[Pages S3617-S3620]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

CRISIS IN LIBERIA

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, the resumption of violence in Liberia is of
great concern to me. A factional standoff over an ousted government
minister has led to widespread looting, arson, and murder, plunging the
country into a state of chaos. This spasm of violence is the first
major interruption of the Abuja Accords, which have held peace together
in Liberia since last August.

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The deterioration of Liberia is disheartening. Since 1989, the civil
war has caused the deaths of more than 150,000 people and has displaced
more than 800,000. Thousands of children have been conscripted to the
armed forces. The resumption of violence threatens the lives of even
more Liberians. The potential of a massive humanitarian disaster is
high, as supplies of food and water dwindle, sanitary conditions
deteriorate, and outbreaks of cholera erupt.
Mr. President, The United States has a special responsibility toward
Liberia. Founded in the early 19th century by freed slaves, the United
States and Liberia have had almost 150 years of uninterrupted
friendship. In World War II, the airfields and ports of Liberia were a
key part of the link to supply the battlefields in North Africa and
Europe. During the cold war, the people of Liberia were at many times
the only reliable ally of the United States in Africa. Liberia served
as a ``listening post'' and headquarters to the United States
intelligence services. At the United Nations, Liberia consistently
voted for the United States position even when this position was
unpopular with other developing nations.
In addition, I would like to add that I have a special interest in
this war-devastated country as so many emigrants from Liberia have
settled in Rhode Island. Just this morning, a delegation of
approximately 400 Liberian-Americans who live in my State participated
in an impressive demonstration of their eagerness for peace to be
restored to this tragically war-torn country.
These Rhode Islanders, led by longtime community leader Lady Bush,
marched several miles into downtown Providence where they demonstrated
in front of the Federal Courthouse Building and met with members of my
staff and the staff of my colleague, Senator Chafee.
The demonstrators presented a petition, entitled ``Plea for an
Immediate End To the Human Carnage in Liberia.'' It urges active U.S.
Government efforts to end the fighting and places the blame for the
latest outbreak of terror and fighting squarely on the assorted
warlords whose forces control various portions of the capital and the
country.
I ask unanimous consent that a copy of that petition be printed in
the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, it is understandable that the international
community is hesitant about investing anything more in Liberia. It is
up to the faction leaders who constituted the last Council of State and
who control the rival forces to stop the looting and killing and to
rebuild a sense of national unity. The rival warlords must demonstrate
that they are ready for peace. The people of Liberia should not have to
endure any more violence. If the United States pulls out of Liberia, it
will certainly put the last nail in the coffin for this poor, African
nation. Moreover, if the situation in Liberia continues to unravel, the
regional implications will be of monumental proportions.
I believe the United States must have an immediate response to this
crisis. As a result, I am cosponsor of the resolution introduced this
afternoon by my distinguished colleague from Wisconsin, Senator
Feingold. Among others, this resolution urges the administration to
support West African peacekeepers, to influence other nations to
support the peacekeeping force, and to lead efforts in the United
Nations to sanction those parties which violate the U.N. arms embargo
on Liberia.
I would like to add that it is imperative that the international
community, at its highest levels, make public their views on the
atrocities in Liberia. The international community, moreover, must
actively engage with ECOMOG and ECOWAS, to find a lasting solution. And
most importantly, I call upon the competing warlords to stop the
pillaging of Liberia. There has already been too much bloodshed, too
much hope lost.

Exhibit 1

Liberian Community Association

of Rhode Island, Inc.,

Providence, RI, April 18, 1996.

Petition of the Liberian Community Association of Rhode Island to the
Government of the United States

