[Pages S3922-S3926]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

SENATE DISASTER RELIEF TASK FORCE REPORT

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I am very pleased at this time, along with
my friend and colleague from Missouri, Mr. Bond, as cochairs to lay
before the Senate the Final Report of the Senate Task Force on Funding
Disaster Relief. The task force was established pursuant to a sense-of-
the-Senate resolution contained in Public Law 103-211, the emergency
supplemental appropriations relief bill for victims of the Northridge,
CA, earthquake.
I think I can speak for Senator Bond when I say that our sense of
accomplishment in presenting this report is somewhat tempered by events
past and present, in that we have just marked the solemn 1-year
anniversary of the devastating California earthquake. For all the good
that has happened in the past year, thanks to selfless efforts by
friends, neighbors, charities and, yes, Government bureaucrats of all
stripes, we know that for so many their lives have been irrevocably
changed.
We also share the grief and shock of the Japanese people who had a
tragedy of their own, the horrendous Kobe earthquake. We know the
character of the Japanese people, and given some time and help--and we
are glad President Clinton and the able Director of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], James Lee Witt, have offered some
of our technical expertise--we know the Japanese will soon be on their
feet again.
These catastrophes--and need I mention the terribly destructive
floods which recently rained down on California--underscore the
importance of having an integrated and comprehensive emergency
management system, and we are making great progress toward that goal
today.
Our task force was commissioned to look at Federal disaster
assistance programs, funding and effectiveness, possible program and
policy modifications, budgetary and funding options, and the role of
State, local, and other service providers.
The report covers a spectrum of issues on how we can best ensure that
Federal assistance will always be there when needed and how our
disaster response system might be made more efficient and more cost-
effective. Given the enormity of this project, Senator Bond and I
decided to enlist the resources of congressional entities such as the
Congressional Budget Office [CBO], the Library of Congress, and, in
particular, the General Accounting Office [GAO], which we tasked to
coordinate and take the lead working with our staff on the preparation
of this study.
The end product, I believe, is a testament to the professional work
and collaboration of all of these different groups and bodies. Many
individuals labored long and hard, and we in the Senate owe them a debt
of gratitude.
One of the more striking aspects we found was the lack of
comprehensive Government-wide data on Federal disaster expenditures. I
had thought going in this would be readily available. We found it was
not. While most agencies can produce statistics for a particular
disaster or annual spending, the number of persons assisted and
estimated benefits, these have not been systematically collected across
Government--until now.
GAO has totaled up how much we have spent across the board between
1977 through 1993. In doing so, they examined our disaster planning,
mitigation response, and recovery programs, and these programs I would
like to describe in just a little bit more detail.
Our disaster preparedness and mitigation programs consist chiefly of
FEMA grants and assistance for fire suppression, floodplain management,
earthquake and hurricane vulnerability; flood control and coastal
erosion works under the Army Corps of Engineers; NOAA's severe weather
tracking programs; U.S.G.S. earthquake and volcanic reduction programs,
and; coastal zone management activities through the Department of
Commerce.
In the area of Federal disaster response and recovery programs, we
are dealing primarily with FEMA's individual and public assistance
grants, temporary housing, community disaster loans, and unemployment
benefits; Small Business Administration loans; repairing crucial
roadways through the Department of Transportation; aid for the
restoration of school facilities by the Department of Education;
disaster
[[Page S3923]] recovery grants by the Economic Development
Administration; emergency disaster assistance loans, payments and food
stamps administered by the Department of Agriculture, and; the Army
Corps' emergency water supply operations and flood control and coastal
works repair.
To state the obvious, our emergency management system is far, far
more complex than most people realize. It involves quite a number of
Government agencies.
I should note that these figures do not include FEMA's mission
assignment requests of other agencies to provide specific types of
assistance, depending on the situation and the need.
There is a pervasive cynicism in our land today that derides
Government's ability to deliver efficient and effective services and to
return taxpayer dollars in a meaningful way to those who sent them to
Washington in the first place. In short, to touch people's lives when
there is a desperate need.
What I just listed does that and more. We may talk about cutting
Government, but these programs I feel are real, they are vital, and
they are indispensable.
If in times of major emergencies we do not provide this assistance,
then who will? I spent many days on the floor managing the minority
side for the unfunded mandates bill and agree with much of what is said
by States and localities regarding Federal mandates. But what we, the
Feds, have spent in helping States and our citizens prepare for,
respond to, and recover from disasters has never really been quantified
until today.
This report shows that from fiscal years 1977 through 1993, Federal
agencies obligated almost $120 billion for emergency management
programs--$120 billion in constant 1993 dollars for emergency
management programs.
Most of which, about $87 billion, was for post-disaster recovery
