[Pages S335-S338]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY ON NORTHERN IRELAND

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, last November, the British and Irish
Governments acted jointly to create an innovative three-member
committee,

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called the International Body, to assess an extremely difficult issue
that had become a serious obstacle to the peace process in Northern
Ireland--how to remove all arms from Irish politics.
Our former colleague, Senator George Mitchell, agreed to serve as
chairman of the International Body, and he was joined by two other
distinguished international leaders, Gen. John de Chastelain of Canada
and former Prime Minister Harri Holkeri of Finland.
The International Body issued its report earlier today, and I welcome
it as a reasonable way forward for all sides in Northern Ireland. I
hope all sides will make the fair and modest concessions needed to
enable the peace process to move ahead.
I commend Senator Mitchell, General de Chastelain, and Prime Minister
Holkeri for their sensible approach to the difficult problem of
decommissioning weapons. The International Body did its work well.
Reasonable people who genuinely want peace have a priceless opportunity
now to make the kind of progress needed to end the current impasse. It
is time for all-party talks to begin.
I believe that all of us in Congress concerned about Northern Ireland
will find this report of great interest, and I ask unanimous consent
that it be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:

Report of the International Body, January 22, 1996

(By George J. Mitchell, Chairman, John de Chastelain, and Harri
Holkeri)

i. introduction

1. On 28 November 1995, the British and Irish Governments
issued a Communique which announced the launching in Northern
Ireland of a `` `twin track' process to make progress in
parallel on the decommissioning issue and on all-party
negotiations.''
2. One track was ``to invite the parties to intensive
preparatory talks with a remit to reach widespread agreement
on the basis, participation, structure, format and agenda to
bring all parties together for substantive negotiations aimed
at a political settlement based on consent.'' This has become
known as the political track.
3. The other track concerned the decommissioning of arms
and was set forth as follows in the Communique:
``5. In parallel, the two Governments have agreed to
establish an International Body to provide an independent
assessment of the decommissioning issue.
``6. Recognising the widely expressed desire to see all
arms removed from Irish politics, the two Governments will
ask the International Body to report on the arrangements
necessary for the removal from the political equation of arms
silenced by virtue of the welcome decisions taken last Summer
and Autumn by those organisations that previously supported
the use of arms for political purposes.
``7. In particular, the two Governments will ask the Body
to:
--identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method
for full and verifiable decommissioning; and
--report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of
those in possession of such arms to work constructively to
achieve that.
``8. It will be for the International Body to determine its
own procedures. The two Governments expect it to consult
widely, to invite relevant parties to submit their analysis
of matters relevant to the decommissioning issue and, in
reaching its conclusions within its remit, to consider such
evidence on its merits.''
4. We are that Body. This is our report. We have no stake
in Northern Ireland other than an interest in seeing an end
of the conflict and in the ability of its people to live in
peace. Our role is to bring an independent perspective to the
issue. We are motivated solely by our wish to help. This
assessment represents our best and our independent judgement.
We are unanimous in our views. There are no differences of
opinion among us.
5. To provide us with sufficient information to meet our
remit, we held two series of meetings in Belfast, Dublin and
London: the first, 15 through 18 December 1995; the second,
11 through 22 January 1996. In addition, we held an
organisational meeting in New York on 9 December 1995.
6. In the course of our meetings we heard orally and in
writing from dozens of government officials, political
leaders, church officials and representatives of other
organizations and institutions. We received hundreds of
letters and telephone calls from members of the public and
met with many others. We thank all for their submissions.
Contributions from those who suffered losses during the time
of troubles but are strongly committed to the peace process
were especially moving. All the submissions have been
carefully reviewed and considered.

