security.
The expansion of the Euroatlantic alliance will bring into
NATO counsels new, solidly democratic and very pro-American
nations. That will further deepen the American-European
kinship while expanding Europe's zone of peace and democracy.
Such a more secure Europe will be a better and more vital
partner for America in the continuing effort to make
democracy more widespread and international cooperation more
pervasive. That is why NATO's enlargement--in itself a vivid
testimonial to the dynamism of the democratic ideal--is very
much in America's long-term national interest.

Since its inception, NATO has provided a forum to resolve
disagreements among members and for institutionalizing norms and
relations fundamental to modern democracies. It is natural therefore,
that newly emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, which
qualify, should be considered for membership in the alliance.
The accession to the alliance of Poland, the Czech Republic, and
Hungary is the culmination of years of work on these countries part to
meet the requirements of NATO membership. As Dr. John Micgiel, Director
of the East Central European Center at Columbia University has said,
``the mere prospect of membership . . . has acted as a catalyst for
political reform. . ..'' Furthermore the ``three prospective member
countries have each taken a proactive role in cooperating with their
neighbors and sometime former adversaries.''
These three countries have demonstrated functioning democratic
political systems, as well as economic reforms that will allow them to
share the costs of NATO membership. Although there are no set
requirements for membership, at a minimum, candidates for membership
must meet the following five requirements: new members must uphold
democracy, including tolerating diversity; new members must be making
progress toward a market economy; their military forces must be under
firm civilian control; they must be good neighbors and respect
sovereignty outside their borders; and they must be working toward
compatibility with NATO forces.
Poland's membership is the logical culmination of its long struggle
for freedom and economic independence. In 1989, the world watched as
Poland became one of the first former Soviet-controlled countries to
hold free and democratic elections. ``Solidarity'' became a symbol of
freedom recognized around the globe.
In 1993, Poland was the first country in the region to record
economic growth, and it now has one of the strongest economies in
Europe. In 1997, its GDP grew at a rate of about seven percent, while
its inflation and unemployment rates declined.
Moreover, Poland has demonstrated its readiness to contribute to
security beyond its borders, one of the requirements of NATO
membership. Poland contributed forces to the Gulf War coalition and
currently provides troops to the NATO-led Stabilization Force mission
striving to keep peace in Bosnia.
Hungary has met the requirements for NATO membership by holding fully
free and fair elections since 1989. Over the past nine years, the
country has had two complete democratic changes of government.
Economically, Hungary has engaged in successful, yet painful,
stabilization programs to cut its current budget deficits. Since 1990,
Hungary has attracted almost $16 billion in foreign direct investment;
almost a third of all foreign direct investment in Central and Eastern
Europe.
Since 1989, the Czech Republic has held three fully free and fair
elections. Their constitution contains protections similar to ours,
such as the freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and the freedom of
the press. Economically, the country has privatized state-owned
enterprises, engaged in tight monetary policies, and liberalized trade
policies. As a result inflation is

[[Page S3880]]

controlled, the GDP has been rising since 1994, and unemployment is
low.
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were chosen to join the
alliance because they meet all the requirements of admission. Each will
be a good ally and each country is prepared to accept the
responsibilities of NATO membership, including contributing their share
to NATO's costs. I would like to congratulate Poland, the Czech
Republic and Hungary, for their courage, for their perseverance and now
for their imminent membership in the greatest military security
alliance the world has ever known.
Other countries will soon also be prepared to join the alliance, that
is why I believe the expansion of NATO should be regarded as a process
rather than the enactment of a single policy. Nations such as Romania
and Slovenia, who were not invited to join NATO at the Madrid summit
should be extended NATO membership once they meet the alliance's
admission requirements.
During the 104th Congress, I supported the NATO Enlargement and
Facilitation Act of 1996. This legislation would have extended economic
aid to those countries in Central and Eastern Europe showing genuine
interest in furthering economic privatization and political
pluralization as a prerequisite to NATO membership. This legislation
sent an important signal of American support for these countries
undergoing the painful transition from communism to democratic market
reform.
Mr. President, constituents from my state have indicated strong
support for NATO expansion. While my constituents include Americans of
Hungarian and Czech descent, you may know that Chicago has been called
the Warsaw of the Midwest because of the large number of city residents
of Polish descent. Statewide, there are nearly 1 million Illinoisans of
Polish-ancestry, many of whom who have contacted my office in support
of Poland's imminent entry into NATO.
Mr. President, it is not, however, merely the many Polish-Americans,
or Hungarian-Americans or Czech-Americans in Illinois and around the
United States who wish these countries well as they assume the
responsibilities of full NATO membership. Freedom-loving people in
every part of the world can take heart from these countries' examples.
History records the innumerable times that they have been invaded by
hostile armies. But these people have strived to maintain their culture
and their unique way of life, and that struggle has finally been
rewarded. For as long as there is a North Atlantic Treaty Alliance,
their security will be guaranteed by some of the most powerful nations
on earth.
Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I rise today as we reach the end of our
debate on NATO enlargement to restate my firm support for the Protocols
to the North Atlantic Treaty providing for the accession of Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic. NATO enlargement is the right thing to
do. We must seize this opportunity now to help make Europe whole and
free. I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of enlargement.
While NATO was born out of the Cold War to protect ourselves and our
allies from the Soviet threat, it is also part of the broader U.S.
policy to foster European integration after the end of World War II.
The first step in this policy was the Marshall Plan, not NATO. But
after Stalin's Iron Curtain divided Europe, and Soviet-installed puppet
governments rejected Marshall Plan aid, it was clear that economic
recovery and political cooperation could not proceed without a security
shield. NATO provided that shield.
The Soviet Union is gone. So are the Moscow-controlled puppet
governments in central and eastern European states. Once again, we have
a window of opportunity to complete the work we started at the end of
World War II. We must not miss this historic chance to advance our
policy of supporting European integration based on democracy, human
rights, and the rule of law.
We have a chance to bring into the circle of Western democracies
those states, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, that were denied
this chance by Soviet occupation at the end of World War II. By voting
for enlargement, we are again extending the hand that Stalin slapped
away, affirming the promise of freedom and security for the Polish,
Hungarian, and Czech peoples.
As Chairman of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, better known as the Helsinki Commission, I have seen NATO
candidate states take steps to resolve internal problems and external
disputes that have been major features of national life within those
states for generations. Human rights violations in those states have
substantially decreased, and their membership in NATO and, in the
future, the EU, will give us leverage to resolve remaining problems.
But for the promise of the security guarantee that comes with NATO
membership, I believe these problems and disputes would not only have
remained unresolved, but would likely have given rise, over time, to
confrontations between states that could have led to war.
Thus, by that measure, NATO enlargement is already having positive
results.
Once NATO enlargement is realized, the political risk associated with
economic reform in central and eastern European states will diminsh.
This will make international investors more willing to provide capital
to businesses in these states, creating jobs and improving economic
health. Improved performance during and after transition to free market
economies will help cement in place stable democratic governments.
The combination of healthy economies and stable democratic
governments will help the European Union expand to include these
states. Thus, expansion of NATO's security shield is the first step,
not the last step, toward further broad European integration.
There have been many statements of caution about the impact of NATO
enlargement on Russia. I firmly believe that Russian democracy will be
better served by having healthy, stable, and prosperous democracies on
its western border, than by leaving a gray zone between a steadily more
integrated Europe and Russia.
Since coming to the Senate in 1981, I have been a member of the
Helsinki Commission. This work has brought me into contact with the
Soviet dissident community, which over time has become the core of the
Russian pro-reform and pro-democracy movement. From this long
experience, I can tell you that a failure to expand NATO and the
European Union to embrace every European state that can meet the
established entrance requirements would be a victory for the anti-
democratic forces in Russia.
Especially if NATO enlargement were to fail because the United States
would not agree to it, extremist politicians of all stripes from Russia
through eastern and central Europe would take heart and encouragement.
Democrats and free market reformers would be seriously damaged, and
political and economic stability would be called into question. The
influence of the United States would be greatly decreased, and our
commitments would be open to doubt. When we cast our votes today, we
need to keep in mind the probable highly negative consequences of what
would, in effect, be a veto by the United States Senate of NATO
expansion.
NATO enlargement, European integration, and the advancement of
political reform, democracy, individual freedom, and free market
economics are all part of the same effort. What we do here today can
make a major contribution to the security and prosperity of future
generations of Americans.
The opportunity to expand the circle of free and democratic countries
can not be missed. This amendment to the North Atlantic Treaty should
be approved. I will vote for it, and I urge all of my colleagues to
support it.
Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, for quite some time I have been studying the
issue of whether we should expand NATO. There are some who have argued
that there has not been sufficient debate about NATO expansion. Yet, we
have been considering NATO expansion for several years now, long before
this resolution of ratification made it to the Senate floor. By wide
margins, the Senate indicated its support for the concept of NATO
expansion in 1994 and 1995, and since then, there has been much
discussion in the Senate and in the media on the pros and cons of
expanding NATO. As the Administration has worked with our allies on the
details of NATO expansion, building on

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the Partnership for Peace which lay the ground work for this move back
in 1994, and culminating with the signing of the Protocols to the North
Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic in December 1997, we have reached the point where there is
little doubt that the Senate will ratify the resolution before us
today. It is interesting to note, that as a bipartisan consensus for
NATO expansion has emerged, opponents of NATO expansion have sharpened
their arguments. I want to credit these opponents for giving us all
much food for thought and for ultimately helping me focus my thinking
on this important issue.
After careful consideration, I have concluded that expanding NATO is
in our national interest and I intend to support the resolution of
ratification before us today for a number of reasons.
NATO will help to fill a security vacuum in newly democratic Central
Europe. It has only been a few short years since Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic have embraced democratic institutions and embarked
on the path to political and economic reform. We need to send the
strongest possible signal to the fledgling democracies of Central and
Eastern Europe that they must not falter in this endeavor. It is in our
national interest for these nations to succeed, and support from the
West allows them to proceed with difficult political and economic
reforms. Just as it made sense in the breathless months after the
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact to invite these countries to join NATO,
we cannot back away from them now. Following through on our invitation
offers them a sense of security after years of domination by the Soviet
Union. And, it is fitting that a military alliance originally conceived
to counter the Soviet threat would offer them a safe haven from the
threats of the future. Although it may seem that they have little to
worry about now, we cannot predict what threats may emerge. After all,
few among us could have predicted the fall of the Berlin Wall and the
end of the Cold War.
We should support NATO expansion because it will help ensure that
Russia does not pose a threat to those countries in the future. Russia
may not pose a threat now, but the fears of Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic that Russia will change its stripes or that some other
hegemonic power will threaten them are all too real. We must respond to
these fears. It's easy for critics of NATO expansion on this side of
the Atlantic to say that these fears are not justified but we must not
forget that the reason the nations of Central and Eastern Europe are
clamoring for NATO membership in the first place is because of their
long history of invasion and subjugation. Who among us could look the
Poles, and the Czechs, and the Hungarians in the eyes and say that even
without NATO they need not fear an invasion in the future. True, no one
can make the case that the Russian military in its current state is in
any position to reconstitute the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact.
Recent articles in the Washington Post and the New York Times lay out
in stark terms the weakened state of the military, and the difficulties
Russia is facing in developing strong economic and political alliances
with its neighbors. Although some have argued that these are reasons to
oppose NATO expansion, for me this underscores the challenges Russia
faces today in realizing full political and economic reform, challenges
that have little to do with NATO expansion. If Russia does not
succeed--and we must do all we can to ensure that it does--I shudder to
think of the consequences. NATO expansion will shield Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic from these consequences.
I do not intend to respond to all of the arguments made by opponents
of NATO expansion, but I want to say a few more words about Russia. I
do not believe that NATO expansion will undermine Russian efforts to
achieve democratic reform: If Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic
want greater integration with Western Europe this should not pose a
threat to Russia. However, just as we are responding to the fears of
the Central Europeans by inviting them to join NATO, we must recognize
Russian fears. We must continue to remind the Russians that NATO is not
antagonistic to their interests. And, we must redouble our efforts to
help the Russians so that they too can succeed in their economic and
political reforms. As the resolution of ratification states:

The Senate finds that is in the interest of the United
States for NATO to develop a new and constructive
relationship with the Russian Federation as the Russian
Federation pursues democratization, market reforms, and
peaceful relations with its neighbors.

I hope that at some future date the Senate will consider specific
measures to further this goal.
As tensions between the United States and Russia have subsided, the
end of the Cold War has brought many long dormant ethnic rivalries to
the surface. NATO expansion is a reasonable response to these
developments: A broad based military alliance can help keep ethnic
tensions from escalating into violence. As we have seen all too vividly
with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, ethnic tensions in Europe are still
deep rooted. The world was taken by surprise at the atrocities that
were unleashed in Bosnia and it took several years for the West to
bring enough pressure on the parties to end the violence. We want to do
what we can to prevent the dissolution of state militaries into
murderous ethnic militias as took place in Bosnia. There are no
guarantees, but by bringing the emerging democracies of Central and
Eastern Europe into a broad based military alliance we are encouraging
military cooperation and understanding and fostering relationships that
will make it easier to resolve major conflicts. Although NATO's primary
purpose is not as a dispute resolution body, it is my hope that NATO
can help prevent many of these disputes from emerging in the first
place.

NATO's strength is that it is not only a military alliance, but an
alliance of nations sharing democratic values. Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic have made great strides over the last seven years
demonstrating that their commitment to democratic institutions and
political reform runs deep. Some have argued that political stability
rests on economic stability and that we should press the European Union
to admit the countries of Central and Eastern Europe before we engage
them in a military alliance. However, free market economies are not the
only key to stable democracies. The role of the military can make a
difference in the long-term success of democracies. A military alliance
that defers to civilian leaders can serve as an example of stable
civil-military relations. I am confident that inclusion in NATO will
strengthen democratic values in the new democracies of Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic.
The NATO alliance has been a successful alliance. It is in our
national interest to build on that success. For fifty years, NATO has
united Europe and America in a common purpose, and with its strong
emphasis on cooperation and a collective defense, NATO will serve as a
building block for the security arrangements of the future. We have
established some very important relationships in NATO. These
relationships are a source of strength and they should not be
abandoned. And, the strong ties we have with Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic can be formalized by admitting them to NATO.
Earlier in the debate we reaffirmed the strategic purpose of NATO. I
believe that as the threats of the future come into sharper focus, the
strategic rationale for NATO will evolve. This will not happen
overnight. And that is why I supported the Warner amendment. Before we
remake an alliance that has served American interests and proceed with
further expansion we need to spend more time thinking about the role
NATO will play in our changing security arrangements. The Warner
amendment also would have allowed us to step back from the process
without specifically rejecting any of the nations of Central or Eastern
Europe. Regardless of how long we wait before the next group of nations
is admitted to NATO, we must closely monitor the integration of Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO.
Finally, I would like to say a few words about the cost of NATO
expansion, an issue of particular concern to me. Although there have
been numerous estimates, the most recent Administration estimate is
that we will spend $400 million over the coming decade to

[[Page S3882]]

cover the US share of NATO expansion costs. This is not a small sum.
Consider, however, that we have already spent more than $6 billion on
US operations in Bosnia in the last two and a half years. If NATO can
help prevent the Bosnias of the future, even if NATO expansion costs
are double the Administration's current estimate, this will be money
well spent.
I am disappointed that there is no consensus in the Senate to limit
our spending in this area beyond the existing limit on the US
contribution to the NATO common budget. I supported the Harkin
amendment that would have placed a 25 percent cap on expenses that
might be incurred to help NATO's newest members integrate their forces
with NATO, and I will continue to watch spending in this area. As the
Resolution of Ratification states: ``the United States is under no
commitment to subsidize the national expenses necessary for Poland,
Hungary or the Czech Republic to meet its NATO commitments.''
Our future is and always has been inextricably tied to Europe, a
region that has been beset by war. After two devastating World Wars
dominated the first half of this century, we have relied on the NATO
alliance to help keep the peace during the second half. I believe that
NATO expansion can also help us maintain peace and stability in Europe
into the next century and for that reason the resolution of
ratification to admit Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic merits
our support.
Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, almost 10 years ago, the wall that had
divided Europe for more than a generation suddenly crumbled. Brave,
freedom-loving people in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia took
matters into their own hands, eventually toppling their communist
governments. East Germans attacked their wall with gusto, and in a
matter of months, Germany was reunited. Ever since that time, there has
been talk in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary of joining the West
in a more formal way, to solidify their break from the East, to
recognize their conversion to democracy and free markets, and to insure
against future aggression from the East. NATO membership was seen as
one way to do this. Eastern Europe also recognized that economic
development was critical to their success and sought economic
integration with the West and access to its markets. Membership in the
European Economic Union was a high priority for most states.
While the West spoke glowingly of the transformations taking place in
the East, it soon became clear that there would be only meager amounts
of foreign assistance and economic investment for the East, and access
to new markets would remain limited. Western Europe and North America
were wrestling with their own economic difficulties and fighting
popular expectations that the end of the Cold War would bring reduced
financial commitments abroad. Increasingly, it became clear to many
Eastern European governments that joining NATO was their best chance of
getting membership in a western ``club''. NATO membership would address
the historical and emotional anxieties of many East Europeans left by
decades of domination and oppression by the East, and would provide
western aid to modernize their militaries. While it wasn't what they
needed most, at least it was something.
As the prospects of membership in the Economic Union faded, many East
European governments jumped at the 1995 NATO announcement that it would
consider taking in new members. NATO, led by the United States, was
faced with the difficult task of deciding which countries would qualify
for membership immediately and which ones would be refused, pending
further political, economic and military maturation. The stakes were
high, and in some cases, the disappointment was great. The United
States made it clear to all who were not accepted that there would be
other chances to join in the near future, that the door to membership
would remain open. No clear vision of the shape or boundaries of NATO
emerged from this exercise.
The decision to enlarge NATO also altered the context for the newly
formed Partnership for Peace (PFP). Rather than concentrating on the
quality of PFP discussions and ways that it could enhance regional
security, the focus shifted instead to the benefits of full NATO
membership. Rather than easing the tensions caused by the Cold War
dividing line through the heart of Europe, enlarging NATO revived those
tensions, once again creating a sense of ``us'' versus ``them'', and
reducing the ability of the PFP to address the void left by the
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.
Americans feel the strong emotional pull of the countries who want to
join NATO. We want to do what we can to reward them for their struggles
and solidify their political, social and economic gains. We have little
ability to pry open European markets, and few financial resources to
commit to economic development programs. So NATO membership at first
glance seems the obvious thing to do.
I have some very deep reservations about this course of action. For
one, NATO membership will not provide what the new democracies of
Eastern Europe need most--economic and political development. Secondly,
NATO expansion may well jeopardize critical U.S. national security
concerns that require close cooperation with Russia. Additionally,
moving to expand NATO at this time cuts short the potential development
of the PFP into a more innovative structure for handling the very
diverse military concerns of its members who now span the globe from
the Arctic Ocean to Central Asia to the Pacific Ocean. We also must
recognize that estimates of the cost of NATO expansion vary widely, and
it is likely that the American taxpayer will get stuck picking up a
very sizable percentage of the costs. Finally, I do not believe that
the American public has given sufficient attention to the question that
is being asked of the Senate: Should we extend our very best security
guarantee to more nations? Are we ready to commit US troops to the
unconditional defense of even more territory? The Senate should not act
until it is sure that the American people support this commitment.
Now is not the time to make this move. Let's think for a moment about
the most immediate threat facing both Europe and the United States. It
is not really a Russian attack upon Eastern Europe. The war in Chechnya
showed that the Russian military is not even capable of putting down
internal rebellion. Yet this is what NATO is designed to protect
against.
A very real and pressing threat to U.S. and European security is the
leakage of Russian weapons of mass destruction. An expanded NATO gives
us no advantage in countering this threat, while at the same time
cutting back on the degree of cooperation we will get out of Russia in
addressing these threats. If we want to work with the Russian military,
we must convince them that we are not escalating the threat against
them. Much as we might say that NATO is not an aggressive alliance
aimed at Russia, Cold War perceptions do not dissipate that quickly,
and if Russia feels increasingly threatened, it will be even more
reluctant to scale back its military capabilities, to ratify START II
and to cooperate in other arms control initiatives. And these are
things that matter very much to U.S. national security.
We have increasingly found that the resolution of most thorny
international crises require some assistance from Russia. The standoff
with Saddam Hussein over UN weapons inspections was the most recent
example. Bosnia will continue to demand active US-Russian cooperation,
and other efforts such as reducing the spread of nuclear weapons in
South Asia will be enhanced if we have Russian assistance.
The decision to move NATO closer to the borders of Russia may well
have one other unintended and dangerous consequence--driving Russia
into a closer relationship with China. China will continue to emerge as
a greater presence on the international scene. And I believe we will
have even more serious disagreements with its leadership. Russia is a
part of this strategic equation. Our job now is to convince Russia that
it shares our concerns vis a vis China, and that it is not in Russia's
best interest to turn a blind eye to dangerous Chinese behaviors. But
it Russia feels that a closer relationship with the West will not bring
it greater security, then this will be a very difficult argument to
make.

