[Pages S10680-S10697]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

JOINT MEETING OF THE TWO HOUSES--ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY KIM YONG-
SAM, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Recess

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now
stand in recess until the hour of 12 noon and proceed to the Hall of
the House of Representatives for the joint meeting.

[[Page S10681]]

Thereupon, the Senate, at 10:44 a.m., recessed and, preceded by its
Secretary, Kelly D. Johnston, and its Sergeant at Arms, Howard O.
Greene, Jr., proceeded to the Hall of the House of Representatives to
hear an address delivered by His Excellency, Kim Yong-sam, President of
the Republic of Korea.
(For the address delivered by the President of the Republic of Korea,
see today's proceedings in the House of Representatives.)

after recess

Whereupon, at 12 noon, the Senate, having returned to its Chamber,
reassembled and was called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr.
Ashcroft).
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will come to order.
Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Parliamentary inquiry.
I think it would be helpful if the Chair would cite the order of the
time of the votes and the pending matter.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending matter is S. 21, the Bosnia
matter. There are 45 minutes to each side under control in debate, and
circumstances with leaders on each side controlling debate. At 1:30----
Mr. WARNER. I think it is 1:45, Mr. President.
Will the Chair clarify the time?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is controlled time until 1:30, followed
by the two leaders who have an opportunity to speak to the issue and
use their leader time. The amendment by the Senator from Georgia. [Mr.
Nunn] is pending to the substitute of the majority leader.
Mr. WARNER. Thank you. Mr. President, then, for planning purposes,
Senators could anticipate a vote between 1:45 and 2.
Would that be correct?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That, I believe, is the general time of which
the next recorded vote should occur.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. CRAIG addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho is recognized.
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed as in
morning business for no more than 10 minutes.
Mrs. MURRAY addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time for that purpose?
Mr. CRAIG. And that the time not be used by either side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, would that
time then be divided for both sides fully?
Mr. CRAIG. I would choose it not be divided from either side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the Senator's request?
Mr. CRAIG. If there is no objection, it could be divided equally.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I have to
consult with the distinguished majority leader. I note the presence on
the floor of a number of Senators who wish to address the pending
resolution.
Might we inquire of the Senator from Idaho the time?
Mr. CRAIG. It does not deal with this issue.
Mr. WARNER. I realize that. The time that the Senator would want?
Mr. CRAIG. No more than 10 minutes.
Mr. COATS. Mr. President, may I inquire of the manager of the bill--I
am sorry. I just walked onto the floor and did not understand what the
allocation of time was. I know we are moving toward a vote at 1:45,
approximately. The time is reserved for leaders. I would like to get
some assurance that I will be able to speak on the pending question for
up to 10 minutes or so. I do not know how that works in terms of other
time that might be allocated. I just offer that so that the leader has
some opportunity to make a judgment on this.
Mr. WARNER. For the information of the Senators present, there is now
an hour and a half of time equally divided between the majority leader
and the Senator from Connecticut and those who wish to speak in
opposition. I see the presence of two or three Senators I happen to
understand will be speaking in favor, on behalf of the majority
leader's amendment. I am perfectly willing to allocate such time within
that 45 minutes as they desire.
Could the Senator from Indiana indicate how much time he would like
to have?
Mr. COATS. I prefer more, but I will accept 10 minutes or so.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, if I may indicate to the Senator from
Virginia, I would be happy to have 5 minutes reserved for my comments.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have just been advised by the majority
leader's staff that the majority leader is overcommitted at this time
with respect to the time period of 45 minutes under his control.
Therefore, I regret that I would have to interpose an objection to----
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I will yield the floor then if time has
been allocated for this purpose.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, this is the first I knew about this
allocation of time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from
Indiana.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. WARNER. Might I ask the Senator from Indiana if he could lessen
that time if at all possible because we are overrequested.
Mr. COATS. I will do my best.
Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Virginia for his courtesy. I
did speak on this issue a few days ago, and I will attempt to summarize
the statement that I have here in the interest of preserving some time
for other Members.
I tried to make two points. First, that it is regrettable that we are
here not debating what the policy should be relative to Bosnia,
fulfilling our constitutional role of advise and consent to the
President of the United States, who is Commander in Chief and who is
delegated and given the responsibility and authority to conduct the
United States foreign policy, but regrettably we are here formulating
that policy in the absence of leadership provided by the President and
the administration in fulfilling their duties. That has been a
continuing sad story that has permeated this entire Bosnia debate over
the last 2\1/2\ to 3 years.
Filling this vacuum of leadership is not something that this Senator
relishes or even feels fully qualified to perform. Nevertheless, it
seems that it is left to us to try to identify and define some policy
relative to the United States involvement or lack of involvement in
this conflict in Bosnia.
It is true that the choices that face us as a nation in terms of
dealing with this conflict are not easy choices. Former Secretary of
Defense Les Aspin said all choices in Bosnia are bad; some are worse.
It is clear that we are dealing with perhaps what might be defined as
the best of the worst in terms of choices. But a couple of facts
confront us very, very directly today in this conflict.
Fact No. 1 is that the current attempts at negotiating a settlement
to the conflict in Bosnia have failed. And they have failed for a
period now of 2\1/2\ to 3 years. There have been numerous attempts.
There have been numerous so-called peace agreements, new peace plans. I
met with the Bosnian Foreign Minister just a few days ago. He said,
``We have signed 17 pieces of paper agreeing to cease-fires and
agreeing to peace plans.'' He said that, ``We have one party in this
conflict that holds a piece of paper and no weapon, and another party
who holds a weapon and no piece of paper.'' He said to guess which one
is going to prevail.
He said, ``We will not be able to sit down at the table and begin to
negotiate an agreement which both sides can agree to and adhere to
until there is an equalization of the confrontation that exists between
the two.'' Either both hold a piece of paper or both hold a piece of
paper and a weapon, and some sort of rough stalemate exists that will
cause both parties to have an incentive to come to the peace table. As
the situation now exists, no peace can be achieved if one party has no
reason to achieve a peace, no basis to achieve a peace. There is no
reason they need to achieve a peace if they can achieve their gains
through force.
The second truth we face is that UNPROFOR's--the so-called protective
force's--policy of protecting Bosnians

[[Page S10682]]
in safe havens has failed. We daily read of the latest disaster in this
regard.
It is clear that UNPROFOR, for whatever reason, does not have the
capacity, the will, or whatever, to achieve a successful implementation
of the protection policy.
The third basic fact, and we might as well say it and be up front
about it, the United States is not going to intervene militarily to
solve this and resolve this conflict. The American people do not
support it, the Congress does not support it, the President has not
articulated why we should do this, how it is in our vital strategic or
national interest, how we could achieve this militarily, how long we
would be there, what our exit strategy would be.
None of the defined criteria that are used to justify American
intervention have been either defined or articulated to either us or
the American people, and it is clear that we will not commit troops to
this conflict.
Anyone who has studied the history of conflict in this region, anyone
who understands to the most elementary level the nature of the
environment in which we will be placing our troops, anyone who
understands the complexity of this particular conflict, has to come to
the conclusion that it would be a disaster, a mistake, to involve the
U.S. militarily in this conflict.
Therefore, we are left with what I believe is probably the best-worst
option, something that I have been reluctant to endorse, but something
I do now endorse, and that is a lifting of the embargo. I agree with
the proposal that withdraws the U.N. protective forces first before we
lift. I think that is important. I agree with the policy that says the
United States should not commit to a NATO strategy that is destined to
be a failed policy.
But after UNPROFOR has left, and hopefully we will not need to
fulfill the President's already-stated commitment and promise to our
NATO allies to utilize U.S. forces to withdraw those forces, hopefully
that will not be necessary. I will reluctantly support that, in an
emergency situation, if there is no other way, as a commitment to NATO
that I believe has been made and we need now to keep. Hopefully, we
then can lift the arms embargo.
I think we need to understand what this means. I asked the foreign
minister, what does this mean lifting the arms embargo? What kind of
arms do you seek? He said, ``You don't understand. We don't need
American advisers on the ground; we don't need massive training off
site, we are very skilled in the rudimentaries of conflict.''
What we are dealing with here is not a Desert Storm sophisticated
arms conflict, but something more akin to pre-World War II. He said,
``The first thing we need are helmets.'' He said, ``Most of our deaths
are caused by shrapnel injuries to the head because we are not allowed
to have helmets under the arms embargo.'' It is an absurd restriction.
Second, he said, ``We need some ammunition, small arms ammunition. We
don't need people to show us how to use that. We have been an arms
manufacturer in the past.''
Third, he said, ``We need some antitank weapons so that we can deter
the heavy tank forces that may be arrayed against us.'' He said,
``These don't need to be sophisticated either; shoulder-held, shoulder-
fired antitank weapons would be sufficient.''
And fourth, ``We need artillery to counter the artillery that is
utilized by the Serbs so that we can achieve some kind of balance of
forces.''
So lifting the arms embargo does not mean necessarily greater U.S.
involvement, it does not mean we need to supply the arms. These arms
are available on the world market. It simply means we give the Bosnians
the right to do what they had asked us to do, and that is to defend
their own borders.
Finally, I think we need to examine a strategy of containment that is
in our vital national interest, not to have this spread into the areas
of Macedonia and Kosovo. We do need to draw the line, NATO does need to
be involved in this, but it requires U.S. leadership to accomplish it.
U.S. leadership has been the glue that formulated NATO, it has been the
glue that has held it together, and it is going to be the leadership
necessary to maintain NATO as a sustainable, viable defense entity. So
we need that leadership, and we should consult with our NATO allies
about a containment strategy that keeps this conflict contained within
its current area.
So, Mr. President, that is a very abbreviated explanation of why I
support the Dole-Lieberman effort here. I do so reluctantly. I believe
we have no other choice.
I thank the Senator from Virginia for the time that he has allotted
to me.
Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I yield myself such time that I might
require.
I think it would be in order if we sort of recognized, went back and
forth from those in support and those in opposition. The Senator from
Washington came very promptly. So I suggest by way of unanimous consent
that the Senator from Washington proceed, to be followed by Senator Kyl
and Senator DeWine, Senator Thurmond. Of course, we can interrupt that
order, if necessary, if others in opposition wish to speak.
And then I also announce that we have reason to believe that Senator
Cohen may be desirous of submitting an amendment. I hope he will advise
the managers as to his time requirements as early as possible. I yield
the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is
so ordered. The Senator from Washington.
Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes in opposition.
I do rise today in opposition to S. 21, which directs the President
of the United States to unilaterally lift the arms embargo on Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Like many of my colleagues, I, too, want to do
something, anything, to stop further atrocities from occurring in
Bosnia. The situation grows more horrid everyday. We have all said it
in a hundred different ways: There are no good options to choose from
when trying to determine how best to respond to the tragedies in Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
Compelling, sound, and thoughtful arguments have been made on both
sides of this debate. In the words of one young Dutch peacekeeper just
freed from Srebrenica: ``You wish the war would stop, but it's only a
wish. It will be a miracle if this war ever stops.''
He had come to that conclusion after witnessing first hand the hatred
that has fueled this conflict for generations, a hatred so deep as to
seem endless, passed on for centuries from parent to child.
At home, most Americans wonder aloud why the nations of Europe have
not been able to come together around this crisis. Knowing how pressing
the needs are in our own country, many Americans voice frustration at
the unending calls for one form or another of United States involvement
in Bosnia. Many resent the United States. in the role of global
policeman again, and still many others are horrified by the pictures
they see of refugees, of Bosnia's senseless dead, of ethnic cleansing
and genocide, of a young woman hanging from a tree in desperate pursuit
of escape.
It is this profound sense of frustration that brings us to this
debate today. Proponents of S. 21 argue that this approach gives us the
best of both worlds--allowing the United States to do something to
resolve the conflict while doing nothing to further our own national
involvement. But I believe, Mr. President, that the promises of this
approach may well prove to be false and that the consequences of
Senator Dole's bill are not well understood.
It is those consequences that concern me the most. It is those
questions that have not been answered as we go through this debate.
Despite those who have dismissed his comments during the course of
this debate, I agree with Secretary of Defense William Perry when he
says that unilaterally lifting the embargo greatly risks Americanizing
the war in the Balkans.
Let me make it clear that I agree with those who argue that the arms
embargo should be lifted, because it is the Bosnians' right as an
independent nation to defend themselves. U.N. Resolution 713, agreed to
in 1991 and imposing an arms embargo on all states formed from former
Yugoslavia, has frozen a military imbalance in place, because Bosnian
Serbs inherited most of the arms and troop strength from Tito's
Yugoslavia.
But I continue to have very strong concerns about the United States
going