II. DISCUSSION

7. Our examination of the issues and of the facts, and the
perspectives brought to us by those who briefed us or who
made written representations to us, convince us that while
there is no simple solution to the conflict in Northern
Ireland, the factors on which a process for peace must be
based are already known. We can indicate the way we believe
these factors should be addressed so that decommissioning of
arms and all-party negotiations can proceed, but only
resolute action by the parties themselves will produce
progress.
8. That noted, we are aware of the enormous contribution
already made by individuals and groups in advancing the
process of peace in Northern Ireland to its current stage.
The tireless and courageous efforts of Prime Minister John
Major and Taoiseach John Bruton (and before him Albert
Reynolds) have been essential to the peace process. They have
been joined by other political leaders, institutions,
organisations and individuals in the promotion of peace.
9. We consider our task in the light of our responsibility
to all of the people of Northern Ireland; the need for the
people to be reassured that their democratic and moral
expectations can be realised; and in the spirit of serious
efforts made by the British and Irish Governments to advance
the peace process.
10. For nearly a year and a half, the guns have been silent
in Northern Ireland. The people want that silence to
continue. They want lasting peace in a just society in which
paramilitary violence plays no part. That was the dominant
theme expressed in the many letters and calls we received
from those in the North and South, Unionist and Nationalist,
Catholic and Protestant, Loyalist and Republican.
11. Notwithstanding reprehensible ``punishment'' killings
and beatings, the sustained observance of the cease-fires
should not be devalued. It is a significant factor which must
be given due weight in assessing the commitment of the
paramilitaries to ``work constructively to achieve'' full and
verifiable decommissioning.
12. Since the cease-fires, the political debate has focused
largely on the differences that have prevented the
commencement of all-party negotiations intended to achieve an
agreed political settlement. This circumstance has obscured
the widespread agreement that exists--so widespread that it
tends to be taken for granted. In fact, members of both
traditions may be less far apart on the resolution of their
differences than they believe.
13. No one should underestimate the value of the consensus
for peace, and the fact that no significant group is actively
seeking to end it.
14. In paragraph five of the Communique we were asked ``to
provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning
issue.'' It is a serious issue. It is also a symptom of a
larger problem; the absence of trust. Common to many of our
meetings were arguments, steeped in history, as to why the
other side cannot be trusted. As a consequence, even well-
intentioned acts are often viewed with suspicion and
hostility.
15. But a resolution of the decommissioning issue--or any
other issue--will not be found if the parties resort to their
vast inventories of historical recrimination. Or, as it was
put to us several times, what is really needed is the
decommissioning of mind-sets in Northern Ireland.
16. We have asked ourselves how those who have suffered
during the many years of internal strife can accept the fact
that the establishment of a lasting peace will call for
reconciliation with those they hold responsible for their
loss and pain. Surely the continued suffering and bereavement
of individuals and of families should never be forgotten. But
if the focus remains on the past, the past will become the
future, and that is something no one can desire.
17. Everyone with whom we spoke agrees in principle with
the need to decommission. There are differences on the timing
and context--indeed, those differences led to the creation of
this Body--but they should not obscure the nearly universal
support which exists for the total and verifiable disarmament
of all paramilitary organizations. That must continue to be a
principal objective.
18. However the issue of decommissioning is resolved, that
alone will not lead directly to all-party negotiations. Much
work remains on the many issues involved in the political
track. The parties should address those issues with urgency.

iii. recommendations: principles of democracy and non-violence

19. To reach an agreed political settlement and to take the
gun out of Irish politics, there must be commitment and
adherence to fundamental principles of democracy and non-
violence. Participants in all-party negotiations should
affirm their commitment to such principles.
20. Accordingly, we recommend that the parties to such
negotiations affirm their total and absolute commitment:
a. To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of
resolving political issues;
b. To the total disarmament of all paramilitary
organizations;
c. To agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the
satisfaction of an independent commission;
d. To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by
others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence
the course or the outcome of all-party negotiations;
e. To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached
in all-party negotiations

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and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying
to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may
disagree; and
f. To urge that ``punishment'' killings and beatings stop
and to take effective steps to prevent such actions.
21. We join the Governments, religious leaders and many
others in condemning ``punishment'' killings and beatings.
They contribute to the fear that those who have used violence
to pursue political objectives in the past will do so again
in the future. Such actions have no place in a lawful
society.
22. Those who demand decommissioning prior to all-party
negotiations do so out of concern that the paramilitaries
will use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the
negotiations, or to change any aspect of the outcome of
negotiations with which they disagree. Given the history of
Northern Ireland, this is not an unreasonable concern. The
principles we recommend address those concerns directly.
23. These commitments, when made and honoured, would remove
the threat of force before, during and after all-party
negotiations. They would focus all concerned on what is
ultimately essential if the gun is to be taken out of Irish
politics: an agreed political settlement and the total and
verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organisations.
That should encourage the belief that the peace process will
truly be an exercise in democracy, not one influenced by the
threat of violence.