Subject: Plea for an Immediate End To the Human Carnage in
Liberia

Whereas the Republic of Liberia was founded and funded by
humanitarian societies in the United States, with the
appropriation and assistance of the American Government as a
safe haven for emancipated people of color;
And whereas throughout its one hundred forty nine years of
independence, the people and Government of these United
States of America have manifested friendly and benign
interest in Liberia's right to exist as a sovereign state,
lending aid in times of national exigencies and emergencies;
And whereas Liberia has always shown its gratitude and
appreciation to the Government and people of the United
States by being staunch ally and trusted African friend
during times and circumstances critical to the national
interest of the United States;
And whereas the on-going genocidal civil conflict in
Liberia resulted from the rash, diabolical, dictatorial, and
military rules which set the stage for subsequent atrocities
and infrastructure destruction, causing the displacement at
home and abroad of over one half the population, many of whom
are stranded in the United States;
And whereas the civil war since 1989 has resulted into the
slaughter of a quarter million people, most of whom are
civilians; women, children and the elderly;
And whereas the war-lords do not have the fortitude to
honor the many peace accords that they themselves signed,
resulting into the carnage that began on April 5, 1996 and
continues to date, described by the international press and
the United States Government as the worst in three years;
And whereas the EMOMOG has proven that it cannot enforce
the cease-fire, monitor the disarmament process and protect
innocent civilians;
And whereas the rebels and government troops, some as young
as six are still heavily armed;
And whereas the recent carnage that began April 5, 1996 is
so war torn that the United States is evacuating its citizens
from Liberia;
And whereas the recent massacre of women and children is so
contiguous that Americans, Americans of Liberian descent, and
Liberians residing in Rhode Island convened on April 14, 1996
and after deliberation resolved that the organization
petitions the United States Government to intervene to help
bring the carnage to an immediate end.
We therefore, appeal to the United States to:
1. intervene directly to bring the carnage to an end;
2. use it economic, diplomatic and military leverages to
encourage the warring factions to call for, and honor a true
cease-fire and disarmament;
3. convene a meeting of the war-lords in the United States
to work out modalities for the enforcement of the cease-fire
as in the case of Bosnia;
4. to help plan, monitor, and enforce the disarmament
process;
5. impose an embargo on the shipment of arms to any of the
warring factions;
6. freeze all assets of the war-lords, their family
members, and representatives; and
7. deny all war-lords, their family members and
representatives visas to travel to the United States except
for a conference to resolve the conflict.
We call on all peace loving countries of the world, the
United Nations and other international organizations to join
the United States, a country of goodwill that has practically
resolved all conflicts in modern times, to do the same for
Liberia. We are pleading. Please help us.

NUCLEAR SECURITY

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to call attention to the
single greatest security threat to Americans in the post-cold war ERA--
the possibility that weapons of mass destruction could be acquired by
rogue states, criminal organizations, or terrorists, and used against
American targets.
In the coming weeks, I hope that this body will have the opportunity
to act on the Chemical Weapons Convention and reduce one portion of
this threat.
Today, however, as President Clinton prepares to join President
Yeltsin and the G-7 leaders in Moscow for a nuclear safety and security
summit over the next 2 days, I would like to focus my remarks on the
nuclear threat.
President Clinton has placed nuclear nonproliferation at the top of
the U.S. national security agenda--he is clearly committed and willing
to lead on this issue. Vice President Gore's regular meetings with
Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin also have advanced nuclear
security. Indeed, in the last 3 years we have seen important agreements
and cooperative projects between U.S. officials and their counterparts
in Russia and other Republics of the former Soviet Union.
Despite these positive steps, however, the threat before us remains
immense, and the path to nuclear security remains long and difficult.
We need to understand the potential magnitude of

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the threat, and muster the resolve and resources to address it
effectively.