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it alone and lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia unilaterally--
against the better judgment of our European allies who have troops on
the ground, and who have far more at stake than we do at this point.
We have spent little time during this debate discussing the actual
details of the plan before us. But it is those details that will
determine the success or failure of this approach.
For example, if the goal of lifting this embargo is to get arms to
the Bosnians, how exactly will that be accomplished? Who will be
supplying the arms? The language of the bill suggests that we can
somehow preclude U.S. participation, but I am unclear as to how that
can be achieved. If we act unilaterally, we may then be in a position
of supplying not just arms, but also trainers and other U.S. military
support personnel. Or, if we simply provide funds for the Bosnians to
purchase arms, will we be supportive if they use United States funds to
purchase arms from Russia--or Iran?
How do we keep United States supplied arms from falling into the
wrong hands? This may be a particularly difficult problem if Russian
arms are purchased--given that Russia has remained very close to the
Serbs during this conflict.
More broadly, if we view the Bosnian crisis as a potential threat to
European stability, then I believe we must approach the problem in
concert with our European allies, despite how difficult this has been.
They are strongly opposed to lifting the embargo, and have made it
clear that if the United States lifts the Bosnian embargo, they will
remove their peacekeepers. That will no doubt lead to a new wave of
refugees in Europe. It is the Europeans who will have to deal with the
immediate effects of any U.S. action. It will be their soldiers who are
on the ground in Bosnia, and whose lives will be on the line.
Other questions remain.
Currently, the United States works with our allies to enforce the
embargo. If we break it unilaterally, will our allies continue to try
and enforce it, and if so, how will we deal with such conflicts?
The Croatians, too, have lost territory to the Serbs and would like
to reclaim it. If we lift the embargo against Bosnia, why will we not
be asked to do the same for Croatia?
And, if the United States acts unilaterally, this could lead some
nations to question their commitment to other embargoes, such as the
economic boycott of Iraq currently in place.
Mr. President, I am not prepared today to bury the multilateralism we
have worked so hard to develop over the last 50 years with our allies.
And finally, if the U.N. peacekeepers are removed, the United States
may find itself in a position of having to deploy our own troops to
help in that evacuation. Have the American people been adequately
prepared for the loss of life that may occur under those circumstances?
On that question, Mr. President, I strongly believe we should take the
matter to a vote of the House and Senate if a wider role for U.S.
troops is requested, so that the American people are involved.
Let me make it clear that although I do not support the resolution
before us today, I agree that the status quo is totally unacceptable.
The handwringing of the West has been endless. Our actions have been
irresolute and irresponsible.
It has been a mistake from the beginning to deploy U.N. peacekeepers
in a situation where no peace exists. It is not the mission of U.N.
peacekeepers to make peace. Their role is to try to keep the peace once
a settlement to the conflict has been agreed upon. That is not the
situation in the former Yugoslavia. In the words of the Secretary
General, the West has delivered to the United Nations a ``mission
impossible.''
Scores of peacekeepers have been killed--and countless wounded. They
have been deployed as soldiers into a war zone, but without the arms
and means to protect even themselves.
The peacekeepers have done their best under these horrid
circumstances. They have saved countless thousands of lives. They have
delivered vital humanitarian relief supplies. But they cannot be
expected to resolve this war.
As I said in the beginning of my statement, we have come to this
debate out of a deep sense of frustration.
This past weekend's ministerial level meetings in Europe produced a
refinement of current allied strategy, but the current allied position
remains tenuous and untested. We know that NATO's pinprick airstrikes
are to be replaced by a NATO air campaign. We have been promised
significant improvements in the duel-key command and control system,
but confusion on this critical issue remains.
Overall, the agreement between the United States and our allies is
extremely fragile, with important questions remaining about its
implementation. Will, for example, the plan to protect Goradze become a
policy and extend to other U.N. safehavens if they come under attack?
Fundamentally, is there a policy of resoluteness behind this site
specific plan? If so, I have yet to hear it. And will the military
officers on the ground finally be in control of military decisions, as
opposed to the current situation where civilian U.N. officials can veto
a military recommendation to initiate airstrikes. It is that situation
which has led the Serbs to conclude that the West is nothing more than
a paper tiger.
Rightfully frustrated by what appears to be yet more allied
indecisivness, Senators voting today in support of the unilateral
lifting of the embargo believe their action will contribute to a
solution in Bosnia. For the sake of the Bosnians, and for the sake of
the entire civilian population throughout the former Yugoslavia, I hope
that they are right, and that this action brings the conflicting
parties closer to the peace table.
But we have no way of knowing that will be the case.
Let me state clearly that I oppose unilaterally lifting the embargo
for two basic reasons: At the core, this is a European issue. Our
European allies are on the frontline, and they do not want us to act
unilaterally. We have 50 years of solid NATO relations at stake, and I
have strong concerns about the United States going it alone against our
European allies who have troops on the ground and who have more at
stake than we do as we go into this debate.
Second, and more important, if we do this, we have to be prepared to
accept the consequences--we, the Senators of the U.S. Senate.
The moment we lift the embargo, there is a strong chance the allies
will leave and an all-out war will follow. If that is our choice, we
will have to live with the resulting carnage. It is for those two
reasons that I oppose this proposition before the Senate.

Mr. President, this is a debate with endless questions and few
answers, but in my view history will far better be served if the United
States continues to try to forge a consensus approach to this tragic
situation, rather than adopt a go-it-alone strategy that may well have
the unforeseen consequence of widening the war and escalating our own
national involvement.
It is with a great deal of reluctance and sadness that I vote today
in opposition to the amendment before the Senate.
Mr. WARNER. I yield myself such time as I may require. I am informed
at the present time there will be an objection to any request to extend
the amount of time now elapsing between 12:20 and 1:30, at which time
the leaders have their time reserved.
Therefore, I ask the Senator from Arizona how much time is required?
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, 5 minutes.
Mr. WARNER. Could the Senator reduce it to 3?
Mr. KYL. I will do my best.
Mr. WARNER. I ask the Senator from Ohio [Mr. DeWine], to reduce his
time to 3 minutes.
The distinguished Senator from South Carolina, could we inquire as to
the amount of time that the Senator desires?
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, 7 or 8 minutes.
Mr. WARNER. Could I ask the Senator to reduce that amount of time? We
are rapidly running out of time.
Hopefully we can accommodate the Senator from Maine.
Mr. THURMOND. Can the Senator extend it to give me 7 minutes?
Mr. WARNER. I am told there will be an objection. Could we hopefully
do 5 minutes?
Mr. THURMOND. I will try.
Mr. WARNER. I yield the floor.

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The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I want to strongly support the Dole-Lieberman
resolution. It is frustrating for all because the moral imperatives
here demand action, yet as has been noted by all of the other speakers,
all actions are fraught with problems.
We all agree there are no good options. We all agree that lifting the
arms embargo is not a panacea, but it will enable the Bosnian Moslems
to defend themselves, which is their right under article 51 of the
United Nations charter. It may hasten the day when the Serbs cease
their aggression.
Ever since the United Nations extended diplomatic recognition to
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, I have believed that the United Nations
should either act to get the United Nations to lift the 1991 embargo,
or unilaterally lift that embargo to make it easier for the Moslem
communities to defend themselves.
We all know that the Bosnian Serbs have an arsenal of weapons which
they obtained largely from the Yugoslavian Army, also from Romania, the
Soviet Union and other sources.
In Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, and with the Kurds in Iraq, the
United States helped those defending their families and territory to
acquire the weapons to defend themselves. This situation is no
different, Mr. President. That is why I support lifting the arms
embargo.
While some negative consequences could result from lifting the arms
embargo, it cannot be worse for the Bosnian Moslems than the death of
200,000 civilians, perhaps thousands of women raped, 2 million people
left homeless, and the loss of 70 percent of their territory.
Albert Wohlsetter pointed out in an editorial entitled ``Genocide by
Embargo,'' ``adherence to Security Council Resolution 727, even after
the United Nations, European Community and the United States has
recognized the independent status of the states of the former
Yugoslavia, is a violation of article 51 of the U.N. Charter which
acknowledges the right of self-defense.'' He says ``The United States
should now simply declare that there is no valid embargo on the
sovereign nations who are the victims of continuing Serbian genocide.''
Mr. President, shortly we will be voting on two amendments which seek
to involve the United Nations. Of course, if the United Nations could
quickly lift the arms embargo, that would be the best result. These
amendments should not interpose between U.S. action immediately and
lifting of the arms embargo by the rest of the world communities any
requirements that would delay U.S. action.
That is why I believe we should first pass the Dole-Lieberman
resolution which commits the United States to action, not dependent on
what anyone else does. As former British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher wrote in her recent letter to Senator Dole, ``American
leadership is vital to bring order out of the present chaos. No country
must be allowed to veto the action required to end the present
catastrophe.''
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent I may proceed for
not to exceed 2 minutes on my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, it is important that the Senator from
Maine be given an opportunity to propose an amendment which is in the
nature of a second-degree amendment. I yield to him 2 minutes.

Amendment No. 1851 to Amendment No. 1848

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, last evening I took the floor to indicate
that my expectation was that Senator Nunn would be offering an
amendment that essentially would require President Clinton to go to the
United Nations. A year ago in August, Senator Nunn and then Senator
Mitchell also sponsored legislation requiring the President to go to
the United Nations. The President did, but he did not seek a vote.
Under the Nunn amendment, as I understand it, he would require the
President to seek a vote to lift the embargo on a multilateral basis.
It is my expectation that if the President were required to do so,
nonetheless we could anticipate that one of the members of the Security
Council--be it Russia, be it France, be it any other member--would
impose a veto or seek to prevent it from coming to a vote.
My amendment to the Nunn amendment would require that in the case
that a vote is prevented or in case a veto is lodged, that the
President would then go to the General Assembly of the United Nations
which has voted--the membership of that has voted on two prior
occasions overwhelmingly--to lift the embargo.
This would, in my judgment, meet the objections of our colleagues who
are concerned about undermining our relationship and the United Nations
or with NATO. This would give an opportunity for a multilateral lifting
of the embargo and would preserve the integrity of the institution
itself.
I believe it would resolve the problems that many of my colleagues
feel now, acting unilaterally. This is an opportunity for the countries
who have voiced their support for the lifting of that embargo on a
multilateral basis to cast their vote. I believe we would accomplish
our objectives. I intend to support the Dole resolution. I intend to
support the Nunn amendment, and hopefully my colleagues will also
support it.
Mr. President, I send to the desk my amendment in the second degree.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Maine [Mr. Cohen] proposes an amendment
numbered 1851 to amendment No. 1848.

The amendment is as follows:

Strike the period at the end and insert in lieu thereof the
following: ``In the event the United Nations Security Council
fails to adopt the resolution to terminate the application of
United Nations Security Council resolution 713 to the
Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina because of a lack of
unanimity of the permanent members, thereby failing to
exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security, the United States shall
promptly endeavor to bring the issue before the General
Assembly for decision as provided for in the Assembly's
Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950.''

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I believe the Nunn amendment is
sufficient to allow consideration of a multilateral lift of the arms
embargo by our allies. The Nunn amendment provides the United States
ample opportunity to consult to the greatest reasonable extent with our
allies. As I said in my statement earlier, the time to act is now--not
later. However, so that it can never be said that the United States did
not allow every opportunity for the international community to support
a multilateral lift of the arms embargo, I will support the Cohen
second-degree amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.

Amendment No. 1801

Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the Dole-
Lieberman bill.
Let me make very clear, however, at the outset, that I believe that
this is a terrible way to have to make foreign policy.
The facts are that no congressional action can substitute for
Presidential leadership. No congressional action can substitute for
Presidential vision. There is no substitute for a clear and coherent
U.S. foreign policy defined, articulated, and pursued by the President.
Congress cannot negotiate with our allies. Congress cannot open up a
back channel. Congress cannot order airstrikes.
Therefore, this is a resolution that I am not particularly happy to
have to endorse. I am sure that many of my colleagues share my intense
dislike for congressional micromanagement of foreign affairs and
foreign policy. I do not think, Mr. President, we should make a
practice of acting as pseudo-Secretaries of State.
In fact, last week when the President called the majority leader and
asked him to delay action on this resolution, I had hoped then that the
President was going to lead. The events of last weekend and the last
few days, as articulated by my colleague from Connecticut and my
colleague from Virginia several hours ago, clearly shows this is not
going to happen.
Mr. President, Congress cannot force the President to lead, but maybe
Congress can push him towards leading. Indeed, we must do this. The
stakes in Bosnia are great. This conflict is more than just a civil
war. It involves more

[[Page S10685]]
than just the tragedies we see on TV, however horrible they are.
It also involves the question of the future of NATO and ultimately the
stability of Europe.