assistance. Over $64 billion, 54 percent of the total, was in the form
of either grants to disaster victims and communities or expenses from
disaster-related activities and response. Some $55 billion, 46 percent
of the total, consisted of various disaster recovery loans made by
FEMA, SBA, or the Farmers Home Administration.
Since a large portion of the loans will ultimately be repaid, the
entire loan amount is not necessarily a Federal cost, though costs are
incurred through subsidized interest rates and when loans are forgiven
or are written off.
(Mr. THOMAS assumed the chair.)
Mr. GLENN. For example, during this same timeframe, the Farmers Home
Administration [FmHA] obligated over $34 billion for disaster emergency
loans and wrote off about $7.5 billion. That is not too bad in a
situation like this, I do not think.
To sum up, we have spent directly over $64 billion between fiscal
years 1977 and 1993 and some $55 billion indirectly through low-cost
Government loans.
While this data is the best we have to date, it is not exhaustive. It
excludes what we have spent to repair or rebuild damaged Federal
Government facilities, which we do not currently track. It also does
not include costs incurred by the Federal Government through subsidies
and disaster insurance programs.
During this timeframe, we spent about $10 billion on the Federal Crop
Insurance Program and almost $3 billion in costs through FEMA's
National Flood Insurance Program.
Last year, Congress did change both of these programs to make them
more cost-effective, to minimize potential losses but still provide
protection from these tragic events at a reasonable cost.
We soon will consider another supplemental bill to pay for additional
costs from the Northridge earthquake. I know this is something my
distinguished co-chair will be holding a hearing on, I believe
tomorrow, in the HUD-VA Subcommittee on Appropriations, and
particularly how we are going to pay for this request. That is a tough
one.
As our communities continue to grow, so do our potential risks and
liabilities. We need to see if there are better ways to prepare
financially for such catastrophic events.
Increasingly, the debates on disaster relief aid and where the money
comes from have grown rather contentious, and that is understandable.
Since these measures are deemed ``emergencies,'' they have not been
subject to budget caps requiring program offsets, so they add to the
deficit.
Also, these bills have become too often the proverbial Christmas
trees for items that may have little or no bearing on our disaster
response efforts.
In other words, people know this legislation is going to go through,
it is going to pass in some form, so whatever their pet program is,
with the Senate's lack of germaneness rules, it can be brought out and
attached. It is something I think we ought to correct in Senate rules
and procedures sometime in the future.
But anyway, this tendency to treat some of these emergency bills as
Christmas trees has attracted heightened scrutiny and distracts us and
the public from our purpose at hand, which is to help fellow citizens
in their time of need.
The report we are releasing today proposes several funding and
budgetary options for consideration of the Senate.
By changing current procedures, these options could reduce the use of
emergency supplementals and lower total Federal spending--but at a
price, making it harder to provide such aid.
Our mission with this report was not one of coming up with one firm,
solid recommendation. It was to lay out options for the Senate's
consideration. It was to define problems, how we have dealt with these
things in the past, and what options we have for dealing with them in
the future.
Each of these options is more fully described in an appendix to my
statement, which I ask unanimous consent be included at the completion
of my remarks, Mr. President.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. GLENN. Each of these options has its own advantages and
disadvantages, and there probably is no clean, pure and simple magic
bullet because, for one reason, we do not have clean and simple
disasters out there so we can plan for them in advance like we might
prefer to do.
There are five basic options:
First, tighten the criteria for using the emergency safety valve of
the Budget Enforcement Act.
In other words, setting a threshold on what is categorized as truly
emergency spending. This could mean that States don't always request
Federal funding on things that normally, in times past, could and
should have been taken care of by the local community or the county or
the State government.
Second, fund disaster programs at historic average levels.
Third, establishing a rainy day fund to cover future disaster
expenses for Federal disaster relief.
Fourth, eliminate the emergency safety valve and cut other spending
to offset the cost of disaster assistance.
Fifth, allow funding only for emergencies in any supplemental
containing an emergency designation.
Those are five options.
With increasing budgetary constraints, these approaches deserve
serious consideration. I know Senator Bond is going to be on the hot
seat grappling with these issues on his appropriations subcommittee,
particularly what the implications are if his subcommittee accounts
will have to absorb much of the current supplemental request. In other
words, what is going to get cut if it all has to come out of his
subcommittee accounts. I do not think it right that this should happen,
but that is one of the things he has to deal with--whether these funds
will come out of veterans programs, out of the space station, or out of
low-income housing, all of which are covered under his subcommittee.
And those are going to be tough decisions.
I hope he would not have to make those decisions from within just the
confines of that budget restriction, and that we could make separate
funds available for emergency consideration. Being forced to change the
rules in the middle of the game is a very serious policy change and one
we should not adopt lightly.
Another area I wish to address is the rise in the number of