Mr. President, Senate ratification of this enlargement of NATO is
just the

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first step. Other countries are now very anxious to get ``in'' and
eventually more of them are going to meet the stated qualifications for
membership. Yet every new addition beyond the three before us today
brings more trouble, both in terms of Russian reaction and challenges
to the cohesion of the NATO structure. If NATO is unable to act
decisively on matters that we feel are central to our security, it will
be of diminishing use to us in the future.
I am quite concerned that by accepting these three countries today,
we are increasing the pressure on others to join. Putting top priority
on developing a close military relationship with NATO is not what these
new democracies need right now. They should be focusing primarily on
their economic, social and political development. I fear that we do
them a disservice by holding up NATO membership as the best way to be
``tied'' to the West. After all, having a stable democracy and strong
economic ties with one's neighbors has proven to be the most successful
way to ward off both military and political strife.
If we proceed to invite Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to
join NATO, I believe we must be very cautious about any additional
rounds. I have proposed an addition to the document before us that
would require the Administration to report regularly to Congress on the
status of discussions with other countries about joining NATO.
Hopefully this will allow us to be more involved in the process before
any new invitations are extended. I appreciate the Managers acceptance
of my amendment. And I trust that the vigorous debate we have had on
this issue will encourage much greater caution by the Administration
and NATO in extending future invitations.
I know some Senators objected earlier to efforts to postpone
consideration of this treaty. Yet, no matter where my Colleagues come
down on this issue, I trust they all now will agree with me that U.S.
foreign policy and the American public have benefited from the fuller
debate we have had as a result.
In closing, Mr. President, let me say that Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic deserve to be recognized for the great strides they have
made in recent years. But I am not convinced that immediate full
membership in NATO is the right answer for them or for us. And I am
very concerned that the process this treaty sets in motion is one that
we may well ultimately come to regret.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I rise in support of expanding NATO to
include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
As the Congress has considered this issue, I have evaluated the
arguments for and against NATO expansion. There are compelling
arguments on both sides. However, on balance, I have concluded that
this round of NATO expansion should be supported.
The first question I asked myself in making this vitally important
decision is whether expanding NATO serves America's national security
interests. I concluded that it does.
America has fought two brutal world wars in Europe, and we have
thousands of troops stationed in Bosnia. Our vital interests in
promoting European stability and democracy are clear.
I believe that NATO expansion will promote stability in Europe. The
mere possibility that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic might be
invited to join NATO created a strong incentive for them to resolve
peacefully longstanding ethnic and border disputes and to improve ties
with their neighbors. Hungary, for example, concluded Basic Treaties on
Understanding, Cooperation, and Good-Neighborliness with Slovakia and
Romania in 1996, and its relations with Romania are greatly improved.
Clearly, Europe is more stable as a result, and that is good for
America.
While I hope tensions will not arise in the future among any of these
new members, they may. If these countries are not NATO members, our
ability to prevent tensions from boiling over into full-blown conflicts
will be more limited. Experience has shown that NATO can play a
constructive role in resolving conflicts between members, helping
reconcile former adversaries like France and Germany and moderating
tensions between Turkey and Greece. It could play the same role in
mediating conflicts between new member countries.
NATO strength has come from the fact that it is not only a security
alliance but also a political organization. Just as it has been a force
for stability in Europe, so it has been a force for democratic
development. Now that the Cold War is over, that political role will be
increasingly important. By including Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic in NATO, the U.S. and NATO will have a greater ability to
influence the continued democratic development of these countries.
Furthermore, expanding NATO will advance America's long sought goal
of defense burden sharing. We've spent a considerable amount of time in
the Senate debating the costs of NATO. But few have talked about the
benefits of including three countries that are willing and prepared to
share the defense burden in the Alliance. Already prospective members
are working with NATO through the Partnership for Peace program and
serving with American troops in Bosnia. All three would have supported
American air strikes in Iraq. They're willing to pay their fair share
and contribute to the collective defense. The West ought to welcome
them.
The second question I asked in making this decision, Mr. President,
was whether each of the prospective NATO countries meets the five
criteria articulated in 1996 by then Secretary of Defense Perry:
commitment to democratic reform; commitment to a free market economy;
good neighborly relations; civilian control of the military; and
military capability to operate effectively with our other NATO allies.
I am satisfied that each of the countries the Senate is being asked to
approve for NATO membership meets these criteria.
In Poland, where communism once reigned, democracy is flourishing.
Seven free and fair elections have been held since 1989, and two
democratic changes in the government have taken place. A new Polish
constitution has been approved in a popular referendum. The judiciary
is independent, and the press is free.
As a result of Poland's economic reform program, the country
currently has one of the fastest growing economies in Europe. The
private sector is thriving and currently accounts for about two-thirds
of GDP and about 60% of the country's work force.
Poland has good relations with all seven of the states it borders.
Its new constitution codifies civilian control as well as parliamentary
oversight of the military. And American officials have determined that
Poland has the most capable armed forces in Eastern Europe.
Hungary receives high marks on each of these criteria as well.
A stable, parliamentary democracy, Hungary has had two democratic
changes of government since 1989 in free and fair elections. Its
governmental institutions are stable, and its judiciary is independent.
Since 1989, the country has implemented price and trade
liberalization, extensive privatization and instituted important legal
changes. That almost one-third of all foreign direct investment in
Central and Eastern Europe has been attracted to Hungary speaks to the
strength and attractiveness of its economy.
After many years of tension, Hungary has made tremendous strides in
improving its relations with neighboring countries, such as Romania,
where large concentrations of ethnic Hungarians reside. New Treaties
with Slovakia and Romania include important provisions on ethnic
minority rights and reconfirms Hungary's commitment to respect existing
borders.
Importantly, Hungary's military is under civilian control, and its
armed forces are reorganizing to meet NATO standards.
Finally, Mr. President, there is the Czech Republic, a parliamentary
democracy which has held three free and fair elections since 1989.
Vaclav Havel, a former political prisoner and human rights advocate,
serves as President and conscience of the country.
The economy of the Czech Republic has been so transformed that nearly
80% is currently in private hands, an astonishing amount for a formerly
centrally planned economy, and 65 percent of the GDP is generated by
the private sector. Since 1991, the Czech Republic

[[Page S3884]]

has operated on a balanced budget. Relations between the Czech Republic
and its neighbors, including Germany and Slovakia, are sound. And the
Czech military is under civilian control.
As a Member of the Helsinki Commission, I am aware of the issues that
continue to form a part of the U.S.-Czech bilateral dialogue, including
property restitution problems and discrimination against the Romani
minority. At the same time, I believe that Czech leaders are committed
to resolving these problems and I am committed to working with the
Czech Government until they are.
I am keenly aware, Mr. President, that there are some risks involved
in expanding NATO and that many are deeply concerned about the impact
that expanding NATO will have on our relations with Russia. I have
thought long and hard about this risk. I have discussed it at length
with Undersecretary Pickering, and I have concluded that while NATO
expansion may create some complications in our relations with Russia,
those difficulties can be managed.
Despite the fact that most of the Russian political elite say they
oppose enlargement, Russia continues to pursue a cooperative
relationship with the U.S. Public opinion polls in Russia reveal that
the vast majority of the Russian public would rather cooperate with
than confront the enlarging Western alliance.
Even on arms control issues, progress is being made with the Russians
despite the debate over NATO expansion. For example, Russia has
continued to implement START I reductions in strategic forces. In fact,
I am told that Russia is dismantling its strategic nuclear forces more
rapidly than the Treaty requires.
Despite the fact that NATO was well on its way to expansion, at the
March 1997 summit in Helsinki, President Yeltsin agreed to the outlines
of a START III accord, and he agreed to urge the Duma to ratify START
II. Importantly, there are signs that the Duma will move forward and
ratify the START II agreement this summer because, according to Duma
speaker Seleznev, it ``meets Russia's interests.''
There are other positive signs regarding arms control. While NATO
expansion was being debated, Russia ratified the Chemical Weapons
Convention. It also continued to work with the U.S. on adaptation to
the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.
While I do not have a crystal ball, and I cannot predict the future
of arms control, I am encouraged by these signs. They indicate to me
that this round of NATO expansion will not derail arms control.
Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the inclusion of
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO. Expanding NATO will
erase Stalin's artificial dividing line. Poland, Hungary, and the
former Czechoslovakia ended up, against their will, on the wrong side
of the Iron Curtain after the Second World War. Now that democracy is
flourishing in each of these countries, it is to America's advantage to
erase that dividing line and bring them into the NATO alliance. We
expanded NATO in 1952 when we allowed Greece and Turkey to join. We
expanded it in 1955 when we allowed Germany to join. And we expanded it
in 1982 when we invited Spain to join.
We should expand it now by allowing Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic to join as well.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, after much consideration of the pending
resolution of ratification to expand NATO, I intend to vote in favor of
this resolution. It is in the national security interest of the United
States and our allies. But, as the Senate continues this historic
debate on the expansion of the NATO alliance to include Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic, I would like to make some observations
about the cost implications of expanding NATO and steps we have taken
in the Senate to address them.
When the Senate committees began to consider NATO expansion last
year, I was skeptical. The Senate, I feared, was approaching this issue
with insufficient information or appreciation for the costs of such
expansion for the American taxpayer.
That is why I joined with our colleague from Texas, Senator Kay
Bailey Hutchison, on a letter of June 25, 1997, to the President
requesting specific facts and analysis regarding the cost and military
implications of NATO expansion.
I continued to pursue the cost issue last October, when the Senate
Appropriations Committee held a series of hearings on this important
issue. On the first day, the committee heard about the policy
implications of NATO expansion from Defense Secretary Cohen and
Secretary of State Albright. The next day, the committee heard about
the military implications from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General Shelton, and the Commander in Chief of the U.S. European
Command, General Clark.
What came out of both days of hearings was the fact that no
definitive estimates existed for the true costs of NATO expansion.
The committee heard how the original Defense Department estimates may
have been inflated because they took into account a fourth country,
rather than only those three currently invited to join NATO. Those
estimates also considered a greater Russian threat than actually
existed because of that country's recent reductions in force. The
generals testified that, first, specific military requirements will be
developed; then, NATO will determine the costs for meeting those
requirements.
The third day of those hearings was critical. On October 23, 1997, I
asked a witness from the General Accounting Office to provide for the
Committee a definitive analysis of the cost of this expansion. During
that hearing, I expressed my concern that no official estimates yet
existed about what the U.S. contribution will be to an expanded NATO.
IN fact, the title of the GAO report summed it up--``Cost Implications
for the United States Remain Unclear.''
The hearing also revealed that the GAO cost estimates lacked critical
information, such as the $60 million in bilateral aid which the U.S.
had already provided the three invited countries. In response to my
question, the GAO conceded the $60 million was American taxpayers'
money and should be counted.
Ultimately, I was informed that an accurate projection could not be
provided for some months.
Then in February of this year, the administration provided much lower
figures for the U.S. share of NATO expansion--approximately $40 million
each year over the next 10 years. This estimate stood in stark contrast
to the much larger figures that had been quoted just months before.
Because of my concerns about the unpredictability of future expansion
costs, I joined the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee,
Senator Stevens, on his amendments as an original cosponsor. The Senate
adopted these amendments earlier this evening. They establish limits on
the U.S. share of the common NATO budget and ensure Congress has the
necessary authority to keep close watch over these costs in the future
years of expansion.

Another important aspect of the cost issue is the expected
contributions from the new members of NATO. Although Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic have made tremendous economic strides since the
collapse of the Warsaw Pact, there have been concerns about their
ability to live up to their individual cost commitments to NATO. It is
important for the Senate to fully consider the commitments from these
countries so the American taxpayers will not be forced to shoulder an
unfair burden in the future. Therefore, I obtained letters of
commitment from each of these Governments and ask unanimous consent
that the text of the letters be printed in the Record following my
remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER without objection, it is so ordered.
(See Exhibit 1.)
Mr. CAMPBELL. Before I close, I want to recognize the work of our
former distinguished colleague in this body from the State of Colorado,
Senator Hank Brown, who is one of this country's most ardent supporters
of NATO expansion. Few have played a more crucial or steadfast role in
the effort to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in the
NATO alliance. His outstanding work will have a lasting impact.
After much consideration of the cost and military implications of the
pending resolution of ratification to expand

[[Page S3885]]

NATO, I intend to vote in favor of this resolution. It is in the
national security interest of the United States and our allies.

Exhibit 1

Warsaw, February 28, 1998
Hon. Mr. Trent Lott,
Senate Republican Majority Leaders,
Hon. Mr. Tom Daschle,
Senate Democratic Minority Leader,
Washington, DC.
Distinguished Senators: The Senate of the United States of
America will soon vote on NATO enlargement with respect to
Czech, Hungarian and Polish membership. It will be an
important political decision with particular implications for
the security of many nations, especially of those from
Central and Eastern Europe.
Decisions of the member state of the North Atlantic
Alliance and the United States' decision particularly, will
provide our region, which suffered so much in the XXth
century, with stability, security and lasting democratic
order.
As leaders of all parliamentary caucuses in the Polish
Parliament--those ruling as well as in the opposition--we
assure you, Honorable Senators, that this question of Polish
membership in NATO is vital for security of the Euroatlantic
region and enjoys overwhelming support in our society.
Poland as a future member of NATO would like to be not only
a security consumer but also a security provider. At the same
time, we are determined to fulfill all necessary Alliance
obligations--including financial ones.
It is our hope that the United States Senate will meet the
expectations of millions of Poles and will give consent and
advice to the President of the United States to ratify the
Protocolls of Accession.
We address ourselves to you, as American Statesmen, to use
your authority to assure the successful outcome of the Senate
vote on NATO enlargement.
We remain, respectfully yours,
Leszek Miller,
Chairman, Parliamentary Caucus, Democratic Left Alliance.
Janusz Dobrosz,
Chairman, Parliamentary Caucus, Polish Peasant Party.
Marian Krzaklewski,
Chairman, Parliamentary Caucus, Solidarity Election Action.
Tadeosz Syryjczyk,
Chairman, Parliamentary Caucus, Union for Freedom.
Jan Olszewski,
Chairman, Parliamentary Group, Movement for the
Reconstruction of Poland.

The Ambassador of Hungary,

April 28, 1998.
Hon. Ben Nighthorse Campbell,
U.S. Senate,
380 Russell Senate Office Building,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Campbell: As the U.S. Senate continues its
debate on the enlargement of NATO and the accession of
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the Alliance, I am
writing to you as the representative of the Hungarian
Government in the United States. I highly appreciate your
interest in this matter important for both the security of
the United States and that of the European continent. I
understand that you need assurances of our countries
commitment to share the financial burdens of the enlargement.
Earlier last year, the Hungarian Government decided to
raise the ratio of defense expenditures within the GDP by 0.1
percent annually until Hungary reaches the average level of
defense spending by current NATO members of the same size as
Hungary. Given the 4%+ growth of our GDP, this commitment
will result in a 8-10% yearly increase of defense spending in
real terms. Since both domestic and international financial
institutions project the same or more growth in the years to
come, it will be an ``increasing slice of a growing pie'' and
my country's commitment to meet all the financial obligations
stemming from our accession is supported by a solid economic
background.
Mr. Senator, I remember that during the Appropriations
Committee hearing last fall, you raised a concern that the
U.S. cost implications would be unclear until NATO adopts its
Target Force Goals report. It is true that this study will be
adopted in June by the NATO Ministerial, however I should
clarify that the Target Force Goals include military
requirements to be fulfilled by the 3 nations. These
requirements are national expenses and to be exclusively
financed by the applicants, thus, they would not have an
impact on the U.S. costs. It is clearly stated in one of the
conditions of the Resolution of Ratification that ``the
United States is under no commitment to subsidize the
national expenses necessary for Poland, Hungary, or the Czech
Republic to meet its NATO commitments''. As a matter of fact,
during our recent accession talks Hungary underwent a
thorough ``screening'' by NATO which resulted in a conclusion
that all the military requirements of NATO accession can be
paid from the existing defense budgets.
With the above, I would reiterate the commitment of the
Hungarian Government to pay all the necessary expenses of our
membership. It is our fundamental interest to successfully
adapt into an alliance that continues to be successful. This
approach is supported by all the parliamentary parties of
Hungary. This was also communicated to the U.S. Senate: our
Foreign Minister visited Washington twice during the last
half a year and meeting your distinguished colleagues as well
as the leaderships of both aisles, he assured them about our
firm commitment.
Enclose please find the Hungarian Government's memorandum
on the enlargement that includes the financial commitment, as
well. The memorandum was disseminated in the Senate in
February.
I hope you will find the above useful in your
consideration. I look forward to a continuing cooperation
with you.
Sincerely yours,
Dr. Gyorgy Banlaki.
____

Memorandum of the Government of the Republic of Hungary on the
Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Hungary considers the enlargement of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization as a unique historic step that will
expand the zone of stability and security to the benefit of
all countries of the Euro-Atlantic region. Hungary's
accession to NATO is a decisive step in the process of firmly
anchoring itself in the community of democratic nations, with
whom it shares values, interests and goals. Hungary is
determined to play its part in ensuring international peace
and justice, democracy and fundamental human rights, the
principles and practice of the rule of law and a free market
economy. The Hungarian Government is convinced that the
strengthening of the transatlantic link assured by NATO is an
indispensable prerequisite of the security of both present
and future members of the Alliance.
Hungary's accession to NATO is based not only on the
consensus of all parties represented in the Hungarian
Parliament but also possesses an overwhelming support of
Hungarian citizens. This was manifested in the impressive
result of the referendum held on 16 November 1997 on the
country's accession to the Alliance.
It is the firm intention of Hungary to provide for its own
security and contribute to the security of all its Allies
within the framework of a cohesive, strong NATO, based on
solidarity among its members on both sides of the Atlantic.
Hungary fully accepts all responsibilities and obligations
and wishes to enjoy all rights stemming from membership.
Hungary accepts the broad approach to security as outlined
in NATO's Strategic Concept. Hungary is determined to
participate fully in NATO's Integrated Military Structure and
in Collective Defense Planning. Hungary will commit the bulk
of its armed forces to collective defense and is ready to
commit forces, as necessary, to other NATO missions as well.
Hungary will allocate adequate budgetary resources for the
implementations of its commitments. The country's sustainable
economic growth and the envisaged increase of defense
expenditure will provide solid foundation for fulfilling
them.
The Republic of Hungary fully supports the continued
openness of the Alliance, as stated in the Madrid
Declaration. Hungary has a vested interest in seeing all
countries of Central and Eastern Europe become members of the
Alliance that wish to do so, once they have fulfilled the
criteria of membership. Hungary remains committed to
supporting their efforts and to sharing its experiences
gained during the accession process.
In the period to come Hungary will further intensify her
efforts to successfully complete her preparation for
membership.
The Hungarian Government expresses its gratitude to all
those in the United States of America, civilians and military
alike, who have helped the entire process of Hungary's
accession to NATO with dedication and a high level of
professionalism.
The Hungarian Government hopes that the upcoming
discussions and debates on NATO enlargement in the Senate
will reflect the constructive approach that has consistently
characterized the United States' position in all earlier
phases of the enlargement process. Legislators in both
current and future member states are facing the historic
challenge of making a decision that will shape the future of
the Euro-Atlantic region for a long time to come.
____

Embassy of the Czech Republic

3900 Spring of Freedom St. N.W.

Washington, DC, March 18, 1998.
Hon. Ben Nighthorse Campbell,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Campbell: The Embassy of the Czech Republic
appreciate your interest in the contribution the new NATO
members will make to the common defense of the North Atlantic
Alliance.
I can assure you that the Czech Republic is ready to bear
its share of the costs of NATO enlargement. In September
1996, the Czech Government decided to increase the military
spending by 0.1% of the GDP annually until the year 2000. The
1998 budget adopted by the Parliament last December provides
for a 22 percent increase in defense spending as compared
with the previous year.