We have to reassert U.S. leadership of NATO. We have to maintain NATO
as a viable force. We have to prevent the spread of this conflict.
The administration simply does not have a coherent policy to achieve
these ends. Crossing your fingers is not a policy.
To achieve these ends, you have to start changing the conditions on
the ground. The bill before us outlines one way in which we could begin
to do this.
Clearly, though, lifting the arms embargo is a moral imperative. It
is the right thing to do. The administration may not have a foreign
policy yet, but until they do we should at least give the Bosnians a
chance to defend themselves.
The arms embargo is an unwise, outdated policy, enacted against a
country that no longer exists. I am, however, troubled by the idea of a
unilateral U.S. withdrawal from a collective engagement. That is why I
intend to support the amendments of Senators Cohen and Nunn. We should
go to the U.N. Security Council--and, if we fail there, the General
Assembly--to make this an allied and not a purely American policy.
Mr. President, the handwriting is on the wall for the U.N. policy in
Bosnia. The UNPROFOR troops are coming out--they are probably coming
out whether we pass this resolution or not.
They are coming out for good reason. They simply have no constructive
role to play under the rules of engagement.
Are the UNPROFOR troops supposed to stay in Bosnia just to die? Are
they supposed to stay there just to be captured--just to serve as a
shield for the aggressors? No. The writing is on the wall, and they are
coming out.
We need the President to lead.
The President needs to explain to the American people what America's
goals are in Bosnia--how, specifically, he intends to achieve them--
what sacrifices the American people might have to make--and why.
We cannot do that here on the Senate floor, but somebody has to. And
that somebody is the President of the United States.
On this issue, the administration is adrift. It is my hope that by
passing this resolution, the Senate is recalling the President to his
most important responsibility--to serve as Commander in Chief.
Mr. President, this problem will not just disappear. The only hope
for a more positive resolution of this tragedy will come with
Presidential leadership.
Mr. WARNER. Now, Mr. President, the distinguished senior Senator from
South Carolina is about to address the Senate. I would like to make a
further request for unanimous consent that the Senator from Minnesota
[Mr. Wellstone] be granted 3 minutes following that.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, last week I spoke on the floor about the
situation in Bosnia--about the U.N. safe havens being overrun by the
Bosnian Serbs and U.N. peacekeepers being taken hostage.
Since my statement on the floor, the United States and its allies,
primarily Britain and France, met to discuss options. The result of
those meetings was a stern warning that aggressive airstrikes would be
used against the Bosnian Serbs if they try to overrun anymore U.N. safe
havens, like Gorazde. The Bosnian Serbs reaction to that ``stern
warning'' was to fire a barrage of shells into Sarajevo killing and
wounding civilians. Members opposing S. 21 are asking that time be
allowed for the new directive to use aggressive airstrikes against the
Bosnian Serbs to work. In the meantime, the U.N. General Secretary is
sitting in New York determining exactly what the use of aggressive
airstrikes will include. And according to the news accounts today, he
will retain the authority to veto any NATO recommendation to use
aggressive airstrikes. Meanwhile, Zepa fell yesterday to the Bosnian
Serbs, and Sarajevo continues to be shelled.
It is clear to me that the majority of Members in this body agree
that the U.N. mission has failed--it is time for the U.N. protection
forces to withdraw. Despite continued stern warnings and threats by the
United Nations and NATO to use aggressive airstrikes, the Bosnian Serbs
continue to defy the United Nations and NATO and continue to pose a
danger to the civilians in the U.N. safe havens and the U.N.
peacekeepers there to protect them. The time has come for the
administration and our allies to quit wringing their hands about what
to do in Bosnia and quit looking to the United Nations to make
decisions on whether to use aggressive airstrikes to enforce peace in a
country where there is no peace.
Mr. President, as I stated last week, the United States has no
national security interests in Bosnia. The only interests the United
States has with regard to the situation in Bosnia is to provide
leadership and act responsibly as a member of the United Nations
Security Council and as a member of NATO. It is time for the United
Nations to withdraw its forces from Bosnia and to seek agreement to
lift the arms embargo against Bosnia. Failing an agreement by the U.N.
Security Council to lift the embargo, the United States should
unilaterally lift the arms embargo so that the Bosnians can defend
themselves. It is time for the Congress to show its leadership to
ensure that U.S. credibility as a treaty partner and NATO ally. We must
assist, if requested, in a NATO withdrawal of the U.N. protection
forces from Bosnia.
I remain concerned that Members of this body did not actively engage
in a discussion of U.S. support in a NATO withdrawal of UNPROFOR. The
U.S. cannot stand by while our allies are in mortal danger during a
withdrawal of UNPROFOR. As I stated last week, the damage to U.S.
leadership, honor, prestige and credibility would be beyond
calculation, if we do not send a clear signal now that the Congress
will support the participation of U.S. troops in a withdrawal
operation. It should be understood, however, that any U.S.
participation in a U.N. withdrawal must be totally under NATO command
and that there can be no dual key arrangement between the United
Nations and NATO and there must be robust rules of engagement.
The situation facing this body is not complicated, but the demand for
us to take decisive action is clear and urgent. The Dole-Lieberman
substitute to S. 21 allows us to take action which is well defined and
in the best interest of our Nation. The Dole-Lieberman substitute also
serves the best interests of our Allies, to whom we have pledged our
support in leaving what has become an impossible mission. I urge the
Senate to support the Dole-Lieberman substitute to S. 21 and hope that
our Allies join in this positive course of action.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would like to pose a further unanimous-
consent request, that from the time under the control of the
distinguished majority leader, 4 minutes be granted to the Senator from
Minnesota, now waiting to speak; that 3 minutes be granted to the
Senator from Iowa; that 3 minutes be granted to the Senator from New
Jersey [Mr. Lautenberg] who has been here; and my understanding is the
Senator from New York [Mr. Moynihan] is going to speak against the
amendment, consequently he would take 5 minutes from the time under the
control of the other side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Minnesota.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, we have witnessed, over the last few
months, especially the last 2 weeks, a sickening spectacle in Bosnia.
Women raped for alleged sins committed by their ancestors centuries
ago, torture, and the brutal cold-blooded murder of young Moslem men.
Where are the Serbs taking these men, 12 years of age and older--if you
want to call a 12-year-old a man? I have felt from the beginning we
should be flying over, taking notes of the license plates, and making
clear to the Serbs they will be held accountable for war crimes.
Mr. President, this is the never again--again. These are Nazi-like
tactics, Nazi-like actions. That is what we are witnessing.
During the last 3 years, I have voted at various times both on the
arms embargo and to find other ways that allies could respond to this
aggression by the Serbs. And it does seem to me that the arms embargo
must be lifted.

[[Page S10686]]

But if we are going to be intellectually honest, we need to think
through all of the policy implications that accompany this momentous
decision. If the UNPROFOR forces are going to be leaving, they have to
have safe exit, and the international community, with the United States
included, I believe, has to make a commitment.
What about the refugees themselves? I traveled to the former
Yugoslavia, and I met with refugees. And I saw enough pain to last a
lifetime. God forbid what is going to happen to them in the interim if
U.N. forces withdraw and the Serbs just go on forward and we have more
slaughter on top of slaughter. What is going to be our response and the
response of the international community?
I say to my colleagues, I think this is a moral imperative, and we
should end this. I hope it is multinational. But we should end this
arms embargo.
But, please, Democrats and Republicans alike, do not think that now,
all of a sudden, it is a level playing field. Do not make this a
technical fix. Do not turn your gaze away from what is happening
because we have other obligations that we must live up to. The people
of Bosnia need our help. They deserve the right to defend themselves
against brutal Serb aggression.
We should vote today to send a strong signal to the administration
and to our allies that we must move forward forcefully on Bosnia before
the entire U.N. operation collapses and the people of Bosnia are
overrun altogether by the Serbs.
Mr. President, my colleagues, Senator Lieberman, ``never again''
should mean ``never again.'' Let us vote to send a strong signal to the
rest of the world that we still believe in that proposition.
Mr. GRASSLEY addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, regardless of which side you may be on
in this debate, I think we can all agree on one thing. And that one
thing we can all agree on is the lack of leadership this administration
has displayed in this crisis. This administration under President
Clinton has zigged and zagged and flipped and flopped more than a lost
rabbit in an Iowa corn field.
This administration has huffed and puffed and bluffed it's way
through this crisis for over 2 years now. I would agree that the prior
Bush administration also made mistakes. But, those mistakes have been
increased and expanded under a Clinton foreign policy that no one
understands or respects. And, that includes our allies.
The only entity that has less respect is probably the United Nations.
And who do we turn the responsibility over to? Of course, the Clinton
administration has allowed the United Nations to define and control our
policy.
Just a few examples of the multilateral ineptitude that's taken place
including the following:
In November 1993, a Sarajevo schoolyard was shelled, killing 4
children and wounding 40. The Clinton administration responded by
saying ``We're not going to allow that city to be strangled, to be cut
off, to be relentlessly attacked.'' What action was taken? None.
In May 1995, 200 U.N. peacekeepers were taken hostage and used as
human shields against air strikes. We heard all kinds of protests and
threats from the Clinton administration to the NATO Secretary General.
What action was taken? None.
One of our planes was shot down recently thanks to the fact that the
administration had neglected to provide missile jamming devices to our
planes. And the pilot was hunted like an animal. Thankfully, the pilot
was rescued. What action did we take against the aggressors? None.
Mr. President, in stark contrast, we see the leadership of Majority
Leader Dole. Senate Dole has consistently moved forward with efforts to
allow the Bosnian Government to exercise its inherent right to defend
itself. Against many odds last year, including a hostile Clinton
administration, and an uncooperative Congress, Senator Dole forged
ahead and made his case. Today, his case, which is the case for justice
to the Bosnian Government, will finally win the day.
Of course, it may only be for a day or so, since the Clinton
administration is adamant about continuing its incompetent course of
disaster, by threatening to veto a unilateral lifting of the embargo.
This of course, is another sad commentary on the administration's
failed policy.
Mr. President, it is way beyond the time to finally act. And veto
threats, notwithstanding, I urge my colleagues to do the right thing
and support the Dole substitute amendment.
Mr. MOYNIHAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.
I rise for the simple purpose of clarifying, to the degree that I am
able, a point of law, a point of international practice, an American
principle which is at issue in the first two amendments that we are
going to consider. And I thank my friends from Virginia and Connecticut
for allowing me this time.
A very brief proposition, sir, but a long history behind it: Article
24 of the charter, drafted in a time of great expectations for post-
world war that did not come to pass, states that,

In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the
United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties
under this responsibility the Security Council act on their
behalf.

Sir, this was at a time when we anticipated that the Security Council
would have available to it armed forces from various member countries.
The Senate provided that the President could make available specific
military units--the 6th Fleet, the 1st Marine Division. If once we had
agreed in the Senate and in the Congress to do this, he could
thereafter deploy them at will.
However, it was stated, and it was a matter of great concern in our
delegation in San Francisco--Senator Vandenberg was most particularly
concerned--that the powers of the Security Council would not interfere
with the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, which
was the basic law of nations. Senator Vandenberg said that, if this was
not provided in the charter explicitly, a reservation would be offered
on this floor, and he would support it, and, in the end, it was agreed
to. Then Republican adviser John Foster Dulles, was not that
enthusiastic, but after much debate by the delegation it became the
position of the United States that it had to be included in the
charter.
Now, sir, here is the simple point, and I hope I can be heard on
this. I speak as someone who was Permanent Representative to the United
Nations under President Ford. I speak as someone who once served as the
President of the Security Council.
If we adopt the two amendments before us, we concede that in the one
instance, the Security Council, in the other, the General Assembly, has
the right to deny the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense. If they have to vote to agree to the exercise of that right,
then it is not a right itself; it is simply an authority that can be
conferred by a higher body; to wit, the Security Council or the General
Assembly.
I say once again, sir, this is an article of great concern to us. The
Treaty of Chapultepec, the Western Hemisphere defense system, the
Monroe Doctrine--all of those things were agreements which we were
concerned might be limited by the charter, putting into question the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.
If we ever concede, for whatever transient purposes of this moment,
that the Security Council has the right to confer what becomes simply a
privilege, not a right, or the General Assembly has the right to confer
what becomes now a privilege, not a right, then we are in grossest
ignorance and avoidance of the history of the charter and the text of
the charter.
Mr. President, I hope we do not make this mistake. It would be
something that 50 years ago on this floor would have been clearly
understood. And we have not dealt with these issues much in the last
half century. We may have become forgetful, although the revered former
chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations would remember. He was
there.
I point out, sir, that the right of individual or collective self-
defense is inherent. That is the language of the

[[Page S10687]]
charter. The charter is simply a codification of rights. The right to
self-defense being an inherent right, we cannot ever concede to the
Security Council or to the General Assembly some authority to confer--
let the right become operational, or however you like to say it--that
right. It ceases at that point to be a right. It becomes a privilege to
be conferred or denied.
I thank the Chair most specifically for his kindness and attention.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a memorandum of law be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the memorandum was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

Memorandum of Law

SUMMARY

The history of Article 51 demonstrates that any member
state's obligation to defer to the Security Council in
refraining from engaging in individual or collective self-
defense is conditioned on the Security Council taking
effective measures to restore peace and prevent aggression.
The record further shows that unless this point was made
clear in the Charter, the Senate probably would have taken a
reservation on this point in giving its consent to
ratification.

DISCUSSION

According to Ruth Russell's indispensable ``A History of
the United Nations Charter,'' the principle of the right of
self defense was so unanimously agreed upon that initially
there was no proposal to include in the Charter an express
provision on this point. The bulk of the debate over the
issue revolved around the desire of the U.S. delegation to
confirm that the Security Council could not interfere with
the ``collective'' right of self defense within the Americas
under the Treaty of Chapultepec.
The American delegation initially considered opposing any
express reservation on the grounds that it could only be used
to restrict what was ``inherent'':
``When the [American] delegation made its paragraph-by-
paragraph study of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, its most
serious difficulties arose with . . . maintenance of peace
and security. The enforcement aspects of the chapter were
accepted without debate. The only point left unsettled was
whether a specific reservation of the right of self-defense
should be included. As this was agreed to be an inherent
right of sovereignty, not deniable by the projected Charter,
there was no controversy on the principle. The question, as
it had earlier confronted American officials, was whether
attempted definition would not defeat the very end desired by
making possible a restrictive interpretation of the
principle. The issue was left open. . . .''
Later the U.S. delegation had ``acrimonious'' debates about
how to protect the right of the U.S. to engage in collective
self-defense in the Western Hemisphere in the face of a
``Great Power'' veto. This passage is from Senator
Vandenberg's diary:
``[John Foster] Dulles argued that there is nothing in
Dumbarton Oaks which prohibits `self-defense' and that under
the Chapultepec agreement `self-defense' in the Western
Hemisphere is a partnership affair and that the Monroe
Doctrine is still part of it. I served notice on the
Delegation, as a matter of good faith, that if this question
is not specifically cleared up on the Charter, I shall expect
to see a Reservation on the subject in the Senate and that I
shall support it.''
A subsequent U.S. delegation statement of the U.S. position
made it clear that states must be free to take action if the
Security Council is frustrated by the use of the veto: ``if
any one of the Great Powers with a veto in the Security
Council abuses its power . . . the Organization will have
broken down and all states would then be free to take
protective action.''
When the U.S. finally proposed that there should be a
formal recognition of the `inherent'' right of self-defense
in order to protect its rights in the Western Hemisphere, the
official U.S. position--endorsed by President Roosevelt--was
explained as follows:
``Should the Security Council not succeed in preventing
aggression, and should aggression occur by any state against
any member state, such member state possesses the inherent
right to take necessary measures for self-defense.''
Ruth Russell explains that an express reservation on this
point was in part necessitated because the delegation ``faced
a very practical problem in getting the treaty through the
Senate.''
The British proposal on Article 51--which is very close to
the final version--makes even more clear than the final text
that the Security Council must act and act effectively if
other states are to be expected to defer to it:
``Nothing in this Charter should invalidate the right of
self-defense against armed attack, either individual or
collective, in the event of the Security Council failing to
take the necessary steps to maintain or restore international
peace and security.''
Interestingly, two of the last three paragraphs in
Russell's 965-page history of the Charter concern the
inherent right of self-defense. She was writing in 1958 and
the ``Great Power'' veto had, of course, become very much a
problem:
``Responsible American officials assumed, it can be said
with more accuracy, that if the desired cooperation did not
materialize, a serious great-power split would probably lead
to another world war, with or without the United Nations.
Even if the Council could not guarantee the peace, they also
pointed out, it could make clear the record. And as the
Charter in no way abrogated the right of self-defense, which
no nation was prepared to relinquish, action against
aggression could still be taken outside the Organization.
This was always an implicit assumption of American officials,
although it was not made explicit until the San Francisco
Conference.
``There the right was recognized in Article 51, in both
national and collective terms. If, therefore, the United
Nations machinery for any reason could not function to
maintain international peace and security, national power
could be mobilized by the states on a regional or some other
joint basis. The decisive factor, in that case, would be the
willingness of other states to act against the recalcitrant
state even at the cost of war. What experience has shown is
that the desire to support such drastic action against
disliked policies and countries is never as widespread as the
willingness to condemn them. This was as true in the autumn
of 1945 as it has been under the United Nations.''

