

# EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

## PERSONAL EXPLANATION

HON. DEBORAH PRYCE

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, December 20, 1995

Ms. PRYCE. Mr. Speaker, due to inclement weather in my district, I was unavoidably detained and not able to vote earlier this week. Had I been present, I would have voted "aye" on rollcall No. 866, "aye" on rollcall No. 867, "aye" on rollcall No. 868, "no" on rollcall No. 869, and "aye" on rollcall No. 870.

## CORRESPONDENCE WITH ROLF EKEUS OF UNSCOM

HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, December 20, 1995

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, on November 1, 1995 I wrote to Mr. Rolf Ekeus, the Executive Chairman of the Office of the U.N. Special Commission [UNSCOM] in charge of weapons destruction and monitoring in Iraq. My basic question was: Why doesn't UNSCOM release the names of companies providing dual-use or military items to Iraq?

Mr. Ekeus' basic answer is that UNSCOM cannot carry out its weapons dismantlement tasks without the help of sovereign governments, sovereign governments—often because of ongoing legal cases—want to control the release of information about companies, and releasing the names of companies without the approval of sovereign governments will undermine the ability of UNSCOM to carry out its important mission.

I appreciate Mr. Ekeus' response, but I am still of the belief that sunshine is a powerful deterrent, and I will want to pursue this question further.

The text of the correspondence follows:

COMMITTEE ON  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,  
Washington, DC, November 1, 1995.

Hon. ROLF EKEUS

Chairman, U.N. Special Commission on Iraq,  
United Nations Headquarters, New York,  
N.Y.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I write with respect to the question of companies that supplied or are supplying dual-use goods, services or technology to Iraq, and the use of those dual-use items in Iraq's programs to build weapons of mass destruction.

At the time of the creation of UNSCOM by UN Security Council Resolution 687 in April, 1991, it had been my impression, from both you and from U.S. officials, that the names of companies supplying dual-use items to Iraq eventually would be made public. Thus far, to my knowledge, no such list has been made public.

I continue to think that it is important to make a list of all such companies public, on the theory that sunshine is the best deterrent of such transfers of dual-use items in the future.

I would like to ask a number of questions:

1. Why has a list of companies supplying dual-use items to Iraq not been made public? When will a list of such companies be made public?

2. What is the policy of UNSCOM on the publication of such a list of companies?

Does UNSCOM set policy on disclosure of names of companies itself, or is it acting on instructions of the Security Council or members of the Security Council?

Is it the policy of UNSCOM to defer to individual governments on the publication of such information? If so, why?

3. Do you agree that the publication of such a list of companies would serve as an important deterrent on future dealings with Iraq in dual-use items?

What steps can be taken to bring about the publication of such a list?

What additional steps can be taken to deter future transfers of dual-use items to Iraq?

Thank you for your time and attention, and I look forward to your early reply.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

LEE H. HAMILTON,  
Ranking Democratic Member.

UNITED NATIONS  
SPECIAL COMMISSION,  
December 14, 1995.

Hon. LEE H. HAMILTON,  
Ranking Democratic Member, Committee on  
International Relations; House of Rep-  
resentatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN HAMILTON: Thank you for your letter of 1 November 1995. I appreciate your letting me know of your concerns and inviting me to give my response. I regret the delay in this letter, but I was away from the United States much of November, principally in the Gulf region.

Your personal attention to our mission is highly appreciated and important as Iraq's insistent efforts in retaining and reacquiring weapons of mass destruction is and should remain of public concern.

Given the importance of foreign acquisition for Iraq's WMD programmes, the Special Commission gives priority to the task of securing as much information as possible on foreign suppliers to Iraq. It is especially important to map out Iraq's supplier network. In this respect, UNSCOM has so far been quite successful, thanks very much to the support from governments of those States from which supplier companies have been operating. Each case of export to Iraq of prohibited or dual-use items has to be carefully explored and investigated. Access to the companies concerned is crucial for the in-depth investigation. To get such access, UNSCOM has in practice to get the approval of the government concerned. Otherwise, governments would, no doubt, be upset were UNSCOM to initiate investigations without consent on their national territory. Our experience is that governments are cautious in providing access, and that without government support to the Commission's investigations, companies are at liberty to refuse talking to our experts. Over time, the Special Commission has learnt that a primary concern of governments appears to be the question of confidentiality. This requirement is applied almost on a universal basis. It means that if data like the name and iden-

tity of a company, and of the country of a supplier could be suspected to be published, the government would refuse access for investigation of the company concerned. Without government pressure, the supplier company would tend to be even more uncooperative. Thus, publication of data on supplier companies would have a devastating effect on the continuous and future efforts by the Special Commission to effectively block Iraq from retaining or reacquiring proscribed weapons.

