[Pages H1078-H1142]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

LINE ITEM VETO ACT

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call
up House Resolution 55 and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 55

Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this
resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule
XXIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of
the bill (H.R. 2) to give the President item veto authority
over appropriation Acts and targeted tax benefits in revenue
Acts. The first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with.
General debate shall be confined to the bill and shall not
exceed two hours, with one hour equally divided and
controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight and one hour
equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking
minority member of the Committee on Rules. After general
debate the bill shall be considered for amendment under the
five-minute rule. In lieu of the amendments recommended by
the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight and the
Committee on Rules, it shall be in order to consider as an
original bill for the purpose of amendment under the five-
minute rule the amendment in the nature of a substitute
printed in the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying
this resolution. That amendment in the nature of a substitute
shall be considered as read. Points of order against the
amendment in the nature of a substitute for failure to comply
with clause 7 of rule XVI are waived. During consideration of
the bill for amendment, the Chairman of the Committee of the
Whole may accord priority in recognition on the basis of
whether the Member offering an amendment has caused it to be
printed in the portion of the Congressional Record designated
for that purpose in clause 6 of rule XXIII. Amendments so
printed shall be considered as read. At the conclusion of
consideration of the bill for amendment the Committee shall
rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as
may have been adopted. Any Member may demand a separate vote
in the House on any amendment adopted in the Committee of the
Whole to the bill or to the amendment in the nature of a
substitute made in order as original text. The previous
question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and
amendments thereto to final passage without intervening
motion except one motion to recommit with or without
instructions.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hastings of Washington). The gentleman
from Florida [Mr. Goss] is recognized for 1 hour.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the
customary 30 minutes to my respected friend and colleague, the
gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson], pending which I yield myself
such time as I may consume. During consideration of this resolution,
all time yielded is for the purpose of debate only.
Mr. Speaker, this historic 104th Congress has been in session for
less than 1 calendar month, a period that in Congresses past saw little
legislative progress; lots of talk maybe, but very little action unless
you count travel. But with the brisk winds of change at our backs and
the unmistakable call for fiscal discipline still ringing in our ears
from the American people we work for, we are on our way toward
fullfilling our Contract With America and were moving a lot faster than
the other major event in this country, the O.J. Simpson trial. We have
already passed an historic balanced budget amendment and landmark
legislation to curb unfunded Federal mandates.
Today we draw the third side of this powerful triangle of reforms to
restore fiscal sanity to this institution and to our Government. The
line-item veto proposed in H.R. 2 is a real line-item veto, with the
type of teeth many of us know are necessary to bring about greater
fiscal discipline. It puts the emphasis on saving. It makes it harder
to spend taxpayers' money. It increases accountability and it forces
the White
[[Page H1079]] House and the Congress to work together on controlling
the Federal budget.
{time} 1030

It is fitting that we consider the line-item veto under a wide open
rule and this is a wide open rule. This is a serious discussion about
reining in Federal spending, restoring accountability to the
congressional budget process and balancing the powers of the executive
and legislative branches of Government. This topic deserves the full
benefit of the deliberative democratic process our Founding Fathers
envisioned for this House. I am proud to offer my colleagues this wide
open rule, one that allows any Member to be heard on issues of concern.
I would also like to point out, Mr. Speaker, that we have not only
created an open rule, an open rule-plus, but we have several days of
time for this issue to be debated on the floor, on the Calendar, and
brought to some kind of a resolution. We have, I think, compared to
past attempts to discuss this issue, gone way over the edge in terms of
scheduling latitude. We have 3 legislative days in front of us compared
to really hours only in the past when we debated this issue. And I
point out that in those legislative days we also have a weekend which
is available for work if necessary.
At this point I understand we have 31 amendments out there which have
been filed under the option of prefiling, and no doubt we will be
hearing other amendments under the 5-minute rule because we do have one
very important issue on policy and a whole lot of other issues on
precedents.
This rule makes in order as base text for the purpose of amendment a
substitute that reflects the combined, bipartisan work of the Committee
on Government Reform and Oversight, Chairman Clinger and the
gentlewoman from Illinois, Mrs. Collins, and the fine work that they
have been doing, and the Committee on Rules.
I was pleased to hear the ranking member of the Government Reform
Committee, Mrs. Collins, express her appreciation to Chairman Clinger
for the fair treatment the minority received in his committee. I hope
the minority members of the Rules Committee felt they too had a fair
chance to be heard. The spirit of bipartisanship we have seen on this
legislation--even as some clearly do disagree on how far a line-item
veto should go--has been particularly refreshing and gives me great
hope. In the course of the committee process, we consulted frequently
with the Parliamentarian's Office for guidance about matters of
germaneness, scope and jurisdiction and given the technical nature of
some provisions, even the experts were not always in agreement on some
of the processes here. For that reason, this rule does include a
precautionary waiver for clause 7 of rule XVI, which prohibits
nongermane amendments. While this Member and our new committee
leadership are generally hesitant to waive standing rules, because of
the conflicting advice from the Parliamentarian's Office during the
committee process, important language was included in H.R. 2 to give
the President the option to propose that savings from his line-item
veto be applied toward deficit reduction.
While this language may technically have been nongermane to the bill
as written, I would think most Americans--and certainly most Members I
hope--see the goal of cutting the deficit as highly germane to the
subject of line item veto. If we are going to take this step to give
the President the authority to cut or reduce spending--or targeted tax
benefits--we should also provide the option that the money be saved
rather than spent elsewhere. The rule provides 2 hours of general
debate, and then opens the bill to amendment under the 5-minute rule.
We have included in this rule the encouragement for Members to have
their amendments pre-printed in the Record. This is not a requirement--
but it is something all Members might want to consider doing. Even the
distinguished Member from West Virginia [Mr. Wise], who has had much
experience in this House, I am told found the need for a technical
correction to an amendment he wishes to offer through this voluntary
pre-printing process. So it is beneficial it simply gives Members and
the Parliamentary experts alike a chance to review the language,
understand the implications and run the traps on the technical
pitfalls. In my view, this type of rule should be called an open-plus
rule, because it offers Members a mechanism to better prepare
themselves for the floor and the debate. This is a bonus to
deliberative democracy, it is not a hindrance. I urge my colleagues to
support this rule.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hastings of Washington). The gentleman
from California [Mr. Beilenson] is recognized for 30 minutes.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, before I speak on the rule, I yield such
time as he may consume to the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr.
Montgomery].
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Montgomery was allowed to proceed out of
order.)

VA ACTIVATES HELP LINE FOR PERSIAN GULF VETERANS

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to announce that today the
Department of Veterans Affairs is activating a toll free Help Line for
Persian Gulf veterans who are concerned about their health. The number
is 1-800-PGW-VETS.
Mr. Speaker, this Help Line will be staffed from 7:30 in the morning
until 8:30 at night. We also expect any day now the final regulations
to be published which will guide the VA in paying compensation to
Persian Gulf veterans with chronic disabilities due to ``We cannot
diagnose what the problem is.''
So the veterans of Persian Gulf who have problems with their health,
there is now a toll free number and certainly they should call it.
This assistance is in addition to the priority health care VA already
provides to Persian Gulf veterans and the comprehensive research that
is being conducted to find the causes of these undiagnosed illnesses.
I take great pride in being the author of the legislation we passed
last year, which President Clinton signed last November. We must do all
we can to help our Persian Gulf veterans and all veterans who are sick
or disabled.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] for
yielding to me.
Mr. Speaker, although we have very serious concerns about the bill
this rule makes in order, we do support the rule itself. It is an open
rule, as the gentleman from Florida has well put it, so all Members
will have the opportunity to offer any amendment which is in order
under the standing rules of the House.
Mr. Speaker, because the rule provides for 2 hours of general debate,
there will be ample time to discuss the ramifications of this
legislation.
H.R. 2 is a very important piece of legislation, and we appreciate
the fact that this rule will give the House the chance to fully air the
problems many of us have with it, and to debate alternative versions
and modifications.
However, I do want to restate for the membership the concerns that
the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Moakley], and other Members and I
raised about the preprinting provision in the rule at the Rules
Committee meeting yesterday.
This provision allows the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole to
give priority in recognition for the offering of amendments to Members
who have had those amendments printed in the Congressional Record
before today. Its purpose and a good one is to encourage Members to
give notice of their intent to offer an amendment, without actually
requiring them to do so.
A similar provision was included in the rule for H.R. 5, the Unfunded
Mandate Reform Act. What we found during consideration of that bill is
that the Chair tended to recognize the majority floor leader and
manager over Members with preprinted amendments--and that is certainly
within the Chair's discretion, but it caused some confusion among the
membership.
In addition, Members offering amendments were not sure if they should
proceed with amendments which were not preprinted if there were still
other amendments pending which had been preprinted. And, there was some
uncertainty about whether Members would be recognized at all if they
had not had their amendments preprinted.
[[Page H1080]] The priority recognition provision, I think, adds
unnecessary confusion and complication to the amending process. It is
not always going to be feasible to have an open rule, but if we are
going to have what we call an open rule, we would much prefer having an
oldfashioned, unfettered open rule.
I might add that we also hope that there is no effort at any point
during consideration of H.R. 2 to limit debate time on any of the
amendments Members wish to offer.
I know that that is the intention of our friends in the majority, but
we express that hope nonetheless.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to take just a few moments to highlight
the concerns that many of us have about the bill that this rule would
make in order.
While we all agree that reducing Federal budget deficits is one of
the most important tasks facing the Nation, and that Congress and the
President should have the necessary tools to accomplish that task, many
of us do not believe that H.R. 2, as reported from the Rules Committee
and the Government Reform and Oversight Committee, deserves the support
of the House.
Under H.R. 2, the President's proposed rescissions or targeted tax
benefit repeals would automatically take effect unless the Congress
specifically passes a resolution disapproving those proposals. Even if
Congress overturned the President's action the President could then
veto the disapproval which, in turn, would have to be overridden by
two-thirds of both Houses of Congress.
Thus, the President would be empowered to cancel any spending or tax
benefits with the support of only a minority of the Members of either
House. A one-third plus one minority working with the President would
thus control spending.
This procedure would result in a dramatic--and possibly
unconstitutional--shift in responsibility and power from the
legislative branch to the executive branch. This broad shift of power
could easily lead to abuses. The President could target the rescissions
against particular legislators, or against particular regions of the
country, or against the judicial branch e.g. This power could be used
to force the Congress to pay for a pet Presidential project, or to
agree to a policy that is completely unrelated to budgetary matters.
Furthermore, we would be transferring this immense amount of power to
the President with little reason to believe that it would have much of
an effect on the Federal budget deficit.
This new line-item veto would be used primarily for discretionary
spending--spending which is appropriated annually.
{time} 1040