[[Page S3886]]

Attached please find statements of Czech officials on the
costs of NATO enlargement and basic data on Czech military
expenses.
Sincerely,
Anotnin Hradilek,
Deputy Chief of Mission.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. President, I rise today in support of Senate
approval of extending North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership to
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. For me this issue is very
clear, admitting these countries into NATO will strengthen the
Organization, reinforce new democracies, renew the American commitment
to European security, and reaffirm American leadership in international
relations and diplomacy.
The United States plays a pivotal role in international relations
because of our position as the world's only military and economic
superpower, and as the world's strongest democracy. The existence of
NATO is one of our best hopes for relieving much of the burden of that
role. NATO initiatives can prevent international incidents from
becoming serious military conflicts by encouraging member nations to
work together to resolve conflicts. The success of NATO initiatives
depends entirely on the support and participation of member nations.
Ratification of this NATO expansion resolution is a test of whether the
United States will stay engaged in a changing and evolving Europe.
If NATO was not regularly reinforced and reinvigorated, the world's
only superpower, the United States, would necessarily be involved in
every international conflict and crisis. There is overwhelming
bipartisan support for the notion that the United States taxpayer
should not be responsible for policing the world, and that this should
increasingly be an international responsibility. While I share this
belief, I also have a personal interest in NATO expansion. My oldest
son Brooks is in Bosnia as part of a NATO support effort. As NATO
becomes more inclusive, the chances of going to war for all countries
decreases. Likewise, as more countries join NATO, spreading the burden
of conflict resolution and peacekeeping, fewer American soldiers will
be needed abroad. This is a positive blessing for all Americans.
Nevertheless, there are some who oppose the expansion of NATO and
others who would like to place limitations on expansion, eroding the
body's effectiveness. Because Russia and the rest of the world know
that NATO is a defensive peacekeeping body, not an offensive regime,
the current fears that an expanded NATO will directly threaten
relations with non-NATO member neighbors are inflated. Instead,
including eastern European countries in NATO will lead to increased
stability in the region, something good for all countries throughout
the world. Additionally, efforts to preclude other countries from
joining NATO over a specified time period and attempts to limit the
powers of the Organization are not well thought out. Limiting the
mission of NATO would not be wise, particularly because we would be
limiting our own abilities in the future. And a mandated pause would
undermine the open door commitment that NATO has had since 1949. All
countries have always been welcome to join the fold of NATO and all
countries should forever remain welcome to join an Organization
committed to peace and security. The United States cannot walk away
from the role of leadership in Europe. By what we have witnessed in
Bosnia, Europe is at a very fragile stage. We must embrace the European
countries that wish to be a part of a world alliance for peace and
security, and we have a moral obligation to strengthen Europe and
reduce the possibility of war in the region. The door to NATO must
remain fully open, not half closed, to those nations equipped to
shoulder the responsibility and reforms necessary to meet NATO
membership standards.
With regard to the cost of NATO expansion, I believe that equitable
financial involvement of member nations should be enforced. The U.S.
should do what it can to support NATO to an extent equal to efforts of
other countries involved. It is imperative that NATO expansion costs be
kept as low as possible, and I do not believe that substantial
expenditures to upgrade the new entry militaries is necessary or wise.
Instead, I applaud the efforts of NATO to prioritize communications
infrastructure, language skills, and strategic training for new members
over big ticket items as the immediate criteria for NATO membership. It
should also be noted that the governments of Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic estimate that they would spend more on defense, not
less, if they remain outside NATO. Although the United States will have
a proportional increase in overall NATO expenditures, I believe the
cost of forgoing NATO expansion is much greater.
For these reasons, I fully support Senate approval of extending North
Atlantic Treaty Organization membership to Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic. Admitting these countries into NATO will strengthen the
Organization and reaffirm American leadership in international
relations and diplomacy. President Clinton announced his support for
NATO enlargement in 1994 and in 1997 the Senate held over ten hearings
on this issue. Debate on this issue has been extensive and thorough.
NATO expansion is good for America and for the world.
Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I rise to make a few remarks about
expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO.
I believe in a United States that is an activist leader and
respectful participant in world affairs. This leadership comes with
responsibilities that are often difficult for the United States: troops
stationed and foreign aid dollars expended abroad; cooperation with
international organizations like the United Nations; and the decision
on NATO expansion that is before the Senate today. U.S. leadership
abroad remains a vital national interest to the American people. My
record as a United States Senator is strongly in support of a United
States fully engaged with the world, a country and a people that
participate and lead the international efforts to address the many
problems that transcend borders and cultures.
NATO, since its founding in 1949, has been a successful foundation of
U.S. security and cooperation with our European allies. This was
particularly true throughout the period of the Cold War. The collapse
of the Soviet Union and communism can be partially credited to NATO;
both to the alliance's collective defense arrangements and to its
complimentary role in bringing Europe together which has fostered
democratic and economic ties among countries with historical and
cultural grievances. NATO has played a significant role in creating a
Europe free from serious conflict for nearly 50 years.
The Senate is now considering whether to enlarge the sixteen member
alliance by admitting Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Few will
deny that these three countries are prepared and committed to assuming
the responsibilities of NATO membership. Few will contest the statement
that these three countries have long ties to the West; that these three
countries are the most Western states of the former Soviet bloc. And
few will assert that these three countries face any military threat
from Russia or other foe, either today or in the foreseeable future. I
am confident that the enormous changes that have taken place in Poland,
the Czech Republic and Hungary will not be jeopardized by the upcoming
vote. These changes including the creation of democratic institutions,
new respect for human rights, and a growing market economy all enjoy
enormous public support and will be continued regardless of Senate's
decision on NATO expansion.
I do have a number of very serious concerns about NATO expansion
including several which have been addressed through the amendment
process. My concerns have very little to do with the three candidates
for NATO expansion. In fact, I believe the United States and our allies
should take aggressive steps to support these burgeoning democracies
which have demonstrated so much promise since the fall of the Soviet
Union. Each of these countries has a remarkable story to tell and each
is deserving of closer ties to the United States and the West.
I voted for the amendment offered by Senator Harkin to call for an
accurate accounting of all expenses to the United States related to
NATO expansion. The Senate and the American people ought to better
understand the obligations we are assuming if we agree to NATO
expansion. I have no confidence in the various cost estimates

[[Page S3887]]

that have been presented during this entire process. In fact, I am
fairly certain the costs to U.S. taxpayers will exceed even the
Administration's highest estimates. The various cost estimates for NATO
expansion have ranged from $1.5 billion to $125 billion.
Opponents of the Harkin amendment argue that the U.S. is not issuing
a blank check on behalf of our taxpayers. Certainly, Congress will
object to escalating costs for NATO in the future and particularly if a
significantly larger NATO burden falls upon the United States. However,
my concern is that without a full accounting of costs, the United
States is assuming a new moral and financial obligation to NATO without
adequate consideration by the Senate. U.S. prestige and our position in
the world should not be risked at some future point because we did not
know or were not prepared to consider today the full costs on NATO
expansion.
The Moynihan amendment to link NATO expansion with admission to the
European Union also addresses my concerns regarding the most
appropriate forum for integration between the West and the many former
Soviet satellite states seeking closer ties with Western Europe and the
United States. Senator Moynihan has been an articulate voice throughout
this debate and I do agree with many of the eloquent points he has
brought before the Senate. I voted for the Moynihan amendment as I
believe European Union membership is the most appropriate of the
available forums for integrating with the West the three nations
invited to join NATO.
These three countries are in various stages of economic development
and each is committed to improving the lives of its citizens through
closer ties to the West. In my mind, the European Union is a far better
vehicle for economic growth and integration with the West.
Participation and inclusion in the EU and its marketplace will pay
dividends for the people of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary that
far outweigh the security assurances inherent with NATO membership.
The European Union has begun negotiations for EU admission with
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary and several other countries.
Frankly, I am very skeptical that the EU will in a timely manner admit
new members. The EU has a history of protected industries--particularly
agriculture--and I doubt Europe's protected industries will be anxious
to take on lower wage countries or significant agricultural producers.
Export states here at home, like my state of Washington, have long
sought to open Europe's protected market and system of state subsidies.
We should be careful not to aid or validate Europe's trade practices
which have hurt the United States.
Admission to the EU is a question for EU countries to consider,
however, I do not think we should give the EU the opportunity to settle
for NATO expansion. Europe has the strongest interest in the success of
many former Soviet states. The EU, including the European states who do
not belong to NATO, should also be expected to make sacrifices to
ensure a peace for all time in Europe.
My vote for the Moynihan amendment should be viewed as a call for new
thinking on the shared objective of bringing the newly independent
nations of Europe into the existing political and economic system. We
have to ask ourselves if the tools of the Cold War will work for the
U.S. and Europe as we enter a new century.
The impact of NATO expansion on our relationship with Russia is my
most significant concern on this issue. I am delighted so many of my
colleagues have raised the issue, both those who favor expansion and
those who oppose it.
Unfortunately, I believe that the impact of the vote we are to cast
today will have very little effect on the U.S.-Russia relationship. For
I believe, from the very beginning of the expansion process, we have
pursued a process and a policy that has seriously damaged our
relationship with Russia. I believe the Administration has erred
greatly here and our foreign policy will be effected by it for years to
come regardless of the outcome of the NATO expansion vote.
Already, numerous Senators have cited the historic work of George
Kennan. I also take his counsel very seriously and I encourage my
colleagues to ponder his words from a 1997 New York Times opinion
piece. Mr. Kennan wrote, ``Expanding NATO would be the most fateful
error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era. Such a
decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and
militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect
on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of
the cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign
policy in directions decidedly not to our liking.''
Kennan's final words are particularly troubling as he states, ``. . .
to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our
liking.'' One needs only look at recent weapons inspection crisis with
Iraq to see the worsening ties between the U.S. and Russia as a result
of NATO expansion. There are other examples of the growing divide
between the U.S. and Russia: cooperation with Iran on ballistic
missiles, agreements with China to counter a world with one superpower,
and an assortment of other nuclear weapons related issues from
declarations on the first use of nuclear weapons to ratification of
START III and the eventual negotiation of START. All of these issues
are vital to the United States and all have been negatively impacted by
NATO expansion.
It goes without saying that Russia does not dictate to the United
States our foreign policy interests and policies. However, U.S. policy
makers should not underestimate the degree to which Russia matters to
our own future. Russia is the largest nation in a new Europe. Any
attempt to guarantee the future peace and security of Europe by
excluding Russia creates more problems than promise for the future.
NATO Expansion fails to consider the political landscape of Russia.
Approximately two-thirds of the Russian Duma is controlled by communist
and nationalist parties. These political parties are very anti-American
and the West. The Russian Constitution grants enormous powers to the
Presidency that have allowed the West to underestimate Russia's
opposition to NATO Expansion.
My fear is we have undermined those in Russia who are advocating and
following the course of democracy, international cooperation and
economic reform. I hope the Senate does not revisit the words of George
Kennan with immense regret in future years. The Administration and the
Senate now must take it upon themselves to rebuild those ties with
Russia to go forward and address our many shared interests for the
future. Vice President Gore has been instrumental in building ties
between our two countries, and I certainly encourage him to continue
his leadership role with Russia's new prime minister.
I have discussed in detail my concerns with NATO expansion. This has
been a very difficult decision for me. In the end, I was swayed by one
additional, very powerful concern.
This powerful concern is for U.S. credibility. I do believe U.S.
credibility is on the line with this vote. Regardless of the wisdom of
NATO expansion, I fear that rejection of NATO expansion at this point
will send dangerous messages to the world about U.S. intentions for the
future. The international community will view a rejection of this
initiative which was started and driven by the United States as a sign
of U.S. isolationism. Allowing that message to be sent around the world
will, in my mind, be far more damaging to U.S. interests worldwide than
admitting Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization.
Quite frankly, I think the Administration has marginalized the United
States Senate on the question before us today. While I doubt that the
Administration intended to do this and I know the Senate has been
active and engaged throughout this process, the result is the same. The
Senate, as I see it, has little choice in the matter before the body
today. To reject NATO expansion at this point will also cause serious
long-term problems for U.S. interests throughout the world.
Therefore, I will vote for NATO expansion.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I rise to engage in a colloquy with the
distinguished Senator from Delaware, the Minority manager of the
resolution of ratification regarding NATO enlargement.

[[Page S3888]]

I had planned to submit an amendment to the resolution of
ratification as I discussed in my floor speed of October 27, 1997. This
amendment, simply put, would express the Sense of the Senate that the
United States should consult with all NATO member nations, subsequent
to the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic but prior to
the consideration of any other nation for accession, concerning the
desirability of establishing a mechanism to suspend the membership of a
NATO member if it no longer conforms to the Alliance's fundamental
principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.
Mr. President, I raised this issue with former Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger when he testified before the Armed Services Committee
on January 29th. In response to my question as to whether NATO should
have a mechanism to suspend a member, Secretary Kissinger stated:

I think in situations in which a government emerges
incompatible with the common purpose of the Alliance, there
ought to be some method, maybe along the lines you put
forward. I have not thought this through, but I fully agree
this is a very important issue which does not apply to any of
the new countries that are now before us.

I also raised the issue of establishing a mechanism for suspending a
NATO member with former Secretary of Defense William Perry when he
testified before the Armed Services Committee on March 19th. I posed
the question in the context of a NATO nation that no longer conforms to
NATO's fundamental principles but still has a veto over NATO
operations. Secretary Perry stated:

That is a very good question, Senator Levin. What you are
describing is a problem--in fact, I would call it a flaw--in
the original NATO structure, the NATO agreements. And, in my
judgment, this is a problem which should be addressed. It has
been a problem for many, many years. And, therefore it is
important, in addressing that problem to separate it from the
issue of NATO accession. I would not in any way want to tie
that issue to the NATO accession issue.
We could have predicted several decades ago that that would
cause a problem, there would be some major issue come up on
which we could not reach consensus, and that would bring NATO
to a halt, or that some member would depart from the NATO
values. Happily that has not happened. But it is a potential
problem, and I think we ought to address it.

Mr. President, I do not intend to offer this amendment at this time
because it has nothing to do with Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic
and I do not want to suggest or imply any such connection.
Nevertheless, I do believe it is an issue that needs to be raised
within NATO councils. I believe it should be resolved before any
additional accessions to NATO are considered. And so, I would ask the
distinguished Senator from Delaware if he believes this is a matter
that merits consideration?
Mr. BIDEN. I agree with the Senator from Michigan that this is an
important matter that raises fundamental issues for the United States
and our Allies. I believe that this is a matter that merits careful
consideration within NATO councils. It would certainly be preferable
for NATO to discuss this in a careful and measured way now, rather than
to be faced with the issue at some future time when an emergency
situation exists. I want to commend the Senator from Michigan for
raising this matter. I also commend him for not seeking to amend the
resolution of ratification, for, as he has correctly noted, this issue
is not related to Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic.
Mr. BINGAMAN. I have voiced a number of concerns with regard to the
Administration's open-door policy on NATO enlargement, and in
particular the implementation of that policy with regard to the Baltic
states.
Over the last few days, the Administration and Sen. Biden and his
staff have worked closely with myself and my staff to address my
concerns.
I wish to confirm with Sen. Biden and Sen. Helms that my
understanding of certain provisions in the NATO resolution, as modified
by the Manager's Amendment, is correct.
First, there is the issue of consultations with the Senate. I
understand that the Resolution, as clarified by the Manager's
Amendment, states that the Senate will be consulted prior to the U.S.
consenting to invite any European state to begin accession talks with
NATO, as was done for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic at Madrid
last year. This would apply for the Baltic states, and for any other
European state seeking admission to NATO. Is that correct?
Mr. BIDEN. I agree.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Second is the issue of U.S. security commitments. The
NATO resolution contains a provision stating that only ``a consensus
decision by the full membership of NATO, approved by the national
procedures of each NATO member * * * will constitute a security
commitment pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty.'' This means that a
political document, like the Baltic Charter, which has not been
approved by the Senate pursuant to constitutional treaty-making
process, does not constitute a U.S. security commitment to the Baltic
states. Is my understanding of that provision correct?
Mr. BIDEN. I agree.
Mr. BINGAMAN. The third concern that I wish to address is whether the
United States, in signing the Baltic charter, has ``pre-committed'' to
support Baltic membership in NATO in the future. The Resolution, as
modified, contains a provision to the effect that, other than Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the United States has not consented or
committed to invite any other country to join NATO in the future. My
understanding of this provision is that it reflects the fact that the
Baltic Charter of Partnership does not constitute a U.S. pre-commitment
to NATO membership for the Baltics, and that presently the United
States has not consented or committed to support NATO membership for
any European state (other than Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic)
that may seek to accede to NATO. Is that understanding correct?
Mr. BIDEN. I agree.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I want to begin my discussion of this
very important issue by commending the people of Poland, Hungary and
the Czech Republic for their brave and determined transition to
democracy and free market economies. The citizens of these three
nations have suffered grave injustices and brutal atrocities during
World War II and the Cold War and now, to see these nations emerge from
these dark days and turn toward democracy, deserves the praise of every
man and woman who cherishes freedom.
I also want to express my strong support for the security and
independence of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. I also believe
the United States and its military forces will support the independence
of these nations whether or not they join NATO.
While I want to encourage the move toward democracy, free markets and
Western values in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, I also want
to see these values take root in Russia. It is because of my concern
that a vote now on NATO expansion will hinder our relations with Russia
and risk the Duma's ratification of the START II Treaty that I will
vote against NATO expansion at this time.
I have spent a good deal of time and effort discussing the issue of
NATO expansion with a number of U.S. foreign policy makers and military
leaders. I have given this question a considerable amount of thought
because I believe before the United States commits itself to defending
additional nations, with U.S. nuclear weapons if necessary, we must
carefully consider all of the ramifications of this action.
As I look at the current security situation in Central Europe, I do
not see a security threat that necessitates a vote to expand NATO
today. What I do see however, is a weakened superpower in Russia with
thousands of nuclear weapons that can reach the United States.
I think if anyone looks at the lessons of the end of the First World
War and the Treaty of Versailles, it shows that the harsh terms of the
peace imposed on Germany fed the antagonisms that allowed Adolf Hitler
to come to power. That, I believe, is the real threat we face today.
At present, we have an historic opportunity to bring Russia into the
West and cement Russia's commitment to freedom, democracy and free
enterprise. On the other hand, we can expand NATO, right up to Russia's
border, and we can thereby inadvertently recreate a Russia that is a
threat to U.S. security and peace in Central Europe.