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, does the Senator from New York require
more time?
Mr. MOYNIHAN. I would only say the same thing over and over again.
The right of self-defense--individual, collective--is inherent and in
no way depends on the approval of the Security Council or the General
Assembly or any other international body.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think he has very clearly stated his
message.
Under the current unanimous-consent request, there are 3 minutes for
the Senator from New Jersey.
Mr. President, I yield such time as to make that 5 minutes, 2 minutes
additional.
To inform other Senators, that results in the expiration of the time
under the control of the majority leader.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. I thank the Chair. I thank our colleague from
Virginia for his graciousness in permitting me these 5 minutes. I know
everybody is pulling at him, and I do not want to use any more time
except to thank him for that.
Mr. President, if any of us were fence sitting or had doubts about
what it was that we were witnessing, I think each day that has gone by
in recent weeks has further confirmed that we no longer can stand idly
by, that we must take action as befits our status as an international
leader in terms of morality and humanity, a country that supports human
rights almost above all else. Our very Constitution is based on law.
And when we stand by idly, which we are being forced to do by the
cowardice of our allies, then I think we become coconspirators, whether
we like it or not.
Mr. President, as recently as this morning, we saw something that
kind of confirms what the distinguished Senator from New York just
said.
In a report from Brussels, the New York Times writes that:

The allies agreed to make what one NATO official called a
``strong recommendation'' to Mr. Boutros-Ghali to leave it to
his military field commanders on the ground in Gorazde and
elsewhere to decide when the time has come to start bombing
the Serbs if they attack. But since Mr. Boutros-Ghali has
been extremely cautious about approval of airstrikes in the
past, what was meant to sound like a roar in London 4 days
ago appeared to have been throttled down to something more
like a growl by the NATO Ambassadors.

That is the situation. But the killing does not stop. The attacks do
not stop. The barbarism does not stop. And if one had at all any sense
of rights, when you read the stories about what happened in Zepa and
what happened before that in Srebrenica, where a woman was forced to
drink the blood of her 16-year-old son after his throat was cut,
barbarism of the most primitive and cruel fashion, we cannot stand by
and permit that to happen.
Mr. President, last year, we gave a deadline of November 15 for our
allies to get themselves together so that we could move multilaterally.
What happened? Since then hundreds, thousands more have been killed,
thousands abused, and more territory taken by the rogue government of
the Bosnian Serbs--total disdain for world organization, for rules, for
humanitarian conduct among people. It is shocking to see, and we ought
not to permit it to go on any longer.
Now, I know, Mr. President, that we are embarking on a shaky course,
but

[[Page S10688]]
not to do anything is a far shakier course. And certainly coconspiring
with the Bosnian Serbs to say that we will talk ourselves into the
ground while you kill the Bosnian people, separating men from women,
families, brothers from sisters, is terrible. It is terrible. And there
is not a person here who could witness a crime like that taking place
and not intervene at one's own peril--no one. No decent human being
could walk by and permit that to happen.
Mr. President, yesterday I had a conversation with the Prime Minister
of Bosnia, and I asked him the perennial question that seems to exist
now, and that is: Are you not afraid that larger forces will come in
and bring even more devastation? And he said, ``Ask the 5,000 missing
in Srebrenica whether or not they were afraid of more power coming
against them.''
Mr. President, he is not asking for much. He is asking for us to give
them a chance to fight back, to untie the hands from behind their backs
and give them the weapons necessary to defend themselves, as the
Senator from New York so articulately stated just a couple of minutes
ago.
It pains me to make this kind of a decision because we are going down
a path we are not sure about. There is one thing I am sure about. I for
one cannot permit the killing to take place, the barbarism to continue,
without speaking out against it in a way that has significance.
I yield the floor.
Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to say to my distinguished
colleague from New Jersey that was a very powerful statement, and I
hope it can be clearly understood and accepted by all. I certainly join
him in his observation and very much respect his support of this
important measure now before the Senate.
Mr. President, it is my understanding that would consume all the time
under the control of the majority leader.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time under the control of the majority
leader has been consumed.
Mr. WARNER. I yield the floor.
Mr. LIEBERMAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Shelby). The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Noting the absence in the Chamber of any colleagues
wishing to speak on the other side, I rise to say a few words with the
understanding that as soon as or even before I see someone else who
wishes to speak, I will yield the floor.
Mr. President, this has been, since we began it yesterday afternoon
at 2:15 p.m., a very important, very serious, very heartfelt debate,
and I thank my colleagues for, no matter which side they are on,
appreciating the seriousness of what we are doing here and for
reflecting that seriousness in their remarks.
I just want to say a few words in closing. Of course, Senator Dole
will speak in leader's time a little bit later.
No matter what any of those in opposition to the proposal that
Senator Dole and I and others of both parties have made, no matter what
arguments have been made--that it would cause bloodshed, it would
Americanize the war, it would do offense to our allies, all of which
arguments I feel we have rebutted--one thing stands out. No one has
come to the floor of this Senate to say that the arms embargo is
justified or should stay in place. No one has supported the arms
embargo. Everyone who has said they will be voting against our measure
to lift the arms embargo will do so because of their fear of what might
happen--the war might be widened; it does not give a proper opportunity
for the London communique, as flawed as Senator Warner and I indicated
we believed it was earlier in the morning, or did not give time for the
London communique to go into effect. But I have not heard anyone come
here and justify the arms embargo, because it is unjustifiable.
As Senator Moynihan said, in what might be called an articulation of
a natural rights theory of international law, quite valid, to suggest
that this is a right of self-defense that must be granted or can be
taken away by an international body is wrong. It is conveyed as a right
under the charter of the United Nations.
I would say under any theory of natural rights that people have
individually or acting collectively. Again, remember that it was
imposed in 1991 on Yugoslavia, which no longer exists, on the premise
that it might help stop a war from breaking out because it would keep
weapons from pouring into that area, encouraged--in fact, requested by
Milosevic in Belgrade. Why? Because he knew he had a monopoly of the
weapons and munitions, supported by a well-meaning world. But what was
its justification to support it after war broke out, and after the
Serbs invaded Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and began to kill and remove
from their homes hundreds of thousands of people, millions of refugees?
This is an illegal act. It is an immoral act, and has consequences on
the victims. And it is invalid.

Some have said if we lift this arms embargo, what about the other
international policies of sanctions against Iran and Iraq and Libya? Is
any Member of the Chamber prepared to compare the behavior of Iran to
that of the Bosnian people or Libya to Bosnia or Iraq to Bosnia? And in
every other one of those cases, those nations violated international
law, international norms. The Bosnians have done no such thing. And
they have been the victims of this embargo. Just think if anyone stood
up today, the embargo had not been in effect since 1991, and proposed
an arms embargo on the nations in the former Yugoslavia, no one would
support it. It is so self-evidently unfair, and unfortunately in its
consequences brutally deadly.
So, I take some heart from the fact that the opposition to the
proposal that we have made to lift the arms embargo has not featured
anyone saying that the embargo was or is justified in their feature
arguments of what might happen if the embargo was lifted.
Does the Senator from North Dakota wish to speak?
Mr. DORGAN. Let me, Mr. President, if I might. I would like the ask
the Senator from Connecticut to yield for a question.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I would be glad to.
Mr. DORGAN. I have been enormously torn by this issue. Much of what
the Senator from Connecticut and the Senator from Kansas and others
have expressed on the floor is real anguish. There is real anguish
about, I think, a moral problem confronting the world with respect to
what is happening in the Balkans. I know there has been a lot of
criticism on the floor that the current policy does not work, the
President does not have a policy, and so on.
Frankly, I have not heard anyone else on the floor express what
policy they would work in the Balkans. This resolution, as I understand
it, is a policy that simply says lift the arms embargo. That is not, of
course, a policy to end the war. It is a policy, as the Senator from
Connecticut describes, to try to even the odds. But to those who say
there is no policy, I would say that I am very anxious to hear, what do
they think will solve this problem in the Balkans?
What is happening there is grotesque. Unspeakable horrors are being
visited upon innocent civilians. I read yesterday of Dutch observers,
Dutch soldiers coming back who describe what is happening. And there
are other reports from reputable sources. What is being visited upon
the Bosnian Moslems can only be described as a horror. And we must care
about that and deal with it and respond to it.
Yet I would ask the Senator this question. Here is what troubles me.
We have not--the United States--put U.S. troops on the ground in the
Balkans. I do not think we should. And I would not support us doing so.
But other countries have. The British have. The French have. The
Ukrainians have. The Dutch have. Other countries have put their troops
on the ground in harm's way in that region.
It troubles me at this point for us, who have not put troops on the
ground, and I do not think we should, to say to those countries who
have, that we do not care what you think about the proper policy in
Bosnia. This bill tells our allies that we do not care that you believe
the arms embargo ought to continue. We will decide unilaterally that
the arms embargo should not continue. That is what I am torn by. That
is what I am troubled by.
Other countries have made a troop commitment on the ground. And they

[[Page S10689]]
still say they believe that we ought to act together on lifting the
embargo. And they are not yet willing, as I understand it, to decide
that the arms embargo ought to be lifted.
I wonder if the Senator could respond to this general question. How
does one look at what our allies have done, that we have not done, and
then respond that we can unilaterally decide on an arms embargo without
caring what their position is?
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank my friend and colleague from
North Dakota. Actually, I have watched him as he has been listening to
this debate. I have seen, because I know him, his own struggling and
anguish about this. And I respect the seriousness with which he has
gone out, and the sincerity and the relevance of the questions that he
asks now.
Let me answer the two questions. In the first place, what is the
policy? Who can offer a policy that will do any better than what is
happened now? I will say to my friend, the policy that the Western
World and the world has followed up until now, which is to send the
United Nations into what I consider to be a mission impossible, to keep
the peace where there was only war has not worked.
The London communique raised some hope that it might begin to work if
the allies can get together and use their air power to give some
meaning to the word ``safe'' as applied to safe areas. Right now they
are the furthest things from safe. Combined with that the very weak and
confused U.N. presence, the continued arms embargo, that has been the
policy up until now.
I judge that to be a failure. It has not stopped Serbian aggression
and not stopped the suffering of the Bosnian people and it has done
terrible damage to the credibility of the United Nations, NATO, and
unfortunately the United States.
The alternative policy, the preferable policy, which is in part
implemented by the proposal that we will vote on in awhile, is the so-
called lift-and-strike policy that in fact President Clinton adopted in
the 1992 campaign and carried with him into 1993 and to the Presidency.
He was frustrated in his desire to implement that lift-and-strike
policy in the spring of 1993 when our allies in Europe refused to go
along.
So what we are asking in putting this proposal here is to begin to
finally, though the hour is late and ever more difficult in Bosnia, to
implement the lift-and-strike policy. Lifting through this action and
striking hopefully through the broadening of the measures agreed to and
the toughening of the measures agreed to in the London communique.
Mr. DORGAN. If I might ask a question about that point. That suggests
somehow that the strategy of dealing with the conflict in Bosnia is to
rely on air power. And I tell you, I have been in meetings where Colin
Powell, when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others
described for us how air power might be used in the Balkans. It is a
much different circumstance than using air power in the desert, where
folks would run their tanks out into the middle of the open desert and
we would send airplanes over to bomb the tanks. I wonder whether the
Senator believes that air power eventually is what is going to resolve
the conflict in the Balkans?
Mr. LIEBERMAN. No. I agree with Senators and others who have spoken
that air power can help but never decide the conflict. But when
combined with the considerable Bosnian military force on the ground,
finally fully armed, I think it is a winning combination.
I say to my friend I note the presence on the floor of the Senator
from Georgia. I do not want to impinge on his time. I would simply
answer the second question raised about the troops on the ground and
the allied nations that I hope that the U.N. mission can be fortified
as a result of the London communique. I am doubtful based on the
conflicting messages that have come out of late, but it does seem to me
the lifting of the embargo does stand separately because it is an
illegal and invalid act and it can stand alongside the continued
presence of the U.N. troops.
However, responding to concerns expressed, I think appropriately, by
the Senator from Georgia and others, Senator Dole and I made a
substantial change in the proposal to lift the arms embargo from the
measure we introduced last year to say the embargo would not be lifted
until the allies on the ground had the chance to exit if, in fact, they
chose to exit.
I will say finally, as the Senator from North Dakota considers how to
vote, it seems to me--and I must say of all the reasons given for
voting against our proposal, the one that has most profoundly troubled
me is the suggestion that it would cause more bloodshed. Here I think
we owe it to the victims, those who have shed their blood, to listen to
them and not to make a paternalistic judgment for them about what may
be better for them. They are the ones who have suffered.
I close, finally, with words from a letter of Prime Minister
Silajdzic of Bosnia, who said:

Our people ask that we be allowed only our right to defend
ourselves. It is on their behalf that I appeal to the
American people and Government to untie our hands so that we
may protect ourselves. The slaughter has gone far enough. My
people insist that they would rather die while standing and
fighting than on their knees. In God's name, we ask that you
lift the arms embargo.