However, discretionary spending, as Members well know, which accounts
for just over one-third of the Federal budget, is already the most
tightly controlled type of spending. Discretionary spending is reviewed
and approved each year, and is subject to strict spending caps. In
fact, programs funded in this manner normally must go through two
processes in Congress: authorization and appropriation.
Discretionary spending has been declining both as a percentage of the
total Federal budget, and as a percentage of GDP, for the last several
years. Additional controls on this area of the budget will not
accomplish much, if anything, in the way of deficit reduction.
In fact, our efforts to institute additional mechanisms to control
appropriated spending have distracted us from dealing with the area of
the budget which has been growing at a rapid rate, and is far more in
need of additional control than, of course, is entitlement programs.
Programs comprising this type of spending do not require annual--or
even periodic--approval, and are not subject to spending caps.
Providing new rescission authority for discretionary spending, but
not for entitlements or other types of non-appropriated spending, will
further distort the budget process so far as control of different types
of spending is concerned. If our goal is truly to establish more
safeguards against increases in spending, we ought to be looking at
ways to establish more controls for the 63 or 64 percent of our
spending that is not subject to the annual appropriations process.
In addition, discretionary spending is an area of the budget where
Presidents have wanted more spending than Congress has approved.
According to the Office of Management and Budget, from fiscal year 1982
to fiscal year 1993, Congress has appropriated $59 billion less than
the Presidents during those 10 or 11 years. In addition, over the last
20 years, Congress has rescinded $20 billion more than the Presidents
have requested in rescissions.
If those patterns continue, and the President is given greater
leverage in the appropriations process. it is likely that he will or
she will use the rescission process--the new line-item veto authority--
as a threat to secure appropriations for programs that the President
wants enacted, rather than to reduce total spending.
Mr. Speaker, the other type of spending H.R. 2 covers is targeted tax
benefits. However, the bill's narrow definition of ``targeted tax
benefit'' ensures that little will be achieved in the way of deficit
reduction by that provision. The vast majority of tax breaks--worth
hundreds of billions of dollars--would remain immune from the
President's power to repeal. However, we can rectify that matter by
expanding the definition of targeted tax benefit by adopting the
amendment that will be offered by the gentlewoman from New York [Ms.
Slaughter] and the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Barrett].
Most importantly, during consideration of this bill, we will have the
opportunity to choose a different form of rescission--one that will be
a very effective mechanism for making further reductions in spending,
without providing for a dangerous and unwise transfer of power to the
executive branch. That is the expedited rescission proposal that will
be offered by Messrs. Wise, Stenholm, and Spratt.
The Wise-Stenholm-Spratt proposal would permit the President to
propose to rescind all or part of any discretionary spending, or to
repeal any targeted tax provision, passed by Congress. The critical
difference between this proposal and H.R. 2 is that a rescission or
repeal could only be enacted by approval of both Houses of Congress.
Thus it maintains Congress' constitutionally mandated power of the
purse, and avoids transferring an unwarranted amount of power to the
President. At the appropriate time, I strongly urge Members to support
this alternative to H.R. 2 as reported.
Mr. Speaker, once again, I want to express my support for this open
rule, and urge my colleagues to support it.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon], the distinguished chairman of
the Committee on Rules.
(Mr. SOLOMON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, the previous speaker, who I have great
respect for, a good friend, has inferred that this line item veto only
affects one-third of the Federal budget; in other words, discretionary
spending. He is right, one-third of the Federal budget, and how much is
that? It is not just $500,000. It is not just $5 million. It is $500
billion; that is one-third of the Federal budget. Where I come from, as
my colleagues know, that is a heck of a lot money.
The gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson] is somewhat critical of
a preprinting suggestion, and yet a very prominent Democrat from his
side of the aisle filed an amendment so that he would have priority in
offering his amendment. Lo and behold, the Parliamentarian found a flaw
in that amendment, and it is a very significant amendment which should
be debated on the floor, but because of preprinting he was able to
correct the flaw and prefile another amendment. So it benefited him, a
Democrat from the gentleman's side of the aisle, and that is the reason
we did this.
Now let me just get back to the bill for a minute. As my colleagues
know, Mr. Speaker, this is just one of the proudest days of my life
since this is the first time this House has ever considered a reported
bill on the line item veto. Oh, we have had plenty of votes before on
this proposal, but always as an amendment to another approach, a
watered-down version which always was opposed by the majority
leadership. In other words, in the past the
[[Page H1081]] leadership on the Democrat side has always put
forth a bill which was a watered-down version, and that meant
that those of us that believe in a real line item veto then
had to fight to offer an amendment to strengthen it. And I
say, ``That puts you at a tremendous disadvantage.''
This time we do not have that problem. Now the real line item veto is
on the table, and it is up to those in opposition, the big spenders, to
try to water it down. But we are not going to let that happen.
I am proud to say that this bill has been properly reported by two
committees of this House, one of which I have the privilege of
chairing. Moreover, it has the full support of the majority leadership.
In fact, this is one of the major promises made in our Contract With
America which was authored by our current majority leadership, the
Speaker and the majority leader. And I am sure the American people are
pleased to see that we are keeping our promises in that contract,
especially on this line item veto bill which has always enjoyed the
support of 70 percent of the American people, 70 percent.
I am also pleased that we were able to bring this to this floor under
a completely open rule allowing all Members, be they Democrats or
Republicans, be they liberals or conservatives; they are going to have
the opportunity to participate and work their will on the floor of this
House, and that is the way it should be.
This bill does enjoy bipartisan support in this Congress and by the
administration. One of the leaders on the Democrat side of the aisle,
the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Parker], has fought long and hard
to have a real line item veto enacted into law.
We have already seen the deliberative process at work in the two
committees of jurisdiction. Amendments have been offered and adopted to
strengthen and improve this bill, and I am sure that will continue to
happen on this floor. That is what deliberative democracy is all about.
Mr. Speaker, a few years ago, when we first started pushing for the
legislative line item veto, there were a few doubting Democrats who
said,

Solomon, it's easy for you to support the line item veto
when your party controls the White House, but we bet you you
won't be so gung ho for it if we have a Democrat President.

Well, here we are. We get a Democratic President, and here is Solomon
up here fighting for the same line item veto for that Democrat
President. I think this is something that a chief executive in
government, regardless of political party, should have, just as 43
Governors of States have it, one of them being Governor Tommy Thompson
of Wisconsin who has done a tremendous job of putting that State's
fiscal house in order. In New York State we now have a Republican
Governor, and he is now going to have that opportunity which was never
exercised by a former Governor named Mario Cuomo, who left a $4 billion
deficit in that State. But, Mr. Speaker, more than just saying that, I
proved it by offering this true line item veto twice in the last two
Congresses under Mr. Clinton's presidency. I only wish Mr. Clinton had
supported me then as he is doing here today. We only lost
that vote by a few votes both of those times; seven votes the last
time, and it is going to be different this year.

I remember my hero, Ronald Reagan, pushing for the line-item veto for
8 straight years and getting absolutely nowhere. Back in 1986, in an
address to the Nation President Reagan said, and I quote:

No other single piece of legislation would so quickly and
effectively put order back into our budget process. All that
it would mean is that the President could selectively sign or
veto individual spending items so that he wouldn't have to
take the fat along with the meat.

{time} 1050

No, the line-item veto is not a meat ax, as some would have us
believe. Instead, it is a precision knife for doing just what President
Reagan said it would do--separate the fat from the meat.
That is why the American people support this overwhelmingly, because
they are fed up with pork-barrel spending by this Congress.
Mr. Speaker, I am not under any delusion that this is some kind of a
panacea for deficit reduction. It is not. But it can make a significant
difference in our spending habits and our deficit situation. And gosh
knows, we need it. I think one of the greatest benefits will be the
deterrent effect by discouraging us from slipping pork into our
appropriation bills in the first place.
I understand the concerns of those who feel the line-item veto shifts
too much authority to the President, and that it might somehow be
abused or used for partisan or political purposes. I just happen to
disagree with both of those arguments. I guess I have enough confidence
in any President, regardless of political party, to use this new tool
selectively and judiciously. No President in his right mind would want
to create a major confrontation with the entire Congress by grossly
abusing this authority. Even if a President were tempted to overstep
the bounds of propriety, he would surely realize Congress would find
ways to retaliate. And we know we can do that. It would be a no-win
situation for any President.
In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I urge the Members to support this
completely open rule for the line-item veto that it makes in order. We
have an historic opportunity this week to really do something for the
American people. If we pass this and it becomes a statute, a law,
coupled with the balanced budget amendment, we are going to turn around
this sea of red ink which is literally ruining this country. For your
children and my grandchildren alike, we have got to do something about
it.
Mr. Speaker, I ask the Members to please support this rule.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, we have always known that our friend, the
gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon], was a man of principle and
integrity. He has proved it again by supporting this bill to give a
Democratic President this kind of power.
For purposes of debate only, Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the
gentlewoman from North Carolina [Mrs. Clayton].
Mrs. CLAYTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague, the gentleman from
California [Mr. Beilenson], for yielding this time to me.
Mr. Speaker, like my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, I rise in
support of this wide open rule on the line-item veto.
I want the Speaker to note that this rule for the line-item veto is
wide open today. And I bet it will be wide open tomorrow. But on
Monday, it is anybody's guess. The distinguished chairman of the Rules
Committee has said that the rule will stay open unless he decides to
close it. That is what worries me.
A bill that is open 2 days and closed on the third is not an open
rule. A rule that does not allow Members of Congress to make amendments
to a bill is closed.
Mr. Speaker, in addition to being wide open, today's rule on the
line-item veto contains an interesting condition that we have seen once
before. It suggests--but does not require--preprinted amendments in the
Congressional Record.
Mr. Speaker, I have been a Member of this House for only one term and
this is my third year, but I can tell you right now we do not need a
rule to tell Members they can print amendments in the Record. The rules
of the House take care of that for us. We only need a rule if they must
print amendments in the Record.
I have been told this is for convenience sake but it is unnecessary.
And, in addition to being unnecessary, the preprint-if-you-want
condition is confusing.
During debate on the unfunded mandates bill, which also had a
preprint-if-you-want condition, the Chair recognized the majority floor
manager before it recognized Members who had their amendments
preprinted.
So, if preprinting does not get you recognized any earlier, and if
this is truly a wide open rule, I would like to suggest to the
Republicans that we dispense with this condition and do an open rule
the way they used to define them.
But, even if we do not, a strange open rule is better than no open
rule, and I support the open rule.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, will my friend, the gentlewoman from North
Carolina, yield?
Mrs. CLAYTON. Yes, I am glad to yield to the gentleman from New York.

[[Page H1082]]

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I would just say this to the gentlewoman:
She said that the chairman of the Rules Committee, that being me, has
said he will close down this rule. That is not true.
The gentlewoman should understand that on an open rule, only by a
majority action of the House could we close down this rule, and I think
that is the fair way to go about it. That is why we in the Rules
Committee put out an open rule, and now, if there are dilatory tactics
or stalling tactics--and I do not think there will be; I have looked at
the amendments, and I have a lot of faith in the other side of the
aisle that they are going to be sincere about it--but should that
happen and should it be necessary to close down the debate, it would
take an action by this House, not by me saying so, but by a majority of
the Members of the House. I just wanted to point that out to the
gentlewoman.
Mrs. CLAYTON. Mr. Speaker, there is a slight difference, but with the
gentleman's leadership, I gather. Is that what the gentleman is saying?
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to how much time remains on
either side?
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hastings of Washington). The gentleman
from Florida [Mr. Goss] has 17 minutes remaining, and the gentleman
from California [Mr. Beilenson] has 19 minutes remaining.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss].
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to our colleague, the
distinguished gentlewoman from Ohio [Ms. Pryce], a valued member of the
Committee on Rules.
Ms. PRYCE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida [Mr.
Goss].
Mr. Speaker, another important plank in the Republican Contract With
America, the line-item veto, comes to the floor of the House today
under a wide open rule, allowing any Member of this body to offer a
germane amendment.
This is the third contract item to hit the floor since the 104th
Congress began just 4 weeks ago, following on the heels of the balanced
budget amendment and the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act.
As in the case of the mandate relief bill, this open rule gives
priority recognition to Members who have published their amendments in
the Congressional Record. I would emphasize that this is not a
preprinting requirement. As has been mentioned already, printing of
amendments in the Record is purely optional. Members who do not
preprint amendments will not be prohibited from offering their
proposals, but many of us who serve on the Rules Committee encourage
Members to exercise this option in the future, not only to receive
priority recognition but, more importantly, to inform our colleagues in
advance of amendments that are likely to be offered so that we can
reduce time-consuming discussion on overlapping amendments and have
more meaningful informed debate. With all due respect to my friend, the
gentlewoman from North Carolina, this makes an overall better
legislative process.
Supporting this rule, Mr. Speaker, will mean full debate on
bipartisan legislation specifically designed to help restore fiscal
discipline to the budget process.
H.R. 2 will help Congress and the executive branch identify and
remove unnecessary and wasteful spending without unduly tying the hands
of either branch of Government. Of all the issues raised during the
most recent elections, I believe the American people were most
concerned about Federal spending and the need to avoid saddling future
generations of Americans with an increasingly large debt burden.
Last week we passed a constitutional balanced budget amendment to
respond to those concerns. Today under this open process we will
consider adding yet another weapon in the fight against wasteful
government spending.
Public opinion strongly supports the line-item veto. Forty-three of
the Nation's Governors hold the line-item veto, and just last week
President Clinton stood in this very Chamber and asked the Congress to
give him that authority.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this rule.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield 5
minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from Illinois [Mrs. Collins]
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I support this open rule for
H.R. 2, but I oppose the bill. At the outset I would like to address a
point raised at our committee markup. The statement was made that the
line-item veto is a bipartisan issue. That is true. The President, like
his Republican predecessors, supports it. Republican and Democratic
Members supported it in various forms.
Even so, I do not believe we should decide this issue on the basis of
which party is in control of the Congress or the White House. I have
consistently opposed this proposal regardless of which party controlled
the White House.
The approximately 600,000 constituents of the Seventh District of
Illinois, which I represent, expect their elected Representative to do
the job to which I was elected. The power of the purse is granted to
the Congress, not the President.
Currently, the President can veto legislation, but the Congress can
override. This legislation turns the Constitution on its head. It
effectively lets the President write the legislation. Under the
procedures of this bill, a Presidential rescission is effective, unless
Congress passes a resolution to override. That resolution is subject to
a veto, which requires two-thirds of Congress to override. Thus, just
one-third plus one of the Congress would have the power to uphold a
rescission. This allows spending decisions by the minority. For this
reason, I have strong doubts of the bill's constitutionality.
What is particularly troublesome is that if we guess wrong, and
regret this ceding of power to the President, it will probably be
impossible to ever reverse our decision. A Presidential veto would be
certain.
On this point, I would note that in testimony before the Senate
Judiciary Committee last week, Assistant Attorney General Walter
Dellenger challenged the constitutionality of H.R. 2. Let me read
briefly from his statement in which he refers to the authority H.R. 2
gives the President over targeted tax benefits.