iv. commitment to decommissioning

24. The second of the specific questions in paragraph seven
of the Communique asks us ``to report whether there is a
clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such
arms to work constructively to achieve'' full and verifiable
decommissioning.
25. We have concluded that there is a clear commitment on
the part of those in possession of such arms to work
constructively to achieve full and verifiable decommissioning
as part of the process of all-party negotiations; but that
commitment does not include decommissioning prior to such
negotiations.
26. After careful consideration, on the basis of intensive
discussions with the Governments, the political parties,
religious leaders, the security forces, and many others, we
have concluded that the paramilitary organisations will not
decommission any arms prior to all-party negotiations. That
was the unanimous and emphatically expressed view of the
representatives of the political parties close to
paramilitary organisations on both sides. It was also the
view of the vast majority of the organisations and
individuals who made oral and written submissions. It is not
that they are all opposed to prior decommissioning. To the
contrary, many favour it. But they are convinced that it will
not happen. That is the reality with which all concerned must
deal.
27. Competing views were advanced on prior decommissioning.
One was that decommissioning of arms must occur prior to all-
party negotiations. We were told that the clearest
demonstration of adherence to democratic principles, and of a
permanent end to the use of violence, is the safe removal and
disposal of paramilitary arms, and that at this time only a
start to decommissioning will provide the confidence
necessary for all-party negotiations to commence. In this
view, all parties were aware of the need for prior
decommissioning before the cease-fires were announced and
should not now be able to avoid that requirement.
28. In the competing view we were told that decommissioning
of arms prior to all-party negotiations was not requested
before the announcement of the cease-fires, and that had it
been, there would have been no cease-fires; that those who
entered into cease-fires did so in the belief they would lead
immediately to all-party negotiations; and that the request
for prior decommissioning, seriously pursued for the first
time months after the cease-fires were declared, is merely a
tactic to delay or deny such negotiations. In this view, the
cease-fires having been maintained for nearly a year and a
half, all-party negotiations should begin immediately with no
further requirements.
29. We believe that each side of this argument reflects a
core of reasonable concern which deserves to be understood
and addressed by the other side.
30. Those who insist on prior decommissioning need to be
reassured that the commitment to peaceful and democratic
means by those formerly supportive of politically motivated
violence is genuine and irreversible, and that the threat or
use of such violence will not be invoked to influence the
process of negotiations or to change any agreed settlement.
31. Those who have been persuaded to abandon violence for
the peaceful political path need to be reassured that a
meaningful and inclusive process of negotiation is genuinely
being offered to address the legitimate concerns of their
traditions and the need for new political arrangements with
which all can identify.
32. Clearly, new approaches must be explored to overcome
this impasse. That is the purpose of the six principles we
recommend. They invoke a comprehensive commitment to
democracy and non-violence that is intended to reassure all
parties to the negotiations.

v. decommissioning during all-party negotiations

33. One side has insisted that some decommissioning of arms
must take place before all-party negotiations can begin. The
other side has insisted that no decommissioning can take
place until the end of the process, after an agreed
settlement has been reached. This has resulted in the current
impasse.
34. The parties should consider an approach under which
some decommissioning would take place during the process of
all-party negotiations, rather than before or after as the
parties now urge. Such an approach represents a compromise.
If the peace process is to move forward, the current impasse
must be overcome. While both sides have been adamant in their
positions, both have repeatedly expressed the desire to
move forward. This approach provides them that
opportunity.
35. In addition, it offers the parties an opportunity to
use the process of decommissioning to build confidence one
step at a time during negotiations. As progress is made on
political issues, even modest mutual steps on decommissioning
could help create the atmosphere needed for further steps in
a progressive pattern of mounting trust and confidence.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS: GUIDELINES ON THE MODALITIES OF DECOMMISSIONING

36. The first of the specific questions in paragraph seven
of the Communique asks us ``to identify and advise on a
suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable
decommissioning.''
37. We recommend the following guidelines on the modalities
of decommissioning. These recommendations are realistic in
light of the nature and scale of the arsenals in question,
estimates of which were provided to us by the Governments and
their security forces. We believe these estimates to be
accurate.
38. Decommissioning should receive a high priority in all-
party negotiations. The details of decommissioning, including
supporting confidence-building measures, timing and
sequencing, have to be determined by the parties themselves.
The decommissioning process should suggest neither victory
nor defeat.
39. The cease-fires and the peace process are products not
of surrender but rather of a willingness to address
differences through political means. This essential fact
should be reflected clearly in the modalities of the
decommissioning process, which should not require that any
party be seen to surrender.
The decommissioning process should take place to the
satisfaction of an independent commission.
40. The decommissioning process should take place to the
satisfaction of an independent commission acceptable to all
parties. The commission would be appointed by the British and
Irish Governments on the basis of consultations with the
other parties to the negotiating process.
41. The commission should be able to operate independently
in both jurisdictions, and should enjoy appropriate legal
status and immunity.
42. In addition to having available to it independent
sources of legal and technical advice and adequate field
resources to receive and audit armaments and to observe and
verify the decommissioning process, the commission should be
able to call upon the resources and the relevant technical
expertise of the British and Irish Armies, when it is
appropriate.
The decommissioning process should result in the complete
destruction of armaments in a manner that contributes to
public safety.
43. The decommissioning process should result in the
complete destruction of the armaments. Procedures for
destruction would include the cutting up or chipping of small
arms and other weapons, the controlled explosion of
ammunition and explosives, and other forms of conventional
munitions disposal.
44. The decommissioning process could encompass a variety
of methods, subject to negotiation, including:
The transfer of armaments to the commission or to the
designated representatives of either Government, for
subsequent destruction;
The provision of information to the commission or to
designated representatives of either Government, leading to
the discovery of armaments for subsequent destruction; and,
The depositing of armaments for collection and subsequent
destruction, by the commission or by representatives of
either Government.
Parties should also have the option of destroying their
weapons themselves.
45. Priority should be accorded throughout to ensuring that
armaments are safely handled and stored, and are not
misappropriated.
The decommissioning process should be fully verifiable.
46. Whatever the options chosen for the destruction of
armaments, including the destruction of weapons by the
parties themselves, verification must occur to the
satisfaction of the commission.
47. The commission would record information required to
monitor the process effectively. The commission should have
available to it the relevant data of the Garda Siochana and
the Royal Ulster Constabulary. It would report periodically
to relevant parties on progress achieved in the
decommissioning process.
The decommissioning process should not expose individuals
to prosecution.
48. Individuals involved in the decommissioning process
should not be prosecuted for