I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I do not want to interrupt my friend from
Connecticut. I do want to get started on my remarks. I understand I
have 20 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. A little under 20 minutes.

Amendment No. 1848

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I would like to begin my remarks by briefly
reviewing the history of the Bosnian debate that has taken place in the
Senate not over the last 3 or 4 years, but over the last 12 months.
As most Senators will recall, last July during the consideration of
Department of Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1995, the
Senate debated two competing amendments. One, sponsored by Senators
Dole and Lieberman, would have unilaterally lifted the arms embargo
upon the request of the Bosnian Government. The other, sponsored by
Senator Mitchell and me, expressed the sense of Congress that there
should be a multilateral lift of the arms embargo.
I know it has been pointed out, but the Dole-Lieberman amendment we
now have before us is not a lift-first-then-leave policy; it is a
leave-first-and-then-lift policy, and that point needs to be
emphasized. This is not the same Dole-Lieberman amendment we had last
year.
The Dole-Lieberman amendment last year failed on a 50 to 50 vote, and
the Mitchell-Nunn amendment was adopted on a vote of 52-48. Later, on
the Department of Defense appropriations bill, another vote was taken,
and the Dole amendment was adopted and the Mitchell-Nunn amendment was
adopted again.
During the House-Senate conference on the authorization bill, with
both of these amendments on the authorization bill, the House bill had
a unilateral lift provision that passed by a significant margin in the
House. The Senate bill had the Mitchell-Nunn provision I already
described. The compromise provision, worked out during conference,
stated as general United States policy that the United States should
exercise leadership within the international community to cause the
Bosnian Serbs to accept the contact group proposal. It also called for
such leadership to be taken on three separate, but complementary
tracks, as follows, and these are important as background for this vote
today:
First, there was an international track policy that if the Bosnian
Serbs did not accept the contact group's peace proposal by October 15,
1994, the President should formally introduce and support a resolution
within the U.N. Security Council to lift the Bosnian arms embargo
multilaterally. The provision was not mandatory because the President
wrote to the conferees committing his administration to introduce and
support such a resolution in the Security Council. The administration
did as they committed they would do to the conferees, but they did not
press the resolution to a vote because they determined that it would
not pass.
The second part of the provision in that authorization bill, a
compromise between the House and Senate, was a

[[Page S10690]]
unilateral U.S. policy track. It provided that if the U.N. Security
Council did not lift the Bosnian arms embargo, then, first, no funds
could be used to enforce the arms embargo on the Bosnian Government
other than as required of all U.N. member states, and that has been the
law since last year. We have not been enforcing the embargo according
to the law. We have been respecting it, not enforcing it, with our
money and with our forces.
Second, the President shall submit a plan to and consult with the
Congress on the manner in which U.S. Armed Forces and the forces of
friendly states would provide training to the Bosnian army outside
Bosnia.
And, third, the President should submit a plan to consult with the
Congress regarding the unilateral termination of the Bosnian arms
embargo and the implications thereof.
The third and final part of last year's authorization bill, which I
think perhaps was its most relevant part to where we are now, was an
interim policy track. It provided that if the Bosnian Serbs attacked
any safe areas, the President should promptly, formally introduce and
support in the U.N. Security Council a resolution that selectively
lifts the Bosnian arms embargo in order to allow the provision of
defensive weapons, such as antitank weapons, counter-battery radars and
mortars, to enable the Bosnian Government to defend the safe areas.
Mr. President, to my knowledge, the Clinton administration did not
introduce a resolution in the U.N. Security Council to selectively lift
the Bosnian arms embargo when the Bosnian Serbs attacked and overran
the safe areas just recently. I consider it unconscionable for the
United Nations protected safe areas to be overrun, with the Bosnian
defenders being unable to defend because they are denied defensive
weapons, and the United Nations is unwilling or unable to defend these
safe areas. We declared that policy last year in the authorization
bill. We gave the President congressional instructions, short of a
mandate, but instructions as to what should be done. It has not been
done.
The United States, our allies, and the United Nations have reached
the point in Bosnia of making a fundamental change in policy or
beginning to withdraw. A continuation of the present policy is a
prescription for continued tragedy on the ground in Bosnia and
continued erosion of U.N., NATO, and United States credibility in
Europe and throughout the world.
The Clinton administration favors the continued presence of the U.N.
forces in Bosnia, as well as a vigorous use of NATO air power to save
the remaining safe areas. But a number of fundamental questions about
this strategy remain unanswered.
First, have our NATO allies truly signed on to a substantial and
decisive use of air power, hitting lucrative targets, if Gorazde is
attacked?
Second, is NATO willing to continue its air attacks as required, even
if hostages are taken or the Serbs begin killing substantial numbers of
U.N. personnel?
Third, are we protecting only Gorazde or are other safe areas
included? If not, what does the term ``U.N. safe area'' mean at this
point in time when two have fallen and only one is clearly designated
as being protected? Will the United Nations divide safe areas into
three classes--fallen safe areas, about-to-fall safe areas and safe-
safe areas? It appears that is taking place.
Fourth, does the so-called dual-key arrangement remain in effect?
This morning's New York Times reports from Brussels that British and
French officials in NATO really do not want the United Nations to give
up its dual key. If accurate, this would directly contradict the
administration's understanding and explanation of the London
conference.
Fifth, if NATO and the United Nations really intend vigorous
airstrikes, why are U.N. personnel not being moved out of harm's way,
both as a protective measure and as an indication of the dead
seriousness of NATO's new resolve?
Sixth, if there is an allied diplomatic strategy to go along with its
London policy, what is it? I have not seen it.
Will the United States continue to insist on a just settlement--I put
those words in quotes because they have been used so many times in both
editorials and in debate--insist on a just settlement to the conflict,
but also remain unwilling to commit American resources for a just
settlement and remain unwilling to admit that there will never be a
just settlement unless the United Nations and NATO are willing to
impose it by force?
That question is not simply for the administration, but for many in
Congress, for many in the news media that keep talking about a just
settlement but never, ever, complete the logic that it requires the use
of force to impose it. Otherwise, it is not going to happen. And the
use of force is most likely going to have to be outside force,
including U.S. force.
Mr. President, these open questions make it clear to me that the
United Nations, the NATO policy, and the U.S. Government altogether
have no coherent strategy regarding Bosnia.
To many Members of Congress, the Dole-Lieberman proposal is more
attractive than the current policy, primarily because it has not yet
been tried and tested. This proposal also is far from complete or
coherent. It has taken on a very large and, I believe, exaggerated
significance, both by its supporters and by its critics, and many of
its critics continue to describe it as it was last year without
acknowledging it has changed.
A number of key questions are not answered or even acknowledged by
the Dole-Lieberman proposal that we will vote on this afternoon. I will
add quickly, that both Senators Dole and Lieberman have addressed some
of these policies in their oral statements.
Most of these are not in any way part of this deliberation, because
they are not going to be voted on. It is not in the proposal.
First, there is a large question that must be answered by the
supporters of the Dole-Lieberman proposal, which encourages U.N.
withdrawal--and when we vote on it today, that is what we will be
doing. We will not mandate. We will be encouraging it. We will be
giving an incentive.
Are the supporters prepared to back President Clinton's public
commitment and private commitment to assist in the U.N. withdrawal with
U.S. ground forces, if required? We are calling for the withdrawal. The
President has said we will help the withdrawal, if it takes place, with
ground forces, if necessary.
But we ignore that question. We act like it does not exist. We act
like that is not even part of the equation, if we can simply vote on
the part we like here--lifting--but not face the implications of the
part we do not like; that is, U.S. ground forces committed. The Dole-
Lieberman proposal's silence on this point, I am afraid, speaks loudly
to the world.
Second, will the United States furnish equipment like artillery,
tanks, and antitank weapons when the embargo is lifted? If we will not
do it directly, will we help facilitate that delivery? Will the allies
also lift the embargo? If they continue the embargo, will we forcibly
break the embargo by delivering equipment? Will Russia unilaterally
lift its embargo on Serbia, as it has said it will do over and over
again? If that is the case, will there be a net gain for the Bosnian
Government?
Third, and perhaps more importantly, will the United States help
train the Bosnian forces, or at least help facilitate the training?
Training is needed more than equipment. Equipment is part of the
equation, and an important part, but training is sadly lacking. It has
to take place. Someone has to do it. When will it take place? Where
will it take place? Who will do it? Will the United States help?
Silence on this key set of questions is what we have, and what we
will be voting on. Silence.
Fourth, do the authors of the Dole-Lieberman amendment envision
defensive or offensive equipment flowing to Bosnia, or both?
Understandably but unfortunately, in order to secure votes for passage
of the Dole-Lieberman amendment, it addresses these key questions--
training, supplies, equipment--it addresses these key questions only by
silence, plus one paragraph. That is a negative paragraph on page 5,
section 4(e) which states as follows:

Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as
authorization for deployment of United States forces in the
territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina for any purpose,
including

[[Page S10691]]
training, support, or delivery of military equipment.

That is what this says. We are not going to help them with training.
We are not going to help them with equipment. We have no authorization.
We will not let any American forces on the ground. All of this somehow
wondrously is supposed to take place.
Fifth, considering the implication of this paragraph, who will
provide close air support to protect the few remaining safe areas when
the U.N. forces begin pulling out, as envisioned by the Dole-Lieberman
bill? Who will have the forward air observers on the ground to
designate targets for our aircraft if the United States conducts
airstrikes to protect against Bosnian Serb offensives? And as the
United Nations starts pulling out--and it will take anywhere from 7
weeks to 22 weeks--and the Bosnian Serbs go on the offensive, and there
are no close air observers there plugged in, with training, with NATO
equipment, how are we going to have airstrikes that go after targets
unless they are fixed targets? We can go after fixed targets, but what
about the moving targets? Believe me, those on the attack will be
moving. Will we ask for British and French to provide the protection
while the United Nations is pulling out prior to the lifting of the
embargo and the necessary weeks of training of the Bosnian forces?
Again, these are unanswered questions.
Mr. President, I feel the Senate is faced with a choice between two
incoherent policies. In these circumstances, our Nation would be better
off if we made impassioned speeches and avoided passing a law.
The Dole-Lieberman amendment does not face up to the reality of the
situation on the ground where the Bosnian Serbs occupy between 70 and
80 percent of the territory in Bosnia and have a decided advantage in
heavy weapons.
Mr. President, I pointed out many flaws with the current policy and
with the Dole-Lieberman proposal. Even with these flaws, however, in
the legislative proposal, the Dole-Lieberman bill is much improved over
the earlier provisions.
It has been mischaracterized by the administration, our allies, and
the U.S. press. Yes, it requires a unilateral lifting of the Bosnian
arms embargo, but it does so only after the U.N. forces are withdrawn
from Bosnia. It does not mandate that UNPROFOR withdraw from Bosnia. It
places a responsibility upon the Government of Bosnia to make the
difficult choice of requesting that the United Nations withdraw its
forces, with all the attendant consequences, including the loss of
humanitarian relief supplies, of such a withdrawal.
This is not going to be an easy decision for the Bosnian Government.
The Rapid Reaction Force, consisting of our French, British, and
Dutch allies, has deployed to the Sarajevo area with the intention of
countering Bosnian Serb attacks on U.N. forces there, including those
U.N. forces who are escorting humanitarian relief convoys.
NATO is apparently determined to conduct robust air action to counter
the Bosnian Serbs' attack on Gorazde, a determination that will
hopefully be extended to other safe areas, Bihac and others, if
necessary.
If these actions are carried out successfully, and if this bill is
ultimately enacted into law, the Bosnian Government will be faced with
a very difficult decision, a difficult decision that I do not believe
we can predict with certainty.
One choice they will have is to keep the United Nations in Bosnia,
which means a continuation of the effort to protect the flow of
humanitarian relief supplies to the Bosnian people and some degree of
protection for at least the safe area of Gorazde and perhaps Sarajevo.
The other choice the Bosnian Government will face is to have the U.N.
forces withdrawn and have the arms embargo lifted by the United States
after the U.N. forces are out of Bosnia, which may --I say may--result
in their acquiring more heavy arms and equipment and may result in a
continuation of air defense and airstrikes by the United States or some
other nation.
Mr. President, there have been assertions over the last week or so
that various actions will Americanize the conflict in Bosnia. I think
those who say that about either the current policy or the Dole-
Lieberman amendment are accurate. In my view, with either policy choice
we are given today, there is a danger that the conflict will
increasingly be Americanized.
Mr. President, neither the current policy of the United Nations and
NATO, nor the Dole-Lieberman approach, in my view, are coherent
policies.
The administration has worked diligently in the last few days to
bring about change in the current policy in Bosnia. It has fallen short
of the mark.
Mr. President, the United States, our allies, and the United Nations
have reached a critical juncture in Bosnia. I believe that the actions
of UNPROFOR, particularly the actions of the Rapid Reaction Force to
ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies to the people of
Sarajevo, and the actions of NATO to deter or, if necessary, repel
attacks on Gorazde, and hopefully the other remaining safe areas, will
in the final analysis, determine the outcome of the Dole-Lieberman
amendment. Not only the outcome as to whether it becomes law, but what
happens if it does become law, and what the Bosnian Government does
when the ball is in its court.
When this bill passes, it will probably be accepted by the House of
Representatives and sent to the President in the next few days. The
President will undoubtedly, as he said, veto the Dole-Lieberman bill,
and Congress will vote whether to override the President's veto.
Mr. President, in spite of its flaws, I will vote for the Dole-
Lieberman bill today even with all of its defects, as a way of
expressing my strong feeling on two key points: First, the current
U.N.-NATO policy in Bosnia is a failure and, without dramatic change,
will continue to erode the credibility of the NATO alliance and the
United States worldwide; second, the ability of the Bosnian Serbs to
overrun the so-called safe areas without the United Nations taking
decisive steps to prevent that, and the commission of unlawful acts in
capturing the safe areas and in mistreating innocent civilians by the
thousands clearly demonstrate that the continuation of the arms embargo
is both untenable, immoral and unjustified.
Mr. President, this embargo should be lifted the way it was imposed--
multilaterally, and, in the final analysis, unilaterally, if absolutely
necessary. It is my hope that the Nunn amendment, which will express
that order of priorities, will pass when it is voted on in a few
minutes, because it makes it clear that even though the odds are
against the Security Council lifting the embargo multilaterally, we
ought to at least try to get it lifted multilaterally before we do so
unilaterally. Otherwise, we will truly meet ourselves coming back, in
terms of our embargo on Iraq, Libya, and perhaps other places in the
world as events unfold.
Mr. President, I believe that, even after this bill passes and after
it goes to the President and after it is vetoed, if it is, I believe
that all of us--whichever side of this argument we are on or where we
have been--need to carefully review the developments on the ground in
Bosnia, and particularly the performance of the United Nations and NATO
in the coming days.
I will decide and I will cast my vote on the inevitable question of
overriding the President's veto, based upon these events that will
unfold.
Mr. President, I yield back any remaining time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I certainly wish to express to my good
friend and colleague of these many years my own appreciation for his
supporting the underlying measure by the distinguished majority leader
and the Senator from Connecticut. The Senator from Georgia and I have
worked in this arena for many, many years together. I have always had a
profound respect for his ability to get right to the heart of an issue
and to express, irrespective of politics or partisan issues, what he
thinks is in the best interests of the country. Again, I appreciate his
joining here today.
I would like to see if I could clarify one part of my colleague's
remarks. He addressed the rapid reaction force,

