[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E983]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

[[Page E983]]
REFORMING U.S. INTELLIGENCE

______

HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

of indiana

in the house of representatives

Wednesday, May 10, 1995
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I would like to insert my Washington
Report for Wednesday, May 10, 1995 into the Congressional Record.
Reforming U.S. Intelligence

Many efforts are currently underway to reform and
streamline the federal government. Few parts are better
candidates for reform than the multi-billion dollar agencies
that make up the intelligence community. With aggressive
growth but no master plan for several decades, the
intelligence community has become a bloated, poorly-managed
bureaucracy whose mission has yet to be redefined for the
post-Cold War world.
The Intelligence Community. Intelligence is information on
foreign events, intentions, capabilities, and personalities
that could affect our security. The Pentagon uses
intelligence to design weapons, make deployment decisions,
and fight wars. The President and other foreign policy
officials use intelligence to prepare for negotiations and
predict foreign developments that could threaten U.S.
interests.
Thirteen civilian and military agencies--not just the CIA--
collect and analyze intelligence. Each of our four military
services has its own intelligence unit, and the Pentagon has
another. U.S. intelligence agencies employ tens of thousands
of people and produce dozens of different daily or weekly
reports.
Need for Reform. The U.S. needs an intelligence community
that gives government officials information that is accurate,
relevant, timely, and cost efficient. To meet that challenge
in a world far different from the one for which it was
created, the intelligence community will require a new
mission and substantial organizational change.
From the end of World War II until the early 1990s, U.S.
intelligence had one overriding objective: winning the Cold
War. By the end of the Cold War, roughly half of all
intelligence resources were focused on Soviet bloc military
forces. The world has changed dramatically in the past few
years, but the mission of U.S. intelligence has been slow to
adjust.
Winning the Cold War was so important an objective that
almost any intelligence expenditure could be justified.
Intelligence programs and spending grew steadily. The number
of CIA employees nearly doubled during the 1980s alone.
Our massive intelligence bureaucracy is not well-
coordinated. It is a ship without a captain. Agencies often
needlessly cover the same topic, wasting money. Sometimes
agencies fail to collaborate effectively. That generates
intelligence that is lower in quality and less timely than
our national security demands.
What Should Be Done? With the President's backing, John
Deutch, the incoming director of the CIA, has promised
dramatic reforms in U.S. intelligence. The intelligence
community is also being carefully examined by a bipartisan
commission established by law last year. Several key reforms
are needed.
First, we need to redefine the mission of U.S.
intelligence--to decide what we want our intelligence
agencies to focus on, and in what order of priority. Nearly
everyone agrees that intelligence on weapons proliferation,
terrorism, and regional wars should be the highest priority
after the Cold War. But some officials also want U.S.
intelligence agencies to monitor economic, environmental, and
other non-military developments. The lack of consensus has
permitted the number of intelligence targets to grow in
recent years. That complicates coordination and risks
spreading resources too thin.
Second, once we have figured out what our intelligence
community needs to focus on, we must decide what combination
of agencies and resources it needs to do the job. For
example, paramilitary covert action should be assigned to the
Department of Defense. To ensure that we get all the
intelligence we need at a price we can afford, we should
subject the intelligence community to a top-to-bottom
management review. We must eliminate redundant programs and
improve coordination. In general, the intelligence community
should be smaller and more focussed on the central issues of
national security.
Third, since effective management will require stronger
leadership, we should create a new post, the Director of
National Intelligence, with authority over key appointments
and the entire intelligence budget, which the head of the CIA
now lacks. The Director should be in charge of the
intelligence community. Our current management system is a
recipe for inefficiency. No one person is in charge of the
thirteen intelligence agencies.
Fourth, we need to address the politicization of
intelligence. Policy officials sometimes misuse intelligence
to promote favored policies, and intelligence officials
sometimes tell policy makers what they think they want to
hear. President Clinton's decision to make the new CIA
director a member of his cabinet threatens the necessary
separation between intelligence and policy, and should be
reconsidered. The CIA director should not be a policy maker,
and should scrupulously keep his assessments free of policy
considerations.
Fifth, we need to improve counter-espionage efforts. The
case of Aldrich Ames, the convicted CIA agent who spied for
Russia without detection for nine years, highlighted stunning
weaknesses in our counter-espionage system. Congress has
approved legislation that makes it easier to monitor the
personal lives and finances of intelligence employees, but
additional steps may be necessary.
Finally, I have come to the view that fundamentally the
culture of the CIA needs to be changed. Within the
intelligence community today is an attitude that they know
better than the policymakers--including the President and
Congress--about what to do to protect national security.
Decisive steps must be taken to ensure that intelligence
officials are fully accountable to policymakers. The
intelligence community must rigorously respect the law, move
toward greater openness, and work closely and cooperatively
with Congress.
Conclusion: The U.S. must engage the post-Cold War world
with a smaller, better, more cost-efficient intelligence
community. The challenges that bedevil us today require that
our policymakers have the very best information upon which to
make the decisions necessary to preserve the national
security of the country.

____________________