the nature of the threat

Mr. President, Soviet nuclear missiles no longer point at American
cities. With the START process, we have also seen and hopefully will
continue to see significant reductions in strategic nuclear weapons in
the former Soviet Union. But these arms control successes should not
give us a false sense of security.
Over 100,000 weapons or weapons equivalent material remain strewn--
literally strewn--about Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. The
centralized system that prevented the possible theft or diversion of
this immense quantity of fissile material during the cold war no longer
exists.
I should also note that each year as more nuclear warheads are
dismantled, additional tons of weapons-grade material move from
relatively more secure military facilities to less secure nuclear
storage facilities. The 3,000 warheads that are dismantled each year
yield 15 tons of plutonium and 45 tons of highly-enriched uranium.
Of this veritable cornucopia of dangerous fissile material spread
across the territory of the former Soviet Union, only a small fraction
would be required to wreak unspeakable damage.
It takes only 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium or 8 kilograms
of plutonium to create a weapon capable of massive destruction. We are
talking about an amount of uranium the size of a softball--or a
baseball in the case of plutonium. That small amount of material could
be easily concealed and transported in a sturdy briefcase or a
backpack.
As my colleagues know, the greatest barrier to overcome in
manufacturing a nuclear weapon is acquiring the appropriate grade and
quantity of fissile material. After that, it just takes a little time,
money, and technical know-how.
A determined terrorist or rogue state does not even need to build a
perfectly designed atomic bomb with the highest grade fissile material
to create unimaginable terror. A weapon built of crude, low-grade
nuclear material such as a nuclear radiological device would be
sufficient to generate widespread panic.
This is not just doomsday rhetoric. Does anyone actually deny that
there exists a great demand today for nuclear material? Those who are
not yet convinced need only consider the chilling incidents that have
occurred over the last few years. As my colleagues are well aware, gram
and kilogram quantities of weapons-grade uranium--almost surely leaked
from the former Soviet Union--have been seized in Moscow, Munich, and
Prague. In addition, dismantled parts of Soviet nuclear missiles have
made their way to Iraq.
We know that the demand exists. We also know that the supply exists.
Elementary economics tells us that without intervention, a supply curve
and a demand curve will intersect--and you will have a transaction. It
is incumbent upon us to intervene and prevent even one of these
potentially deadly transactions from occurring.
These are the key challenges we face in doing so:
How do we develop a comprehensive accounting system for all nuclear
material in the former Soviet Union?
How do we gather and physically protect nuclear material in a limited
number of secure sites?
How do we safely dispose of excess nuclear material?
How do we prevent the theft and smuggling of nuclear material?
And, how do we prevent former Soviet nuclear experts from selling
their knowhow to rogue states or terrorists?
The answers to these questions are not exclusively of concern to the
United States. They are vitally important to Western Europe, Japan, and
even to Russia.

the situation in the former soviet union

Perhaps it would be useful if I briefly walked through what we know
about the situation in Russia today to demonstrate the difficulties we
face in meeting these challenges.
First, the collapse of the Soviet command and control security system
has been replaced by chaos and the absence of many controls at sites
where nuclear materials are stored. In the context of Russia's current
tumultuous social and economic conditions, we are talking about an
environment conducive to theft and extortion.
Second, the Soviet Union had no comprehensive accounting system for
nuclear weapons and fissile material--certainly no computerized
inventory. In other words, we--including the Russians--do not even know
exactly where all of the Soviet Nuclear material is stored or how much
of it exists. We think most nuclear material is located in 80 to 100
sites. But there may be another 40 sites. We think the Soviet Union
produced some 1,200 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and some 200
metric tons of plutonium. Needless to say, it would be difficult to
determine if a few kilograms of this material were misplaced here and
there.
Third, the lack of physical protection of nuclear material in the
former Soviet Union is shocking. Nuclear material is stored in
containers without seals to prevent tampering. Many of the labs,
research centers, and power plants with nuclear material do not have
perimeter fences, electronic sensors, or monitoring cameras to deter
and detect intruders. Instead, U.S. officials have seen nuclear rods
stored in metal lockers secured with padlocks. According to the Russian
Government, 80 percent of its nuclear facilities--80 percent--do not
have radiation detectors to prevent those on the inside from walking
out the door with nuclear material.
Fourth, there are nuclear technicians and guards at these facilities
who have not been paid in months. I have heard that the senior staff of
one nuclear facility abandon their posts a few hours a day to tend to
their potato gardens, so that they will have food to eat. It seems to
me that these conditions are so ripe for corruption that the threat of
an inside job is much greater than the threat of an outside thief
entering a nuclear facility--as easy as that may be.
Fifth, current border controls throughout the former Soviet Union are
notoriously weak. If smuggled nuclear material passes through Europe,
we have some chance that intelligence officials and law enforcement can
interdict it. However, trafficking routes through the Caucasus or
Central Asia are another story--the chances of successful interdiction
are slim to none.
Finally, we have the problem of the thousands of nuclear scientists
and technicians in the former Soviet Union with knowledge about nuclear
weapons who are looking for ways to make a living in the new world
order. Their expertise would certainly be welcome in some aspiring
nuclear states that immediately come to mind.