It does so by purporting to authorize the President to
``veto'' targeted tax benefits after they become law, thus
resulting in their repeal * * * The use of the term ``veto''
and ``repeal'' is constitutionally problematic. Article I,
clause 7 of the Constitution provides that the President only
can exercise his ``veto'' power before a provision becomes
law. As for the word ``repeal'', it suggest that the
President is being given authorization to change existing law
on his own. This arguably would violate the plain textual
provisions of Article I, clause 7 of the Constitution,
governing the manner in which federal laws are to be made and
altered.

We have an alternative to this bill that will be offered as a
substitute by Congressman Wise, Congressman Spratt, and Congressman
Stenholm. The substitute would require Congress to vote on a
Presidential rescission request.
The Wise-Spratt-Stenholm substitute is on far sounder constitutional
grounds that the provisions of H.R. 2. The substitute does not tamper
with the constitutional authority of Congress to tax and appropriate
revenues. If Congress does not approve the President's rescission, the
rescission would not take effect.
I strongly urge Members to support this amendment. It makes it
possible for Congress to carry out its responsibilities under the
Constitution.
{time} 1100

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Michigan [Mr. Camp].
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Camp was allowed to proceed out of order.)

u.s. term limits organization running negative attack ads

Mr. CAMP. Mr. Speaker, I stand here disgusted. Since being elected to
Congress I have supported term limits. When this body votes on term
limit legislation in the weeks ahead, I will be a vocal proponent of
any legislation that limits terms. My record is clear, consistent, and
unwavering.
Today, at the threshold of finally passing term limit legislation, a
certain organization called U.S. Term Limits, perhaps because they now
face obscurity if this body passes term limits, has chosen to run
negative and
[[Page H1083]] misleading television attack ads against me and other
term limit supporters.
This organization, which has been subject to allegations of
fraudulent petition gathering, is not aiming their guns at opponents of
term limits, but instead waging a war against their supporters.
Mr. Speaker, it pains me to realize that this organization, which has
been parading as supporting term limits, is nothing but a guardian of
the status quo and committed to business as usual. They have stated
publicly they will oppose 12-year term limit legislation that comes to
the House floor for final passage. I guess their jobs are more
important than their goal.
Ms. PRYCE. Mr. Speaker will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CAMP. I yield to the gentlewoman from Ohio.
Ms. PRYCE. Mr. Speaker, I would like to associate myself with the
remarks of the gentleman from Michigan and congratulate him on his
strong statement.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished vice
chairman of the Committee on Rules, the gentleman from greater San
Dimas, CA [Mr. Dreier].
(Mr. DREIER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from Sanibel for yielding
me this time so generously, the distinguished chairman of the
Legislative Process Subcommittee.
Mr. Speaker, needless to say, like all of us I rise in support of
this very, very open rule.
I heard from the other side a Member state that we needed to have an
old-fashioned, unfettered rule. Well, the fact of the matter is, Mr.
Speaker, nothing could be more unfettered than providing the option for
Members to in fact put their ideas in the Congressional Record, and
then allow possibly second-degree amendments to come forward, as we did
yesterday with the Dreier-Moakley compromise when we were dealing with
the unfunded mandates legislation.
This clearly is the kind of example of a rule that will allow Members
to participate and involve themselves in the process, even before we
come to the floor with legislation.
I believe that this can also be an example for a bipartisan spirit,
which is going to be very important for us in the Committee on Rules to
proceed with. It is a new day. As the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss]
said, we are just at the end of the first month of the 104th Congress,
and we have had some tremendous legislative accomplishments. And I
believe that moving ahead with item-veto authority for the President of
the United States is another very clear and strong example of that.
Doing it under a wide-open amendment process is a very good thing, not
only for this institution, but for the country.
Many people have been saying to me over the past several days, as
there was a high level of frustration during the open amendment process
on the unfunded mandates legislation, that we should simply ram through
our proposals, as though no one cares whether or not it is done under
an open amendment process.
I will acknowledge the work that goes on up on the third floor does
not often go recognized, but I believe we can in fact proceed with an
open process for debate on a wide range of legislation, and this is
just one example of that.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, we have no further requests for time at
this time, and I reserve the balance of our time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to
the distinguished gentlewoman from Utah [Mrs. Waldholtz], a new member
of the committee.
Mrs. WALDHOLTZ. Mr. Speaker, as a cosponsor of H.R. 2, I rise in
strong support of this open rule and of this legislation.
The line-item veto is a proven success. The Governors of 43 States
have some form of line-item veto authority, including Mike Leavitt in
my home State of Utah.
This Nation needs the same kind of benefits that Utahans enjoy. We
need to stop the kind of spending that benefits the favored few at the
expense of the average taxpayer. For more than two decades, Americans
have strongly supported a line-item veto. It is time that we listen to
the people and enact this legislation.
Now, this is not a partisan issue. I think it is important to note
that at a time when we have a Democrat in the White House, it is a
Republican-controlled Congress that will finally give the President a
line-item veto.
This issue transcends party lines simply because it is not a party
issue. It is a people issue. For too long Congress has failed to bring
spending under control and in doing so it has failed the American
people. Time and again Congress manages to circumvent the few budgetary
restraints it sets for itself, and the people are fed up. They are
tired of picking up the tab for unjustified spending.
Some have said this alters the balance of power between the executive
and the legislative branches. But this line-item veto does not allow
the President to substitute his spending priorities for Congress. The
President cannot spend more money, and he cannot use the funds he cuts
to fund other programs he would like to spend the money on. He can only
help us save taxpayers' money.
As we struggle to balance the budget and work to control excessive
spending of the last few decades, it is crucial that we have every
fiscal tool at our disposal, and the line-item veto is one of those
tools.
Let me take a moment to commend my colleague, the gentleman from
Florida [Mr. Goss] for the work he did in committee on this bill. As
originally drafted, H.R. 2 did not contain a mechanism with an
established time frame to ensure that a disapproval bill could actually
make it to the House floor for a vote. This concern was raised by both
sides of the aisle, and the gentleman successfully drafted language
that addresses this concern.
Congress has repeatedly shown itself unwilling and unable to control
spending, pork-barrel spending. The line-item veto is a step in the
right direction, to eliminate unnecessary and wasteful government
spending.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this rule and the line-
item veto.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield 6
minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Volkmer].
(Mr. VOLKMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. VOLKMER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, I wish to commend the gentleman from California and also
the gentleman from New York and the other gentleman from the Committee
on Rules for giving us an open rule on this very important piece of
legislation.
As one who has supported a line-item veto for many years, I am not a
Johnny-come-lately, and many of us are not, we who have worked on this
legislation. But some of us who have been students of history, and love
our Constitution and believe in a balance of power between the
executive branch, the legislative branch, and the judicial branch, do
not feel that we should give to the executive branch an inordinate
amount of power as far as spending priorities are concerned, and that
is basically what the base bill by the Republican Party does.
It gives to whoever is in that executive branch--and I have a
Democratic President at this time, and I strongly object to giving our
President, whether he be Democrat or Republican, that power--that power
over the purse that I think distorts what our Founding Fathers did in
our Constitution.

{time} 1110

Our Founding Fathers gave us a procedure, gave us the way to keep the
balance of power between the three branches of Government. This line-
item veto, as proposed in the base bill, would give the President of
the United States, one person, one-third of the House or one-third of
the Senate plus one, one of each, either one, the power, the power over
the purse strings in setting priorities of this Congress.
All I ask anybody to do is to go back a few years to the 1980's. We
have heard on this floor before, in 1 minutes and
[[Page H1084]] others, talk about the Reagan years and how great the
Reagan years and how this revolution was started in the Reagan years.
I want every one of my colleagues to go back and look at the Reagan
budgets submitted by that President and the spending priorities in
those budgets. I would not have very many people anymore in my district
in rural Missouri. I would not have towns that now have running water,
now have sewer systems. I would not have a lot of children who have got
an education at the University of Missouri or Kirksville or in
Marysville or any of these other places because, if we look at those
budgets, we would have found that that President's spending priorities,
those spending priorities of that President were to eliminate or
drastically cut many of the programs that were beneficial.
They are not pork. But he could have very easily have zeroed them
out, after we appropriated them, because we decided in the Congress,
no, we are not going to do that. We are not going to relegate many of
our youngsters to a high school education and that is all. We are not
going to tell the American public that they do not need good clean
water to drink, that they can continue to do like their forefathers do
and haul it in because they do not need running water; they do not need
a water tower and a water system, they do not need that. We cannot
spend our money for that.
Those were the priorities, if Members will look at that budget, they
will find those priorities.
That is what scared some of us to death, when they started talking
about giving that President that one President, any President, and one-
third of the House or one-third of the Senate plus one the power over
the purse.
For that reason, I strongly object and will oppose and will strongly
vote against the proposal for the line-item veto on that side.
However, on the other side, I will strongly support, strongly support
the Wise-Stenholm-Spratt provision that says a majority, a majority
decides along with the President.
I believe in majority rule. I believe this country was based and had
been based on 200 years on majority rule. And, therefore, I appreciate
the Committee on Rules permitting us to offer the Spratt-Stenholm-Wise
provision that I think would continue the balance of power between the
executive and the legislative and the judicial branches.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Colorado [Mr. McInnis], also a member of the Committee
on Rules. We are glad to have the gentleman aboard.
Mr. McINNIS. Mr. Speaker, I also express appreciation to the
gentleman from Florida for allowing me to speak this morning for a
couple of minutes.
First of all, this is exciting. This is very refreshing. We have got
a rule now that is going to allow us to discuss for 3 days the line-
item veto. Last year I can remember what we got allowed to us by the
other side, a total of 3 hours. We get 3 days now. That is the
difference. That is the beauty of this rule. So I commend the chairman
of the Committee on Rules, and I commend the committee on both sides of
the aisle for allowing this kind of rule so that we can have the
discussions that are necessary.
Second of all, let us talk about the merits of the line-item veto.
Take a look at the defense budget. No President in the history of this
country has been allowed, because of the defense necessary for this
country, to veto the defense budget. So what happens, that is the
obvious place to put in pork, to tuck it away. The Congressional
Research Service estimates that $50 billion worth of nondefense-related
appropriations have been stuffed into the defense budget because no
President would dare veto that appropriation. Now with the line-item
veto, that game is over, folks.
Let us give it to the President, whether the President is Democrat or
Republican, let us stop the games. Let us get into budget management.
Finally, in regards to the comment that this is not a balance of
power when we allow the President to have a line-item veto, as the
Republican bill does. Of course, it is a balance of power. The veto is
a basic part of our Constitution. It is a basic part of the procedure.
And there is a balance in there in that it can be overridden with two
thirds. It is not different than any other veto.
I strongly support the Republican version. Again, I commend the
chairman of the Committee on Rules for allowing us 3 days of debate on
the line-item veto. No more ``three hours and you're out.''
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield 6
minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
(Mr. TRAFICANT asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, I oppose the line-item veto. Very simple,
the presidency has become so powerful that the President can bail our
Mexico and Congress does not even question it. From what I understand,
the congressional leaders on both sides of the aisle nodded their heads
and said, go ahead, Mr. President, under some sort of executive
authority that you may have, go ahead and enact a program that 80
percent of the American people oppose and could not pass through the
Congress.
Now, I am not knocking President Clinton. I am talking about the
presidency and the separation of powers, legitimate separation of
powers.
I have seen over the years the Congress of the United States, their
authority usurped by Presidents who are making decisions, clearly
within the constitutional province of the people to a duly elected
Congress, and the Congress has not challenged it.
I believe on the eve here, in the wake of this Mexican bailout, that
the Congress of the United States should go to court and attempt to
enjoin this White House from proceeding and get a determination in the
courts as to whether or not the people rule in
America or the White House becomes the autocratic ruler around here.

And I would not be the one making this statement. That should be
coming from the Speaker and the leaders of the Congress who passively
turned their backs.
Now, I want to talk business about line-item veto. I want my
colleagues to imagine this little political science scenario: 1993
budget of President Clinton, I was one of the 40-plus Democrats to
oppose that budget. I disagreed with the raising of taxes with no
accompanying move to mitigate our trade problems and our bankruptcy.
And I stood strong in meetings at the White House, and the President
and I had a very good exchange in the cabinet room about it.
When it came to the floor, I spoke out against that budget. I did not
know that I would be the only Democrat who would have spoken out. I
guess Democrats bit their tongue. And while some of them may laugh
about this, while Democrats bit their tongue, Republicans are the
majority.
I want Members to imagine a meeting with the line-item veto authority
in the cabinet room. The President says to the Vice President, ``Al, I
see where Traficant got an expansion for x-ray equipment for that
veterans outpatient clinic.''
``Yes sir, Mr. President. Look, I am not going to take his side, but
his constituents have to drive to Cleveland for an x-ray.''
``Al, I see where there's five bridges in that highway bill.''
``Mr. President, those bridges are condemned that community has so
many problems.''
``Al, I see where there is some expansion at that air base and there
are cuts all around America.''
``Mr. President, that's cost-effective. They have the greatest
airport in the country, and they have no passengers because of the near
proximity of Cleveland and Pittsburgh.''