[[Page S3889]]

It is ironic that by adding Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to
NATO we may create the security danger these nation's fear. More
importantly, by voting to expand NATO today I believe we run the risk
of undercutting the supporters of democracy in Russia and fuel the
fears of those who want to restore an aggressive, imperialist Russia
that will then require billions of dollars in additional American
taxpayer money to deter.
This is not idle speculation, this scenario is real and it is here
now. At present, the Russian Duma has refused to ratify the START II
Treaty and this action has led the United States to maintain nuclear
armed ICBMs, SLBMs and ballistic missile submarines that we would
otherwise deactivate under the START II treaty. In fact, the U.S.
strategic nuclear arsenal would drop from about 6,000 warheads under
START I to 3,000 under START II. Department of Defense figures indicate
by fiscal year 2000 it will cost hundreds of million of dollars to keep
the U.S. nuclear arsenal at a START I level.
While we wait for the Russian Duma to ratify START II, the Secretary
of Defense, our friend Bill Cohen, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, General Shelton, believe that we must keep our forces at a
START I level to keep the pressure on the Russia Duma to ratify the
treaty.
Therefore, when the supporters of NATO expansion discuss the costs
associated with adding Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the
alliance, I would ask that they add the cost of keeping U.S. nuclear
forces at a START I level to their calculations. Let the record show,
no Administration official has stepped forward to argue that a Senate
vote to expand NATO will encourage the Russian Duma to ratify START II.
In fact, in a conversation I and several members of the Senate Armed
Services Committee had with Alexie Arbatov, a member of the Russian
Duma and a democratic reformist, Mr. Arbatov told us that NATO
expansion undercuts democratic reformists ability to promote
cooperation between NATO allies and Russia. He continued to tell us
that expansion of NATO to include these three countries will delay
Russian ratification of START II.
The Washington Post recently included two articles describing the
degraded state of Russia's nuclear arsenal. These articles also confirm
the extensive testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee
which documents Russia's growing reliance on nuclear weapons.
As my colleagues, know, Russia's economic problems have resulted in a
huge reduction in that nation's conventional capability. This reality
has led Russian policy makers to enunciate a policy stressing a
reliance on nuclear weapons to defend Russia's security interest.
We therefore find ourselves in a situation, under the proposed NATO
expansion, where we are extending the U.S. nuclear umbrella closer to
Russia's border, and literally to Russia's border in the Kaliningrad
province which borders Russia, at a time when Russia is increasing its
reliance on weapons of mass destruction to defend its interests.
Given Russia's growing reliance on nuclear weapons, I believe it is
dangerous for the United States to push the border of NATO eastward to
Russia's border at this time.
Administration officials tell us NATO expansion is not directed
toward Russia, indeed some offer the hope that Russia will eventually
join NATO, but I ask these officials do the Poles, the Hungarians and
the Czechs believe NATO is their defense against Russia? Of course they
do!
I also question the logic of those who say Russia is free to join
NATO. If Russia is allowed to join NATO, what is the real mission of
NATO? If Russia and everyone else who wants to is allowed to join NATO,
is NATO still a self-defense alliance or is it then a new version of
the United Nations?
I believe NATO expansion at this time will decrease U.S. national
security because I believe it will hinder joint U.S.-Russian efforts to
stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction. According to a February
editorial in the New York Times by Howard Baker, Sam Nunn, Brent
Scrowcroft and Alton Frye, ``frictions over NATO distract Moscow and
Washington from profound common dangers.'' At the top of the list of
the ``profound common dangers'' is the threat of the spread of weapons
of mass destruction. This enormous challenge begins with our effort to
control the nuclear weapons, nuclear materials and nuclear scientists
in Russia. All of these crucial non-proliferation programs require the
active cooperation of Russia and a vote today to expand NATO does not
contribute to this cooperation.
As it stands today, even my good friends on the other side of this
issue will agree Russia's conventional forces are weak and getting
weaker. Russia's plans for new conventional weapons systems are slowed
and reduced. Russia cannot afford to regularly pay the members of her
armed forces. Instead, Russia has turned efforts inward to refocus and
rebuild their country; and, with our help, Russia may reemerge with a
strong market economy rooted in freedom and democracy. Without a doubt,
Russia's continued evolution toward the West will have the greatest
impact on long term U.S. security.
Mr. President, I support efforts by the United States and the
European Union to help Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to become
strong democracies with robust market economies. But I also want Russia
to continue on the road to freedom and democracy so I therefore will
oppose the resolution to expand NATO at this time.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I support the expansion of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization to include the Czech Republic, Poland and
Hungary. The inclusion of these three countries will alter the
Alliance, but the benefits clearly make this expansion both timely and
worthwhile.
In 1949, if the founders of NATO had been asked to predict where the
alliance would be five decades later, few if any could have foreseen a
more extraordinary success. The NATO nations stood firmly together as
the great bulwark against communism during the Cold War. NATO is,
without doubt, the most successful security alliance in history.
The original purpose of NATO was to protect the West against the
former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations. Now, even though the
Cold War is over, NATO continues to be essential. It makes sense to
adopt this modest expansion of the Alliance beyond its Cold War borders
to include three nations which were once part of the Warsaw Pact.
The greatest threats to European security are now the long-standing
ethnic conflicts that have simmered inside many of these nations for
centuries. Two world wars in this century began in Central Europe.
Extension of NATO's security umbrella to these three additional nations
will place them in a part of Europe where wars no longer happen.
Obviously, there are concerns about the expansion of NATO that
Congress and the country must be sensitive to--especially the potential
impact of this expansion on our relationship with Russia.
We have rightly spent much of the past decade and billions of U.S.
taxpayers' dollars in working with Russia to achieve nuclear arms
reductions and to help Russia safeguard its nuclear arsenal and its
nuclear materials. Russian cooperation with the U.S. under the
Comprehensive Threat Reduction Program and our bilateral nuclear arms
reduction treaties with Russia have substantially reduced the chance of
nuclear war. In my view, anything that would disrupt or harm this vital
progress would be a fateful error.
Many of Russia's leaders do not support NATO's invitation to Poland,
Hungary or the Czech Republic. But the addition of these countries to
NATO poses no threat to Russia. I commend President Clinton for his
effective leadership in making this point clear. We must continue to
work to assure President Yeltsin and other Russian leaders that the
expansion of NATO is not a danger to their country or their security.
We must do all we can to address Russia's concerns and increase our
cooperation in all key areas with Russia to ensure that our goal of a
more secure future is achieved.
We must also deal with the concerns over costs, especially the costs
that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will have to bear to
upgrade their military forces to NATO standards.

[[Page S3890]]

These costs will inevitably have to compete with pressing domestic
needs in those countries.
Together, these three nations will have to spend as much as $14
billion over the next 10 years to meet NATO standards. These costs are
the responsibility of these prospective new members. They committed to
pay these costs when they asked to become members of NATO. The U.S.
already pays 25% of NATO's commonly-funded expenses. NATO expansion
should not impose costly new burdens on U.S. taxpayers.
Nevertheless, these countries are on the right track, and so is NATO.
This expansion of NATO is amply justified. Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic will strengthen NATO. They are solid democracies, and
they will make our alliance for peace even stronger. Their rightful
place is in NATO, and I urge the Senate to support this Resolution of
Ratification.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, later this evening the Senate will conclude
debate on a resolution of ratification authorizing the United States to
support the entry of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
The decision that the Senate takes with respect to this resolution
will have an historic impact on the future of Europe and the nature of
the Transatlantic partnership that will take us into the next
millennium.
Without question, NATO has been the singularly most successful
alliance for mutual defense in modern history since its establishment
in 1949. For nearly fifty years it has served as a bulwark against
communism, and as a deterrent against threats posed by the Soviet Union
and its Warsaw Pact satellites.
Today the world has changed. The Soviet Union no longer exists, and
the Warsaw Pact is fast becoming a mere footnote in our history books.
In that context, it seems to me to be a particularly appropriate moment
to review whether and how NATO's role should evolve, to keep pace with
the changing political landscape.
Some changes have already been undertaken by NATO. For example, not
too long ago NATO members agreed that it was an appropriate mission for
NATO forces to assist with efforts to implement the Dayton Peace
accords in war torn Bosnia.
Certainly the debate this week is as much about such matters as it is
whether Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic will be good NATO
partners.
The debate is also about the merits of admitting additional members
beyond these three--and the order and timing for doing so. And, it is
about the budgetary implications of an enlarged organization with an
expanded land area requiring collective defense. Finally, it is about
the impact on U.S. and NATO's relations with Russia and other NIS
countries and the implications for internal Russian political
stability.
These are all important and legitimate areas for discussion. The
Senate's debate on these questions has been thoughtful and
constructive. Senators Warner, Moynihan, Harkin and others have asked
some very important questions that deserve answers before moving
forward to take NATO from 16 to nineteen members and beyond. It would
be foolhardy not to carefully assess these matters before making
changes to NATO.
I agree with those who have held up a yellow flag urging caution.
Certainly it behooves us to act judiciously in reshaping NATO to ensure
that whatever we do does not undermine the effectiveness or efficiency
of the current organization. Nor should we foster expectations in
Eastern and Central Europe that cannot be fulfilled--or create
additional and unnecessary financial burdens on existing or new
members.
I also believe that it is important that we take into account the
implications for our current and future relations with Russia and other
former Soviet states. And particularly with respect to Russia's
continued willingness to move forward to ratify Start II and other
future arms control agreements.

While I agree with those who suggest it would be wrong to give Moscow
veto power over NATO decisions--on the other hand, I see nothing to be
gained from causing unnecessary uncertainty or anxiety with respect to
our intentions toward Russia.
After the many hours of debate we have had on the pending measure, I
believe a strong case has been made in favor of admitting these three
new members. Foreign policy experts and scholars who have spent a great
deal of time studying NATO over the years make a persuasive case in
support of expansion.
I also believe that Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Secretary
of Defense Bill Cohen, together with other Clinton Administration
officials, have during hours and hours of Congressional testimony made
a very compelling case in favor of ratification of the pending
protocols. Former Presidents Bush and Carter have endorsed the
President's decision. As have a number of our distinguished former
Secretaries of State and former members of the Pentagon's Joint Chiefs
of Staff. They have also adequately addressed concerns that have been
raised with respect to NATO expansion.
During the July 8, 1997 Madrid Summit, NATO heads of state, including
President Clinton reached common agreement at that time to invite
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to join the organization, while
leaving open the door to other interested governments. However, no
commitment was made with respect to the sequence or timing of such
additions.
That was appropriate in my view. It goes without saying that we must
assess any impact of enlarging NATO by three on that organization's
ability to continue to fulfill its primary mission--namely collective
self-defense--before moving forward to consider additional new members.
Realistically, such an assessment is likely to take three or more
years by my estimation--in line with the time frame fame Senators
Warner and Moynihan have included in their so called pause reservation.
Having said that, I really do not think it necessary to codify this
time frame into a binding proposition. In fact, the time period could
even turn out to be longer than three years. Were we to codify the time
period, we might in fact be creating false expectations in the minds of
countries waiting to join that invitations will automatically be
forthcoming once three years have elapsed. It was for those reasons
that I voted against this amendment earlier today.
It is important as we review the current structure, purpose, and
membership of this important organization that we remain mindful of the
central proposition--the organization's relevance to today's and
tomorrow's realities. We should ask as well whether and what changes
best further U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. Only
after such questions have been fully explored should we move forward to
alter NATO.
I believe that during the course of the current debate we have
exhaustively reviewed the implications and U.S. interests at stake with
respect to the pending protocols. I am satisfied that the addition of
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO will enhance U.S.
national security and foreign policy interests by strengthening and
fostering European unity and security.
There is little doubt in my mind, Mr. President, about the likely
outcome of the final vote on this matter. In my judgement the United
States Senate will give its advice and consent to ratification, and
thereby authorize the United States to consent to the admission of
these three members.
Mr. President, I will join my colleagues in voting aye on this
matter. To do otherwise would severely undermine the cohesive support
that has existed for NATO since its establishment in 1949 and leave us
ill prepared to promote a strong, secure, and united Europe in the 21st
century.

the cost of nato enlargement

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, there is no more complex issue than the
financial cost of NATO enlargement.
Over the past two years there have been several studies by private
and by governmental organizations, which have yielded widely differing
estimates.
The highest figure reached one hundred twenty-five billion dollars
over ten years, with over thirty billion of that accruing to the United
States. The most recent--and I believe the best--estimate is NATO's own
cost study, which estimates only one-and-a-

[[Page S3891]]

half billion dollars in direct costs over ten years. According to the
latest estimate, the expected U.S. contribution to the direct costs of
enlargement are estimated to average forty million dollars per year for
ten years.
There are good reasons for the vast disparities in the estimates--
basically there was a lot of ``apples and oranges'' mixing going on.
Explaining all this requires a fair amount of effort, which, I
regret, some of the critics of enlargement either were unwilling to
give, or which they eschewed for the easier route of utilizing
unexplained, raw data for partisan purposes.
Mr. President, at this time I would like to examine the cost issue.
The 16 NATO nations collectively spent about $455 billion on defense
in 1997. Of that total approximately $1.6 billion goes to the NATO
common budget.
What does the NATO common budget pay for? Let's take the airbase at
Aviano, Italy, as an example.
The host country, Italy, maintains an airbase that has been
designated for NATO use. Italy pays for all costs related to the base
except new construction and improvements that benefit the United States
Air Force units stationed there. These improvements, above and beyond
the national needs of Italy, comprising some $260 million, are paid for
by NATO's common budget.
One of NATO's founding principles was (and remains) equitable cost
sharing--that is, nations make financial contributions to offset costs
based on their ability to pay.
In the 1950's, the U.S. paid almost 50% of NATO's operating costs. In
the 1960's, however, our European allies assumed about half of the
original U.S. contribution in recognition of our worldwide security
commitments.
Since then, our overall national contribution to NATO's three common
budgets has been reduced to about one-quarter. Our allies account for
the other three quarters of NATO operating costs.
We participate in NATO at a reduced rate, but we receive security
benefits that far outweigh our financial contributions.
Let's take a closer look at where our annual contributions to NATO's
budget go.
NATO has three budgets, each supporting a distinct aspect of NATO
operations.
NATO's Civil Budget pays for the operating costs of NATO's modest,
1960's-vintage headquarters building plus associated staff in Brussels.
Additionally, there are numerous public information, political, and
scientific activity programs supported by this budget, including
civilian elements of NATO-sponsored Partnership for Peace activities.
The annual U.S. contribution is provided by the State Department.
NATO's Military Budget provides support for NATO's military
headquarter (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, and other elements of the
integrated command structure.
This budget also supports operations of several key NATO military
agencies, like the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency, the NATO C3
Agency, for example, and the costs of running the NATO AWACS fleet.
Annual contributions are paid from Department of Defense Operations
and Maintenance funds.
NATO's Security Investment Program pays for construction of the
facilities and installations NATO uses to support alliance military
activities, such as command structure C3 support, force mobility
projects, and training facilities--in other words, infrastructure.
It is also used to support common-user procurements to meet priority
military requirements set by SACEUR and SACLANT, like integrated air
defense and interoperable communications systems.
U.S. contributions to this budget are obtained from Department of
Defense Military Construction funds.
As I said, the U.S. pays approximately one-quarter of the overall
NATO common budget.
If there were no enlargement in 1999, we would still expect to pay
about $458 million.
Now let's turn to the costs of enlargement. NATO has estimated that
over 10 years, the cost to the NATO common-funded budgets will be about
$1.5 billion.
While the amount may not be distributed evenly over 10 years, let's
accept for the sake of discussion that it will.
This means that the U.S. quarter-share will be about $400 million
over 10 years, or about $40 million a year.
This represents only a 9% increase in our total contribution to the
NATO common-funded budgets.
Bearing in mind that the U.S. share of NATO's common-funded budgets
represents only one-tenth of one percent of the current defense budget,
I believe that enlargement expenditures are a pretty good deal.
The key questions for us should be: Is the $1.5 billion figure
accurate? What is the U.S. share? and Is the U.S. share a fair share?
Anyone who has looked at this issue would, I believe, agree that it
is extremely confusing.
There are lots of numbers out there on enlargement costs in addition
to the $1.5 billion.
You will recall that the Administration told us in February 1997 that
the total cost of enlargement would be about $27 to 35 billion.
Let's look at those numbers.
First, as the General Accounting Office (GAO) has pointed out, the
Administration's estimate included two categories of costs that are not
direct enlargement costs.
The first was costs to current NATO members--$8 to 10 billion. These
are the national costs the current allies needed to spend to meet their
commitments under the revised 1991 Strategic Concept to improve their
mobility, reinforcement, and power projection capabilities.
They would incur these costs even if NATO did not enlarge.
That's why GAO said the Administration made a mistake in including
them in the February 1997 estimate.
The U.S. has already met its power projection requirements, so we
would not have additional costs in this area.
The second figure in the February 1997 estimate, which is not counted
in the final NATO study, represented the costs to new members to
restructure and modernize their militaries--$10 to 13 billion.
They would incur these costs even if they did not join NATO.
Once again, this is why GAO said the Administration goofed in
including these costs in their February 1997 estimate.
This leaves us with $9 to 12 billion in direct enlargement costs.
Of this $9 to 12 billion, the Administration said in February 1997
that about 60% would be eligible for NATO common funding.
The rest of these direct enlargement costs would be picked up by the
new members.
For example, there is the procurement of something called
Identification of Friend or Foe (IFF) gear--you need to have it if
you're in the Alliance--but NATO common funding won't pay for it.
60% of $9 to 12 billion is about $5.5 to 7 billion.
This is the number we should start with when comparing the NATO
estimate of common-funded costs of $1.5 billion.
What accounts for the difference? $5.5 to 7 billion versus $1.5
billion?
I just talked about the top half of this chart * * * above the dash
line.
Let's focus on why the Administration's $5.5 to 7 billion estimate
and NATO's $1.5 billion estimate are different.
First, there is the matter of four versus three new members. The
Administration did its estimate several months before the decision in
Madrid. The extra member counts for about $1.1 billion. That brings us
down to $4.9 to 6.2 billion.
The February 1997 estimate did not have the benefit of detailed
responses by the three to NATO's Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ)
or the benefit of site visits to the three countries' facilities
conducted by SHAPE military experts.
The infrastructure turned out to be much better than expected. This
is a key point. In February 1997, we thought we had a lot of work to do
to bring airfields up to NATO standards.
The reality is that a number of the Polish, Czech and Hungarian
airfields are in very good shape. The earlier Administration
assumptions about the capacity of the airfields to host NATO aircraft
were incorrect.

[[Page S3892]]

For example, during Partnership for Peace exercises, a Hungarian
airbase successfully hosted a Dutch F-16 squadron, that is, the Dutch
F-16s landed, were serviced and refueled, and took off again.
With regard to funding eligibility: The Administration assumed NATO
would pay for some works that NATO later determined were national
responsibilities.
There were also some pricing differences. The U.S. used generalized
cost factors and pricing, while NATO used by-item, historical cost data
from their files.
While there were some military requirements differences between the
U.S. and NATO studies, these were modest and not operationally
significant. What are we getting for $1.5 billion? Is it the right set
of requirements? The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff says it is.
What are those categories?