Presidentially declared disasters.
[[Page S3924]] In 1988, just 7 years ago, we had 17 declared
disasters, but in 1993 there were 58.
Now, whether that is the result of Mother Nature becoming more testy
or whether it is classifying more types of events as declared national
disasters than in the past, or more generous Presidents--or a
combination of all of these things--remains to be seen. But as the
report suggests, we might want to examine setting very explicit and
objective criteria for Presidential disaster declarations.
I also want to note two integral components of our emergency
management system. We depend on the States and localities--the
emergency managers, the firefighters, the rescue squads and, sometimes,
the National Guard--to be the primary responders in times of
difficulty, times of disaster. And that is as it has been in the past.
We do not want it to be that every time some disaster occurs, the
Federal Government is called in to do everything rather than having
State and local people be mainly responsible themselves. The efforts of
these primary responders, the emergency managers, the firefighters,
rescue squads and, sometimes, the Guard are augmented through the good
work of charitable organizations like the American Red Cross, the
Salvation Army, and many other worthy religious, church, and
professional groups.
Locally, they provide what historically has been the way in this
country of ours, and that is that neighbors take care of neighbors,
locals take care of locals, States take care of their own situation as
much as possible and only call on the Federal Government to supplement
their efforts when things are basically out of control.
Now, our report highlights their special role and the enormous
contributions made by thousands of dedicated volunteers. But we, the
Federal Government, need to supplement their efforts where disasters
get beyond the resources of local communities.
By and large, this system has worked well for the vast majority of
disasters. It is only when we have a truly catastrophic disaster, one
that is beyond the capabilities of these entities, that the Federal
Government enters the picture in any significant way.
It is not to say, however, there is no room for improvement. A
section of our study looks at how Federal assistance to States,
localities and individuals is being spent. The short answer is: We
really do not know. We must do a better job in overseeing what results
we are getting for our money, whether the funds are being used
effectively, and if program objectives are being met.
Further, I was also struck by the sheer number of Federal disaster
programs we currently have spread across many agencies. I think it is
imperative we begin to look at whether any of these are redundant or
duplicative, can be done more efficiently, or organized differently.
Can they be streamlined or consolidated to maximize resources and
increase their efficiency? In a time of budget constraints, a thorough
review of the mission, the management and organization of these various
agency programs is long overdue.
We must also remember that our disaster response system is, in fact,
a partnership which is, indeed, a hallmark of our federal system.
I know that some States take these matters quite seriously but
others, perhaps, less so. As States have been faced with their own
fiscal constraints, too often their emergency management programs get
cut to the bone with the assumption: ``Why bother; the Feds will come
to the rescue.'' That is the wrong attitude.
Our own position is shaky enough. We must ensure that the States are
doing their part to uphold their end of the bargain.
I think it is telling that before this study took shape, neither FEMA
nor the States had an idea of what the States were spending or getting
for their emergency management and related programs. And thanks to this
effort, FEMA is now working with the National Emergency Managers
Association [NEMA] to do just that. I think it is critical to know
exactly how the States shape up in this regard.
The report also suggests a number of ideas to improve Federal-State
coordination such as: adopting performance standards; providing
incentives for planning and mitigation; cost-sharing reductions for
those not up to par; more frequent exercises and training, and; very
importantly, I believe, post disaster analysis to learn what worked,
what did not, were the money and resources well spent. In short, to
determine lessons learned after each disaster.
We should work with the States to implement these approaches, and
FEMA is now beginning to do that. We also must make sure FEMA itself
has the capabilities to effectively manage and oversee this effort so
we will better know how well or how poorly the States are doing their
job.
So, again, I wish to recommend to my colleagues they take a look at
our task force report. I thank all those who have devoted their time
and effort to putting it together.
In particular, GAO did an outstanding job in supervising and
coordinating this effort. It is a job well done. And I already have
asked unanimous consent the appendix be printed in the Record.
I want to close by giving full credit to my cochair in this effort,
Senator Bond. After the election of last fall, when the leadership in
the Senate changed, we sort of changed roles on this a bit. He took a
major role from there on in putting this whole thing together and has
done a superb job. I compliment him for his efforts in this regard, for
leading this effort. It has been a pleasure to work with him on it.
We have made a report that does not solve all of our problems, but
under his leadership, and working with him, I think we have been able
to put together a report that is the most definitive report ever on
disaster relief assistance, the Federal role, its historical
connotations, and to provide some suggestions for the Senate's guidance
of how we should deal with this in the future.
It has been a pleasure to deal with Senator Bond on this. I know he
will submit our report on this officially. I yield the floor.
Exhibit 1