{time} 1120

``Al, let me ask you something. Maybe it's time that we get a
reckoning here, Al. Maybe it's time we get Traficant's attention.
Traficant wants that bridge. You tell him next year we'll talk a little
better on that tax vote.
``His people need those veteran outpatient services, I can understand
it, but you tell Traficant, we'll talk about them next year after that
vote on Mexico.
[[Page H1085]] ``And then you let Traficant go through the Congress
where he's going to protect everybody else's bridges and try and
override that, Al.''
I am not saying the President is going to do that, but you, Congress,
will empower the President to have a meeting just like that in the dark
rooms of the White House.
I am opposed to transferring any more of the people's power to the
presidency. Nothing to do with Bill Clinton. You are not transferring
power, Congress. You are transferring the power of the people. In
American the people are supposed to govern. Where did we change that?
We have evolved to a situation where the agencies of the government
pass regulations that waive the Constitution. Look at the IRS. Now it
has gotten to the point where a President realizing he cannot pass a
piece of legislation that he supports, namely a bill out of Mexico,
sidesteps the Congress and in fact says, ``For the betterment of
America, I'm going to go beyond the authority of the people's Congress
and enact this.''
The Republican majority wants to empower the President to be able to
reach into the people's budget and strike out issues called line item
to stop pork.
In closing, let me say this. One of George Bush's last budgets, he
asked for a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution and a line-
item veto, and I am not putting President Bush down, but while he asked
for a line-item veto to stop pork and he asked for a balanced budget
amendment--that evidently does not work in D.C., I might add--George
Bush asked for a record amount of new spending without revenue, $322
billion.
George Bush is not here any longer. I do not want to give Franklin
Delano Roosevelt, if I were in those days, Harry Truman, John Kennedy,
Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, George Bush, Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter,
Bill Clinton or whomever any more power. They execute the laws of the
people.
They administer the government of the people and, damn it, we run it.
Act like it.
I oppose this line item veto and ask our party on this side to force
the Republican majority to transfer the power to the American people.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished
gentleman from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts [Mr. Blute], who is a
major sponsor and has done yeoman's work on this legislation.
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to support this open rule which
will provide for extended debate in this House on the line item veto,
longer than it has ever been debated before.
In the 102d Congress, the total time the House devoted to debate was
40 minutes. In the 103d Congress, the House only debated for 4\1/2\
hours in the first session and only 3 hours and 10 minutes in the
second session for such an important issue.
I commend the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon], the chairman and
the entire Committee on Rules for giving us a rule which not only gives
the House extended debate but also allows the consideration of all
amendments by Members of this body.
I hope that the Members vote in favor of this open rule so that we
can get on with this debate on the real line item veto. I urge Members
to support the Clinger bill.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield 3
minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Kleczka].
Mr. KLECZKA. Mr. Speaker, I also support the rule and will be
supporting line item veto authority for the President. I come from
Wisconsin. It has been in our Constitution for years. Even though the
current Governor is now abusing that power, I think it is one which
Governors should have and Presidents should have. But I am a little
concerned over this rule.
I am told it is an open rule, but it is an open rule if, and the
``if'' is, if we do not finish by Monday night and wrap this and give
it as a birthday present to President Reagan, then we are going to
close it. I am saying that is kind of phony symbolism. I do not know.
We could be done before Monday or early Monday on this proposition, but
what I am told and what the rumor mill around here is that it is open
but we cannot go past Monday night because then we go past President
Reagan's birthday.
I am saying if in fact that is how we are going to legislate with
that type of phony symbolism, then what bill do we pass on President
Ford's wedding anniversary? Have you selected that yet? And if
amendments are pending, do we have to stop talking?
How about President Nixon's confirmation date? I am assuming there is
some legislation that has been pegged to hit on that date and not an
hour later.
I will support the rule but I will be very, very interested to watch
the majority on Monday once we start getting into the evening hours and
at that point watch them close this process up, because this has to be
wrapped and sent to California--for President Reagan's birthday?
That is the same type of symbolism we had last night with these three
rules, on three noncontroversial bills. So the Committee on Rules, to
up their batting average, put out three open rules on three bills which
needed no rule, they put the taxpayers through the expense of not only
drafting but printing up the rules.
I checked back here where the rules are left for the Members'
edification and was told that they were thrown away. I wish I was here
on the floor last night to grab that garbage bag so I could bring it
here and say, ``This is the phony symbolism, American taxpayers, that
we're going through.''
We have to pass legislation on Presidents' birthdays, we have to do
rules which are not necessary to up the majority's batting average, and
what happens? It is wasted because they are thrown in the garbage.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon], the chairman of the committee.
Mr. SOLOMON. I will try not to use the whole minute and a half.
Mr. Speaker, let me just say to the gentleman from Wisconsin, he
ought to be careful about using terms like ``phony symbolism.'' I think
people on both sides are sincere in this body.
Let me just say this. This is not just a birthday present for Ronald
Reagan. It is a birthday present for the American people. They want
this and they want it badly.
Second, we have got a contract to abide by. We have had as little as
40 minutes debate on this subject in the past. Last year, just 3 hours
and 10 minutes. This time it is going to be 3 days. I do not think we
should be criticized for that. I think that is being more than open and
fair.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Washington [Mr. Nethercutt].
(Mr. NETHERCUTT asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. NETHERCUTT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida for
yielding me the time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of the rule to accompany
H.R. 2, the Line-Item Veto Act.
Today, we take up the third plank of the Contract With America,
having passed overwhelmingly the balanced budget amendment and a bill
to curb Federal unfunded mandates. The American people elected a
Republican Congress last November so that we could bring to open debate
the many pieces of legislation that have wide popular support, such as
the provisions of the Contract With America. The people are eager to
move quickly on this legislation and I hope that we will not have
numerous, dilatory amendments offered on this bill.
For too long, a spendthrift Congress has squandered, without
restraint, the tax dollars of the American people on wasteful programs.
Congress has shown an institutional inability to control its runaway
spending habits. Therefore, the time has come to make the President a
full partner in the quest for rationality and sensibility in the budget
process.
History will record that the passage of the line-item veto will be
the most significant achievement of these historic 100 days. It is a
tribute to the leadership of this House that we will, today, take up
this legislation under an open rule and I commend the Speaker, Chairman
Solomon and Chairman Clinger for the work they have done to
[[Page H1086]] bring this bill to the floor. In preceding Congresses,
this bill would have never seen the light of day and certainly not
under a rule allowing everyone on both sides of the aisle with an
interest in the bill to offer an amendment.
In the past, Congress has sent the President bloated, omnibus
legislation filled with questionable spending items that would be
impossible to justify on their own. We need to give the President the
authority to delete these items to act as a check in the classical
constitutional system of checks and balances on the past tendency of
Congress to bankrupt our future.
The people of the Fifth District of Washington are in strong support
of this cost-cutting measure and I strongly urge my colleagues to
unanimously support this rule and this legislation.

{time} 1130

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am privileged to yield 2 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Linder], a member of the
Committee on Rules and the Subcommittee on Legislation. We are proud to
have him.
Mr. LINDER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Speaker, I want to begin by expressing my support for House
Resolution 55, an open rule which allows for thorough consideration of
H.R. 2, the Line-Item Veto Act. I am a cosponsor of H.R. 2 and I
strongly support this fiscally responsible piece of legislation, but I
am pleased that all Members will have the opportunity to debate a
significant number of alternatives on the House floor in coming days.
While I agree that, by itself, the line-item veto does not provide a
silver bullet to end all wasteful Federal spending. I am confident
that, with a cooperative congressional-Presidential effort to cut
spending, we will be able to remove much of the wasteful spending that
so offends the American people.
I want to congratulate the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] for his
hard work in crafting the language that establishes the expedited
procedures which set forth a specific timetable for congressional
action in responding to a President's line-item veto message.
Mr. Speaker, H.R. 2 was favorably reported from both Government
Reform and Oversight and the Rules Committee, and this open rule
received unanimous support by the Rules Committee members. The rule
allows any Member the opportunity to perfect the line-item veto, and I
urge my colleagues to adopt the rule.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, if I do not have a chance to reclaim any
of my time, let me again urge my colleagues to vote for this open rule.
Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield 1 minute to the
distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. Miller].
Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for
yielding me this time. I simply rise to commend the Committee on Rules
for passing out an open rule and urge support of the rule.
I think this is really the test of an open rule, and that is when we
have tough issues. We saw an open rule under unfunded mandates. Yes,
there were many amendments, but there were many issues drawn and
Members got a chance to express themselves and cross-examine Members on
both sides of the aisle. I hope we do that again as on unfunded
mandates, and I want to compliment the Committee on Rules for
preserving this debate. Next to our voting card our constituents give
us, the right of free debate and the ability to cross-examine one
another on issues is one of the most important privileges we have in
this House.
We should not get too caught up in the 100 days. Otherwise, the 100
days could end up looking like George Bush's golf game. He played
really fast, but it was not really a good game.
I hope we can preserve open rules so we have free and open debate
that is subject to cross-examination on the basic ideas about the
direction of this Government. Again I want to thank the Committee on
Rules on preserving an open rule on this measure.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the
distinguished gentleman from Florida [Mr. Diaz-Balart], a distinguished
member of the Committee on Rules.
Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased that the last two
distinguished colleagues from the other side of the aisle who spoke
thanked the majority on the Committee on Rules for issuing an open
rule, especially after there had been so much confusion brought forth
previously with regard to, and with much imagination, I might add,
imagination with regard to the fact, for example, yesterday a number of
bills were brought to the floor with open rules; in other words, with
the ability of any Member to present any amendment that any Member
wishes to, and yet, with a lot of imagination, objection was made to
that. It was said, ``Well, you should not do that. You should waive the
rules,'' and put it on something called the suspension calendar or
something.
And there was imagination used today on this floor, with good faith I
am sure, that this open rule was maybe not an open rule, it was
something else because we want to give notice to colleagues here on the
floor by urging, by encouraging Members who are going to present an
amendment to notify Members beforehand by publishing them beforehand
that they plan to introduce an amendment, not requiring, but giving
incentive, giving encouragement to Members to provide our colleagues
with notification.
So again I am glad that the two last distinguished Members thanked
the majority, Chairman Solomon and the majority of the Committee on
Rules for permitting--and this is important, this is procedural, but it
is important--any Member of this Congress to bring forth any amendment
with regard to this very important measure, which is the line-item
veto.
It is something that was almost extraordinarily, extraordinarily I
would say, but not unheard of, but extraordinarily unique in previous
Congresses. This time the Members representing their constituents can
bring forth any amendments, even on as important a measure as this, any
amendments that they wish.
This is serious business that we are doing today. There is no doubt.
I am one of those who is of the belief that our constitutional
Presidency in the United States is not only a strong Presidency, it
could be categorized as an imperial Presidency. We have a Presidency
where the President can send troops to die in any foreign country, can
even pledge billions and billions of dollars from the U.S. Treasury,
with the full faith and credit of the American people, to foreign
countries unilaterally. So talking about a strong Presidency, it is a
strong Presidency.
Nevertheless, Mr. Speaker, we need every--albeit in this case small
weapon, the line-item veto for the task at hand--every weapon available
for the task at hand during the next 5 to 7 years, and that is to
balance the Federal budget. It is not going to be easy. It is going to
be extraordinarily difficult, in fact. But this is one very necessary,
I believe, weapon, and it has been seen in State after State of our
Union that it is useful to the chief executives, and I am sure it will
be useful to the Chief Executive of either party, of both parties in
the United States in helping us balance the budget, which is necessary
for future generations to maintain our strength economically into our
posterity.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hastings of Washington). All time has
expired.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the
resolution.
The previous question was ordered.
The resolution was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 55 and rule
XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 2.

{time} 1139

in the committee of the whole

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole
House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R.
2) to give the President line-item veto authority over appropriation
acts and targeted tax benefits in revenue acts, with Mr. Boehner in the
chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having
been read the first time.
[[Page H1087]] Under the rule, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr.
Clinger] will be recognized for 30 minutes, the gentlewoman from
Illinois [Mrs. Collins] will be recognized for 30 minutes, the
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] will be recognized for 30 minutes,
and the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson] will be recognized
for 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Clinger].
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2\1/2\ minutes.
At the outset, may I wish everybody a Happy Groundhog Day. As the
Congressman who represents Punxsutawney Phil, he did not see his
shadow, so winter is going to be over shortly, and I think that is a
good omen as we bring H.R. 2, the line-item veto to the floor. I think
it is a harbinger of that which is a historic piece of legislation
which when we enact it, as we will, will complete the second
installment on the Republican Contract With America. Together with the
balanced budget amendment and entitlement reforms, this bill provides
much needed reform of Congress' bloated tax-and-spending habits.
H.R. 2 gives the President line-item veto authority over
discretionary appropriations and targeted tax benefits. The bill allows
the President to reduce or eliminate any discretionary spending
specified in an appropriations bill or accompanying report, and to veto
any tax benefit which he determines would benefit 100 or fewer
taxpayers.
Under H.R. 2, the President will have 10 days after signing an
appropriation or revenue act to submit to Congress a special message
identifying his rescission or veto proposals. A separate rescission or
veto message will be required for each act and each message must be
considered en bloc.