C31 Requirements include: Cross border connections, transmission
media, terminal and security equipment; Upgrades to military
headquarters interface equipment; C2 info systems, including the NATO-
specialized functional area sub-system; and a NATO satellite
communications (SATCOM) terminal for Hungary.
Air Defense Requirements include: Air Sovereignty Operations Center
communication links to airfields; NATO air defense ground environment
C2 sites; Interface to the NATO Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS); Installation of Combined Air Operations Centers in Hungary and
Poland; Upgraded air defense radars; and Air Command and Control System
acquisition.
Necessary reinforcement improvements (land, air & maritime facility
upgrades) include: Tactical fighter airfields; An AWACS and air-
refueling forward operating base; Rail and storage facilities for land
reinforcement; Petroleum, oil and lubricant facilities; and Maritime
facilities.
Training and exercise improvements include: Upgrades to air and
ground communications, Tank and vehicle wash facilities, Movement costs
for new allies' exercise participation, and Costs for minor
construction and administrative travel.
Now I would pose the question: are these the right requirements.
I have confidence in the positive assessment of these requirements
given by General Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Department of Defense has assured us that the scenarios which
these requirements have been planned against include robust
assumptions.
These assumptions have changed from the Cold War assumptions of about
40 to 60 divisions coming across the border with less than 24 hours'
warning, to scenarios of 10 to 20 divisions with 60 to 90 days'
warning.
We can discuss the specifics in a classified setting.
But I am satisfied that the requirements are based on reasonable
assumptions, and that they include sound, worst-case analyses, given
the current security environment.
To sum up, the most recent NATO estimate of the direct costs of
enlargement appears to be sound.
The annual costs of NATO enlargement to the United States are real,
but they are affordable, constituting only a tiny fraction of our
annual defense expenditures. For them, we gain three loyal allies with
a quarter-million troops. The costs are, in short, a bargain.
I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the Senate is considering whether Poland,
the Czech Republic, and Hungary should be admitted to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This is one of the most important
foreign policy issues to be considered by the Senate in recent years,
and the outcome will shape the future direction of NATO and our
military relationship with our European allies.
In addressing this question, we should begin with the fundamentals,
by examining the past and future purpose of NATO. NATO is a collective
security military alliance, with the original purpose of defending
Western Europe from a possible attack by the Soviet Union and its
allies in the Warsaw Pact. When considered from that perspective, NATO
stands as one of the most stunningly successful alliances ever
conceived. Not just because it maintained the peace for over forty
years--other alliances in human history have kept the peace for longer
periods of time. The success of NATO cannot be judged merely by time,
but also by the scope of its mission. For, unlike previous military
alliances, NATO was not intended merely to prevent another conventional
war, but also to deter nuclear war. At stake was--and still is--nothing
less than the preservation of global civilization, and the world owes a
debt of gratitude to the alliance and its leaders for maintaining the
peace.
Some have argued that NATO also serves to maintain democratic
traditions, since its original purpose was to protect Western democracy
from an attack by an authoritarian Warsaw Pact. Today, NATO continues
to defend those democratic values, which are part of the criteria in
the decision to expand the membership of the alliance.
Nonetheless, NATO continues to be, first and foremost, a defensive
alliance. Critics of NATO expansion question whether Russia perceives
NATO to be defensive or offensive, and argue that the admission of the
these three new members will ``alarm'' Russia. These critics believe
that Russian nationalists will perceive the expansion of NATO to be the
enlargement of an offensive alliance aimed squarely at the heart of
Russia, rather than the enlargement of a defensive agreement among
nations inclined to keep, not break, the peace.
The question of Russian nationalists, and their future role in their
own country, speaks to the core of the issues surrounding the future of
NATO. The question is not only how Russian nationalists react today,
but also whether the most militaristic and virulent nationalists might
gain power in the future, and whether that could pose a renewed threat
to peace in Europe.
Russia is unstable in virtually every societal area--her economy is
weak, her military in shambles, and civil order is increasingly
dominated by violence and corruption. Although we all sincerely hope
that this wounded bear will regain her health and settle into a
peaceful way of life that protects the interests of all her citizens
and which deals fairly and openly in the community of nations, it is
not at all clear that democratic traditions will survive within that
nation for the next ten years. Some have argued that the expansion of
NATO could be a factor in bringing the nationalists to power. The
available evidence suggests that this is not the case. The Yeltsin
government has publicly accepted the expansion of NATO, and public
opinion polls indicate that the Russian populace is barely aware of
this question, and everyday Russians do not have strong opinions on the
question of NATO expansion. They are far more concerned about bread and
jobs than they are about NATO.
If authoritarian nationalists are to gain power in Russia in the
future, that sad scenario will be caused by the fundamental instability
of Russian democratic institutions, and the general collapse of the
economy, not by NATO expansion. If nationalists seize power, and impose
a new militaristic dictatorship upon Russia, it will pose a new threat
to the peace of Europe, and the continuation of NATO will be essential
to again preserve that peace. We might again face the question of a
newly hostile Russia that possesses a still formidable arsenal of
nuclear-tipped missiles.
I would also note that critics of NATO expansion argue this question
both ways. They argue that we dare not enlarge NATO because it might
irritate or anger the most virulent of the Russian nationalists, yet
those same critics do not address the question of the threat posed by a
future rise to power of those very same nationalists.
In the event of the rise to power of authoritarian nationalists in
Russia, NATO would be strengthened by the admission of these three
nations. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic occupy key
geopolitical positions in the heart of central Europe. For that reason
alone, their addition to NATO is of strategic importance. These three
nations have also met the criteria for membership, and their inclusion
in NATO would more firmly cement their ties to the U.S. and Western
Europe.
Another related question is whether we should enlarge NATO now, or
wait until some undefined future date.

[[Page S3893]]

There is little to be gained through delay, since the Russian
government has largely accepted the addition of these three countries
to NATO. The diplomatic and political conditions are not likely to be
any better in the future, and there is a serious risk that
circumstances may only worsen. For example, if militaristic
nationalists gained power in Russia in the future, they would likely
vehemently object to any expansion of NATO. NATO would likely not act
to expand the alliance in the face of such Russian opposition, fearing
that it might lead to renewed cold war tensions. The bottom line is
that we would not be able to expand NATO at the very time that such
enlargement would be in our national interest. Under such
circumstances, NATO might deeply regret not including Poland, with the
geopolitically important Polish plain, as part of NATO.
It is probably true that some xenophobic Russian nationalists will
tell their people that NATO enlargement poses a threat to their
country. But we know, as do they, that this argument is entirely false.
NATO is inherently a defensive alliance. Its military structure
revolves around the defense of its own territory, and not around the
launching of offensive operations aimed at subjugating Russia. We
cannot base our foreign policy upon the paranoid concerns of the
opponents of democracy in Russia. They will advance arguments to
undermine democracy and U.S.-Russian relations regardless of what we
do.
Another important question is whether there should be another round
of NATO enlargement, and if so, which nations should be included.
Critics of NATO expansion have argued that a decision to admit Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic implies yet another round of expansion,
and that if we start down this path, we will inevitably include even
more nations into NATO.
In my opinion, there is nothing inevitable about this at all. I am
voting on the admission of three nations, and only three nations. My
vote to admit those three does not imply either approval or disapproval
for any other nations. If this or any future administration decides to
recommend another round of countries for admission to NATO, that
recommendation must receive the consent of the Senate to become a
reality.
I want to clearly separate our vote on enlargement today from any
vote in the future on other nations. I recognize that there are deep-
seated concerns about the possible future admission of the Baltic
nations of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. These are important
questions, which would be carefully evaluated by the Senate, and any
decision involving the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic stands by itself.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has performed a vital role in
maintaining the peace and deterring catastrophic nuclear war. I believe
that the enlargement of NATO, by including Poland, the Czech Republic,
and Hungary, will further strengthen that role in the future.
Therefore, I will cast my vote in favor of expansion.
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of expanding the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization to include Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic. It is the right thing to do, right now.
Fifty years ago, President Harry Truman perceived the very real
threat to our national interest posed by the rise of Soviet Communism
in liberated Western Europe. He understood that although turning a
blind, isolationist's eye to trans-Atlantic affairs may have seemed
attractive in the short term, it could prove far more dangerous and
costly to American interests in the long term. Therefore, it was
absolutely in our national interest to promote and defend abroad our
values of democracy and opportunity against an aggressive and
oppressive Soviet regime. To that end, we fashioned the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization--a collective security agreement with fifteen of
our allies. With NATO, insuring that Western Europe's democracies
flourish--and that its economies grow--became a top U.S. priority, and
rightly so.
Fifty years later, the results are impressive and worth examining. By
instituting collective security among its member nations, NATO achieved
collective stability. This stability allowed Western Europe to enjoy
one of its longest periods of sustained peace and economic development
ever. It has recovered remarkably from the scourge of two World Wars,
and free markets have thrived inside of democratic institutions. NATO
not only deterred the Soviets from aggression, but so strong is our
alliance that since its inception no NATO country has ever been
attacked. Of course, this success has not been achieved without
sacrifice or without cost. However, the price of peace is a mere
fraction of the cost of war.
Clearly, the mission of NATO needs to be adapted to the post-Cold War
world. The threat is no longer the clearly defined ominous shadow of
Communism; but the threat of instability is just as real. The Cold War
has ended, and the Warsaw Treaty Organization has been dismantled, but
now is not the time for passive complacency. Just as the war-torn
countries of Western Europe did fifty years ago, the emerging
democracies and economies of today's Eastern Europe need NATO security
to rebuild and to thrive. And now, like then, it is in the national
interest of the United States that this occur.
Expanding NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
will sustain current and future economic reforms. It will promote
cooperation and peace among neighbors. NATO's presence also will fill a
dangerous military and political vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe,
and further cement European security by uniting East with West.
As well as increasing global security, NATO expansion will have
tangible economic benefits. Free but untapped markets in this part of
the world hold tremendous economic potential for U.S. exporters.
And undoubtedly, the prestige, the security, and the validation that
comes with NATO membership will have a profoundly positive
psychological impact on the minds of foreign investors.

Throughout this process it was important that the invited nations
demonstrate that they are willing to make the sincere commitment
required of NATO members, and it seems to me that they have.
Politically, economically, and diplomatically, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland show great promise that they will become strong
partners in our alliance.
Poland, for example, has just witnessed its second democratic change
of government since 1989 as a result of fully free and fair elections.
Its new democratic constitution was approved last year by national
referendum. Economically speaking, Poland is sound. Its economy has
been one of the fastest-growing in Europe since 1993, and the private
sector now accounts for two-thirds of its gross domestic product.
Poland has also codified civilian control and parliamentary oversight
of its military. On the diplomatic front, Poland has resolved
outstanding differences with its neighbors, including Ukraine, with
whom it recently signed a declaration of reconciliation. These
diplomatic efforts would not have been possible but for the promise of
NATO expansion.
After forty years of dictatorship, democracy now reigns in Hungary.
All six of its parliamentary parties support entry into NATO. The
Hungarian government upholds human rights, freedom of expression, rule
of law, and an independent judiciary, and it too has twice held free
elections since the fall of Communism. While attracting almost $16
billion of direct foreign investment, Hungary has engaged in a strict
stabilization program and cut its budget deficits substantially. And on
the diplomatic front, Hungary has recently signed treaties with Romania
and Slovakia, thus ending territorial disputes that had existed for
generations. And the government has agreements with its neighbors,
including Ukraine, to cooperate against organized crime, terrorism, and
drug trafficking.
The story is much the same in the Czech Republic, which has a
constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and
freedom of the press. Two national elections were held in 1996 for the
legislature, and they were free and fair. Since 1989, the Czech
Republic has engaged in tight fiscal policy, liberal trade practices,
and privatization of state enterprises. As a result, unemployment is
low and inflation is controlled. It maintains

[[Page S3894]]

strong relations with its neighbors, especially Germany--its leading
foreign investor--and with Poland, as the two countries have harmonized
their approaches to European Union and NATO membership.
I would now like to make some comments about some of the amendments
we have voted on.
First, I want to say that I opposed the amendment which would have
linked admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to admission
to the European Union. While NATO and the EU have overlapping
membership, they have different missions. NATO is a collective defense
organization designed to protect and defend the territory of its member
states. The EU is not a military but an economic alliance of European
states which does not include the United States. It also does not
include Canada, Iceland, Norway--which by the way rejected EU
membership--nor does it include Turkey.

The question I have is why would we want to allow an organization of
which the US is not a member, to dictate our security interests?
Another concern I have about this amendment is that it would
ultimately--and unnecessarily--delay NATO enlargement, since Poland,
the Czech Republic and Hungary are not members and have only recently
been invited to begin the process of joining.
Second, I opposed the amendment which would have mandated a three
year pause on new members. Article 10 of the NATO charter provides a
mechanism to enlarge the alliance. This article has successfully worked
for 50 years in bringing new member states into NATO. I strongly feel
that this amendment would not have helped NATO, but rather have added
an additional and unnecessary layer of bureaucracy to the process.
The amendment also would have dampened the spirits of other countries
who eagerly want to join NATO. Many of these countries have made
significant sacrifices--both political and economic--to prepare
themselves for future NATO membership. Enacting this amendment would
have reduced the incentives of these countries to continue these
important reforms. I would like to point out, however, that there is no
commitment at this time to invite other nations to join NATO.
Let me conclude. Through democratic and economic reforms, these three
nations have invested in long-term stability. NATO membership promotes
confidence in this regional stability, thus making it even stronger.
If this century has taught us anything, it is that European
instability ultimately becomes our problem. By admitting these
committed and deserving nations to NATO, we will strengthen our
alliance and expand the dividends of peace and prosperity to a level
unprecedented in modern history.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today regarding the topic before us:
Senate ratification to amend the North Atlantic Treaty to allow for the
accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
I wish to commend Senator Helms and Senator Biden for their sustained
efforts to investigate thoroughly the issues inherent in this historic
move.
As befits the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee has held numerous public hearings and
provided many briefings and reports giving consideration to all
aspects--and all views--regarding this historic move.
The Budget, Appropriations, Armed Services and Intelligence
Committees in both bodies of Congress have further contributed to this
valuable debate. Indeed, in the post-Cold War era in which we now find
ourselves, I don't believe any issue has been more thoroughly vetted,
and I thank my colleagues and the leaders of the relevant committees
for their efforts.
I have lent a great deal of thought to this issue. Amid the euphoria
of 1989, when many focused on the stunning collapse of Soviet
occupation throughout central and eastern Europe, we had to recognize
that a yawning geopolitical vacuum had just opened. For the first few
years we correctly focused on assisting the Germans in their successful
reunification efforts, but as nascent democratic and free markets
institutions arose in central Europe, the United States stepped in to
assist and solidify these developments.
The costs to us of solidifying these institutions were significantly
less than the costs of waging the Cold War, but the benefits we saw--in
terms of the freedom spread where darkness reigned for nearly half a
century--were so much greater.
Mr. President, I have regularly visited the countries that will soon
be accepted as NATO's new members, sometimes on my own, sometimes with
other members, and regularly with our delegations to the North Atlantic
Assembly, recently under the leadership of my colleague Senator Roth. I
have met with their political leaders, their military representatives,
and local analysts on many occasions, as I have sought to measure their
level of democratic advancement.
In 1995, I was honored to address the first multinational graduating
class from the International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest,
Hungary, where the FBI now works with law enforcement officials from
throughout central Europe to assist in combating criminal challenges to
us all.
Democracy is strong in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. The
rule of law is established, civilian control of militaries is well-
established, and these nations rightly take their place alongside the
nations of the West.
There are a few voices, Mr. President, who argue that what the
nations of central Europe need more than NATO membership is economic
development. This is the essence of the amendment proposed by my
respected colleague, Senator Moynihan, which requires European Union
membership prior to the deposit of our instrument of ratification.
With great respect for the senior Senator of New York, I must
disagree: Yes, the countries of central Europe require economic
development, but it is mistaken, in my view, to believe that economic
development and geopolitical advantage are exclusive of each other.
The European Union has only planned for joint defense capabilities;
NATO has preserved the territorial integrity for its members for nearly
half a century. The European Union excludes the United States; but the
United States leads NATO. Therefore, subjecting determinations for
future NATO expansions to the European Union is not only unwise, it is,
in my view, illogical.
Mr. President, you have heard this many times already in this debate,
and I daresay you will hear it many more times. The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization is the most successful treaty defense organization
in human history.
Twice, before the founding of NATO, the United States was drawn into
wars on the European continent, where we suffered huge losses of blood
and treasure. An unbridled Germany and an unstable central Europe were
predominant reasons for the calamities that became these world wars.
The accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO in 1955 firmly
established free Germany into the community of western democracies.
With the unification of Germany in 1990 following the collapse of the
Soviet empire, the integration of Germany was complete. Throughout that
period, NATO succeeded by the virtue of its defensive cohesiveness and
its deterrent effect on the European continent.
Today, we are set to integrate three important nations of central
Europe, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland. With their
integration, geopolitical space in central Europe will be firmly
incorporated into the territory protected by the defensive military
alliance of NATO.
As the report accompanying the resolution of ratification asserts
correctly: ``With the enlargement of NATO, the United States and its
allies have an opportunity to build a more stable Europe, to lock in
that stability, and to replace the dynamics of confrontation and
conflict with trust and cooperation.''
Some have asserted that no threat exists to legitimize such an
enlargement to the alliance now.
Mr. President, the extension of geopolitical stability in Europe is
an insurance policy against the future development of regional threats.
The United States, and the United States Senate, should not need to
wait for the development of an imminent threat in order to implement
sound geopolitical strategy.

[[Page S3895]]

NATO's mission has always been subject to certain applications beyond
the core mission to defend territory. These applications have reflected
consensus among members regarding military challenges, and I am
hesitant to amend this resolution in any way that would impose
definitions or mechanisms that might politicize the carefully honed
language of the original North Atlantic Treaty.
I believe the language of the resolution sufficiently asserts the
central mission and strategic rationale for this enlargement.
It is entirely reasonable for the Senate to carefully review the
costs that this enlargement will incur.
Through the years of considering this move, many numbers have been
manufactured: the range has been startling and the spin has been
confounding.
I suppose it is somewhat predictable that attempts were made to
politicize these numbers, but the scrutiny of many committee hearings
have provided great focus. I am confident that the most recent GAO and
CBO estimates are accurate: a total of $1.5 billion in increased U.S.
contributions over the next 10 years. For increasing the geopolitical
stability well into central Europe, this is a sound and defensible
expenditure.
A great deal of debate has focused on the consequences of NATO
enlargement on Russian geopolitical behavior and U.S.-Russian
relations.
I am not convinced of any direct causality between NATO's decision to
enlarge and the content and direction of Russian foreign policy. I
think historians and analysts of Russia concur with my view.
Despite an unprecedented U.S.-Russia relationship that has developed
over the past decade, a relationship that has seen billions of
U.S. assistance go to the development of Russian democratic
institutions, a relationship that has seen Russian and American troops
serving side-by-side in Bosnia, some believe that this expansion of
NATO will poison our efforts, or will, in the words of some, ``scare
the Russians.''

I have visited Russia many times in my career in the Senate, most
recently three weeks ago. Senator Gordon Smith, who is chairman of the
European Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, and I had many meetings with the Russian foreign policy
establishment, including Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov, responsible
for U.S.-Russia relations, and Andrey Kokoshin, Secretary of President
Yeltsin's Security Council. We met with a number of Duma and Federation
Council members. We discussed many aspects of our bilateral relations,
and NATO was reviewed in every meeting.
Every Russian official I met in Moscow objected to NATO enlargement.
Yet every official I met denied that they believed NATO posed a
military threat to Russia's territorial integrity, and every official I
met admitted that, despite being unhappy with this enlargement, they
were all reconciled to this development. Mr. President, no Russian--not
one--told me that NATO enlargement would be a legitimate cause for
reversal of Russia's domestic evolution toward democracy.
Not one Russian official told me he was afraid of NATO enlargement.
Not one Russian, Mr. President, objected to the new contiguous border
between Poland and Kaliningrad.
I must admit that I find this objection raised by opponents to
enlargement to be somewhat bizarre. Since Turkey's accession to NATO in
1952, NATO had a long border with what was then the Soviet Union--we
used to have nuclear-armed Jupiter missiles in that border country. We
also had a contiguous border between NATO and the Soviet Union along
Norway's eastern border with the Kola peninsula, behind which the
Soviet Union's strategic naval forces resided.
And now we have opponents objecting to a border with Kaliningrad,
which is not contiguous with Russia itself? Or, even stranger, there
are those who analogize the Kaliningrad situation with a Russian
alliance with Mexico along our southern border.
Such an argument would have been denounced 15 years ago as ``moral
equivalence.'' Today, the Kaliningrad argument is ahistorical and
simply dilatory.

Every Russian I met three weeks ago told me they still objected to
NATO enlargement, but told me also they wanted to work with the
Founding Act instrumentalities and were eager to continue and expand
our many levels of bilateral cooperation.
The enlargement of NATO that this body will pass in the next few days
is not short-sighted, Mr. President, but the most significant foreign
policy act before the end of this century.
It has been long-considered, and, frankly, desired even longer. I
recall the days when we looked across the Iron Curtain to countries we
knew had once had Western, democratic societies.
I hope this is not the last enlargement, although I am confident that
future enlargements, if they occur, will occur with the same detailed,
painstaking consideration as we have conducted over the past four
years.
Over the course of this debate we will hear quoted many testimonials
by Americans from all walks of life, both parties, and all regions in
favor of the move we will ultimately take.
It is particularly significant to me that the American Legion, as
well as the American Veterans of Foreign Wars, have endorsed NATO
enlargement. These men and women know the territory; they know the
history; and they know the price. I'm proud to be associated with them
on this important issue.
Mr. President, I am a strong supporter of this historic move. The
countries formerly imprisoned by the Soviets have come out of the cold,
have elected democratic governments that have established the rule of
law, civilian control over their militaries and individual liberty and
free markets. They have all indicated strong support from their publics
for NATO membership and its responsibilities.
A geostrategic vacuum, long a source of instability on the European
continent, is being filled--by an organization that is strictly
defensive, with absolutely no offensive intentions. The action this
body takes in the next few days--by ratifying this protocol to the
North Atlantic Treaty--will not only extend stability into central
Europe, but will extend the promise of peace and stability into the
next century.
I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
Mr. ASHCROFT addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DeWINE). The Senator from Missouri.
Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, may I inquire as to the order of
business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution is open for general debate.
Mr. ASHCROFT. I thank the Chair. I am pleased to have this
opportunity to make some comments about NATO expansion, particularly as
it relates to the resolution of ratification for protocols to the North
Atlantic Treaty.
As was evident earlier, I had an amendment which was designed to
challenge a transformation of NATO that would take place as a result of
the resolution of ratification which would essentially expand the scope
of NATO.
I would refer Members of the Senate to the New York Times of last
Friday, April 24.
The editorial is identified as ``The Senate's Duty on NATO.'' It
reads as follows:

The ratification resolution promiscuously opens the door to
NATO military actions almost anywhere in the world. That
startling expansion of NATO's license to conduct military
operations demands extensive debate.