the u.s response

After a slow start 4 years ago, many of these problems are now being
addressed by our Departments of Defense and Energy. The Energy
Department, for example, has equipped a number of nuclear facilities in
the former Soviet Union with fences, monitors, and sensors. The United
States Enrichment Corporation has arranged for the purchase of 500
metric tons of highly enriched uranium to be converted into commercial
reactor fuel. Newly created international research institutes have
employed hundreds of Russian nuclear scientists. Such cooperative
efforts need to be evaluated and duplicated on a much larger scale.
I commend my distinguished colleagues Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar
for bringing attention to global proliferation threats through Senator
Nunn's recent hearings of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
and Senator Lugar's hearings last august on the issue of Loose Nukes. I
might add that Senator Lugar's hearings are the only hearings that have
been held on this critical issue in the Foreign Relations Committee in
the 104th Congress.
Mr. President, I think that it is worth asking: are we directing
America's limited resources proportionately to meet a clear and present
threat which I and many of my colleagues regard as our greatest
national security challenge?
In 1991, my colleagues Senators Nunn and Lugar had the foresight to
devise the cooperative threat reduction program to assist the states of
the former Soviet Union in dismantling nuclear warheads and protecting
nuclear materials. Over the last 5 years funding for the Nunn-Lugar
program has totaled $1.5 billion--an average of $300 million

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per year, or about one-tenth of 1 percent of our annual defense budget.
In addition, this year's funding level was cut 25 percent from last
year's level.
In contrast, consider how much time, money, and energy we have spent
on the proposed missile defense system to meet the improbable long-
range ballistic missile threat, which we are told is at least 15 years
away. We have spent some $35 billion over the years on missile
defenses. I find it hard to believe that this disparity in spending
corresponds to the threats we face.
As I have repeatedly stated on this floor, a long-range ballistic
missile will not be the most likely means of delivery of a weapon of
mass destruction to the United States. No. A much more likely scenario
is that a terrorist group will smuggle material and parts for a
nuclear, chemical, or biological device onto our shores--perhaps by any
of the many routes used by narcotics traffickers--and then reconstruct
a weapon of mass destruction, put it in a van, and detonate it in near
an important American landmark.
That is the more likely threat, and that is where we should be
focusing the bulk of our energies, not on reviving star wars.

the nuclear summit

Mr. President, I hope that my colleagues recognize that we are
engaged in a race against time. Either we will help secure this
material and provide our citizens with the safety to which they are
entitled, or rogue elements will procure this material and use it to
blackmail civilization.
The danger of uncontrolled nuclear material is a first level national
security threat to the United States of America and a first level
national security threat to our friends and allies. We cannot simply
ignore the problem and leave if for Russia to solve on her own.
Likewise, Russia cannot simply downplay the potential threat and delay
implementing concrete measures. Indeed, Russia itself is a target--just
last November Chechen separatists placed radioactive material in a
Moscow park.
To be successful, the nuclear safety and security summit must build a
global consensus on the nature of the threat before us and generate
wider cooperation for swift action.
The critical first step must be to improve the physical protection of
nuclear material at the source--secure the material at a limited number
of sites and institute a comprehensive accounting system. That, in my
opinion, is the most important agenda item for the leaders of the G-7
and Russia at the nuclear summit.
World leaders at the summit will also discuss ways to improve
cooperation in countering nuclear material smuggling. Given the limited
success we have had in interdicting narcotics traffickers, I am not
optimistic about the prospects of interdiction alone to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear material. Nonetheless, much more can and
should be done to improve border controls and intelligence cooperation.
Mr. President, it is my hope that the nuclear safety and security
summit in Moscow this week will help propel the world's leaders to take
immediate preventative and rational steps toward nuclear security. The
alternative is to delay action until after our first nuclear terrorist
incident--whether in a Moscow park, a Tokyo subway, or a New York
office building.
Mr. President, no other nation can match the expertise and resources
of the United States. We must be the leader in promoting cooperative
efforts to reduce the nuclear threat. Investments we make in this area
today will reap a future return in the form of enhanced security for
all Americans.

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