[[Page S10692]]
which today is reported to be taking positions in the Sarajevo area. If
I understood the Senator, he felt how they carried out that mission
might well have a very strong bearing on the future of this
legislation.
Mr. NUNN. That mission, as well as protecting the other safe areas as
designated, as well as enforcing the other mandates that have thus far
been rather ineffectively enforced; not solely that issue but including
that issue.
Mr. WARNER. But as I look through the press reports and other
information that is available to the Senate, it is not clear to me the
extent to which those rapid reaction forces augmenting the UNPROFOR
forces in Sarajevo will be used for any mission other than protecting
the UNPROFOR forces in the carrying out of the mission, namely of
delivering food, medicine, and the like to that area.
Is it the Senator's understanding that they would participate in the
protection of the civilians if it is unrelated to the mission of
UNPROFOR?
Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Virginia, I am not clear on that
point. I do not know that there is a clear policy.
Obviously, if you keep the road open, as those forces are pledged to
do, that helps the humanitarian mission of getting the supplies
through. Whether they would respond to artillery shelling of the city
if it does not hit U.N. personnel, I do not have an answer to that. It
seems to me, when you have a safe haven and that safe haven is being
grossly violated, if it means anything at all it ought to be enforced.
But I do not have the knowledge to speak to what their intention is at
this point in time.
Obviously, the United States does not have forces there and this
would be a decision made by the United Nations and by our allies who
have forces on the ground.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, that is my understanding, that it is
certainly unclear at this point in time the extent to which they would
engage in retaliating or defending or whatever word you wish to use,
against these prolonged, continuous attacks on the Bosnian Serbs. I
just hope the Senate, indeed others following this debate worldwide, do
not attach too much significance to the presence of those rapid
reaction forces until such time as we have a much clearer idea as to
their mission and their capabilities of carrying out that mission.
This is a relatively small number of combat arms that are being
placed in that area by the rapid reaction forces; in comparison to the
order of battle, after the Bosnian Serbs.
Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Virginia, he may be right on that.
I think we will have to wait and see how the events unfold.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Nunn amendment
to the Dole-Lieberman substitute to S. 21. The Nunn amendment
recognizes that it is the Bosnian Serbs who have rejected the agreement
reached by the contact group. The amendment also places the
responsibility of seeking a multilateral lift of the arms embargo on
the administration. Failing an agreement of the U.N. Security Council
to multilaterally lift the arms embargo, the United States has no
alternative but to unilaterally lift the arms embargo, pending a
withdrawal of UNPROFOR.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democratic leader is recognized for 10
minutes.
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, we are about to vote, and I would like,
simply, to summarize, as best I can, the situation as many of us
understand it to be this afternoon.
As we begin, I think there is much about which there is complete
agreement. We all agree that the current situation is horrifying--the
ethnic cleansing, the violence, the violation of human rights, pictures
on television, all of which we believe we simply should not tolerate.
We all agree that the status quo is untenable. Zepa fell yesterday, and
there continues to be Serbian aggression in areas throughout Bosnia
that we are simply unwilling to accept. We all agree that lifting the
embargo is desirable. And we agree that the Bosnians ought to be able
to defend themselves. We agree on all of those points. I do not think
there is a Senator in the Chamber who would disagree on any of that.
The issue before us is not a question of if we lift the embargo, but
how. How do we lift it so we can enable the Bosnians to fight for
themselves but protect our other vital United States interests as well?
That is the issue.
We have a number of specific questions relating to this embargo that
go beyond enabling the Bosnians to help themselves, and on that issue,
the question of how we keep in balance, in proper perspective, all of
these various aspects of the decision. I am afraid our decisions are
being driven as much by emotions as they are by the facts, as they are
by the cool consideration of the consequences of lifting the embargo
unilaterally this afternoon.
That is understandable. We see the Serbian atrocities and we want to
respond. We see a one-sided war spreading day by day, and by all that
is right we want to scream, ``Enough. Enough.'' We want to be able to
help in some way, because all too often countries have stood by while
atrocities of this kind have been perpetrated. And we want no part of
that.
We are united by that outrage, by that contempt. We are united by the
resolve to do something more. And I understand that, as does every
Senator in the Chamber this afternoon.
What divides us, what really divides us, is how best to transform
resolve into action. Really, the question is, as we try to come to some
agreement as to what our action ought to be--the question is, do we
give NATO and the United Nations one more chance to succeed? Do we give
them one more chance to act to stop Serb aggression before we lift the
embargo? Or must we lift it right now, unilaterally?
The President has made himself very clear. The President has urged us
to give our united efforts that chance. The President has urged us to
recognize the purpose of our alliances, to demonstrate our commitment
to multilateral efforts. How many times have we said to the United
Nations and to other members of the world community: We need your help.
We need your cooperation. We need your participation?
How many times did we send people to Britain and to France and to
countries all over the world during the Persian Gulf war saying, ``Help
us, this is a united effort''? How many times did we go to other
countries and say, ``We have to put some constraints on Libya, or on
Cuba''? And will we, at some point in the future, go to our allies and
say, ``We need your help with North Korea, with China''?
That is what the President is asking us to bear in mind as we make
the decision we must this afternoon. The choice is clear. Recognizing
our desire to lift the embargo, do we give this effort another chance,
recognizing that progress has been made in the last few days?
Recognizing that, at some point, time does run out, do we allow them
the opportunity to demonstrate, with whatever resolve we can muster,
that in the remaining weeks before winter sets in that we use all of
the muscle, all of the force, all of the resolve that we in a united
way can muster, or face the consequences of unilateral action which
could lead this country to great peril and, frankly, to very disturbing
precedents?
A unilateral lift means in large measure unilateral responsibility. A
unilateral lift means accelerated deployment of U.S. forces, and on
that there can be no question. If we lift, they leave. If we lift, we
help them leave. If we lift, we are there, and the action spreads. And
then what? A unilateral lift means the possibility of the
disintegration of NATO.
What do we tell our NATO allies, that this organization, which has
stood now for 50 years--ironically we celebrated that anniversary this
year--what do we tell them the next time they come to us or we go to
them? ``Well, as long as everything is going OK, as long as it is
comfortable for us, we will join you. But, you know, if things get
rough, if we disagree with you, we have the right to say NATO does not
matter anymore. NATO is not going to be an alliance. We are going to
pick and choose for ourselves whether or not and when we want to be
involved in NATO.''
Do we really want to send that message to our NATO allies? Do we
really want to say NATO does not count? Do we really want to suffer the
consequences of a disintegrated NATO

[[Page S10693]]
with all that is going on in Europe today?
A unilateral lift means the demise of other multilateral embargoes.
Let there be no mistake about that either. I do not know how we tell
our allies we still need them in the Persian Gulf, we still need them
in Libya, and, by the way, we do not want you to send anything to Cuba.
How do we say that with a straight face, Mr. President?
A unilateral lift could dramatically undermine our President and this
country's credibility. If we roll over the President this afternoon,
then what? ``Go out there, Mr. President. We are united, Democrats and
Republicans. We want you, as the Commander in Chief and as the
articulator of foreign policy, to go do your thing. We are just going
to roll over you when we decide we do not like what you are doing.''
What kind of standing is this country going to have with all of the
world? We have one President at a time. We have one Commander in Chief
at a time. We have a State Department that we delegate responsibility
to, to create foreign policy.
A unilateral lift, Mr. President, unfortunately may not even work;
arms may not even get through. We are talking here about 3 months
before anything actually reaches Bosnia. That assumes that we can get
through Croatia, that the Croatian ports will be open, that the lines
will be available to us. It means that somehow we have all that worked
out but our allies, after we have ignored their pleas, are going to
agree to end the embargo and allow our supplies to get through into
Bosnia.
Then, what if arms are not enough? What if our allies have gone? What
happens then, Mr. President? What happens when we find out 6, 8 months
from now that this did not work, and our allies are gone and the
horrific acts that we see on television right now are continuing? What
happens then when the Bosnians come to us and say, ``We need your help;
you have seen what we have seen on television, and we cannot tolerate
this.''?
Will we send troops to stop the spread of the war to Macedonia or
Kosovo, or, God forbid, Turkey or Greece? What then? Are we still going
to make these courageous speeches about how horrifying and difficult it
is for the Bosnians? Will we be willing then to rush to their support?
Mr. President, this is not a time to divorce ourselves from a united
effort. Let us make a decision based upon what comes not only from our
hearts but from our efforts as well. Let us vote ``no'' on this
resolution.
I yield the floor.
Mr. DOLE addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
Mr. DOLE. How much time remains?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Ten minutes.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, as I understood last night we had about 15
minutes. I would be happy to yield 5 minutes to the Senator from
Connecticut, Senator Lieberman.
Mr. President, I have listened with great care to the distinguished
Democratic leader, and I have a lot of respect for him. But I do not
think the world is going to collapse if we do the right thing. That is
what it is all about. NATO is going to collapse? Our allies are going
to leave us? They are not going to leave us. We are the leader of the
free world. But we have not acted like it in this instance. But we are.
We did not act like it in the last administration--but we are--when it
came to Bosnia.
So I am not as troubled about the world coming apart here, now, if
the Senate does what it should have done months and months ago, and
maybe a couple of years ago. This is not about rolling over the
President. This is about the Senate of the United States. It is about
Republicans and Democrats with a shared common view--and some on each
side, I might add.
I believe we do not have many opportunities like this to sort of turn
away from the historic failure and chart a new path for America. It
does not have to do with the U.S. Senate. And I know it is a difficult
vote for my colleagues on the other side with a President of their
party. And I commend those who have stood up and said, ``We are going
to do the right thing.''
This is not politics. This is not about President Clinton or
President Bush or anybody in the Senate. It is not the Dole amendment
or the Lieberman amendment. This is a message from the U.S. Senate,
supported, I might say, by dozens and dozens of groups all across
America. And without reading all the groups, the Action Council for
Peace in the Balkans, Americans for Saving Bosnia, America Council for
Public Affairs, American Jewish Conference, American Muslim Council,
American Task Force on Bosnia, and on and on it goes.
Then the Action Council for Peace in the Balkans, represented by
outstanding Americans, Democrats and Republicans, Morris Abrams, Frank
Carlucci, Hodding Carter, Max Kampelman, Frank Fahrenkoph, Richard
Burt, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and that list goes on and
on. Albert Wohlstetter, Paul Wolfowitz, John Silber, Albert Shanker--
Democrats and Republicans, conservatives and liberals, who I guess
believe the people have a right to defend themselves, even if they are
a little, tiny country with no lobbyist running around the Congress.
They will not be affected by what we did yesterday on lobbying reform.
They do not have any.
We get long-distance calls, overseas calls, from the prime minister
and the foreign minister, and they called yesterday. And as they were
calling, they were telling us that Zepa was about to fall, and it did.
So it seems to me that what we ought to be doing here is the very
responsible, right thing--a nonpartisan, nonpolitical, bipartisan
message to the world, not just to Bosnia--that if you are an
independent nation, if you are a member of the United Nations, as the
Senator from New York so eloquently stated yesterday, you have a right
to self-defense. You do not have a right to American troops. You do not
have a right to American air power. You do not have a right to American
anything. But you have a right to self-defense. And that is what this
debate is all about.
We are a big country. They are a small country. And I guess it would
be good if Bosnia would just go away. If they would just surrender, our
problems would end for a while until somebody starts writing the
history of this era.
It would be a stain on the West, almost. Well, maybe not almost. It
would recall previous stains on the West when we stood by and watched
the genocide in World War II.
Call it ethnic cleansing, call it anything you want. The Senator from
Massachusetts, Senator Kerry, said we are going to abandon Bosnia. We
are not going to abandon Bosnia. We are going to do what we have been
told by their elected officials they want us to do, lift the arms
embargo.
And again, I know that things do change. But I remember in 1992,
candidate Clinton said lift the arms embargo and have air strikes; let
us provide some leadership, he was saying to President Bush, who was
fairly quiet on this issue himself. Lift the arms embargo. And I
remember going to meetings at the White House in, I think, April and
May of 1993. It was all for that purpose. The President was for it. The
Vice President was for it. This Senator was for it. But I must say,
there was a mixed group there, as we do have from time to time. We get
mixed advice. The President got mixed advice that said: Do not do it;
do not get involved.
This is an immoral and unjust policy that we have in effect now. They
ought to take away the key from Boutros Boutros-Ghali, lock the door
and throw away the key as far as he is concerned. They are not even
certain yet; they are still debating whether or not we have the dual-
key approach, whether anything can ever be done by NATO without U.N.
approval. I think NATO is in difficulty because nobody can find a
mission. Without a mission, why are they there? And they are troubled
by this. I have been there. I have talked to them. And I have heard
them all tell us the same thing: Do not lift the arms embargo. The U.N.
protection forces are doing the best they can.
And they are, and they should be commended. Some have lost their
lives. They are our friends and they are our allies. But we are the
leader of the free world. We cannot abdicate that responsibility. We
cannot abdicate that leadership and say, well, not this time; we want
to pass on Bosnia. This is a