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the possession of those armaments; amnesties should be established in
law in both jurisdictions. Armaments made available for
decommissioning, whether directly or indirectly, should be
exempt under law from forensic examination, and information
obtained as a result of the decommissioning process should be
inadmissible as evidence in courts of law in either
jurisdiction.
49. Groups in possession of illegal armaments should be
free to organise their participation in the decommissioning
process as they judge appropriate, e.g. groups may designate
particular individuals to deposit armaments on their behalf.
The decommissioning process should be mutual.
50. Decommissioning would take place on the basis of the
mutual commitment and participation of the paramilitary
organisations. This offers the parties another opportunity to
use the process of decommissioning to build confidence one
step at a time during negotiations.

vii. further confidence-building

51. It is important for all participants to take steps to
build confidence throughout the peace process. In the course
of our discussions, many urged that certain actions other
than decommissioning be taken to build confidence. We make no
recommendations on them since they are outside our remit, but
we believe it appropriate to comment on some since success in
the peace process cannot be achieved solely by reference to
the decommissioning of arms.
52. Support for the use of violence is incompatible with
participation in the democratic process. The early
termination of paramilitary activities, including
surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate a commitment to
peaceful methods and so build trust among other parties and
alleviate the fears and anxieties of the general population.
So, too, would the provision of information on the status of
missing persons, and the return of those who have been forced
to leave their communities under threat.
53. Continued action by the Governments on prisoners would
bolster trust. So would early implementation of the proposed
review of emergency legislation, consistent with the evolving
security situation.
54. Different views were expressed as to the weapons to be
decommissioned. In the Communique, the Governments made clear
their view that our remit is limited to those weapons held by
paramilitary organisations. We accept and share that view.
There is no equivalence between such weapons and those held
by security forces. However, in the context of building
mutual confidence, we welcome the commitment of the
Governments, as stated in paragraph nine of the Communique,
``to continue to take responsive measures, advised by their
respective security authorities, as the threat reduces.''
55. We share the hope, expressed by many on all sides, that
policing in Northern Ireland can be normalised as soon as the
security situation permits. A review of the situation with
respect to legally registered weapons and the use of plastic
bullets, and continued progress toward more balanced
representation in the police force would contribute to the
building of trust.
56. Several oral and written submissions raised the idea of
an elected body. We note the reference in paragraph three of
the Communique to ``whether and how an elected body could
play a part.'' Elections held in accordance with democratic
principles express and reflect the popular will. If it were
broadly acceptable, with an appropriate mandate, and within
the three-strand structure, an elective process could
contribute to the building of confidence.
57. Finally, the importance of further progress in the
social and economic development of Northern Ireland and its
communities was emphasised time and again in our meetings, in
the context of building confidence and establishing a lasting
peace.

viii. concluding remarks

58. Last week we stood in Belfast and looked at a thirty
foot high wall and at barriers topped with iron and barbed
wire. The wall, which has ironically come to be known as the
``peace line,'' is a tangible symbol of the division of the
people of Northern Ireland into two hostile communities. To
the outsider both are warm and generous. Between themselves
they are fearful and antagonistic.
59. Yet, it is now clear beyond doubt that the vast
majority of the people of both traditions want to turn away
from the bitter past. There is a powerful desire for peace in
Northern Ireland. It is that desire which creates the present
opportunity.
60. This is critical time in the history of Northern
Ireland. The peace process will move forward or this society
could slip back to the horror of the past quarter century.
61. Rigid adherence by the parties to their past positions
will simply continue the stalemate which has already lasted
too long. In a society as deeply divided as Northern Ireland,
reaching across the ``peace line'' requires a willingness to
take risks for peace.
62. The risk may seem high but the reward is great: a
future of peace, equality and prosperity for all the people
of Northern Ireland.

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