Upon receipt of the President's message, Congress will have 20 days
for both Houses to pass a resolution of disapproval in order to prevent
the cuts. If either House fails to pass the disapproval resolution,
then the rescissions will take effect. If, on the other hand, both
Houses vote to release the appropriation or enact the tax benefit by
passing resolutions of disapproval, the disapproval resolution would be
presented to the President for signature or veto. A Presidential veto
would return the bill to Congress, which would have 5 days to override
by a two-thirds vote of each House.
This process is fundamentally different from that in existing law
which favors spending by permitting either House of Congress to force
the release of moneys through inaction. Currently, unless both Houses
pass bills to approve the rescission proposal, the money must be spent.
Under H.R. 2, however, the cuts would stand unless both Houses vote to
disapprove the rescissions and force the release of money.
While current law tilts the table toward Congress and spending, under
H.R. 2, the table would be tipped toward the President and saving. This
is a major reform of the Federal spending process, and one favored by
the overwhelming majority of the American people according to CNN, USA
Today, and Gallup polls.
Because this legislation offers an important step toward deficit
reduction and a balanced Federal budget, one which will help to
eliminate our current $4.7 trillion dollar debt and continuing $200
billion plus yearly deficits, I urge adoption of the bill which
President Clinton has requested--the strongest possible line-item veto.
I urge the adoption of H.R. 2.

{time} 1140

I might say the President himself, President Clinton, has requested
that we send him the strongest possible enhanced rescission bill that
we can present him.
So I would urge adoption of H.R. 2.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
(Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise
and extend her remarks.)
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to H.R. 2, the
Line Item Veto Act. I think it gives any President whether Democrat or
Republican far too much power over congressional spending decisions,
and I do not believe it would have any significant impact on Federal
spending.
We have heard a lot in recent weeks about what the voters were
telling their Representatives in the last election. What I heard loud
and clear was a cry for greater responsibility on the part of each
Member of Congress.
Our first responsibility as Members of Congress is to be truthful and
thorough in making the laws of the land. Unfortunately, H.R. 2 is not
truthful about its provisions.
Even though this bill is called the Line Item Veto Act, it is not a
normal line-item veto bill. Instead, it would give the President the
most extreme power to cancel programs and projects. Chairman Clinger
himself has characterized the bill as the strongest possible grant of
Presidential power.
Some have said that it mirrors the line-item veto authority that 43
governors enjoy; but this bill is considerably different.
One need only read the committee report to know that. On page 11, it
says, and I quote ``H.R. 2 differs fundamentally from the kind of item-
veto authority granted to Governors in 43 States.'' Yet I am willing to
bet we will continue to hear dozens of speakers talk about the item-
veto power of 43 Governors. They probably did not read this bill.
H.R. 2 would produce such an extreme shift of authority from Congress
to the President that it is likely to be unconstitutional.
Unfortunately, this bill is also another example of how haste makes
waste.
Proponents of the bill did not understand the broad sweeping powers
they were granting the President until it was raised at the markup. Now
they are trying to rewrite the bill to more clearly define what a line
item of spending authority is.
Everyone should also be concerned that a President could easily abuse
the extraordinary power H.R. 2 would give him. As reported, the bill
lets a President define, in any way he chooses, a line of spending
authority that he vetoes. This bill does not restrict a President--
whether he or she is a Democrat or a Republican--to simply eliminating
or reducing spending in the form that Congress passes it, either in an
appropriations bill or report accompanying the bill.
The original draft report of the Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight stated, and I quote:

We decided on enhanced rescission for several reasons. It
permits Congress to continue appropriating with lump sums.
Moreover, after a President signs an appropriations bill, he
may go as deep as he likes within an appropriations account
to propose specific rescissions.

Dr. Robert Reischauer, Director of the Congressional Budget Office,
testified before our committee that extreme proposals like H.R. 2, give
the President ``greater potential power than a constitutionally
approved item veto.''
Dr. Reischauer went on to say that the authority in this bill would
actually allow the President to ``define a line item as any portion of
an appropriation enacted into law.'' In effect, any President whether
Democrat or Republican could reach inside a line item in order to cut a
particular project.
For example, H.R. 2 could allow any President be he Democrat or
Republican to threaten the independence of Federal judges he does not
like, by using the line-item veto to cut funds for the operation of
particular courts. Any President could also cut funding for important
water, road or other projects in States or regions of the country that
did not support him in an election. Similarly, any President could cut
funds out of the legislative appropriations bill for a particular
committee of the Congress, if he wanted to retaliate for its
activities.
Even if a President did not abuse this power, this legislation could
not possibly have much impact on the Federal debt. Under H.R. 2, a
President would not be able to use the line-item veto on the biggest
items in the Federal budget--interest on the debt and mandatory
spending--which account for about 65-percent of all Federal spending.
Instead, the Line Item Veto Act would apply to only about 35-percent
of Federal spending that is subject to appropriations, and this
spending has actually been declining in recent years.
[[Page H1088]] It is an absolute fallacy, therefore, to suggest that
the lack of Presidential line-item veto authority has contributed
significantly to the Federal debt, which has grown from just over $900
billion in 1980 to a projected $4.9 trillion this year. Instead,
reckless, irresponsible spending produced this debt.
At the President's insistence in 1981, Congress passed a gigantic tax
cut that cost the Federal Government nearly $270 billion in lost
revenues by 1988. During that same period and, again, at the
President's request, defense spending more than doubled, even though we
had no way to pay for it.
As a result, 28 percent of all income tax receipts now go to pay just
for the interest on the new debt which the Federal Government incurred
between 1981 and 1993. To put this in some perspective, only about 5
percent of income tax receipts go to pay for the cost of providing
welfare to needy Americans.
It is also untrue that Presidents have been more aggressive than
Congress in trying to curb Federal spending. Over the last 20 years in
which Presidents have had authority to rescind appropriations, all
Presidents have proposed a grand total of $72 billion in rescissions.
During that same time, the Congress has approved rescissions that total
$92 billion--that is, $20 billion more than Presidents have requested.
In addition, Presidential budget requests have actually been greater
than what Congress has appropriated in all but 5 of the last 15 fiscal
years.
Together with Congresswoman Thurman and Chairman Clinger, I proposed
an amendment that gives Congress the right to fully consider a
Presidential rescission proposal. That amendment is contained in the
bill we are now considering. It guarantees that a Member of Congress
would, at least, have the right to call up a President's rescission for
a vote on the floor.
But, this is not enough. The Constitution gives the Congress, not the
President, responsibility for deciding how to spend Federal revenues.
Should we invest more in defense and less in health and nutrition
programs for children and the elderly? Should we give tax cuts or
increase spending on education?
These are tough decisions that each and every Member of Congress is
sent to Washington to make. We cannot expect the President to do our
work for us.
Mr. Chairman, these first few days of the Congress seem to be devoted
more to gimmicks and buzzwords, and less to honesty with the American
people. Rules for unfunded mandates, line-item veto, and balanced
amendments do little to tell the American people how the deficit will
be reduced.
The new majority, who now controls the Congress, owes the people an
honest appraisal of how they intend to balance the budget. Honesty and
responsibility is what the people are demanding, and that is what they
deserve.
{time} 1150

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon], the distinguished chairman of
the Committee on Rules.
(Mr. SOLOMON asked and was given permission to extend his remarks.)
Mr. SOLOMON. I thank the gentleman from Florida for yielding this
time to me.
Mr. Chairman, I requested permission to submit extraneous material
for the Record, that material being the National Taxpayers Union's 1993
rating of the big spenders in Congress. And I would ask the Chairman
and others to pay attention to who is for this line-item veto and who
is opposed to it. You will find out that all the big spenders are
opposed to it, and those who voted for fiscal restraint are for it.
The document referred to is as follows:
National Taxpayers Union--1993 Taxpayers' Friends

Arizona: Sen. John McCain.
California: Rep. Christopher Cox, Rep. Randy Cunningham,
Rep. John T. Doolittle, Rep. David Dreier, Rep. Wally Herger,
Rep. Duncan Hunter, Rep. Howard P. McKeon, Rep. Carlos J.
Moorhead, Rep. Richard W. Pombo, Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, Rep.
Ed Royce.
Colorado: Sen. Hank Brown, Rep. Wayne Allard.
Delaware: Sen. William V. Roth, Jr.
Florida: Sen. Connie Mack, Rep. Tom Lewis, Rep. John L.
Mica, Rep. Dan Miller.
Georgia: Sen. Paul Coverdell, Rep. Mac Collins, Rep. John
Linder.
Idaho: Sen. Larry E. Craig, Sen. Dirk Kempthorne.
Illinois: Rep. Philip M. Crane, Rep. Thomas W. Ewing, Rep.
Harris W. Fawell, Rep. Donald Manzullo.
Indiana: Sen. Daniel R. Coats, Sen. Richard G. Lugar.
Iowa: Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Rep. Jim Nussle.
Kansas: Sen. Bob Dole.
Kentucky: Rep. Jim Bunning.
Maine: Sen. William S. Cohen.
Michigan: Rep. Peter Hoekstra, Rep. Joe Knollenberg, Rep.
Nick Smith.
Minnesota: Rep. Rod Grams, Rep. Jim Ramstad.
Montana: Sen. Conrad Burns.
New Hampshire: Sen. Judd Gregg, Sen. Robert C. Smith, Rep.
Bill Zeliff.
New Jersey: Rep. Bob Franks, Rep. Dick Zimmer.
New York: Rep. Gerald B.H. Solomon, Rep. Bill Paxon.
North Carolina: Sen. Lauch Faircloth, Sen. Jesse Helms,
Rep. Cass Ballenger, Rep. Howard Coble.
Ohio: Rep. John A. Boehner, Rep. Rob Portman.
Oklahoma: Sen. Don Nickles, Rep. James M. Inhofe, Rep.
Ernest Jim Istook.
Pennsylvania: Rep. George W. Gekas, Rep. Bud Shuster, Rep.
Robert S. Walker.
South Carolina: Rep. Bob Inglis.
South Dakota: Sen. Larry Pressler.
Tennessee: Rep. John L. Duncan.
Texas: Sen. Phil Gramm, Rep. Bill Archer, Rep. Dick Armey,
Rep. Joe L. Barton, Rep. Tom DeLay, Rep. Jack Fields, Rep.
Sam Johnson.
Virgina: Sen. John W. Warner.
Wisconsin: Rep. Tom Petri, Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner.
Wyoming: Sen. Alan K. Simpson, Sen. Malcolm Wallop.
National Taxpayers Union Big Spenders of 1993