[[Page S10694]]
European problem. So we go along with the Europeans until it fails.
They tell all the Bosnians we are going to have these six nice safe
havens for you. You give up your heavy equipment. You are not going to
need it. This is safe.
So they give up their heavy equipment. Now they have rifles to fire
against tanks and artillery weapons. And how many safe havens is it
going to take to get anybody's attention? How many are going to fall?
Two already, two more in danger, Sarajevo and Bihac. How many more--
all? Four? Five? Six? And then suddenly we recognize that this must be
a failed policy?
We have had a lot of activity in London and Brussels. We have had a
lot of pounding the table and demanding the Serbs do this and do that,
and they did it. They just took another safe haven. They are scared to
death.
I was asked on a program last evening, and I do not mean it to sound
like this, but I think the person asked the question, well, they are
not killing as many people now so there must be something good coming
out of it. And maybe the killing has been reduced as far as numbers.
There were only 630 casualties in July, 130 killed. An average of 4 or
5 are killed daily, 12 and 15 are wounded, and last weekend 7 children
were killed.
Now, does that mean we have to rush in and help everyone because we
are the world's policeman? Absolutely not. But it seems to me--and I am
not an expert in foreign policy--that this country ought to have a
right through its elected leaders to say to us: It is time to go, U.N.
protection forces. When they leave, lift the arms embargo and let us
defend ourselves.
It always seemed to me that was sort of a basic right, an inherent
right that all Americans enjoyed, and all Americans would defend
somebody else's right to defend themselves or some nation's right to
defend itself. And suddenly it is all mixed up.
The House, by a vote of 3 to 1, has sent the world a message. I know
it is tough for the British, and it is tough for the French. I have
talked to the Prime Minister, and I have talked to the President of
France. They are our allies, and they are our friends. We have been
their friends in tough, tough times, and we have provided the manpower
and the money and the weapons.
Now, there have been a lot of efforts to muddy the waters and say,
boy, if you do this, you are going to Americanize the war.
That is one I cannot fathom. I have talked to Senator McCain about
it. I do not know how you Americanize the war. If you withdraw the
protection forces and lift the arms embargo, the Democratic leader said
as sure as that happens, there are going to be American troops there.
Who said so? I assume the President would come to Congress. They are
not asking us to die for Bosnia. They are asking us to give them a
chance to defend themselves and they will do the dying for their
country. They are not asking for American ground troops. Oh, they would
like some air cover, but they are not even asking for that.
The amendment before us is very important. This amendment does not
prohibit United States assistance to Bosnia, military or financial. I
would say, since Soviet-style weaponry is the preponderance of what the
Bosnians use, certainly we would not be providing the bulk of the arms.
I think we can find some consensus if we pass this resolution and if a
veto is overridden.
This amendment also does not prevent the United States from seeking a
multilateral lifting of the arms embargo in the U.N. Security Council.
I do not happen to believe that the amendment by the Senator from
Georgia is necessary. I know he has offered it in good faith, just as
he did offer an amendment last August in good faith, but I do not
believe it is necessary. I do not think it detracts much from the
resolution. It does not add much to the resolution.
On August 10, 1994, President Clinton sent a letter to the
distinguished Senator from Georgia which stated:

I am writing to reaffirm my administration's support for
lifting the international arms embargo on Bosnia and
Herzegovina . . . It has been my long-held view that the arms
embargo has unfairly and unintentionally penalized the victim
in this conflict, and the Security Council should act to
remedy this injustice.

That was President Clinton's statement a year ago about lifting the
arms embargo. The letter goes on to state:

In this regard, if by October 15--

This was last year--

the Bosnian Serbs have not accepted the contact group's
proposal of July 6, 1994--

Which, I might add, the Bosnians did accept--

it would be my intention within 2 weeks to introduce formally
and support a resolution at the United Nations Security
Council to terminate the arms embargo on Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
Further, as my administration has indicated previously, if
the Security Council for some reason fails to pass such a
resolution within a reasonable time, it would be my intention
to consult with the Congress thereafter regarding unilateral
termination of the arms embargo.

Those are all President Clinton's words.
I believe that 9 months is more than a reasonable time, with all the
atrocities, all the things we have witnessed, as the Democratic leader
said. I listened to the Democratic leader last night on C-SPAN, and I
have listened to others. I listened to the remarkable statement made by
the Senator from Delaware last evening, Mr. Biden, and many, many
others on both sides of the aisle. I have listened to Senator Warner
from Virginia, who has had a different view of this issue up until now,
and he has told us in very vivid terms why he now holds the view that a
great majority do.
So I just ask the question, Is the leadership to say, ``Well, we've
got a failed policy but we have to stick to it and we should not
persuade our allies it is a failed policy''? It might be embarrassing
for the British to have to leave, or it might be embarrassing for the
French to have to leave. And America is going to be blamed if they
leave. We are being blamed right now. We are being blamed right now,
but, as I said, we may be blamed more in the history books for what did
not happen.
The opposition is also saying, the Dole-Lieberman bill will
Americanize the war--America will be alone in providing assistance to
the Bosnians.
Mr. President, that is simply not the case. We know that most of the
members of the United Nations support lifting the arms embargo on
Bosnia. Going first does not mean going it alone.
Mr. President, finally, the opposition to Dole-Lieberman is saying
that this bill abandons Bosnia. In my view, this is truly twisted
logic. I believe that at this very moment the Bosnians feel abandoned.
The issue is not how many troops are on the ground or how many planes
are in the air, but what these troops and planes are doing. It seems to
me that if they are doing nothing, the Bosnians feel abandoned. Let us
face it, these forces are essentially bystanders as events in
Srebrenica painfully demonstrated.
If we are worried about abandoning the Bosnians, let us listen to the
Bosnians. Ask the Bosnians if they feel abandoned by this legislation.
The truth is, the Bosnian Government strongly supports this
legislation. They know the price they are paying. They know the price
they are willing to pay.
In conclusion, I would urge my fellow colleagues to support this
legislation. I would urge them to search their consciences. The U.S.
Senate has the historic opportunity to make a difference. To do what is
right. To let the Bosnians live defending themselves, rather than die
defenseless.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a letter from over 40
organizations in support of this bill, along with a letter of strong
support from Lady Margaret Thatcher be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

July 25, 1995.
Dear Senator: We are writing to urge you to vote YES on the
Dole-Lieberman bill (S.21) to end the U.S. arms embargo
against the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. We also urge you to sign on as a co-sponsor of
the bill and to recruit your colleagues as co-sponsors.
The war in Bosnia is now well into its fourth year. Over
200,000 civilians have been brutally murdered by Serbian
forces, tens of thousands of women raped, and almost three
million people have been forced to flee their homes and
villages. Serbian forces have been able to carry out their
genocidal assault on Bosnia with virtual impunity because of
an immoral arms embargo that denies the legitimate government
of Bosnia the means to exercise its inherent right to self
defense.
The response of the United Nations to the aggression has
been to send poorly armed

[[Page S10695]]
peacekeepers, even though there is no peace to keep. In recent weeks,
Serbian forces have been allowed to overrun two of the six
UN-declared ``safe areas,'' and the UN mission has approached
total collapse. The lesson we must learn is that only the
Bosnian Army has the will and the manpower to defend the
fledgling multi-ethnic democracy and its citizens against
further attacks.
It is also clear that ultra-nationalist Serbian leaders
have no interest in negotiating while they can accomplish
their military and political objectives by attacking Bosnia's
remaining civilian population. Until the Bosnian Army can
mount a credible defense on the ground, this cowardly war of
aggression will continue. And we must live in the knowledge
that, at least in part, we are responsible for tying the
hands of the victims.
The organizations listed below represent a wide range of
religious, humanitarian, student, and citizen advocacy
groups. Some of the names will be familiar to you; others
have been formed in recent months by voters outraged by the
genocide and our feeble and immoral response to it. We have
joined together today to ask for your support for the Dole-
Lieberman bill. The U.S. and its allies, NATO, and the UN
have failed to stop the aggression. Unless Congress acts--and
acts NOW--thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, more innocent
people will die and the price of eventually confronting this
aggression will continue to rise.
By voting for Dole-Lieberman, you will be taking a clear
stand against genocide, against aggression, against
appeasement, and for an honorable and sustainable peace in
Bosnia. You will be rejecting the failed policies of European
countries that have facilitated more than three years of
genocide. You will be voting for the one policy that makes
moral, political, and military sense.
Vote Yes on the Dole-Lieberman bill.
Sincerely,
national organizations

Action Council for Peace in the Balkans.
American Committee to Save Bosnia.
American Council for Public Affairs.
American Jewish Congress.
American Muslin Council.
American Task Force for Bosnia.
B'nai B'rith.
Federation of Reconstructionist Congregations and Havurot.
Islamic Network.
Muslim Public Affairs Council.
National Association of Arab Americans.
National Federation of Croatian Americans.
National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council.
Reconstructionist Rabbinical Association.
Union of American Hebrew Congregations.

grassroots organizations

American Bosnian & Hercegovinian Association.
Americans for Bosnian Orphans.
Ann Arbor Committee for Bosnia.
Bosnia Advocates of Metrowest.
Bosnia Briefings.
Bosnia Support Committee of D.C.
Bosnia Task Force, San Diego.
Bosnia-Hezegovinian Help Organization.
California Coalition Against Ethnic Cleansing.
Coalition Against Genocide.
Coalition for Intervention Against Genocide.
Connecticut Citizens Against Genocide.
Free Bosnia Action Group.
Friends of Bosnia (W. Mass).
Friends of Bosnia, Philadelphia.
Greenwich Coalition for Peace in Bosnia.
Human Rights Council, USA.
JACOB at B'Nai Jeshurun.
Jews Against Genocide/NY Committee to Save Bosnia.
Jews Against Genocide in Bosnia.
New England Bosnian Relief Committee.
New Hampshire Committee for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
New York-Sarajevo Exchange.
Students Against Genocide (SAGE).
Social Action Committee/Congregation Beth El.
Stop Ethnic Cleansing.
U.S. Bosnia Relief.
Women in Islam.
____

Margaret, The Lady Thatcher, O.M., P.C., F.R.S., House of
Lords, London SW1A OPW,
July 18, 1995.
Dear Senator Dole: I am writing to express my very strong
support for your attempt to have the arms embargo against
Bosnia lifted.
I know that you and all members of the United States Senate
share my horror at the crimes against humanity now being
perpetrated by the Serbs in Bosnia. The UN and NATO have
failed to enforce the Security Council Resolutions which
authorized the use of force to defend the safe havens and to
get humanitarian assistance through. The safe havens were
never safe; now they are falling to Serb assault. Murder,
ethnic cleansing, mass rape and torture are the legacy of the
policy of the last three years to the people of Bosnia. It
has failed utterly. We owe it to the victims at last and at
least to have the weapons to defend themselves--since we
ourselves are not willing to defend them.
The arms embargo was always morally wrong. Significantly,
it was imposed on the (then formally intact but fragmenting)
former Yugoslavia at that regime's own behest. It was then,
quite unjustly and possibly illegally, applied to the
successor states. Its effect--and, as regards the Serbs, its
intention--was to ensure that the proponents of a Greater
Serbia, who inherited the great bulk of the Yugoslav army's
equipment, enjoyed overwhelming military superiority in their
aggression. It is worth recalling that the democratically
elected, multi-faith and multi-ethnic Bosnian Government
never asked for a single UN soldier to be sent. It did ask
for the arms required to defend its own people against a
ruthless aggressor. That request was repeatedly denied, in
spite of the wishes of the US administration and of most
leading American politicians.
There is no point now in listing the failures of military
policy which subsequently occurred. Suffice it to say that,
instead of succeeding in enforcing the mandates the UN
Security Council gave them, UNPROFOR became potential and
then actual hostages. Airpower was never seriously employed
either. The oft repeated arguments against lifting the arms
embargo--that if it occurred UN troops would be at risk, that
the enclaves like Srebrenica would fall, that the Serbs would
abandon all restraint--have all now been proved worthless.
For all these things have happened and the arms embargo still
applies.
Two arguments are, however, still advanced by those who
wish to keep the arms embargo in place. Each is demonstrably
false.
First, it is said that lifting the arms embargo would
prolong the war in Bosnia. This is, of course, a morally
repulsive argument; for it implies that all we should care
about is a quick end to the conflict without regard to the
justice or otherwise of its outcome. But in any case it is
based on the false assumption that the Serbs are bound to
win. Over the last year in Bosnian army has grown much
stronger and the Bosnian Serbs weaker. The Bosnian army has,
with its Croat allies, been winning back crucial territory,
while desertion and poor morale are badly affecting the over-
extended Serb forces. What the Bosnian government lacks
however are the tanks and artillery needed to hold the
territory won and force the Serbs to negotiate. This lack of
equipment is directly the result of the arms embargo. Because
of it the war is being prolonged and the casualties are
higher. Lifting the arms embargo would thus shorten not
lengthen the war.
Second, it is said that lifting the arms embargo would lead
to rifts within the UN Security Council and NATO. But are
there not rifts already? And are these themselves not the
result of pursuing a failed policy involving large risks to
outside countries' ground troops, rather than arming and
training the victims to repel the aggressor? American
leadership is vital to bring order out of the present chaos.
No country must be allowed to veto the action required to end
the present catastrophe. And if American leadership is truly
evident along the lines of the policy which you and your
colleagues are advancing I do not believe that any country
will actually try to obstruct it.
The West has already waited too long. Time is now terribly
short. All those who care about peace and justice for the
tragic victims of aggression in the former Yugoslavia now
have their eyes fixed on the actions of the US Senate. I
hope, trust and pray that your initiative to have the arms
embargo against Bosnia lifted succeeds. It will bring new
hope to those who are suffering so much.
With warm regards.
Yours sincerely,
Margaret Thatcher.