Appendix--Task Force Budgetary and Funding Options

i. tighten criteria for using the emergency safety valve of the budget
enforcement act (bea)

This option would require Congress and the President to
issue specific, written justifications for designating
appropriations as emergencies to escape funding constraints.
Such formal criteria could impose a higher threshold that
funding measures would have to hurdle to avoid the
disciplines of the BEA. How high the threshold would be
raised--and how much savings might result--is an open
question. But such written justifications would provide
Members more information and would presumably give those
opposing such funding a more defined target.

ii. fund disaster programs at historic average levels

This alternative would require appropriations for FEMA, SBA
disaster loans, and other disaster programs to be made in
regular appropriations bills in amounts equal to an historic
average or expected funding need for each program before the
emergency designation could be used for supplemental funds.
In theory, this should increase regular appropriations for
such programs and lower the amounts of emergency
supplementals.
Currently, the appropriation request for FEMA is loosely
based on an historic average, which was calculated years ago
and excludes the costs of major disasters. FEMA's regular
appropriation was $292 million in 1994. Had the 10-year
average of about $645 million been appropriated, the size of
FEMA supplementals would have been about $350 million
smaller. If the appropriations caps were unchanged--meaning
spending in other programs was reduced to accommodate this--
the Federal deficit would have been $350 million less.
It should be noted that, since 1993, firefighting programs
of the Forest Service and the Department of the Interior have
been funded based on a 10-year moving average. These programs
also have the authority to borrow from other accounts. Since
this practice was begun, no supplementals for these
activities have been necessary.
On the other hand, unobligated balances could accumulate in
the program accounts during some periods. If they grew large
enough, it would be awfully tempting to lower the threshold
of what is really a disaster, be more generous in our
response, or to raid it for other purposes.
Of course, setting strict definitions of eligible disasters
and developing procedures that would isolate this account
money could be part of any legislative package to carry out
this option.

III. establishing a rainy day fund to cover future disaster expenses
for federal disaster relief

This approach would create a so-called rainy day fund, or
reserve account, financed
[[Page S3925]] by cutting other discretionary spending, by
raising new taxes, or a combination of both.
Annual payments to the fund could be made until some
desired balance is reached. Spending from this account could
be subject to appropriation at the whenever the need arose.
Unlike the previous option--where the executive branch could
obligate accumulated account funds on their own--this
approach would allow Congress to retain the discretion over
using this money.
This option would cause disaster relief to be paid for up
front--either by spending cuts or higher taxes--rather than
borrowing and increasing the deficit, as we do now. But
again, there could be some temptation--particularly in times
of fewer, less costly disasters--for Members to be more
generous than envisioned in utilizing any large, accumulated
balances in this account.

IV. Eliminate the Emergency safety valve and cut other spending to
offset the cost of disaster assistance

This alternative would remove the emergency safety valve
provided for in the Budget Enforcement Act. Disaster
assistance would be paid for by reducing other spending,
thereby lowering the Federal deficit.
One version of this option would require that current year
spending be reduced. Another approach would mandate that
discretionary caps be reduced in future years to offset the
increase in current year spending.
Under both these scenarios, if there is any unnecessary or
excess relief now provided, it would be far less likely to
occur in this modified pay-as-you-go procedure. Of course, as
spending caps grow increasingly tighter, finding the programs
to cut to accommodate the variable needs of disaster relief
is going to be all the more difficult.