Here you have the New York Times drawing attention to this expansion
of NATO's scope and mission. It says that the mission of NATO is
being--in the words of the New York Times--changed when the resolution
``promiscuously opens the door to NATO military actions almost anywhere
in the world.'' To change the nature of a treaty promiscuously, as the
New York Times suggests, without asking the Senate to ratify the
change, is a dangerous and troubling precedent. It is inappropriate.
I have raised this issue of NATO's broadened mission throughout the
debate on NATO expansion. I raised it before this New York Times
editorial was published, but I am very pleased that they would draw
attention to this ``startling expansion of NATO's license to conduct
military operations.'' I don't think you can expand a treaty's license
to conduct military operations without consulting the Senate and
obtaining this body's advice and consent.
The New York Times stated this issue demands extensive debate. I
proposed that we debate it, and I proposed

[[Page S3896]]

that we curtail this expansive extension of the ability of the NATO
alliance to be involved in military operations around the world,
regardless of whether they are related to NATO's collective defense
mission. Frankly, I am very disappointed that the Members of the Senate
have not engaged in extensive debate in this area--an area in which the
Senate has been largely ignored by an administration which seeks to
transform NATO into an entirely new organization. Treaty creep is what
is occurring and NATO is being altered from a defense of territory
organization to a defense of interest organization. The interests of
NATO nations can be pursued around the globe, with international
deployments of NATO forces not necessarily for the defense of NATO
territorial integrity or political independence.
The New York Times properly says this expansion of NATO's scope
demands extensive debate. I am sorry to say that the Senate decided to
walk away from its obligation to oversee the ratification of this
fundamental change in the treaty. By tabling the amendment, the Senate
has failed to address an issue of fundamental importance for the future
strength of NATO and the security of the United States.
It is not every day that I agree with the New York Times, but I think
the article is insightful and clear on this point. I would like to take
just a few minutes--and I will use some of these charts--to indicate
the missed opportunity of the Senate to look carefully at what is
happening to the mission of NATO. I intend to vote against the
ratification of this treaty, if for no other reason than the
promiscuous expansion of NATO's mission endorsed in this resolution of
ratification. This shift from a defense of territory to a defense of
interests is a tremendous question that must be addressed with regard
to the future of NATO.
Let me just refer the Senate to the statement of William Perry, the
immediate past U.S. Secretary of Defense. He was one of the architects
of the treaty expansion that is before us. Here is what he says:

The original mission of NATO--deterring an attack from the
Soviet Union--is obviously no longer relevant.

Then he goes on.

The original geographical area of NATO responsibility is no
longer sufficient. The original military structure of NATO is
no longer appropriate. . . . The new missions of NATO--

You know, this debate hasn't been about new missions. This debate has
been about three new countries. But here the architect of the expansion
said:

The new missions of NATO should be preventive defense--
creating the conditions for peace in Europe . . . the
geographical area of NATO interests should be anywhere in the
world . . . .
That means the ambit of deployment, the arena for the deployment of
NATO troops, including young men and women from the United States, is
anywhere in the world. I think before we make that kind of change, we
ought to think very carefully. No wonder the New York Times says,
``That startling expansion of NATO's license to conduct military
operations demands extensive debate.'' I shudder to think that we
consider tabling ``the most extensive debate.''
But here is what the Secretary of State had to say. Secretary
Albright, according to the Washington Post:

. . . also has urged that an expanding North Atlantic
Treaty Organization . . . must extend its geographic reach
beyond the European Continent and evolve into a `force for
peace from the Middle East to central Africa.'

All of us want to see peace around the world. We all want peace in
the Middle East. We all want peace in central Africa. But if we allow a
treaty to evolve through treaty creep, letting it expand on its own
rather than having a real discussion on the role and responsibility of
the United States and NATO and its proposed new missions of serving as
a force for peace from the Middle East to central Africa, then we are
not fulfilling our responsibility as members of this body.
It is sad that the Senate of the United States decided to turn its
back from that kind of discussion and decided that it would table that
debate. This is a serious matter, whether we are going to be sending
young men and women of the United States of America to perhaps stain
the soil of Africa under some NATO mission, perhaps an international
policing operation not envisaged in the NATO treaty. Such operations
were never before thought to be within NATO's scope, because the
alliance was explicitly for the defense of territory.
Now, by expansion of NATO's mission through press release and speech,
the Secretary of State says we are going to be involved in central
Africa and the Middle East in ways we had not ever anticipated. This
treaty is changing in fundamental ways. If we allow NATO's expanded
mission to be achieved through the unilateral press release, statement,
and policy of this administration, what is the value of the U.S. Senate
in giving its advice and consent to treaties? If the Senate does not
fulfill its role, perhaps it would just take a single treaty that any
administration then could evolve into whatever it chose. I think we
ought to think seriously about allowing an organization, the most
successful military collective defense organization in the history of
the world, to be simply evolved into something for which it was never
intended.
Just to make it clear that it was never intended, let me refer you to
the statement of Senator Tom Connally. Tom Connally is not one of our
contemporaries but was a Senator, chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee in the year 1949, when the NATO alliance first came into
existence. Here is what Tom Connally said: ``Let us not forget''--
awesome words, because I think we are in the process of forgetting--
``that this treaty is limited in scope.''
It was to be limited to North Atlantic Treaty Organization member
states. Now we are talking about anywhere in the world. We are talking
about beyond Europe to central Africa.
This treaty is limited in scope. [I quote again Senator Connally.]
Its main purpose is to maintain the peace and security of the North
Atlantic area. We do not propose to stretch its terms to cover the
entire globe.
The elasticity of stretched treaties has reached new limits, or
perhaps has found no limits in what we are willing to do here today.
The suggestion of the New York Times that this kind of expansion, this
promiscuous opening of the door to military deployments around the
world, doesn't merit discussion at all, it merited tabling--this is a
sad day. A global NATO? That is not what Tom Connally thought we had.
As a matter of fact, NATO's first strategic concepts really focused
on two things, ``Defense planning limited to the defense of the treaty
area,'' and, ``NATO military authorities have no responsibilities or
authority except with respect to incidents which are covered by
articles V and VI of the North Atlantic Treaty.'' It was a defense of
area treaty. It wasn't to be an alliance the troops of which could be
deployed like a mini-United Nations, with a standing army, to the hot
spots around the globe for so-called international policing or so-
called peacekeeping. It was to be something that defended the NATO
nations. And to change this essential mission for NATO, I contend,
should come before the Senate for its advice and consent.
However, these strategic concepts of the past have been superseded by
the Strategic Concept of 1991. Here, instead of having the defense of
territory as being primary, we find ``to provide one of the
indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in
Europe''--all of Europe this time, not just the NATO nations--``in
which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European
Nation.'' This is treaty creep. We have gone from the member nations of
NATO to the European Continent as a whole to ``stop intimidation'' and
``coercion''.
The first priority in the 1991 Strategic Concept is to expand beyond
the member nations of NATO. Talk about the latitude to deploy troops
throughout Europe, and we have seen out-of-area deployments become the
primary focus of the NATO alliance.
No. 2, ``to serve as provided for in article IV of the North Atlantic
Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for allied consultations on any issues
that affect their vital interests.''
Oh, no, we have moved from defense of territory and the defense of
the political integrity of member nations to the defense of vital
interests. I suppose ``vital interests'' could include trade

[[Page S3897]]

interests or interests in humanitarian concerns or interests in
cultural exchanges. We find ourselves with a real potential for the
expansion of the scope of this treaty.
All of a sudden, the collective defense of the territory of the NATO
nations is no longer the prime task, according to the Strategic
Concepts of 1991. Where do we find the collective defense? We find them
down in 3 and 4. They have been placed at the bottom of the list.
There is a new agenda for NATO nations. Not the defense of territory,
it is the defense of ``vital interests.'' No wonder they are talking
about deploying troops in Africa in international policing operations.
No wonder Secretary Perry talked about deploying troops around the
globe. The NATO nations could have commercial interests and trade
interests around the world.
Some would say this expansion of mission is an appropriate thing. I
think when the New York Times said this demands extensive debate, they
weren't ruling out such an expansion of mission out of hand. I don't
think setting NATO on a course to become a mini-U.N. with a standing
army is a good thing, and, as the New York Times points out, we should
at least have an extensive debate before NATO takes this step. When the
time came this evening to look carefully at this, we found the Senate
saying, ``We'll table it; we won't consider it.'' As we all know here,
a motion to table cuts off debate. It doesn't provide for debate.
Let me just say, when the treaty was entered into, it was pretty
clear what territory was covered. Article VI defined the territory that
was to be defended:

Any of the parties in Europe or North America, on the
Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey,
or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the
parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of
Cancer.

Sounds like the legal description of a deed to the house. It is
specific; it is particular. It doesn't say you deploy resources all
around the globe to protect interests. It says that resources are to be
used to defend territory. We have seen this change, and it is reflected
over and over again.
The point that I am making is that when you change the nature of a
treaty, you have a responsibility, at least as members of the United
States Senate, to do so carefully. We didn't even have debate on this
amendment today. We simply had a motion to table the amendment in haste
to move on to other things.
Here is what happens when you cut defense and you start thinking
about global deployments. One of the things I fear is that the same
problem that has attended the deployment of our own Armed Forces around
the world in peacekeeping and policing operations could happen to NATO.
And you know, our Armed Forces are threatened because we have a
tremendous willingness in the administration to deploy, but not much
willingness to fund. We cut the funding and cut the funding and cut the
funding, and we keep sending more troops to different places. As this
administration has slashed defense spending, one wonders whether the
resource that is devoted to the military and defense of this country is
being impaired. I am confident that there are instances where it is.

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic comprise 301,000 new square
miles of territory to be defended; 2,612 miles of new borders to be
defended. And yet, our total national defense spending fell by 27
percent over the last 8 years. And we are going to take on a
substantial new commitment. Our share of whatever happens in NATO has
always been about 25 percent. We are going to have that kind of an
increase in commitment while we are having this kind of plummeting
devotion of resources to our own military spending.
Additionally, we have spent money in a lot of different ways in these
out-of-area deployments for our own Armed Forces. Outside normal
training and alliance commitments, the Army conducted 10 operational
events between 1960 and 1991. Ten times we deployed troops in that 31-
year period, and that is when we had a significant devotion of
resources to support the troops.
Since 1991, we have been cutting our resources to the troops
substantially. And what have we done while we have been cutting their
supplies? We have been sending them out at an alarmingly higher rate.
We had 10 deployments in 31 years, and then in the next 7 years, we
have had 26 deployments. That is a formula for difficulty, and if that
is the way we are going to treat NATO, by having increasing deployments
based on the interest of the parties, not to defend the strategic
territories of the parties, but to just sort of defend their vital
interests, be they in Africa, Asia or the Middle East or somewhere
else, then the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is North Atlantic in
name only.
If we begin to deploy NATO forces without reference to the alliance's
mission, we could hollow out this most successful defense organization
ever in the history of mankind. We could hollow it out so it loses its
effectiveness.
Our Marine Corps conducted 15 contingency operations between 1982 and
1989 and 62 since the fall of the Berlin Wall.
This business of deploying people all around the world is serious,
and if we are going to do that with NATO, we are going to see some of
the same challenges that we have seen in our own operations, because we
are having trouble with maintaining our armed forces. Our fleets are
getting old, and we are having trouble with reenlistments because we
don't have the resources.
The same kind of problems besetting our own military also could beset
the NATO alliance. The point I am making is simply this: If you are
going to change the mission of NATO, if you are going to change it from
defending territory, which is identified and understandable, located
and clearly marked, and you are going to start making NATO into an
organization the troops of which can be sent anywhere, anywhere in the
world in the defense of ``the interests,'' we may well threaten the
viability of NATO itself.
Let me just conclude by making this statement: We talk about NATO
troops as if they are individuals who are strangers. Well, NATO troops
include folks from the United States of America. They include our sons
and our daughters, our brothers and sisters, our nephews and nieces. I
don't think we should embark upon a program of substantial change in
the responsibility and duty of those troops without considering it
very, very carefully. To switch from defending the territory of the
NATO nations to defending interests potentially around the globe is to
make a major change that merits the close scrutiny and extensive debate
that this Senate should and could provide but which it declined to
provide when this amendment was tabled.
However, these strategic concepts of the past have been superseded by
the Strategic Concept of 1991. Here, instead of having the defense of
territory as being primary, we find ``to provide one of the
indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in
Europe''--all of Europe this time, not just the NATO nations--``in
which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European
Nation.'' This is treaty creep. We have gone from the member nations of
NATO to the European Continent as a whole to stop intimidation and
coercion.
The first priority in the 1991 Strategic Concept is to expand beyond
the member nations of NATO. Talk about the latitude to deploy troops
throughout Europe, and we have seen out-of-area deployments become the
primary focus of the NATO alliance.
No. 2, ``to serve as provided for in article IV of the North Atlantic
Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for allied consultations on any issues
that affect their vital interests.''
Oh, no, we have moved from defense of territory and the defense of
the political integrity of member nations to the defense of vital
interests. I suppose ``vital interests'' could include trade interests
or interests in humanitarian concerns or interests in cultural
exchanges. We find ourselves with a real potential for the expansion of
the scope of this treaty.
All of a sudden, the collective defense of the territory of the NATO
nations is no longer the prime task, according to the Strategic
Concepts of 1991. Where do we find the collective defense? We find them
down in 3 and 4. They have been placed at the bottom of the list.
There is a new agenda for NATO nations. Not the defense of territory,
it is the defense of ``vital interests.'' No wonder they are talking
about deploying troops in Africa in international

[[Page S3898]]

policing operations. No wonder Secretary Perry talked about deploying
troops around the globe. The NATO nations could have commercial
interests and trade interests around the world.
Some would say this expansion of mission is an appropriate thing. I
think when the New York Times said this demands extensive debate, they
weren't ruling out such an expansion of mission out of hand. I don't
think setting NATO on a course to become a mini-UN with a standing army
is a good thing, and, as the New York Times points out, we should at
least have an extensive debate before NATO takes this step. When the
time came this evening to look carefully at this, we found the Senate
saying, ``We'll table it; we won't consider it.'' As we all know here,
a motion to table cuts off debate. It doesn't provide for debate.
Let me just say, when the treaty was entered into, it was pretty
clear what territory was covered. Article VI defined the territory that
was to be defended:

Mr. President, I thank you for this opportunity, and I yield the
floor.
Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
Mr. LOTT. I believe the Senator from Texas wishes to be recognized
next, but just so the Senators will be on notice to what I think will
happen now, the Senator from Texas wishes to speak a few minutes on the
final disposition of this issue. Senator Smith will be recognized to
offer an amendment. His amendment will be set aside, and Senator Inhofe
will have an amendment he will offer. At the conclusion of their
debate, then we would anticipate that there would be two or three votes
that would occur, hopefully in sequence, so this could begin in a
relatively short period of time.
We do not have a time agreement, but we hope to reach conclusion
before too late into the night.
Mr. FORD. Would the Senator yield?
Mr. LOTT. Yes.
Mr. FORD. Is there a chance we might get a time agreement on those
other two amendments?
Mr. LOTT. I believe, I say to the Senator, they would prefer that we
not have a time agreement, but they do not anticipate taking a long
time.
Mr. FORD. I thank the Senator.
Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I believe I share with a substantial
number of my colleagues a real sense of unease about the process that
we are about to finish. When I made my opening comments about the
resolution before us, I noticed that a legislative body is ill-suited
to the task of establishing order, coherence, and discipline to a
foreign policy initiative. The last few days have proven me right, as
we have missed the opportunity to greatly improve the resolution before
us.
The decision to expand NATO and extend invitations was made in the
heat of a political campaign, with little attention given to the truly
important questions that should have been addressed.
There has been no assessment of the threat against which the military
alliance was supposed to defend. There were no clear criteria
established for membership in NATO. We did not use

[[Page S3899]]

this opportunity to debate what the mission of NATO should be in the
post-cold-war era. We have not used this opportunity to lay out clear
expectations for the next group of would-be members of NATO. We have
left no roadmap for the future.
Unfortunately, the administration did little to address these issues
when it proposed to expand the alliance in the first place. The Senate
was placed in the position of having to do so because of a failure of
executive leadership. And I do not think the Senate has done very well,
either.
Why was it left to us to wonder about the possibility for border and
ethnic disputes to impact the expanded alliance in a way that might
hurt U.S. interests?
While my amendment on that matter was defeated, 37 Members, more than
one-third needed to stop future expansions, believe that a process to
address such disputes is important and should be discussed. Other
Members raised equally valid concerns, and they were nearly all
defeated.
The Senator from Virginia had a prudent proposal to step back after
the first round of expansion to let the experience be fully absorbed by
the United States and her allies. Defeated.
Our colleague from Idaho wondered if we should not at least vote to
authorize the ongoing and possibly open-ended NATO mission in Bosnia
before we think about expanding the alliance to new members. Defeated.
The Senator from New Mexico said strategy should be adopted before we
take in new members. Defeated.
Because the concerns of so many Members were so summarily dispensed
with, many will find it difficult to support this resolution. How much
stronger a signal might this body have sent on this important matter if
there had been more willingness to find an acceptable compromise with
concerned Members, many of whom are not on the relevant committees and
had no opportunity to really fashion the underlying resolution.
Instead, we have a resolution that has very little to say about the
future beyond the fact that we will likely add three new members to the
alliance. But that has never really been the debate here as far as I am
concerned.
Most of us have not opposed the three countries being considered for
immediate membership. We were concerned about the process by which we
got to this point. In many ways, after more than a week of debate, we
are still not much further than when we started.
For example, there is no strategic rationale for the new NATO
alliance. It is not due from the President until 180 days after this
resolution is passed. There is still no credible estimate about the
cost. We have seen estimates miraculously shrink from $125 billion to a
couple of million as we have gotten closer to this vote. Obviously, no
one knows what the real cost will be. At least we have the protections
available because of the cost caps imposed by the amendment of the
Senator from Alaska.
In the meantime, this body over the last couple of days has voted for
a provision that allows NATO possibly to engage in military efforts on
border and ethnic disputes but, rather strangely, voted against letting
NATO attempt to resolve such disputes peaceably at the lower levels
through dispute resolution.
In short, I think, Mr. President, that both the administration and
the Senate have approached the issue of NATO enlargement in a rather
haphazard and disjointed manner. Because this Senate defeated the pause
proposed by the Senator from Virginia, we will probably be debating the
admission of yet another tranche of countries before we have any idea
about cost, border disputes, or strategic rationale.
So where are we now? Instead of debating the more challenging issues
involving the future of the alliance, we are left with a narrow
question: Should Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary be admitted to
NATO?
These countries have made a sustained commitment to democratic
capitalism since the end of the cold war. In numerous discussions with
the Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers from each of these three
countries as a member of the U.S. Senate's NATO Observer Group, I am
convinced that they intend to aggressively shoulder the burdens of
membership in NATO. They seek no special treatment, and they wish only
to be treated as full members of the alliance with the rights and the
responsibilities entailed.
Further, these countries have demonstrated a commitment to the goals
of the alliance. They have contributed, in some cases heavily, to the
ongoing NATO mission in Bosnia. In the case of Hungary, the United
States has staged its Bosnia operations there for some years. The U.S.
presence there has approached that of our closest NATO allies and our
non-NATO allies. And the Hungarians have been excellent hosts to U.S.
forces.
While I remain steadfast in my belief that NATO needs and should at
least discuss the adoption of a formal dispute resolution process, the
fact is that these countries have worked hard to resolve disputes with
neighbors. The Czech Republic peaceably separated itself from Slovakia.
Hungary and Romania have signed a treaty to resolve issues surrounding
the treatment of ethnic Hungarians in Romania.
Despite these strong indications that these countries are ready for
the burdens and benefits of alliance membership, I would nevertheless
have retained additional reservations had the managers not accepted the
U.S. cost limitations proposed by the Senator from Alaska.
A major issue that must be addressed is how much should the United
States continue to shoulder for peace in Europe? We pay 25 percent of
the cost of NATO. The Stevens amendment will keep U.S. costs at no
greater than what we now spend for NATO. Additional costs incidental to
the adoption of three new members will have to be specifically
authorized by Congress.
With great reservations about this process, I will not vote against
three countries that I believe will strengthen the alliance. I do hope
this administration will not come to us again with new countries
invited before the strategic rationale, cost limitations, border
dispute processes and other conditions many of us tried and failed to
impose. I hope we will not put the cart before the horse.
To that end, I take some comfort in the vote totals for at least two
of the amendments that failed. My amendment on conflict resolution
received 37 votes. Senator Warner's amendment, requiring a pause of 3
years, received 41 votes. It takes 34 votes to stop a future treaty.
I hope the administration and its successors would see these votes as
cautionary should they consider going forward and raising expectations
of good people in other countries before looking at the long-term
security interests of America and considering what our responsibility
is throughout the world. America has never walked away from its
responsibilities. We want to pay our fair share. But we would not
represent the taxpayers of this country if we allowed our country to
take more than its fair share and thereby debilitate the strength of
our own security.
I hope that we can move forward now and continue to have the Senate
maintain its constitutional responsibility in treaties of advise and
consent, not just consent. What we have done instead of truly rewriting
the course of our future and creating an alliance for the next century
is to add three new members to an alliance whose purpose and therefore
whose future is no more certain than when we began this process.
While I cast a vote in favor, I take no great comfort in doing so and
I hope the next debate is on the role of NATO in the post-cold-war era.
Only then will we assure that the greatest defense alliance in the
history of the world will remain exactly that.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.