Mr. DOLE. I will just conclude by saying this is not a partisan
discussion. It is not a partisan debate. It is not about Democrats and
Republicans, not about philosophy. It is not about politics. It is
about whether some small country that has been ravaged on all sides,
pillaged, women raped, children killed, do they have any rights in this
world? Do they have a right to say to these big countries like France
and Great Britain and America that it is time to go, ``Let us fight and
die for ourselves.'' That is what this is all about. They have said our
amendment is simple. It is simple. That is what it does.
Maybe I missed something in my lifetime, but I have never missed the
point that people have a right to defend themselves. And if we stand in
their way, and if more are killed and more are raped and more little
boys 12 years old are taken off to camps and more are hung on trees and
more throats are cut because we imposed our will on this little
country--``You cannot do this because we do not want you to do this.''
It is their country. It is their lives, their blood.
I think it is time for a change in policy. And I hope we will have a
resounding vote in favor of the Dole-Lieberman resolution.
I want to congratulate and commend my friend from Connecticut for his
tireless efforts, nonpartisan, going back--I think we worked together
l\1/2\ years on this issue, without any disagreement, never talking
about the political advantage. This is not about

[[Page S10696]]
politics; it is about life or death for a little country.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Coverdell). The question is on agreeing to
the second-degree amendment by the Senator from Maine.
Mr. WARNER. I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. LOTT. I announce that the Senator from Utah [Mr. Bennett] is
necessarily absent.
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from South Carolina [Mr.
Hollings] is absent because of attending a funeral.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 57, nays 41, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 329 Leg.]

YEAS--57

Abraham
Akaka
Baucus
Bond
Boxer
Brown
Campbell
Chafee
Coats
Cochran
Cohen
Conrad
Coverdell
Craig
D'Amato
DeWine
Dole
Domenici
Faircloth
Feingold
Feinstein
Frist
Gorton
Grassley
Hatch
Inhofe
Inouye
Jeffords
Kassebaum
Kempthorne
Kerrey
Kohl
Lautenberg
Levin
Lieberman
Lott
McCain
McConnell
Moseley-Braun
Murkowski
Nickles
Nunn
Packwood
Pressler
Robb
Roth
Santorum
Shelby
Simon
Simpson
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thompson
Thurmond
Warner
Wellstone

NAYS--41

Ashcroft
Biden
Bingaman
Bradley
Breaux
Bryan
Bumpers
Burns
Byrd
Daschle
Dodd
Dorgan
Exon
Ford
Glenn
Graham
Gramm
Grams
Gregg
Harkin
Hatfield
Heflin
Helms
Hutchison
Johnston
Kennedy
Kerry
Kyl
Leahy
Lugar
Mack
Mikulski
Moynihan
Murray
Pell
Pryor
Reid
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Smith
Thomas

NOT VOTING--2

Bennett
Hollings

So the amendment (No. 1851) was agreed to.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I move to table the motion.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the Nunn
amendment, and the yeas and nays on final passage; and if we could have
10-minute votes on each of those.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a
sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 10-minute votes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Vote on Amendment No. 1848, as Amended

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment
offered by the Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn].
The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. LOTT. I announce that the Senator from Utah [Mr. Bennett] is
necessarily absent.
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from South Carolina [Mr.
Hollings] is absent because of attending a funeral.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 75, nays 23, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 330 Leg.]

YEAS--75

Abraham
Akaka
Ashcroft
Baucus
Bingaman
Bond
Boxer
Bradley
Breaux
Bumpers
Campbell
Chafee
Coats
Cochran
Cohen
Conrad
Coverdell
Craig
Daschle
DeWine
Dodd
Dole
Domenici
Dorgan
Exon
Ford
Frist
Glenn
Gorton
Graham
Gramm
Grassley
Harkin
Hatch
Hutchison
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnston
Kassebaum
Kempthorne
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Kyl
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
McCain
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Murkowski
Murray
Nickles
Nunn
Packwood
Pell
Pressler
Pryor
Robb
Roth
Santorum
Sarbanes
Simon
Simpson
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thompson
Thurmond
Warner
Wellstone

NAYS--23

Biden
Brown
Bryan
Burns
Byrd
D'Amato
Faircloth
Feingold
Feinstein
Grams
Gregg
Hatfield
Heflin
Helms
Inhofe
Mack
McConnell
Moynihan
Reid
Rockefeller
Shelby
Smith
Thomas

NOT VOTING--2

Bennett
Hollings

So the amendment (No. 1848) was agreed to.
Vote On Amendment No. 1801

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now occurs on Dole amendment
number 1801, as amended.
The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 1801), as amended, was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, and was
read for the third time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now occurs on passage of the
bill, as amended. On this question, the yeas and nays have been
ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. LOTT. I announce that the Senator from Utah [Mr. Bennett] is
necessarily absent.
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from South Carolina [Mr.
Hollings] is absent because of attending a funeral.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
who desire to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 69, nays 29, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 331 Leg.]

YEAS--69

Abraham
Ashcroft
Baucus
Biden
Bond
Boxer
Bradley
Brown
Bryan
Campbell
Chafee
Coats
Cochran
Cohen
Conrad
Coverdell
Craig
D'Amato
DeWine
Dole
Domenici
Dorgan
Faircloth
Feingold
Feinstein
Frist
Gorton
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Harkin
Hatch
Helms
Hutchison
Inhofe
Jeffords
Kempthorne
Kohl
Kyl
Lautenberg
Levin
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murkowski
Nickles
Nunn
Packwood
Pressler
Reid
Robb
Roth
Santorum
Shelby
Simon
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Warner
Wellstone

NAYS--29

Akaka
Bingaman
Breaux
Bumpers
Burns
Byrd
Daschle
Dodd
Exon
Ford
Glenn
Graham
Gregg
Hatfield
Heflin
Inouye
Johnston
Kassebaum
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Leahy
Mikulski
Murray
Pell
Pryor
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Simpson

NOT VOTING--2

Bennett
Hollings

So the bill (S. 21), as amended, was passed, as follows:
S. 21

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-
Defense Act of 1995''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) For the reasons stated in section 520 of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995
(Public Law 103-236), the Congress has found that continued
application of an international arms embargo to the
Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina contravenes that
Government's inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense under Article 51 of the United National Charter and
therefore is inconsistent with international law.
(2) The United States has not formally sought multilateral
support for terminating the arms embargo against Bosnia and
Herzegovina through a vote on a United Nations Security
Council resolution since the enactment of section 1404 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995
(Public Law 103-337).
(3) The United Nations Security Council has not taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the aggression
against that country began in April 1992.

[[Page S10697]]

(4) The Contact Group, composed of representatives of the
United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, and Germany,
has since July 1994 maintained that in the event of
continuing rejection by the Bosnian Serbs of the Contact
Group's proposal for Bosnia and Herzegovina, a decision in
the United Nations Security Council to lift the Bosnian arms
embargo as a last resort would be unavoidable.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF SUPPORT.

The Congress supports the efforts of the Government of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina--
(1) to defend its people and the territory of the Republic;
(2) to preserve the sovereignty, independence, and
territorial integrity of the Republic; and
(3) to bring about a peaceful, just, fair, viable, and
sustainable settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.

SEC. 4. TERMINATION OF ARMS EMBARGO.

(a) Termination.--The President shall terminate the United
States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, as provided in subsection (b), following--
(1) receipt by the United States Government of a request
from the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina for termination
of the United States arms embargo and submission by the
Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in exercise of its
sovereign rights as a nation, of a request to the United
Nations Security Council for the departure of UNPROFOR from
Bosnia and Herzegovina; or
(2) a decision by the United Nations Security Council, or
decisions by countries contributing forces to UNPROFOR, to
withdraw UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
(b) Implementation of Termination.--The President may
implement termination of the United States arms embargo of
the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina pursuant to
subsection (a) prior to the date of completion of the
withdrawal of UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina,
but shall, subject to subsection (c), implement termination
of the embargo pursuant to that subsection no later than the
earlier of--
(1) the date of completion of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR
personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina; or
(2) the date which is 12 weeks after the date of submission
by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina of a request to
the United Nations Security Council for the departure of
UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
(c) Presidential Waiver Authority.--If the President
determines and reports in advance to Congress that the
safety, security, and successful completion of the withdrawal
of UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina in
accordance with subsection (b)(2) requires more time than the
period provided for in that subsection, the President may
extend the time period available under subsection (b)(2) for
implementing termination of the United States arms embargo of
the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina for a period of up
to 30 days. The authority in this subsection may be exercised
to extend the time period available under subsection (b)(2)
for more than one 30-day period.
(d) Presidential Reports.--Within 7 days of the
commencement of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and every 14 days thereafter, the President
shall report in writing to the President pro tempore of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives on the
status and estimated date of completion of the withdrawal
operation. If any such report includes an estimated date of
completion of the withdrawal which is later than 12 weeks
after commencement of the withdrawal operation, the report
shall include the operational reasons which prevent the
completion of the withdrawal within 12 weeks of commencement.
(e) International Policy.--If the Government of Bosnia and
Herzegovina submits a request to the United Nations Security
Council for the departure of UNPROFOR from Bosnia and
Herzegovina or if the United Nations Security Council or the
countries contributing forces to UNPROFOR decide to withdraw
from Bosnia and Herzegovina, as provided in subsection (a),
the President (or his representative) shall immediately
introduce and support in the United Nations Security Council
a resolution to terminate the application of United Nations
Security Council resolution 713 to the Government of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. The United States shall insist on a vote on
the resolution by the Security Council. The resolution shall,
at a minimum, provide for the termination of the
applicability of United Nations Security Council resolution
713 to the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina no later than
the completion of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR personnel from
Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the event the United Nations
Security Council fails to adopt the resolution to terminate
the application of United Nations Security Council resolution
713 to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina because of a
lack of unanimity of the permanent members, thereby failing
to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security, the United States shall
promptly endeavor to bring the issue before the General
Assembly for decision as provided for in the Assembly's
Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950.
(f) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
interpreted as authorization for deployment of United States
forces in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina for any
purpose, including training, support, or delivery of military
equipment.
(g) Definitions.--As used in this section--
(1) the term ``United States arms embargo of the Government
of Bosnia and Herzegovina'' means the application to the
Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina of--
(A) the policy adopted July 10, 1991, and published in the
Federal Register of July 19, 1991 (58 FR 33322) under the
heading ``Suspension of Munitions Export Licenses to
Yugoslavia''; and
(B) any similar policy being applied by the United States
Government as of the date of completion of withdrawal of
UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina, pursuant to
which approval is denied for transfers of defense articles
and defense services to the former Yugoslavia; and
(2) the term ``completion of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR
personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina'' means the departure
from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina of substantially
all personnel participating in UNPROFOR and substantially all
other personnel assisting in their withdrawal, within a
reasonable period of time, without regard to whether the
withdrawal was initiated pursuant to a request by the
Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a decision by the
United Nations Security Council, or decisions by countries
contributing forces to UNPROFOR, but the term does not
include such personnel as may remain in Bosnia and
Herzegovina pursuant to an agreement between the Government
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the government of any country
providing such personnel.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from
Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I just wish to echo the many accolades I
have heard paid to the distinguished majority leader for his leadership
on this issue over a period of years. He has been unwavering in his
determination, together with our distinguished colleague, the junior
Senator from Connecticut, Mr. Lieberman, with strong staff support
provided by Mira Baratta, who has worked on this tirelessly now for
years, Randy Scheunemann, Ron Marks, John Lilley, of the staff of
Senator Lieberman, and Mrs. Ansley on my staff. Together, we have been
able to present this in a very fair and objective and nonpartisan way.
I wish to extend my appreciation to those staff members and the
distinguished majority leader and the Senator from Connecticut.

____________________