Alabama: Rep. Tom Bevil, Rep. Robert E. Cramer, Rep. Earl
F. Hilliard.
Arizona: Rep. Karan English, Rep. Ed Pastor.
Arkansas: Sen. Dale Bumpers, Sen. David Pryor, Rep. Ray
Thornton.
California: Sen. Barbara Boxer, Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Rep.
Xavier Becerra, Rep. Howard L. Berman, Rep. George E. Brown,
Rep. Ronald V. Dellums, Rep. Julian C. Dixon, Rep. Don
Edwards, Rep. Anne G. Eshoo, Rep. Sam Farr, Rep. Vic Fazio,
Rep. Bob Filner, Rep. Dan Hamburg, Rep. Jane Harman, Rep. Tom
Lantos, Rep. Mathew G. Martinez, Rep. Robert T. Matsui, Rep.
George Miller, Rep. Norman Y. Mineta, Rep. Nancy Pelosi, Rep.
Lucille Raybal-Allard, Rep. Pete Stark, Rep. Esteban E.
Torres, Rep. Walter R. Tucker, Rep. Maxine Waters, Rep. Henry
A. Waxman, Rep. Lynn Woolsey.
Colorado: Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Rep. David E.
Skaggs.
Connecticut: Sen. Christopher J. Dodd, Rep. Rosa DeLauro,
Rep. Sam Gejdenson, Rep. Barbara B. Kennelly.
Delaware: Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Florida: Sen. Bob Graham, Rep. Jim Bacchus, Rep. Corrine
Brown, Rep. Peter Deutsch, Rep. Sam M. Gibbons, Rep. Alcee L.
Hastings, Rep. Harry A. Johnston, Rep. Carrie P. Meek, Rep.
Pete Peterson, Rep. Karen L. Thurman.
Georgia: Rep. Sanford D. Bishop, Rep. George Darden, Rep.
John Lewis, Rep. Cynthia A. McKinney.
Hawaii: Sen. Daniel K. Akaka, Sen. Daniel K. Inouye, Rep.
Neil Abercrombie, Rep. Patsy T. Mink.
Illinois: Sen. Carol Moseley-Braun, Sen. Paul Simon, Rep.
Cardiss Collins, Rep. Richard J. Durbin, Rep. Lane Evans,
Rep. Luis V. Gutierrez, Rep. Mel Reynolds, Rep. Dan
Rostenkowski, Rep. Bobby L. Rush, Rep. George E. Sangmeister,
Rep. Sidney R. Yates.
Indiana: Rep. Frank McCloskey, Rep. Peter J. Visclosky.
Iowa: Sen. Tom Harkin, Rep. Neal Smith.
Kansas: Rep. Dan Glickman.
Kentucky: Sen. Wendell H. Ford, Rep. Romano L. Mazzoli.
Louisiana: Sen. John B. Breaux, Sen. J. Bennett Johnston,
Rep. Cleo Fields, Rep. William J. Jefferson.
Maine: Sen. George J. Mitchell, Rep. Thomas H. Andrew.
Maryland: Sen. Barbara A. Mikulski, Sen. Paul S. Sarbanes,
Rep. Benjamin L. Cardin, Rep. Steny H. Hoyer, Rep. Kweisi
Mfume, Rep. Albert R. Wynn.
Massachusetts: Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Sen. John Kerry,
Rep. Barney Frank, Rep. Joseph P. Kennedy, Rep. Edward J.
Markey, Rep. Joe Moakley, Rep. Richard E. Neal, Rep. John W.
Olver, Rep. Gerry E. Studds.
Michigan: Sen. Carl Levin, Sen. Donald W. Riegle, Jr., Rep.
David E. Bonior, Rep. Bob Carr, Rep. Barbara-Rose Collins,
Rep. John Conyers, Rep. John D. Dingell, Rep. William D.
Ford, Rep. Dale E. Kildee, Rep. Sander M. Levin.
Minnesota: Sen. Paul Wellstone, Rep. James L. Oberstar,
Rep. Martin Olav Sabo, Rep. Bruce F. Vento.
Mississippi: Rep. G.V. Montgomery, Rep. Bennie Thompson,
Rep. Jamie L. Whitten.
Missouri: Rep. William L. Clay, Rep. Richard A. Gephardt,
Rep. Ike Skelton, Rep. Harold L. Volkmer, Rep. Alan Wheat.
Montana: Sen. Max Baucus, Rep. Pat Williams.
[[Page H1089]] Nevada: Sen. Harry Reid, Rep. James Bilbray.
New Jersey: Rep. Robert Menendez, Rep. Donald M. Payne,
Rep. Robert G. Torricelli.
New Mexico: Rep. Bill Richardson.
New York: Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Rep. Gary L.
Ackerman, Rep. Eliot L. Engel, Rep. Floyd H. Flake, Rep.
Maurice D. Hinchey, Rep. George J. Hochbrueckner, Rep. Nita
M. Lowey, Rep. Thomas J. Manton, Rep. Michael R. McNulty,
Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Rep. Major R. Owens, Rep. Charles B.
Rangel, Rep. Charles E. Schumer, Rep. Jose E. Serrano, Rep.
Louise M. Slaughter, Rep. Edolphus Towns, Rep. Nydia M.
Velazquez.
North Carolina: Rep. Eva Clayton, Rep. W.G. Hefner, Rep.
Stephen L. Neal, Rep. David Price, Rep. Charlie Rose, Rep.
Melvin Watt.
Ohio: Sen. John Glenn, Sen. Howard M. Metzenbaum, Rep.
Douglas Applegate, Rep. Sherrod Brown, Rep. Tony P. Hall,
Rep. Tom Sawyer, Rep. Louis Stokes, Rep. Ted Strickland.
Oklahoma: Rep. Mike Synar.
Oregon: Rep. Elizabeth Furse, Rep. Mike Kopetski, Rep. Ron
Wyden.
Pennsylvania: Sen. Harris Wofford, Rep. Lucien E.
Blackwell, Rep. Robert A. Borski, Rep. William J. Coyne, Rep.
Thomas M. Foglietta, Rep. Paul E. Kanjorski, Rep. John P.
Murtha.
Rhode Island: Sen. Claiborne Pell, Rep. Jack Reed.
South Carolina: Sen. Ernest F. Hollings, Rep. James E.
Clyburn, Rep. Butler Derrick, Rep. John M. Spratt.
South Dakota: Sen. Tom Daschle.
Tennessee: Sen. Harlan Mathews, Sen. Jim Sasser, Rep.
Harold E. Ford.
Texas: Rep. Jack Brooks, Rep. John Bryant, Rep. Jim
Chapman, Rep. Ronald D. Coleman, Rep. E de la Garza, Rep.
Martin Frost, Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez, Rep. Gene Green, Rep.
Eddie Bernice Johnson, Rep. Solomon P. Ortiz, Rep. J.J.
Pickle, Rep. Frank Tejeda, Rep. Craig Washington, Rep.
Charles Wilson.
Vermont: Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Rep. Bernard Sanders.
Virginia: Rep. Rick Boucher, Rep. Leslie L. Byrne, Rep.
James P. Moran, Rep. Robert C. Scott.
Washington: Sen. Patty Murray, Rep. Norm Dicks, Rep. Mike
Kreidler, Rep. Jim McDermott, Rep. Al Swift, Rep. Jolene
Unsoeld.
West Virginia: Sen. Robert C. Byrd, Sen. John D.
Rockefeller IV, Rep. Alan B. Mollohan, Rep. Nick J. Rahall,
Rep. Bob Wise.
Wisconsin: Rep. Gerald D. Kleczka, Rep. David R. Obey.

HISTORY OF NATIONAL TAXPAYERS UNION TAXPAYERS' FRIEND'S AWARDS
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Year
Member awards -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
won 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Allard............................................. 2 TF ....... TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Archer............................................. 15 TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF
Armey.............................................. 9 TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Ballenger.......................................... 4 TF TF TF TF ....... ....... ....... E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Barton............................................. 8 TF TF TF TF TF ....... TF TF TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Boehner............................................ 2 TF ....... TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Bunning............................................ 4 TF ....... TF TF TF ....... ....... E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Coble.............................................. 7 TF TF TF TF TF ....... TF ....... TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Collins, M......................................... 1 TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Cox, C (CA)........................................ 4 TF TF TF TF ....... E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Crane.............................................. 15 TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF
Cunningham......................................... 1 TF ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
DeLay.............................................. 9 TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Doolittle.......................................... 3 TF TF TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Dreier............................................. 13 TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF E ....
Duncan............................................. 5 TF TF TF TF TF E* ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Ewing.............................................. 2 TF TF E* ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Fawell............................................. 7 TF TF TF TF ....... TF TF TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Fields............................................. 12 TF TF TF TF TF ....... TF TF TF TF TF TF TF E ....
Franks, B (NJ)..................................... 1 TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Gekas.............................................. 3 TF ....... ....... TF TF ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... E ....... ....... ....
Grams.............................................. 1 TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Herger............................................. 6 TF TF TF TF TF ....... TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Hoekstra........................................... 1 TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Hunter............................................. 3 TF ....... TF ....... ....... ....... TF ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... E ....
Inglis............................................. 1 TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Inhofe............................................. 3 TF ....... TF ....... ....... ....... TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Istook............................................. 1 TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Johnson, S (TX).................................... 3 TF TF TF E 91 ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Knollenberg........................................ 1 TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Lewis, T (FL)...................................... 1 TF ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... E ....... ....... ....
Linder............................................. 1 TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Manzullo........................................... 1 TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
McKeon............................................. 1 TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Mica............................................... 1 TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Miller, D (FL)..................................... 1 TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Moorhead........................................... 15 TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF
Nussle............................................. 3 TF TF TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Paxon.............................................. 1 TF ....... ....... ....... ....... E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Petri.............................................. 9 TF TF TF TF TF ....... TF TF TF ....... ....... ....... TF ....... ....
Pombo.............................................. 1 TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Portman............................................ 1 TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Ramstad............................................ 2 TF TF ....... E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Rohrabacher........................................ 5 TF TF TF TF TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Royce.............................................. 1 TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Sensenbrenner...................................... 15 TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF
Shuster............................................ 6 TF TF ....... TF ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... TF ....... ....... TF TF
Smith, N (MI)...................................... 1 TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Solomon............................................ 13 TF TF TF TF TF ....... TF ....... TF TF TF TF TF TF TF
Walker............................................. 14 TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF TF ....... TF
Zeliff............................................. 3 TF TF TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
Zimmer............................................. 3 TF TF TF E ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....... ....
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TF=Taxpayers' Friend; E=Year Elected.

Mr. Chairman, this Nation is at war. As we debate this bill today,
the Federal debt hovers above $4.6 trillion. The annual deficit is
projected to top $200 billion every year this century, and Government
spending is adding $10,000 to the debt every second that we stand here.
Just during these 2 hours of general debate alone we will add $72
million to the national debt. This is unconscionable.
Reducing the deficit and the debt are not partisan issues, they are
the American people's issues which must be attacked on two fronts. The
first is on the hard choices making the sacrifices and the spending
cuts necessary to bring our Nation's accounts into balance. Many in
this body claim that the deficit has been reduced, Congress has acted
responsibly they say in keeping the deficit lower than it was projected
to be.
I would urge my colleagues to read the writing on the wall--the
deficit still exists and it is growing larger everyday. It is growing
by $200 billion each year during this decade, as I said before.
Mr. Chairman, the Congress must begin and never stop its war on the
deficit until it no longer exists. All past efforts, both Republican
and Democrat, have failed. They have failed to eradicate the sea of red
ink which is ruining this country.
The truth is our budget process is broken and it must be fixed. And
this system can be fixed by the second front in our war on the deficit.
Real procedural reforms will effectively allow and force these tough
choices to be made. The line-item veto as proposed in H.R. 2 is just
such a procedural reform. Coupled with a balanced budget constitutional
amendment--which this House had the foresight of passing last week--
procedural restraints on run-away spending will be put in place.
[[Page H1090]] Let me assure you that I, in no way, believe that an
effective line-item veto will in and of itself balance the budget, it
will not. However, I do believe that it will have a deterrent effect on
spending, by discouraging us from slipping pork into our appropriation
bills in the first place.
Pork like $20 million for golf videos and pony trekking in Ireland?
How about $58 million to some millionaire up in New York, where I come
from, to bail out his baseball investments? And $34 million for
screwworm research in Mexico last year?
Well, do you not think that $34 million could be better used to
reduce our deficit last year if the President possessed the line-item
veto? Mr. Chairman, as long as this type of wasteful spending is
allowed to permeate our appropriations bills the budget system will
never work. Mr. Chairman, over the last 94 years this Congress has only
balanced 28 percent of its budgets, none in the past 25 years alone.
And the Federal deficit has soared.
Mr. Chairman, what this line-item veto does, and this is what
everybody ought to listen to, is reverse existing law that allows
Congress to reject a President's request to cut pork barrel spending
without even taking a vote. That is what the law is now. Without even
taking a vote, we can reject the President's request to cut spending.
In other words, Congress can block the spending cuts by doing
nothing. This line-item veto reverses that procedure by saying that the
cuts go through unless Congress votes to disapprove the spending cuts.
Do you not think that is going to make a difference, ladies and
gentlemen?
I urge the House to vote for this bill in its strongest form, with no
weakening amendments, and there are 31 of them out there. President
Clinton has asked Congress to send him the toughest item veto bill we
can, and this is the toughest veto bill we can if we do not allow
weakening amendments to go through.
Members, you know what the American people want, they want you to
vote for this line-item veto. Do them and yourself a favor by doing it.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to
the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Kanjorski].
(Mr. KANJORSKI asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. KANJORSKI. I thank the gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson]
for yielding this time to me.
Mr. Chairman, I listened with great pleasure to the gentleman from
New York [Mr. Solomon] and his explanation of the legislation we are
about to pass here that may be such an assistance to balancing the
budget. I wish it were just so simple, and I wish that there had not
been a weakness on the part of not only the Congress but the President
for these last 14, 15 years to reconcile where America should be. But
the worst thing about this debate is we are dealing with the balance of
power that the Founding Fathers warned about when they structured the
Constitution of the United States. And before we change that balance of
power it seems to me even though we may not win, I suspect there are
230 votes at least in this House that will pass this bill, but before
we do that I would hope this debate brings out the proposition of what
it will do to America and the American constitutional form of
government and the intentions of the Founding Fathers as they say down
in Philadelphia, in my home State, and evolved how a democratic
citizenry could make the proper judgments
through their representative officials to spending money, the
taxpayers money.