These explanations should serve to set the background to the answer to your first question, namely that at the present, it is not advisable for the Special Commission to make public the names of foreign suppliers.

Concerning the policy of the Special Commission on the publication of names of suppliers, I can state that the data on suppliers are kept safely within the Headquarters in New York. Information concerning a supplier is, as a matter of policy, shared with the government of the supplier-country, with requests for further information (through interviews with visits and/or interrogation) of the company concerned.

This policy was originally formulated by the Special Commission and presented in briefings to the Security Council. A strong and vigorous support for the policy so defined has been the answer to these briefings.

I agree that the publication of a list on the names of supplier companies could serve as a deterrent on future dealings with Iraq in dual-use items. But such a publication would at the same time bring an end to practically all efforts of the Special Commission to get indispensable support and intelligence from the governments and information from the named companies. That would seriously compromise the task of the Special Commission to identify and eliminate all proscribed weapons in Iraq.

When our policy was originated, it was considered that publication of a list of names of companies could lead to certain presumptions which might very well be unjustified. Prior to the Gulf War, there was no ban on many of the dual-use items and chemicals exported to Iraq. Furthermore, Iraq frequently used agents and front companies to purchase items which were banned or controlled under certain multilateral export control systems, and resorted to false declarations as to destination and end-user. The supplier company, in such circumstances, could have been completely ignorant of the ultimate destination of the items concerned. It is because of these difficulties that the Special Commission reports the name of a company, which it identifies as the source of now proscribed items or materials in Iraq, only to the government in which that company is established. The government then, in most cases, assists in the investigation of the circumstances, of the export concerned and, where those circumstances so justify, undertakes prosecution of the offender. The Special Commission can support such prosecution through the supply of evidence in its possession and, in certain circumstances, through the provision of expert witnesses. Prosecution of a company, which is necessarily public, is surely the most powerful deterrent in convincing other companies not to engage in illegal trade. The Special Commission has every reason to believe that its policy has led to its gaining a much wider

• This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by a Member of the Senate on the floor.

Matter set in this typeface indicates words inserted or appended, rather than spoken, by a Member of the House on the floor.

knowledge of Iraq's procurement networks, and the names of many more suppliers, than would otherwise have been the case. The cooperation with governments which has been obtained, and national prosecutions which have or are taking place, testify to the effectiveness of the policy. A complete understanding of Iraq's supplier networks is the most potent instrument in preventing the reactivation of these networks. The Special Commission already has evidence of certain attempts by Iraq to do so and has been able to prevent the export or to interdict the items concerned on their way to, or upon their arrival in Iraq.

In addition to measures already taken, especially those under the plans approved by the Security Council, the most effective step to deter future transfers to Iraq of dual-use items would be the early adoption by the Security Council of a resolution approving the mechanism for export/import control of Iraq designed by UNSCOM and the IAEA. Under the mechanism, all states would be obliged to notify UNSCOM and the IAEA of intended exports (including transshipment) to Iraq of such items. The proposed mechanism has just been transmitted to the Security Council where we hope for very early action.

I would be happy to meet with you on one of my visits to Washington to explain this matter further to you if you consider this would be useful. One of your staff could telephone my office at (212) 963-3018 to make arrangements.

Yours sincerely,

ROLF EKEUS,  
Executive Chairman,  
Office of the Special Commission.

#### HONORING MAYOR ROBERT ROSEGARTEN

HON. GARY L. ACKERMAN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Wednesday, December 20, 1995*

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to join with my constituents and the members of the Great Neck Lawyers Association as they meet to present Robert Rosegarten, mayor of the village of Great Neck Plaza with their most prestigious Community Service Award.

While maintaining an active business enterprise, Mayor Robert Rosegarten established a model of civic responsibility and participation that served to enhance the lives of all the citizens of Great Neck. He has received both State and national acclaim for developing the economic revitalization programs in the downtown shopping region of Great Neck Plaza and for his work to enhance the beautification of Great Neck Plaza. He has served as mayor of the village of Great Neck Plaza since 1992, and as its deputy mayor for 8 years. Under his leadership, the village of Great Neck Plaza has emerged as an effective municipal government with many of its programs being replicated throughout New York State.

In his role of enhancing the village of Great Neck Plaza, Mayor Rosegarten has shared his many talents with a wide array of community organizations providing both leadership and creativity in addressing community concerns. Among his many community roles, Mayor Rosegarten serves as president of the Great Neck Village Officials Organization, commissioner of the Great Neck Central Police Auxiliary, and board member of Great Neck's Unit-

ed Community Fund, Chamber of Commerce, and the Great Neck Arts Center. In addition, he is the vice-president of the Great Neck Plaza Management Council and director of the Water Authority of Great Neck North. In 1988, Mayor Rosegarten received the Great Neck United Community Fund's prestigious Leo M. Friend Award for community service.