V. allow funding only for emergencies in any supplemental containing an
emergency designation

This option would establish a new point of order in the
House and Senate against considering any bill or joint
resolution containing an emergency appropriation if it also
provides an appropriation for any other nonemergency
activity. While not directly addressing disaster assistance
funding, it seeks to eliminate the ``Christmas tree'' addons.
Opponents of this change could argue there is a
longstanding practice of considering supplemental funding
needs en masse, and this would be akin to requiring separate
votes on provisions of regular appropriations bills.
Whether or not this approach would actually reduce the
deficit is also open. Nonemergency items in supplementals
must be estimated to have no net effect on the deficit, since
there is no room left under the spending caps. So some would
contend that while the policy might change, the Federal
deficit likely would not.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Ashcroft). The Senator from Missouri.
Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I express my sincere thanks to my good
friend and colleague from Ohio, Senator Glenn. On this as on other
matters he has been very easy to work with. I appreciate the tremendous
efforts he and his staff put in and the great leadership he showed on
this task force.

Order for Printing of Report

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I now ask unanimous consent on behalf of
myself and Senator Glenn that the report of the Senate Bipartisan Task
Force on Funding Disaster Relief be printed as a Senate document. In
addition to the usual number of copies, I also ask an additional 300
copies be printed for the use of the Senate. As noted, the task force
was established by Public Law 103-211 in February 1994. Subsequently
Senator Glenn and I were named cochairs of the task force.
I understand this request has been cleared on both sides of the
aisle.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I have already said how much I appreciate
the opportunity to work with Senator Glenn. He has shown great
dedication and concern about disaster declarations and how we provide
assistance. I think he has given, in his remarks, an excellent overview
of the contents of this report. I join him in commending the GAO, CRS,
and the other agencies that worked on this, as well as the members of
the task force and their staffs. As my colleagues can see, this is no
small task. The information was very difficult to compile. It had not
been done before. I believe it is a useful effort and I commend it to
my colleagues. The good news is you do not have to read the whole
thing. There is an executive summary so you can see what we are talking
about.
I also want to highlight the comments that Senator Glenn made about
the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, the National Guard, the other
organizations, individual volunteers, and the State and local
governments that respond in these disasters.
I have had more experience than I want in dealing with disasters as
Governor of Missouri. I found that out of the hardship, death, injury,
damage, and widespread devastation that nature frequently visits on our
country comes a tremendous human response that is probably one of the
most gratifying and encouraging things one can see in a disaster. I
also appreciate Senator Glenn's comments about the funding difficulties
that Senator Mikulski, my ranking member, and I on the Veterans'
Administration, HUD and Independent Agencies Subcommittees on
Appropriations will face if we have to make cuts solely in our
subcommittee in order to handle the disaster implications. This is
something we do need to address because in no subcommittee in
Appropriations is there a great deal of slack to cover the costs of
major disasters.
Let me share just briefly some of my observations. There are a couple
of points I want to highlight about this report. As most of my
colleagues will remember, nearly 2 years ago the Midwest experienced
one of the worst floods in the Nation's history. It was deemed a 500-
year flood in some areas. We in Missouri saw firsthand the devastating
power of Mother Nature. Families were forced out of homes. Businesses
and infrastructure, in some cases whole communities, were under water.
Over the 3-month period of June to August 1993, northern and central
Missouri received over 24 inches of rain. We thought that was a lot of
rain. North of us, in east central Iowa, they dwarfed us with over 38
inches of rain.
The Missouri and Mississippi Rivers crested and fell, crested and
fell, and then crested again. When the waters finally receded, because
the ground was so saturated it took weeks, not days, before people
could begin the nasty, dirty business of cleaning up. If you never had
to be in an area of cleaning up after a major flood, you cannot really
appreciate how difficult and how unpleasant a task that is. Needless to
say, the damage which resulted was extraordinary, and efforts to repair
roads, levees, airports, and communities are continuing in some areas
even today.
It was with this experience still fresh in my mind that I accepted
with pleasure the opportunity to serve as cochair, with my friend
Senator Glenn, and accepted the responsibilities for the Senate's
Bipartisan Task Force on Funding Disaster Relief last February.
As a former Governor who saw several disasters during my two terms as
well as a 500-year flood, I was very pleased to be given the