Article I of the American Constitution does not say that the
President of the United States shall establish such expenditures as he
deems necessary and shall carry out those expenditures without any
further action. As a matter of fact, Article I says the power to expend
money, the taxpayers money of the American people, shall reside in the
House of Representatives, the house that represents the people.
The President represents the Nation as a whole. We as individuals
represent our individual constituents. And we come together as a body
by majority consent to expend the taxpayers money. Yes, it is a give
and it is a take, it is a moderation. Sometimes it is abused, but let
us look at the historical significance of that abuse.
In the last 20 years Presidents of the United States have sent
rescissions to Congress of no more than $70 billion. That is about
$3\1/2\ billion a year out of a $1,500 billion budget. Hardly
significant. But the Congress responded by cutting $20 billion more, or
$4.5 billion a year on average, a full 25 percent more per year than
any President requested.
Does that speak well for the Congress or for the President? Quite
frankly, I do not think it speaks well or poorly about either. Because
when you are talking about $3 or $4 billion in a $1,500 billion budget
it is hardly a traceable item, and it is a very fine distinction as to
whether or not the peoples' will in one region, area or State of the
country have some ability to get relief through the Congress that the
President does not necessarily see in the national interest or toward
his political agenda.
We are putting through a change in the balance of power here so that
we take the appropriation process out of the House of Representatives
and, to a large extent, we transport it down to 1600 Pennsylvania
Avenue and we put it on the desk of the President. Now if I had all the
faith and courage in the world to believe we would always have a
responsible President, a stable President and a President that had no
political agenda or ideological agenda, I would say if we wanted to
change the constitution that way, there are ways of doing it. But not
necessarily being as optimistic as most Members of the House who will
approve this bill are, I can foresee the day that what the President
decides is a priority of expenditures for the American people may not
be consistent with their Representatives' actions or intent.
{time} 1200

Let us look at some examples:
Say California has an earthquake; say New York City has a major fire
or destruction. What is the sympathy in the Congress of the United
States to allocate amounts of money for California or New York and, if
we do it, may have to expend above and beyond the balance of the
budget? But a President who looks at those two States and sees no
political ramifications if he disavows that expenditure, could just as
easily strike that expenditure from the budget, and we would have no
recourse unless it were brought back to this House and passed by a
majority of the House. And then we say, ``Well, that's not
unreasonable,'' and I agree.
Mr. Chairman, that would not be bad, but the gentleman from New York
[Mr. Solomon] indicated that was the remedy, that the majority of the
House of Representatives could overrule the President at will. That is
not true, Mr. Chairman, because the President has the opportunity to
veto that measure, and to override that veto it requires two-thirds of
the House of Representatives and two-thirds of the Senate, a majority
that is overwhelming and seldom had, and, quite frankly, if we had that
ability today, we would not be talking about a piece of legislation for
the line-item veto. We would be talking about a constitutional
amendment to the Constitution.
Now what are the promises here and what are the threats? The threats,
I think, are major. They are a shift of power. I say to my colleagues,
``Now quite frankly, when you look at what's happened in this Congress
in the past few days and in Washington for the last few weeks, you
begin to realize that my friends on the majority party are saying there
is such a mandate swelling from the people that we significantly want
to change the structure of our government.'' I am not sure in my
district, where 67 percent of the citizens voted for me, they sent that
kind of a mandate, that they want a shift of power that is so
significant away from the House of Representatives and the Congress to
the Presidency.
But, my colleagues, just a sidelight here. I say to the gentlemen on
the majority side, ``This power you are giving the President today? the
President exercised extraordinary power yesterday in solving the
Mexican bailout, and I've watched some of the leadership on the
majority side and a lot of the new freshman Members start to question
[[Page H1091]] his constitutional authority and statutory right to do
it, and I agree with them. That's a question that should be tested. But
if we follow down this line that the President should allocate and
appropriate funds at whim and will without statutory authority or with
statutory authority that cannot be withdrawn, the Mexican bailout is
just the beginning of arbitrary power and reckless power exercised by a
President if you happen to sit on this side of Pennsylvania Avenue.''
Now, as my colleagues know, we have a remedy. We have several
remedies.
One, the Congress can come into power and pass one resolution, but
the President shall set such taxing rates, as necessary, to accumulate
the sufficient revenues of the United States so that he may cover the
expenditures made in any appropriate appropriations he deems necessary
for the carrying out of the powers of the U.S. Government, and, if we
pass that by unanimous consent, and the President signs it, hey, we can
go home probably on January 5. It is all over. We do not have to do an
awful lot more. A major part of the process of the Congress of the
United States is the allocation of expenditures of money, and the
receipt of revenues and the rates of how we set that to try to be fair,
equitable, in proportion among our people. But if we really want a
corporate efficiency where the CEO calls the shots, I ask, ``Why don't
we just take the First Article of the Constitution and say, `Henceforth
anything exercised in this by the Congress can be exercised by the
President? We stand by it' and make it impossible to reverse.'' I know
we do not want to do that.
There is another remedy. I say to my colleagues, ``Gentlemen, if you
really want to change the Constitution to provide for the balanced
budget amendment which does an accounting process, a fiscal
responsibility process, a process in the most sacred document, if you
want to hand off to the Chief Executive the authority to appropriate,
if you want to stop the authority of the National Government to have
national standards and to require at some times and under proper
conditions that States have to conform, municipalities have to conform,
if you really want the executive and the legislative branches of this
Government to operate in tandem, what you really want is a
constitutional convention to change the Constitution of the United
States and establish a parliament.''
We are quite distinct from parliamentary forms of government around
the world because our framing fathers, I think with exceptional wisdom,
recognizing the ability of people who exercised sovereign power to
abuse that power sometimes; so, they sever that power into the three
branches of government, making us equal and distinct, but
counterbalancing one another so that ultimately the will of the people,
without revolution, can be heard and make the proper corrections.
Now I agree with my friends in the majority that we have had
excessive, sometimes wasteful, sometimes abusive, expenditures. To deny
that proposition I think would be to face facts and to deny the
existence of those basic facts, but the question is: what kind of a
repair should we make and how delicate that repair should be. Quite
frankly this provision would allow one-third of this Congress to
continue down the road and support the President at any execution of
his--rescission of appropriations at will, and we could not reverse it,
so that 67 percent of the elected Representatives of the people could
not carry out the people's work, but one-third of the elected
Representatives, in conjunction with the President, could accomplish
that.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield?
Mr. KANJORSKI. I will in just one moment.
Now the other proposition is that--
As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from New
York [Mr. Solomon] because I am moving on to another subject.
Mr. SOLOMON, Mr. Chairman, I just want to say this the gentlemen from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Kanjorski] is so well respected in this body. But I
just want to say to him:
``One of the reasons we are going with a statute, as opposed to a
constitutional amendment, is because a law that could be rescinded if
it doesn't work. Let's give it chance, and try it, and let's see if it
works.''
Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Chairman, I say to the gentleman, ``Mr. Solomon,
that was a question I couldn't even exact out of my sight.''
One of the reasons I am taking the time today is I sat on the
committee that drafted this. We discussed it, I thought about it at
great length, and I am satisfied that we can exercise and delegate to
the President substantially more authority, but the weakness that we
have is we can never reclaim that authority once delegated.
Now I am not going to pass on the constitutionality of the delegation
authority. That is for the Supreme Court to do. There is no question in
my mind we can pass this statute, make this delegation of authority,
but our problem, gentleman, is how do we get it back if it has been
abused, and that is the point I am pleased my good friend from New York
asked the question on.
We on our side have found the answer to that, and it is very
prevalent in many States of the Union, and that is a sunset provision.
I offered it in committee. I offered it with the gentleman from Texas
[Mr. Doggett] on the unfunded mandate provision yesterday, and I am
going to offer it sometime this afternoon in conjunction with him on
this bill.
If we really want to see whether an Executive would violate our trust
in our delegation of authority, we have to do something substantial; I
agree with that. This bill does that. It is somewhat extraordinary,
somewhat much larger than I would recommend we do, but I can understand
my friends on the majority doing it.
But the one way that we can condition the responsiveness and the
responsibility of the President to act appropriately with this
tremendous delegation of authority is that, if he knows that if he
abuses this trust we will put in him, then within 5 years the bill will
cease to exist, and the authority given to him will cease to exist.
Now we are going to introduce that bill, and I think that is an
insurance mechanism with no other repeal of the law because remember to
repeal the law it is going to require two-thirds vote of the House of
Representatives and the U.S. Senate because, I say to my colleague,
``You can bet your life a President is going to vote this power once
you give it to him.'' So we cannot ever reform or repeal this
legislation unless two-thirds of the House of Representatives and two-
thirds of the Senate agree, and we have not had those majorities
existing that think in concert or in activity in this body since my
historical memory goes back. I do not recall any time, any party,
entertained in both Houses of Congress a clear two-thirds voting
majority that they could change this legislation.
{time} 1210

So the will of the people can never be implemented again unless we
have the acquiescence of the President to sign and not exercise this
right of veto.
What I am suggesting here is this: We have some minor adjustments. We
have appropriation earmarks that bother us all. We have sometimes
irresponsible appropriations and authority granted when those of us who
rely on our colleagues are sometimes misunderstanding or given
misinformation as to what the actual appropriation bills stand for, and
there is not one of us who has not gone home and been embarrassed.
I remember a colleague from one of the southern States who put in an
appropriation for a school in France in the late hours of the morning,
and I got back to my district and somebody said, ``How could you vote
to give $20 million to a school in France that would have been illegal
if you had given that money in the United States?'' And quite frankly,
I not only would not have voted for it, but I had to do it in one solid
package in the entire appropriation. But then, too, I had to admit I
did not know it was in there, in a 1100-page appropriation bill, until
after the fact. And sometimes we are not even sure when it gets into
the bill, whether it is before the vote or after the vote, because the
bill generally does not get assembled at 11 o'clock at night when the
conference reports are worked out.
We have all had those experiences, but to cure those limited
experiences, to cure the study of the worm that the gentleman from New
York [Mr. Solomon] talked about for $34 million does
[[Page H1092]] not justify a delegation of authority to the President
that cannot be reclaimed in the future except with a two-thirds
majority of the Senate. That is unconscionable.
We have the opportunity to pass a responsible, strong piece of
legislation. I say that although in my basic nature I am against any
action that would destabilize the balance of the three branches of
government--and I think this will--I will support this bill and put
faith in this President and in the next President for 3 years, but if
there is an abuse, we know full well that we are going to have that
cease and have to take action again to delegate that authority away
from that President whoever he may be 5 years from now. I think that is
a reasonable proposition
I urge my colleagues to stop marching across the bridge in such
formation that they are going to bring the bridge and the Constitution
down, that they are going to bring the system down. I would urge the
230 Members of the majority to think about the amendment that will be
offered this afternoon on the sunset. It does not weaken their
provision; it does not weaken the authority of the President. The only
thing it does, it buys a 5-year policy, that if a future President or
this President abuses that authority, the Congress would have to take
to take no further action His authority for so acting would cease to
exist 5 years from the passage of this bill. Is that so unreasonable?
And let me remind the Members again that there are strong feelings in
the House on both sides. Did the President of the United States have
the constitutional or statutory authority to act by executive order to
appropriate more Federal tax money to guarantee the loans of Mexico,
exceeding the total Foreign Affairs appropriation each year of this
Congress? I think that is a question to be answered.
I do congratulate the President for taking
extraordinary executive action, but that does not excuse him if he
did it without statutory authority or constitutional authority.
Luckily, in our system we will get to try that issue at some future
date without affecting his ability to carry on foreign affairs or to
reverse the action he has taken. But when we get down to every
appropriation of every department, every agency, and every bureau,
every program of the U.S. Government, I am not sure that we want to
delegate that type of authority.