Executive Amendment No. 2328

(Purpose: To condition United States ratification of the protocols on
specific legislative action for the continued deployment of United
States Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO
mission)

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the
desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. Smith], proposes an
executive amendment numbered 2328.

[[Page S3900]]

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent
reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the appropriate place in section 3 of the resolution,
insert the following:
( ) Legislative action regarding deployments in bosnia and
herzegovina.--Prior to the deposit of the United States
instrument of ratification, the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have taken a vote on legislation
that, if enacted, would contain specific authorization for
the continued deployment of the United States Armed Forces in
Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO mission in that
country.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and
nays on my amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I say to my colleagues I will be very
brief and try to keep it within 10 minutes.
This amendment is really quite simple. It is very much like the Craig
amendment that we voted on earlier with the exception that it doesn't
call for the passage. It simply says that one way or the other we would
require Congress to debate and then vote--whichever way the vote comes
out--but just vote on our deployment in Bosnia prior to depositing the
instruments of ratification.
I want to briefly touch on why I am offering this amendment. When the
Congress first considered the President's plan to send troops to Bosnia
in 1995, the administration placed very clear limits on the duration of
this commitment. On every single occasion I am aware of, the
administration official stated that U.S. troops would remain in Bosnia
for 1 year. In fact, Secretary Perry, on December 1, 1995, said, ``We
believe the mission can be accomplished in one year, so we based our
plan on that time line. This schedule is realistic because the specific
military tasks in the agreement can be completed in the first six
months and thereafter IFOR's role will be to maintain the climate of
stability that will permit civil work to go forward. We expect these
civil functions will be successfully initiated in one year. But, even
if some of them are not, we must not be drawn into a posture of
indefinite garrison.''
I think these remarks were well intended, and I think it is clear
that the Secretary of Defense meant what he said, but it is also clear
that they didn't bear out.
We also heard from Secretary of State Holbrooke on December 6, 1995:
``The military tasks are doable within 12 months. There isn't any
question * * * The deeper question * * * [is] whether the nonmilitary
functions can be done in 12 months. That's a real question. But it's
not the NATO or U.S. force responsibility to do that. It's on the
civilian side, working with the Europeans. It's going to be very tough.
Should the military stick around until every refugee has gone home,
'til everything else in the civilian annexes has been done? No, that is
not their mission.''
There were many of us who watched these comments--especially in the
Armed Services Committee--very closely, studying the conflict in
Bosnia. We felt that this was an unrealistic commitment. We didn't feel
that those kinds of commitments should have been made, because we
didn't feel they could have been kept. But the American people had no
choice but to kind of accept these comments from our leaders.
I was disappointed but I wasn't surprised when right after the 1996
elections, the President announced the continuation of the military
commitment for an additional 18 months, to June of 1998. That is where
we are now. It is almost June of 1998. Last December, the President
acknowledged that our commitment now in Bosnia is open ended but we are
still talking about clear and achievable goals.
For 2 years the President has had this opportunity, and I believe
that he has been wrong in making these statements. I believe it is
wrong for the Government to conduct the foreign policy of the United
States without any input from Congress and the public. The American
people need to understand what is at stake and either agree to the
commitment or not. We have a commitment. The President made it, and now
he has extended it open ended.
The question before the Congress today is, do you want to continue
with an open-ended commitment, a blank check in Bosnia or don't you?
The President has stated he wants to, and he stated why. Now the
American people ought to hear from us, the Congress, as to whether or
not this is a good idea or a bad idea.
This is no longer simply a Presidential use of force based on his
judgment of an immediate threat. We now have nation-building in Bosnia
as deliberate foreign policy, and it ought to be approved and funded by
the Congress of the United States. Failure to place this before
Congress, in my opinion, will destroy congressional support for his
foreign policy and, frankly, it insults the intelligence of the
American people.
There already has been a casualty in Bosnia, and that casualty is the
trust of the American people that their Government will do what it says
it will do when it puts American armed forces in harm's way.
I don't see how Congress can allow this extended commitment to
continue simply because the President sees no way out. Now, I have been
around the cloakroom and in meetings for a couple of years now while
this policy has been going on and I have been hearing a lot of
complaining from my colleagues, a lot of complaining about how this
will continue, it is open ended, what are we going to do about it.
Here is a chance to vote--and I'm not asking you to vote to say that
we ought to take the troops out or leave them in; I'm asking you to
vote. All I'm asking for is a vote. It could go 5-90 against deployment
or the other way around for deployment. I'm not asking for a vote to
come out either direction. I'm just simply saying the Congress should
vote, the Senate and the House of Representatives, before we deposit
the instruments of ratification. That is all this amendment does. It
does nothing less and it does nothing more.
I don't, frankly, think that is asking very much. With the new
nations we may have more Bosnias. We may have more Bosnias before we
are finished, especially as we continue the expansion that Senator
Hutchison of Texas was talking about a few moments ago, where we
defeated the Warner amendment. So who is next down the line? We
continue to draw lines. Where do we draw these lines? This is a very
important debate, and I really cannot understand why anybody would
oppose this amendment that simply says vote one way or the other. Keep
them in 90-10, or take them out 90-10. Just vote. That is all this
amendment asks for, before we submit the articles of ratification. In
either case, I think the objective is clear that the American people
need to be heard. They haven't been heard. We should let them be heard
right here on the floor of the U.S. Senate.

Again, let me just say that if my colleagues on both sides of the
issue don't support this amendment, which simply requires them to cast
a vote--just cast a vote--on this matter before the June 30 deadline,
they ought to forever keep their peace on Bosnia. No more complaining
in the cloakroom, no more speeches on the floor about how the policy is
so bad and so open-ended, no more second-guessing the President, no
more criticizing the President, no more saying Congress doesn't have
any responsibility. If we can't force ourselves to stand up here
tonight and be counted on this subject, then we don't have a right to
criticize the President on this issue. Every time I am on the floor and
I hear somebody criticizing the President on this, I am going to check
the vote list and see how the votes were, and I am going to rise up and
challenge that Senator. This is not going to delay the passage, the
instruments of ratification. We can vote on this any time. We can vote
next week or the following week, or tonight, for that matter. It
doesn't matter to me when we vote on it. Whenever the leader wants to
schedule it.
Mr. President, my final remarks. The purpose of this amendment is to
simply require Congress to vote, period, one way or another on
deployment to Bosnia prior to depositing the instruments of
ratification for NATO. That's it.

what will expansion cost, and who will pay the bill?

It is obvious to me that nobody really knows what the true costs of
NATO

[[Page S3901]]

expansion will be. Just look at the cost estimates that are available.
In March of 1996, CBO issued a report that provided five options or
scenarios for NATO expansion. The cost of those five options ranged
from $60 billion to $124 billion.
In the fall of 1996, Rand Corporation completed a study on the costs
of NATO expansion and concluded that the costs could range from $10
billion to $110 billion.
In February of 1997, the administration provided its own cost
estimates. In this report the cost of NATO expansion was pegged at $27
to $35 billion.
In December of 1997, NATO itself estimated the cost of NATO expansion
as $1.5 to $2 billion.
The February 16 edition of Defense News reports that the Pentagon
will issue yet another study that will peg the cost of NATO expansion
at $1.5 billion over 10 years.
According to the CRS, the administration assumes that the new nations
will pick up 50 percent of the bill, the current NATO members will pay
44 percent and the U.S. will pick up 6 percent of these costs.

can poland, hungary and the czech republic afford nato expansion?

Supporters of NATO expansion say we must expand in order to help the
young fledgling democracies and market economies of these countries
grow. This is not what NATO does.
NATO is first a military or security alliance, not an economic
alliance. If the goal is economic and not security, then let the EU
deal with these countries, not NATO.
With NATO expansion, we are placing a requirement that the new
members ``buy'' their way in. If they could buy their way in, their
young market economies wouldn't need the protection of NATO expansion.
This circular logic is no logic at all.
In an article on NATO expansion that appeared in the January/February
1998 edition of Foreign Affairs, Amos Perlmutter writes:

The belief that the new members should be able to absorb
costs of close to $42 billion between 1996 and 2001 overlooks
the International Monetary Fund's rules and the Maastricht
Treaty's expectations. The IMF requires former Warsaw Pact
states to invest in economic infrastructure, and the
Maastricht Treaty will accept members only on the basis of
their conformity to its rigorous fiscal standards. Hungary
and the Czech Republic are already experiencing serious
budget crunches and are seeking ways to cut spending to meet
IMF demands. Where, then, will the money come from to expand
their military budgets?

political will

In addition, there is also the question of whether or not there is
the political will in these countries to help pay for expansion. The
United States Information Agency (USIA) conducted a poll in October of
1997 in the countries listed below and asked if the respondents
supported increasing their government's defense spending:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Don't
Support Oppose know
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Czech Republic......................... 29 63 8
Hungary................................ 36 60 4
Poland................................. 56 31 13
Slovakia............................... 21 71 8
Slovenia............................... 22 72 6
Bulgaria............................... 28 55 17
Romania................................ 55 39 7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Result: Only Poles, not Czech or Hungarians willing to increase spending
to pay for expansion.

fiscal realities

Even our current European allies have had sharply declining defense
budgets as they prepare to meet the fiscal requirements of the European
common currency.
Sir John Kerr, the British Ambassador to the U.S. stated the
following on July 23, 1997:

I think, realistically, it is very unlikely that the
Europeans will stump up another $15 billion on their defense
budgets. It would mean increasing defense budgets on average
by about 1.5 percent a year, a very much larger number than
the cost for the United States. And I don't think it will
happen.

In July of 1997 French President Jacques Chirac made the following
statement:

We have adopted a very simple position: Enlargement must
not cost anything in net terms. We are convinced that it is
possible.

A Washington Post article from July 10, 1997 quotes German President
Helmut Kohl as saying:

It is completely absurd to link NATO enlargement with cost
factors as if the aim was to rearm large areas of Europe to
the teeth.

Another German, Walther Stuetzle, a former senior defense planner for
the German Government said in the March 12, 1997 edition of the
Washington Post:

So who will pick up the tab? I think it will have to be the
United States.

So we've heard from our NATO allies and they are saying that they are
not willing to pay for NATO expansion. Some supporters of NATO
expansion will downplay these comments as political comments made for
consumption at home. They say our allies will come through.
I am a firm believer that past performance is an indicator of future
performance. What hasn't been heard too much in public is the fact that
our NATO allies have been falling well short on their current NATO
commitments. That certainly doesn't bode well for any additional
commitment from our current NATO allies to pick up their share of the
costs to expand.
In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Admiral
Jack Shanahan (USN retired) made the following comments:

In 1970 I was assigned to the U.S. mission to NATO in
Brussels. The prevailing attitude of most of the alliance was
that they were safely under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and
that the Warsaw Pact was not a major concern. As a result our
allies did not consistently meet their NATO commitments in
terms of defense spending. Their prepositioned war reserve of
food, ammunition, fuel etc. were well below NATO standards.
Interoperability was a joke. They were not ready then, they
are not ready now, and as we integrate East European
militaries into the alliance this condition will worsen,
placing greater demands on the U.S. military to shoulder the
burden. Even as we speak, our allies are making significant
reductions in military spending and in their force
structures.

This testimony is very revealing and speaks for itself--especially in
light of the additional commitments that our present NATO allies will
be asked to bear through expansion.

We not only have statements from the major Western European countries
indicating that they are not willing to pay for NATO expansion, but
also disturbing testimony before the Senate that our current NATO
allies already have fallen well short of fulfilling their current NATO
commitments.
Thus, it will probably fall to the United States to pay for NATO
expansion. Indeed, the March 12, 1997 Washington Post quoted a senior
U.S. official as saying: ``There was a strong political imperative to
low-ball figures. Everybody realized the main priority was to keep
costs down to reassure Congress, as well as the Russians.''
What are the implications of all this for the article V commitment
that an attack on one is an attack on all? Do we really believe we can
effectively carry out this commitment if the cost of NATO expansion has
been fudged in order to reassure the Congress and Russia? Don't the
supporters of expansion take the alliance more seriously than this?

are they prepared?

The three nations who would become part of NATO have military
infrastructures that are profoundly unprepared to join NATO. Defense
news recently reported on NATO's most recent assessment of the
invitees. The report concluded that Poland, the Czech Republic and
Hungary are years away from having militaries that are minimally
functional, much less strategically interoperable with NATO's military
systems. Examples include:
All of the Czech Army's equipment is ``old and approaching
obsolescence.''
None of Poland's naval ships are ``capable for command and control of
joint or combined operations.''
In Hungary, 70 percent of the pilots carry out only 50 hours of
training per year, far below NATO standards.
The United States cannot even pay for its own modernization. Why
would we want to pay for the modernization of three new NATO members?

can the u.s. foot the bill?

Don't be naive--NATO expansion is not going to be free--no matter how
much the figure is lowered to make it more ``palatable.''
The balanced budget agreement has locked us into a flat if not
declining defense budget during the next few years. We've all heard
reports that readiness in the military is starting to deteriorate.
The House National Security Committee issued a report recently that
chronicled some of the readiness problems that are starting to appear
in our military. What we are facing, in my

[[Page S3902]]

opinion, is the very real scenario where we will be increasing our
national security commitments without a corresponding increase in our
defense spending because of the balanced budget agreement.
The current defense budget we have now is inadequate to meet our
current plans and requirements. Just like every other contingency
operation the Clinton administration has signed U.S. forces up to, an
underfunded Defense Department will have to foot the bill once again.
We keep hearing from this administration that another round of BRAC
is necessary to reduce infrastructure and pay for modernization. Could
it be that the real objective of another BRAC is to pay for NATO
expansion? Does the Senate really want to approve adding one more IOU
to an already empty Pentagon checkbook, when we do not even know how
large the IOU will be? I don't think so.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to lay my amendment aside so
that Senator Inhofe may discuss his amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, can I ask a question of Senator Smith?
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I yield for a question.
Mr. DOMENICI. Senator, I was thinking. Do you mean if I vote no on
this, 3 weeks from now if we want to vote again in the Senate on the
Bosnia policy, I can't vote?
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Did I say that?
Mr. DOMENICI. So the vote means we are going to vote for it or not,
and we can have a vote on Bosnia if we want it, whenever we want,
whatever we do with your amendment.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. You certainly can. But I am saying this
should be a requirement. If we don't have that vote, we ought not to
complain about the resolution of ratification.
Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Senator. I yield the floor.

Executive Amendment No. 2325

(Purpose: To require the President to submit the Kyoto Protocol to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to the Senate for
its consideration under the Treaty Power of the Constitution)

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask
for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. Inhofe] proposes an
executive amendment numbered 2325.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the appropriate place in section 3 of the resolution,
insert the following:
( ) Requirement of transmittal to the senate of kyoto
protocol on global warming.--Prior to the deposit of the
United States instrument of ratification, the President shall
submit the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, done at Kyoto on December 10,
1997, to the Senate for its consideration under Article II,
section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States
(relating to the making of treaties).

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, let me briefly explain what my amendment
does. It simply requires the President to submit the Kyoto Protocol to
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to the Senate
for its consideration under the Treaty Powers of the Constitution.
Mr. President, the White House has made a full-scale effort for
ratification of expansion of NATO. We are considering that now and we
have had a lot of debate. Some of us are against it and some of us are
for it. We have had a chance to get our positions out and we know where
we stand. But according to article II, section 2, clause 2 of the
Constitution, we are the only body--and it has to be by a two-thirds
vote--that can ratify treaties of the United States. The President
can't do it, the Secretary of State can't do it, the Vice President
can't do it, the Secretary of Defense can't do it, the Director of the
EPA can't do it--just the U.S. Senate.
Some might argue that the NATO expansion debate is not an appropriate
place to raise the question about the Kyoto Protocol. But the issue
here is whether the President is going to have serious regard for the
Senate's advise-and-consent authority under the Constitution, which the
senior Senator from West Virginia has reminded us many times is our
prerogative. The President cannot be expected to send treaties up for
advice and consent when he thinks the Senate agrees with him and refuse
to send them up unilaterally when he feels that we do not. Truly, that
is the case.
We made our case very specific when we voted 95-0, prior to going to
Japan, that if they came back with something that did not treat the
developing countries the same as the developed nations, we would oppose
it, and the President came back with exactly that, putting us under
obligations that the developing nations were not under. So that China
doesn't have to worry about it, or Pakistan, and other countries, like
Mexico. But we do. This is the issue we are dealing with here.
I am going to deviate from that for a moment in this very short time
to repeat something that I said earlier in this debate because I
understand I am the last speaker now and this is the last amendment. I
would like to just say there are four reasons why we should not, in the
final analysis, expand NATO.
The first one is the cost. I don't know why nobody seems to be upset
that the range goes all the way from $400 million to $120 billion, and
those at the low end are the administration--the same administration
that said that Bosnia was going to cost us $1.2 billion, and now our
direct costs have skyrocketed way way above $9 billion, and there is no
end to it. It is a permanent commitment. Yet, we were told that it was
going to be $1.2 billion.
So here we have an amount of money--at a time when we have cut our
defense down to the bone, at a time when we have to be able to do
something to put ourselves in a position to defend America. Yet, we are
talking about an open-ended commitment by extending NATO to these
countries.
The second reason is it is the open door. I hope nobody thinks we are
talking about three countries--Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.
We are talking about an open door now that is extended to everyone. I
want to read what our Secretary of State said in a statement she made:

We must pledge that the first new members will not be the
last and that no European democracy will be excluded because
of where it sits on the map.