Mayor Rosegarten's guiding tenet in public service has been to make a positive difference in the lives of his village's citizens. In that undertaking, he has dramatically succeeded. I am most proud to join with so many in honoring him.

#### THE REPUBLICANS' ATTEMPT TO DISGUISE THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL

HON. LOUIS STOKES

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Wednesday, December 20, 1995*

Mr. STOKES. Mr. Speaker, I rise in recognition of the Republicans' attempt to draw attention away from their lifethreatening budget, by attacking the President's budget proposal, are trying to disguise his proposal as a legislative measure. The President continues to be upfront with the Republicans. He has openly voiced his commitment to protecting Medicare, Medicaid, education, and the environment. And, the President has openly warned the GOP that he will veto measures which threaten the quality of life of the American people.

Yet, for some reason, our Republican colleagues just don't get it. What does it take for them to realize that they cannot hide from their budget massacre. The GOP budget will adversely affect the lives of millions of children, seniors, the disabled, veterans, and families across the country.

No matter how many times the Republicans show that they can pass a measure that will devastate the lives of the American people for generations to come—still does not make it right. As we gather here now, to vote on the Republicans' spin on the President's budget, the GOP is attempting to take the American people through another smoke and mirror budget maze.

Mr. Speaker, we do not have time for more of the GOP's pranks. The time the Republicans are wasting here today should be being invested in completing action on the rest of the appropriations bills that are needed to reopen the Federal Government. If the Republican budget could stand on its own merit, the GOP would not have to resort to extremist tactics like we see here today. This action, coupled with the Republicans' politically staged shutdown of the Federal Government, to avoid real debate and serious negotiations on their budget, is not only ridiculous, it is in fact irresponsible.

The American people must be asking themselves, when will the Republicans stop playing games with our lives: When will the Republicans take the needs of the American people seriously? And, most importantly, are the Republicans capable of negotiating, and passing a budget that is compassionate to children, seniors, the disabled, veterans, and hard-working families?

Mr. Speaker, so far the Republicans' positive response to these critical questions re-

mains to be seen. I urge my colleagues to put an end to the Republicans' pranks, and to strongly urge our Republican colleagues to negotiate a compassionate budget. The American people deserve nothing less.

#### RETIREMENT OF JOHN M. COLLINS FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

HON. IKE SKELTON

OF MISSOURI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Wednesday, December 20, 1995*

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to salute a distinguished servant of the Congress and the Nation in the area of national defense and national security. On Wednesday, January 3, 1996, John M. Collins will retire after 22½ years as the Senior Specialist in National Defense of the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Since 1972, Mr. Collins has provided authoritative, in-depth, and profound analysis and advice to the Congress on a range of national defense issues unparalleled in its breadth and scope.

Mr. Collins' retirement closes a lifetime of Government service which mirrors the tumultuous history of the past 50-odd years. A native, I am proud to say, of my State of Missouri, he began his public service with his enlistment in the U.S. Army in May 1942—after being rejected by the Marine Corps, a fact he reiterates with great delight and good humor to numerous Marines and friends over the years. As a young enlisted soldier he came ashore over the Normandy beaches a few days after D-day, in 1944. As a captain he served in the Korean war. As a colonel he served as Chief of the Campaign Planning Group in General Westmoreland's headquarters in Vietnam during 1967–68—managing to get involved in, and survive as the winner, a point-blank shootout with a North Vietnamese soldier in the ruins of Hue City in early 1968.

In between these wartime duties he served in intelligence and contingency planning posts in Japan and the Middle East; training assignments in the United States; commanded a battalion in the 82d Airborne Division; was one of the principal planners for the possible invasion of Cuba which, fortunately, never had to take place during the fateful days of the Cuban missile crisis in October–November 1962; and graduated from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. He closed his 30-year Army career as a faculty member and chief of the strategic studies group at the National War College during 1968–72.

Immediately upon retirement from the Army, Colonel Collins joined the Congressional Research Service as Senior Specialist in National Defense. From the beginning of his CRS career he showed a willingness to examine fundamental assumptions. One of his first CRS reports examined whether the strategic nuclear triad of bombers, ground-based ICBM's, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles had been arrived at rationally, and whether it was in fact the only possible method of constructing U.S. strategic nuclear forces. At the height of the first Arab oil embargo, in 1975, he and a CRS coauthor, Clyde Mark, poured cold water on the idea that seizing Arab oil fields by military force would be an easy task. He