opportunity to take on the task of reviewing the Federal Government's
disaster relief programs and policies. Our task force was asked to do
several things: review the history of disaster relief and its funding;
evaluate the types and amounts of Federal financial assistance provided
to individuals as well as State and local governments; review the
relationship between funding disaster relief and our budget enforcement
rules; and report our findings, options, and any recommendations. As
mentioned earlier, this proved to be an immense task and one which
could not have been done without the massive amount of work done by the
professionals at GAO, CBO, and CRS, who teamed up to put together this
first-ever comprehensive review.
Our colleagues in Congress have been concerned, and rightfully so,
that the cost of disaster assistance was growing exponentially while at
the same time the temptation to declare anything and everything a
disaster in order to get out from under the budget caps was also
increasing. Thus, after seeing the sixth large supplemental moving
through the Senate, our colleagues decided the time had come to take a
longer look at our disaster programs. This report is the result of that
decision, and tomorrow I plan to hold a hearing with the Federal
Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], and a panel composed of GAO, CBO,
and CRS, to begin exploring where we go from here.
Several of our report's findings are worth highlighting. First, the
actual amount obligated by the Federal Government on disaster
assistance, as has already been stated, from fiscal year 1977 to fiscal
year 1993 has been, in constant 1993 dollars, $120 billion.
[[Page S3926]] The distinguished occupant of the Chair, who served
as Governor of Missouri, was on the receiving end of some of that
assistance. I know he and our other colleagues around the country know
how important that assistance can be.
Of this figure, $55 billion are in the form of loans, with $34.5
billion originating from the Farmers Home Administration and nearly $21
billion from the Small Business Administration.
The other major expenditures have been $16 billion from the U.S.
Department of Agriculture for crop losses, $25 billion from the Corps
of Engineers for hazard mitigation efforts, and $10 billion for FEMA's
disaster recovery programs.
But of interest to many of my colleagues is the number of disasters
since 1988. That year there were 17 disasters with a total cost of $2.2
billion.
In fiscal year 1989 there were 29 disasters; fiscal year 1990, 35;
fiscal year 1991, 39; fiscal year 1992, 48; and by fiscal year 1993,
there were 58 disasters at a cost of $6.6 billion. And then last year,
not included in this report's totals, an $8.4 billion supplemental
appropriations was agreed to. As I speak, we have pending before the
Veterans Administration, HUD, and Independent Agencies Subcommittee of
the Appropriations Committee a fiscal year 1995 supplemental request
for an additional $6.7 billion FEMA request. As has been said in many
other instances, that begins to mount up to real money.
Mr. President, I believe this report will serve as a very useful tool
in two basic ways. First, it reminds our colleagues of the costs which
have been occurring as a result of natural disasters and our responses
to them; second, that we need to get everyone to take a second look at
how we have been evaluating the successes or failures of our disaster
responses.
For the past few years, we have been concentrating on improving the
speed of response and the timeliness of the payments--how fast we can
shovel the money out the door. For the most part, there have been
dramatic improvements. We can really shovel it out the door quickly.
However, it is about time that we look to see how the money is being
spent. Senator Glenn has already referred to that. It is not just the
fact that we shovel it out in a timely fashion. Where does it go and
what does it do? I think that his comments are right on target. And
this will be the subject of the hearing we will be holding tomorrow to
begin to explore how this money is actually spent. Where does it go
when it is shoveled out the door?
I invite my colleague, or others who are interested, to sit in or to
have a staff member sit in as we begin to explore where the money goes,
what it does, and if it is the kind of expenditure that we really need
to make.
In the past 5 years, Congress, through FEMA alone, has provided $12
billion in emergency relief. We now are faced with another request by
FEMA of $6.7 billion for this year. It should be obvious to everyone,
as I think it is obvious to me, that in the budget climate we face, we
must address these escalating costs to ensure that the billions we are
spending is spent wisely.
I hope that this report will jump start the effort. I ask our
colleagues to review at least the executive summary of the report so
that they will have an idea of how we are spending billions and
billions of dollars--$120 billion since fiscal year 1977. That is a
significant amount of money, and one which we should take care to
assure we are spending properly.
Mr. President, that concludes my remarks. I yield the floor.
Mr. GLENN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I want to say once again what a great job
Senator Bond did on this report. I think that is exactly what the
Senate had in mind when they asked us to do this. I congratulate him.
We worked on it very closely together.

____________________