She talks about Romania, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia,
Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Slovakia, and the list goes on and on. So
it is the clear intent that this is not the last. If you think this is
going to be expensive, just think what it is going to be when we start
extending it to other countries. Where would we draw the line?
The third concern I have is a genuine concern that we talked about on
the floor, and that is, what does this do to our relationship with
Russia? Everybody says, ``That's all right, I have been to Russia and
they don't mind.'' I have gotten commitments from people saying that is
all right, go ahead, this is not going to be a problem. But that's not
what the Duma said, which is their parliamentary body. The Duma passed
a resolution calling NATO expansion the ``biggest threat to Russia
since the end of World War II.''
There is one person I had a great deal of respect for in this body,
and I regretted when he left this body; it was Sam Nunn, who I served
with on the Armed Services Committee. There is not a person who would
stand up on the floor and question his integrity or his knowledge of
foreign affairs or question his concern for defending America. Sam Nunn
said that Russian cooperation in avoiding proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction is our most important national security objective, and
``This NATO expansion makes them more suspicious and less
cooperative.'' He further said, ``The administration's answer to this
and other serious questions are what I consider to be platitudes.''
So everyone is on record. Last, I will address the concern that the
Senator from New Hampshire had. He has a very good resolution, and I
think everybody understands it. If anybody wants to get on record as to
where they stand insofar as Bosnia is concerned, his amendment is your
opportunity to do so. Because right now we don't have

[[Page S3903]]

anything to show who is on record. We do have a resolution of
disapproval that was barely defeated by only three votes in November of
1995. I suspect that some people now have changed their minds now that
they realize this open-ended commitment is there.
So I would like to wind this up by saying that if this cost to
support the Bosnian operation is any indication, I remind you that in
November of 1995, we were on the brink of being able to defeat this and
not send our troops to Bosnia, except they said that this is going to
be a short commitment, it is not going to be something that would last
a long period of time.
It was going to be over within less than a year, and it was going to
cost $1.2 billion. The only reason that they were able to get those
votes to pass this was, they said, ``We must protect our integrity with
our partners in NATO.'' Now that same argument can be used--I wonder
who is going to be the next Bosnia.
Mr. President, while I have this amendment, I know the votes are not
there for this amendment, and there is one very good reason, because of
a dear person in this body, that we want to not extend any longer than
it should be extended. So nothing would be gained by considering my
amendment.
For that reason, I withdraw my amendment and urge my fellow
colleagues to vote against the extension of NATO.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is withdrawn.
The amendment (No. 2325) was withdrawn.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I was opposed to the amendment offered
by Senator Inhofe. Quite frankly, I believe the consequences if this
amendment passed would have been extremely deleterious to our foreign
policy.
Mr. President, everyone should recognize that his amendment is
nothing more than a thinly-veiled threat to delay NATO enlargement and
to ensure that we won't have NATO enlargement for a significant period
of time. It is very clear that President Clinton can't and won't submit
the Kyoto Protocol for Senate ratification until the conditions he has
set are met--meaningful participation by developing countries. The
Administration is not in a position of saying now when that milestone
will be achieve, but it probably won't be soon. So a vote for this
amendment is a vote to stop NATO expansion.
But even if you oppose NATO expansion, you should oppose this
amendment because the approach it takes is without precedent and would
have a significant impact on how the country conducts foreign policy.
Let me say also that I was a member of the Senate observer group to
the Kyoto conference last December. There has never been a more
complicated, difficult international negotiation attempted. I believe
that the conference was a historic success: more than 160 countries
recognized that the common threat of climate change was more important
than each nation's separate anxiety about the immediate impact of an
agreement.
The Conference was also a historic success because American proposals
won the day. We called for much more real and realistic targets and
timetables. We proposed flexibility through a trading program to use
the power of the market to achieve lower compliance costs for business.
We offered a joint implementation system that would allow American
firms to build clean power plants or preserve forests in developing
countries in exchange for emission reduction credits that could be used
or sold later. Our negotiators won on each of these battles--and they
were very hard fought battles.
But the President has clearly said that the Kyoto protocol is not
ready to be submitted to the Senate. The President has made clear that
the protocol will not be ready for submission until we have succeeded
in achieving the meaningful participation of developing counties. At
Kyoto, a down payment was made in the form of a ``clean development
mechanism'' which embraces the U.S. backed concept of joint
implementation with credit. This will allow companies in the developed
world to invest in projects in countries in the developing world for
the benefit of both parties.
But developing countries will clearly need to do more in order to
meaningfully participate in combating global warming, and in order of
the President to submit the protocol for the consideration of the
Senate. Secretary Albright recently announced a full court diplomatic
effort to achieve this goal.
Mr. President, as far as I can determine, there is no precedent in
our history for doing essentially what this amendment seeks to do,
force the President to transmit a treaty to the Senate before the
President deems it appropriate to do so. This amendment is a high-
handed attempt by Congress to undermine the President's constitutional
power.
Mr. President, I asked the American Law Division of the CRS to look
at a related issue: whether there are any time limitations within which
the President must submit a treaty after it has been negotiated and
signed. Let me quote from that report: ``As a general proposition,
there do not appear to be any time constraints on the transmittal of
treaties to the Senate for its advice and consent. The spare language
of the Constitution provides simply that `(the President) shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur. . . .'
Under this structure, it is the President who negotiates and ultimately
ratifies treaties, provided the Senate gives its advice and consent.
But the constitutional language does not set time limits on any aspect
of the process of treaty-making.''
The report goes on to note that ``nor does statutory law appear to
impose any time constraints on the submission of treaties.''
Mr. President, the memo goes on to discuss numerous cases in which
treaties have not been submitted to the Senate for ratification for a
long time after they were negotiated and signed. For example, the
United States signed the ``International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination'' on September 28, 1966. Nearly
12 years passed after the United States signature before it was
submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent on February 23,
1978.
Let me read here from the memorandum's review of the Legislative
Calendar for the 104th Congress: Final Edition of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations which discloses a number of examples of
significant delay is transmittal of treaties.
A review of the Legislative Calendar for the 104th
Congress: Final Edition of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations discloses a number of additional instances of
significant delays in transmittal. A bilateral treaty between
the U.S. and Haiti ``Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement
and Protection of Investment'' was signed on December 13,
1983, but not submitted to the Senate until March 25, 1986. A
treaty on ``Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters''
between the U.S. and Nigeria, signed on September 13, 1989,
was not transmitted until April 1, 1992. A ``Revised Protocol
Amending the Convention Between the United States and Canada
With Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital,'' originally
signed on September 28, 1980, and then amended in 1983 and
1984, was finally submitted to the Senate on April 24, 1995.
An extradition treaty with Belgium was signed on April 27,
1987, but not submitted until June 12, 1995; and one with
Switzerland was signed on November 14, 1990, but not
transmitted until June 12, 1995. The ``International
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants''
was originally negotiated in 1961, amended in 1972, 1978, and
1991, and finally signed by the U.S. in 1991, but was not
submitted to the Senate until September 5, 1995. Finally, the
``Convention on the International Maritime Organization,''
originally signed on March 6, 1948, was transmitted to the
Senate on October 1, 1996.
All of these examples illustrate the absence of any legally
binding time constraints on the President's transmittal of
treaties to the Senate.
I hope the foregoing is responsive to your request. If we
may be of additional assistance, please call on us.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I am a strong supporter of the treaty
before us to expand NATO. I also strongly support the agreement that
emerged from Kyoto, as well as the President's position that the
agreement is not ripe for submittal to the Senate at this time. There
is no precedent for forcing the President to submit a treaty on a
timeframe established by the United States Senate before the President
believes it is appropriate. But that is what this amendment seeks to
do. Adopting this amendment would have been a terrible precedent for
conducting our foreign policy and I believe would have stopped the
treaty now pending before us.

[[Page S3904]]

Executive Amendment No. 2328

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question remains on the Smith amendment.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will take only 2 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. The hour is late. It has not improved the substance of the
Smith amendment--the time. It is essentially, as the Senator from New
Hampshire indicated, similar to the Craig amendment; very little
difference. I urge my colleagues to recall how they voted on the Craig
amendment, and the same rationale applies with regard to the Smith
amendment.
I hope when we get to the vote--which I hope is very shortly--that we
will vote no on the Smith amendment.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? If
there is no further debate, the question is on agreeing to the
amendment of the Senator from New Hampshire. On this question, the yeas
and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Arizona (Mr. Kyl) is
necessarily absent.
The result was announced--yeas 16, nays 83, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 116]

YEAS--16

Ashcroft
Brownback
Craig
Faircloth
Feingold
Grassley
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Kempthorne
Nickles
Roberts
Sessions
Smith Bob (NH)
Specter
Warner

NAYS--83

Abraham
Akaka
Allard
Baucus
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Bumpers
Burns
Byrd
Campbell
Chafee
Cleland
Coats
Cochran
Collins
Conrad
Coverdell
D'Amato
Daschle
DeWine
Dodd
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Enzi
Feinstein
Ford
Frist
Glenn
Gorton
Graham
Gramm
Grams
Gregg
Hagel
Harkin
Hatch
Helms
Hollings
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murkowski
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Roth
Santorum
Sarbanes
Shelby
Smith Gordon H (OR)
Snowe
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Torricelli
Wellstone
Wyden

NOT VOTING--1

Kyl

The amendment (No. 2328) was rejected.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. BIDEN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the remaining
votes, and there are two remaining votes in this series, then, be
limited to 10 minutes in length.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, the question of whether to expand the
NATO alliance is one of the most important foreign policy decisions
this Senate has been called upon to make since the fall of the Berlin
Wall.
We will make history with this vote. So it would seem appropriate to
consult history before we cast it. That's what I did the other day. I
re-read some of the debate that took place in this chamber 49 years
ago, when our predecessors, in the tumultuous years following the
Second World War, had the courage and foresight to commit our own
nation to this alliance.
One of the chief supporters was Arthur Vandenberg, the chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Vandenberg, a
Republican from Michigan, predicted that NATO would become ``the
greatest war deterrent in history.''
History has proven him right. Because of NATO, a region that produced
two cataclysmic wars in this century has now known a half-century of
peace and stability. Those of us who were born after the Second World
War tend to take that for granted. But in fact, it is a remarkable
accomplishment.
Just as the map of Europe was redrawn at the end of World War II, it
has been redrawn again with the end of the Cold War. Nations that once
marched in lockstep with totalitarian dictatorships have been
transformed into struggling young democracies.
It is time for us to redefine NATO to match the new map, the new
reality, of this post-Cold War world.
Enlarging NATO's circle of security to include the new democracies of
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic is not only in the best
interests of those nations. It is in the best interests of the entire
European continent. And, it is in the national security interest of the
United States.
For these reasons, I intend to vote for ratification of the treaty
expanding NATO. And I urge my colleagues to do so as well.
I do not underestimate the seriousness of this action, nor do I take
lightly the thoughtful arguments some of my fellow Senators have made
against ratification of this treaty.
As I see it, there are essentially four such arguments. In making my
own decision, I have wrestled with each of them. And I would like to
share with you some of my thoughts on them.
First, though, I want to read something from a man who has thought
very deeply about these arguments, and about the future of Europe: the
President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel. President Havel is among
the most articulate supporters of the treaty we are now considering.
``As I follow the debate over whether NATO should be enlarged,'' he
has written, ``I have the strong sense that the arguments are often
purely mechanical, somehow missing the real meaning of the alliance.
``The process of expansion must be accompanied by something much
deeper: a refined definition of the purpose, mission and identity of
NATO.
``The alliance,'' he continues, ``should urgently remind itself that
it is first and foremost an instrument of democracy intended to defend
mutually held and created political and spiritual values. ``It must see
itself not as a pact of nations against a more of less obvious enemy,
but as a guarantor of Euro-American civilization, and thus a pillar of
global security.''
Does NATO exist to defend a fixed list of nations, chosen 49 years
ago, against an enemy that no longer exists? Or does it need to respond
to the new threats we face by including, under NATO's collective
security umbrella, the three countries that have demonstrated not only
a deep commitment to democracy, but a willingness to defend it? That is
the fundamental question in this debate.
The answer, in my view, is yes. We should expand NATO to include the
new democracies of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
There are, as I said, four other questions as well. They also deserve
serious reflection.
The first is: What effect would expanding NATO to include Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic have on Russia's relations with the
West--particularly its relations with the United States?
Russia clearly would prefer that we not expand NATO. Given their
history, that is understandable. Russia lost 20 million people in the
Second World War.
Despite assurances from NATO that no troops or nuclear weapons will
be stationed in the three new member nations, there are those in Russia
who remain fearful of an expanded NATO, and others who are trying to
exploit those fears to weaken the hands of Russian democratic
reformers. This is troubling, because it is clearly in our national
interest to see Russia fully engaged with the West.
There is evidence, however, that Russian leaders wish to continue
that engagement. Russia's willingness last year to sign the NATO-Russia
Founding Act is one example of Russia's commitment to improved
relations with the West. Perhaps an even better example is Russia's
continued active participation in the international peacekeeping effort
in Bosnia.
Some of my colleagues cite fear of antagonizing Russia as a reason to
reject this treaty. While I respect their opinion, I do not believe
this concern warrants such action, and I cite as evidence Russia's own
actions.
We must remember what Secretary of State Albright calls the
``productive

[[Page S3905]]

paradox'' at the core of NATO. That is, by demonstrating that we are
willing to defend our allies, we dramatically reduce the chances that
we will ever actually have to commit troops to do so.
This has been true in the past, and I believe it will remain true in
the future.
A second question we must address is the price of enlargement.
It is important that we be clear from the very start: There are costs
associated with expanding NATO. And, while most of these costs will be
borne by the new member nations, some of the costs will fall to
existing members of the alliance, including the United States.
The initial estimates of the costs to the US were quite high. Two
things have happened in the last year, however, to reduce projections
of those costs.
First, NATO invited three members to join the alliance instead of
four, the number on which earlier estimates were based.
Second, and more significant, the military committee of NATO
conducted a thorough analysis of the three potential new members and
found that their military infrastructures were in better shape than had
been assumed. As a result, the cost of bringing them in line with NATO
standards is projected to be considerably less.
The new, more accurate estimates put the cost to US at an average of
$40 million a year for 10 years.
I am not suggesting for a minute that this is a small amount. It's
not. But compare it to the price of some pieces of military hardware.
One Blackhawk helicopter costs $10 million. One Harrier jump jet costs
$27 million. One F-15 Eagle fighter costs $43 million. One Trident II
submarine-launched ballistic missile costs $53 million. And one B-2
bomber costs $2 billion--five times more than the entire 10-year cost
of expanding NATO.
No, $400 million over 10 years is not a small amount. But if it can
help extend stability and security in central and eastern Europe, it is
not a bad bargain.
It is also important to note, Mr. President, that Poland, Hungary and
the Czech Republic will be compelled to modernize their defenses--
whether or not they join NATO.
If that modernization takes place within NATO's framework, however,
we avoid the risk of re-nationalizing militaries that have caused so
much instability in Europe in the past.
The third question we must consider is if, in expanding NATO, we are
simply drawing new lines in the sand, and thus creating the potential
for new conflicts.
Again, I want to quote President Havel, who has also considered the
consequences of refusing to erase the old lines. ``If this way of
thinking prevails,'' he warns, ``it will turn the alliance into a
hopelessly antiquated club of Cold War veterans.''
We can't allow that to happen.
It is not this Senate, or the NATO alliance, that erased the old
dividing lines of Yalta. History erased those lines. The power of
freedom and democracy erased those lines. We must not maintain an
obsolete line in Europe because we are afraid of drawing a new line. We
must not let fear of an old enemy keep us from embracing a new ally.
Hitler and Stalin helped draw the line that placed Poland and Hungary
and the Czech Republic on the wrong side of freedom in 1944. By
admitting these nations to NATO, we are erasing that line.
Finally, there is a fourth question that some have raised in this
debate. That is, when will we next consider expanding NATO? And which
nations should we consider?
I believe that question is premature. We should remain open-minded.
But we haven't yet approved the first expansion. We need to see this
process through and carefully and thoroughly evaluate it before we can
make any sort of informed decision about admitting additional new
members to the alliance. I see no reason why we should commit ourselves
to a fixed timetable or list of additional entrants now.
The danger in Europe today does not come from a totalitarian
superpower. The danger in Europe today comes from aggressive
nationalism and terrorism and the spread and misuse of nuclear weapons
and other weapons of mass destruction.
By bringing Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO's circle
of security and democracy, we will strengthen the bulkhead against
these destructive forces. We will bolster NATO's fighting capacity by
adding 200,000 troops. We will add geographically significant territory
to the alliance. We will increase NATO's understanding of these new
threats, and thus its ability to head them off.
And all of this, Mr. President, is in the United States' national
security interest.
When the Berlin Wall fell, it answered the prayers of millions of
people all over the world. It also created a new landscape in Europe.
Extending NATO membership to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic
will help ensure that democracy and freedom fill that landscape, rather
than old hatreds and outdated ideologies.
In his first speech as President of Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Havel
described his dream for his country.
``I dream,'' he said, ``of a republic independent, free, and
democratic, of a republic economically prosperous and yet socially
just, in short, of a humane republic which serves the individual and
which therefore holds the hope that the individual will serve it in
turn.''
In the years since the Berlin Wall collapsed, Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic all have made great strides toward achieving that dream.
They have demonstrated that they meet NATO's standards for membership,
and that they can contribute to the alliance in a meaningful way.
For all these reasons, I will vote to expand the NATO Treaty to
include these three new democracies, and I urge my colleagues to do the
same.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I will be brief as we complete debate on the
resolution of ratification providing our advice and consent to the
addition of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Ths has been an excellent debate in the finest traditions of the
Senate. We have spent more than 40 hours on the resolution over the
course of 9 days. Almost 50 Senators have made statement, many of them
on several occasions. The Senate has considered 20 amendments. We have
adopted 12 and rejected 8. This is in addition to the 4 conditions and
7 declarations in the committee's Resolution.
Many people deserve credit in this debate. The Chairman of Foreign
Relations Committee, Senator Helms, has shown great leadership. Senator
Roth led the NATO Observer Group with energy and diligence. Senator
Biden served as the lead Democrat to both and made valuable--and
frequent--contributions to our debate. Senator Gordon Smith, Chair of
the Europe Subcommittee played a central role.
Many staff played key roles as well. Steve Biegun, Brian McKeon, Beth
Wilson and Mike Haltzel of the Foreign Relations Committee can all now
get on with their lives. Ian Brzezinski (BRA-zin-ski) with Senator Roth
was always there for the Observer Group. The Congressional Research
Service, especially Stan Sloan, on the floor now, provided invaluable
services for members on both sides of the issue. Legislative Counsel
Art Rynerson drafted virtually all of the language we have been
debating.
A number of issues have been raised in our consideration. We have
addressed future enlargement, NATO's mission, costs, Bosnia and arms
control. I believe all sides have had an opportunity to have their
voices heard. Now it is time to cast our votes.
Much has been said about Russia over the past week--how Russia will
react to NATO enlargement and the impact on a wide range of bilateral
issues. Both sides agree that Russian hard-liners should not have a
veto over our course of action. But supporters and opponents of
enlargement differ greatly over the impact on our relations with
Russia.
We have heard many estimates of how our vote will influence the
tangled web of Russian politics and the disturbing course of Russian
foreign policy. I do not think anyone can predict the impact with
complete precision. But we can look at some basic facts.
First, NATO poses no threat to Russia. No serious person inside or
outside Russia believes NATO--with 16 or 19 members--jeopardizes
Russia. The

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thought of Czech tanks rolling across the Russian steppes is ludicrous.
Second, the average Russian is not concerned about NATO enlargement.
A recent poll even shows the majority of Russians in Moscow support
adding these three countries to NATO.
Third, the Russians have delayed action on START II for years. NATO
enlargement is only the latest in a long line of reasons given for
their inaction.
Fourth, Russian diplomacy in Brussels has not been affected by our
debate here. Just yesterday, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council
discussed a wide range of issues. Alleged Russian concerns about
enlargement were not an issue.
Finally, long before NATO enlargement became a real possibility,
Russia has engaged in a large number of foreign policy actions that
harm our interests--from proliferation to Iran and violations of START
I to subversion of its neighbors. NATO enlargement may provide an
excuse for Russian adventurism, but will not provide a cause.
Our principle concern with Russia must be Russian behavior--not the
volatile mood swings of Russian domestic politics.
Mr. President, this will be a historic vote. It is fitting that we
are voting on including the Czech Republic in NATO sixty years after
the sellout at Munich, fifty years after the communist coup in Prague,
and thirty years after Soviet tanks crushed the winds of freedom in
Czechoslovakia.
That is the past and, as many Senators have pointed out, this vote is
about the future. It is about what kind of a Europe we want to see. It
is about what kind of allies we want in a continent where we have
fought three great wars in this century.
Expanding NATO is about ensuring this generation and future
generations are not called to fight a fourth time. It is about a 21st
century trans-Atlantic partnership that provides more freedom, more
security and more opportunity for all of us.
A few days ago, I received a letter from Polish Foreign Minister
Geremek (GAR-a-mech). His words are an appropriate way to close debate:

The consistent and visionary foreign policy of the United
States has opened a historic window of opportunity. Just as
in 1989, it was American leadership which was the decisive
factor in ending the Cold War. . . . so today it is the U.S.
Senate which will decide whether a new page is turned in
history of the Transatlantic area and Eurasia. It will be a
chapter testifying to the triumph of freedom and democracy
and to the success of the biggest and most successful
alliance in world history. It will strengthen the Alliance to
the clear advantage of Europe and America.

I thank all Senators for their cooperation in reaching this moment. I
yield the floor.