Quite frankly, in States that I have seen, some Governors have used
this authority to force members of the legislature to come to their
conviction or activity or to punish them by deciding to spend no funds
in particular areas by the exercise of their line-item veto.
I urge my colleagues on the Republican side and my colleagues on the
Democratic side, because this is really a bipartisan effort, to come to
grips with our deficit and our debt and the inability sometimes of this
Congress to act appropriately. So what I am suggesting, Mr. Chairman,
is that the Members on the minority side have a vote for as stringent
or as hard a bill as I think we could imagine they can get by statute,
delegating extraordinary powers to the President of the United States.
The only insurance policy I am asking for is, let us limit that
delegation of authority to 5 years, and if there is abuse, we may not
be able to change that law because we may not be able to override a
veto by a two-thirds vote of the House and a two-thirds vote of the
Senate, but at least we can know that that abuse and that arbitrary
action of that Chief Executive, whoever he may be, can only occur while
the statute will have full force and effect, and that it will be
sunsetted by a provision in that statute.
I urge my colleagues to support that amendment when it is offered,
and further, I urge my colleagues to have a good debate on this
question. I think it is important. I think the American people do want
to see responsible government. I think we have had an opportunity here
in the last days of the unfunded mandate debate, and I want to
compliment my friends on the Republican side. I saw an ability to start
moderating things by taking the fact that we did have some ideas on
this side that did help perfect and improve the legislation.
I think the people of the United States, including, quite frankly,
people in my district in Pennsylvania that I have talked to, want this
center aisle to disappear. They want us to get off the idea that what
is good for the Republicans is bad for the Democrats and what is good
for the Democrats is bad for the Republicans. They want us to ask the
question, ``What is good for America?''
I think what is good for America is to put the tools together to help
get control of our fiscal situation in the United States, but, on the
other hand, they do not want us to so unbalance the fine-tuned balance
between the three branches of the American Government under the
Constitution that we might work havoc on the very system we were sent
here to defend.
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I am now pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Blute], a prime cosponsor and author
of this important legislation.
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, the time has come to pass a real line-item
veto for the President. Proposals for a line-item veto have been
kicking around Capitol Hill for decades.
Two years ago, the line-item veto lost by only 21 votes, last year by
only 13 votes.
This year, we have an opportunity to finally do what we should have
done long ago. And I believe that we will win. Because Congress, along
with people from all over America, has come to realize that in order to
get our budget under control we need to give the President this fiscal
tool.
The line-item veto is an important step in the direction of positive
change and fiscal sanity. We must do it, and we must do it now.
Make no mistake about it, the real line-item veto is the only way to
go. Do not be fooled by calls to pass a watered down version as the
103d Congress did--it did not work and it will not work now.
Expedited rescission is not the line-item veto. The only real line-
item veto bill on this floor today is H.R. 2.
The Clinger bill is the only one which forces the House to override
the President's veto by a two-thirds vote. And thus, it is the only way
to prevent this House from spending taxpayer dollars on pork projects
inserted into bills in the dark of night or during conference--times
when Members know that a majority of this body will never have the
opportunity to take a separate vote to strike questionable projects.
Mr. Chairman, let us face it, sometimes we in Congress cannot help
ourselves. We want to help our districts with earmarks and the like,
and we think that it is no big deal in such a large Federal budget.
But it is a big deal, especially when you multiply those $500,000 or
$1.45 million expenditures by 435 House Members and 100 Senators.
Senator Dirksen was right when he said, ``a billion here, a billion
there, and pretty soon you're talking about real money.''
Unfortunately, when we now speak of our national debt, we are talking
trillions, not billions. Even Senator Dirksen would have been shocked
at this sorry fiscal situation.
We know that the line-item veto works in the States, the laboratories
of democracy. It has been field tested with highly successful results
and it is time to apply it to the national model.
And let us not get sidetracked with arguments about tilting the
balance of power--the fiscal balances of our great Nation have tilted
toward debt and deficit too long.
Mr. Chairman, let us pass the line-item veto bill.
{time} 1220

Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the
gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs. Meek].
Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I serve on the Committee on
Government Reform. I have heard the arguments for and against the line-
item veto. I have read numerous reports and analyses. I have heard from
my constituents and from my colleagues, both pro and con, and noted
arguments ranging from James Madison's intent 200 years ago to concerns
about balancing the budget.
The question that keeps coming up in my mind is what is the rationale
for the line-item veto? Why is the House so anxious to alter the
constitutional balance of power between the legislative and executive
branches? Why? Why are
[[Page H1093]] we so anxious to bolster the power of the President and
to bolster the power of a minority of the House at the expense of our
constitutional power?
It is a very scary initiative, Mr. Chairman, the initiative that you
will find in the line-item veto bill.
I think that this line-item veto will is a constitutional equivalent
of the huckster's snake-oil cure of years gone by. The claims are
inflated, they are exaggerated, the content is questionable, the
results are unknown and unpredictable. No one has tested the impact,
either fiscal or otherwise, of a line-item veto power being given to
our President.
I shudder to think of some of the Presidents we have had in history
having the enormous power which we will give him through the line-item
veto.
Some people seem to think we need it. The claim is that this bill
will reduce Government spending. It seems to me that at the very best,
Mr. Chairman, this bill has only the potential to reduce Government
spending. The potential rests right here, Mr. Chairman, here in the
Congress, with or without this amendment. That is why we were elected.
Each of us has 600,000 constituents. They elected us to make the
decisions we are trying to give to the President.
Mr. HOKE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Mrs. MEEK of Florida. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. HOKE. I appreciate the gentlewoman yielding.
I would answer the question as to why we have to do this now. It is
because we are $5 trillion in debt, and we spend and spend and spend
and spend, and the pendulum has to swing back.
You say there are no models, but I would suggest to you that this has
been used repeatedly. We have got 43 States that have some form of a
line-item veto, and there have not been problems in those States. It
has just given the Governor additional power.
Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I must reclaim my time. I would
like to say I come from a State that had the line-item veto. We have
had Governors abuse that power. There is the potential there.
To me, if there is just that small potential of abusing that power, I
feel that we should keep that separation of power.
Mr. Chairman, did not this body, with great fanfare and expectation
pass the Gramm-Rudman bill in 1985 to get control? That did not work.
We passed the second Gramm-Rudman-Hollings bill, that did not work. We
passed the Budget Enforcement Act in 1990 to do the same thing, to
control the skyrocketing Federal deficit. Here we are today still
hoping.
We have enough procedural things behind us, Mr. Chairman, to stop
spending. It is up to us as the Congress to do this, and not to give
the President these enormous powers. Why are we going to cede our
legislative powers to the executive branch?
Why empower a tiny minority, just one-third of the House, to control
the aspects of Government policy, large and small? We must be sure that
we keep the powers that the Constitution gave to us.
I came to this House after 129 years of not being able to get here,
to participate in the governance of this Government, not to give up the
legislative branch powers to the executive branch.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, the blizzard of numbers and figures that define our
annual budget deficits and the accruing national debt sort of tends to
numb us. It is a sort of my-eyes-are-glazing-over type of situation. We
talk about the billions, the trillions, the several hundred billion
dollar annual deficits we face, the $4.5 trillion in rising debt we are
passing along to our children. These aggregate numbers can often seem
very far away and unreal, especially when you are standing in a
wonderful place like this.
But when we bring those numbers down to the individual level of our
daily lives, when we realize that our debt translates into
approximately $18,000 of liability for every man, woman, and child
right now, today, in our country, that is a tremendous burden to carry.
I heard testimony yesterday in the Committee on Rules that, well, it
is not really that bad, because we have all these national treasures
out there that we can use as assets to offset that debt. I do not know
whether there is a distinction there about cash flow or not, but I have
not heard any serious proposals to
sell Yosemite or the Grand Teton Park or any of those places, so I
would suggest those may be assets, but they are not liquid assets, and
that $18,000 of liability is real. And it is real at tax time, because
we are paying a huge, huge interest on an incredibly enormous national
debt. It is a problem there with real weight that Americans have felt
increasingly over the years.

The time has come. I think the need to change the process has been
expressed, and the outrage against politicians, frankly, who have not
taken corrective action. And we are the people. We are those
politicians.
That is why an overwhelming majority of Americans support a balanced
budget amendment and a line-item veto. And they are fiscal tools, we
admit that. They are not magic remedies. They are fiscal tools that
will help bring the Federal budget process under control.
Today we begin the task of implementing a line-item veto. It is a
milestone clearly in the mission of budget reform. It is not the only
one. For all the rhetoric in the past years, this House has never
demonstrated its commitment to a real line-item veto, one which
actually makes it harder to spend money than it is to save it.
We have always tilted it the other way. We have made it easier to
spend than to save. Today the policy issue is if you want to save it,
go with the tougher version, the version that is in H.R. 2. If you want
to spend it, go with the amendments that are going to try and gut it
and make it easier to spend it. That is the policy issue.
Some can say it is an issue over 72 votes. Some can say it is an
issue over whether or not there is a shift in Government power. What it
is, is an issue over whether we are going to spend or whether we are
going to save.
We have voted on measures in the past that have been labeled ``line-
item veto.'' They are not real line-item veto. We have never passed a
bill that shifts the burden, that requires Congress to say ``no'' to a
President's spending cuts and force Congress then to come up with a
two-thirds majority to make that ``no'' stick and spend the money that
the President wants to cut.
These are tough measures, I admit it. They are the tough measures the
President asked for. But our budget problems are tough problems, and
they are the ones that the people we work for, the American people,
have brought to our attention, most recently in November.
We have a system where it is just too easy for low priority or
wasteful programs to make their way into massive spending bills and
onto the President's desk where they do slide into law because he has
got to sign the whole bill. No one would argue that a line-item veto on
its own will make our budget problems disappear. No one is claiming
that. But clearly our fiscal crisis goes much deeper than the abuses we
have seen of the appropriations process and discretionary spending.
I am amused today to see that we are going to have an amendment that
suddenly we are going to open the door and all the skeletons are going
to fall out and we are going to find out somehow or another there
somewhere have been abuses. Imagine that. I am delighted for that
opportunity to review those abuses, because once we review them, maybe
we can stop them.
Still, H.R. 2 marks the beginning of a monumental effort to change
the way Congress does business and restore public confidence in its
ability to manage the
Nation's finances. This is one piece of the puzzle, and it is a
necessary step on the road toward better management which we are asked
to achieve here as part of our public trust.

H.R. 2 says to Congress that if a President wants to line out certain
spending, the Congress cannot hide anymore. Unlike current law, which
allows Congress to ignore a President's spending cuts and get away with
spending the money, under H.R. 2 the Congress is going to have to come
out into the sunshine and make its case. The harsh glare of
accountability, coming up with that extra level of support to insist on
spending what the President opposes. Remember, insist on spending
[[Page H1094]] when the President says don't spend it. That is the
issue.
During the course of this debate we will hear principled arguments
from people who strongly believe that the line-item veto gives too much
authority to the President. It is an interesting argument; it is an
important argument, but it is not the main issue.
We will hear that we should set up an approval process instead, so
that a simple majority of Congress can block a President's spending
cuts. I understand that argument and respect its proponents for their
commitment to preserving the institutional power of Congress. But I
believe, and I truly believe this, that the American people have asked
us to deliver the toughest possible line-item veto, one that makes it
harder to spend their hard-earned tax dollars and easier to save the
money.

{time} 1230

That is what we pledged to do in the Contract With America, and that
is what H.R. 2 delivers to the floor.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to
the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Moran].
Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to
me.
This, again, is a bill that responds to the American people. The
American people think that one of the answers to the problems in
American is to give the President extraordinary control over the
Congress. Well, it is going to pass. But I would like to remind my
colleagues of some of the potential pitfalls of it and also to
emphasize some areas that drastically need improvement.
One of the flaws in this bill is that there is a little-known
provision that says that the President can only line-item veto tax
provisions that affect 100 or fewer taxpayers. I would submit to my
colleagues that the real abuse of the taxpayers' money is not on the
expenditure side, it is on the tax side, because on the expenditure
side, we have to go through the scrutiny of appropriations committees.
Invariable every questionable item gets debated on the floor of the
House of Representatives, exposed to the public, that is the way it
ought to be, and for the last several years has been defeated. But not
so with tax provisions. Those we can sneak in. We sneak into a tax bill
thousands of pages, and all it takes is a little line. Hundreds of
billions of dollars of taxpayers' money is lost because we do not
scrutinize what is in this Tax Code in terms of special privileges and
because of the very nature of the tax process.
Every single tax bill is a Christmas tree, a giant Christmas tree
that contains thousands of provisions that make it impossible for us,
any individual Member of Congress, even the chairman of the Committee
on Ways and Means, I would suggest, to know what is in that entire tax
bill.
Let me tell my colleagues, if I were to be a lobbyist, I would want
to be a tax lobbyist. That is where the money is. That is where they
can make the changes that really benefit their client in a big way and
sneak it in, and it is there forever.
This bill keeps those special privileges in the law. This bill says
that if any special provision benefits 100 or fewer people, then the
President cannot do anything about it. Well, those are exactly the tax
provisions that he ought to be able to veto, because those are the
special privileges, the tax preferences, for example, that may benefit
101 billionaires, 101 oil drillers, 101 chemical or pharmaceutical
companies. And do not for a minute believe that the tax lobbyists do
not know exactly what they were doing when they put that provision in
this line-item veto, just as they knew what they were doing when they
put it in every tax bill.
So if we are going to pass it, let us do it right.
Now, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt] and I have an
amendment to correct this. I would hope that every Member, there are a
few Members in this hall, but I would trust there are more Members
watching this, they may call their Member and Members that are seeing
this, please, when the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt]
speaks, listen to him carefully. He has a compelling argument for why
this provision has to be included in this line-item veto, if it is
going to be a bill that reflects any real integrity of this body.
The second concern is even a more fundamental concern. For the last
several years, any taxpayer that wanted to lash out at the Congress,
many of us would grab the lash first and say, ``No, wait, let me do it.
I will lash myself and all my colleagues, too, and I can do it so it
hurts even more than it would hurt us if you do it, because I know
where it will really hurt.''
We have been bashing ourselves. And now, in keeping with that effort,
what we are going to do is to give over the power of the purse, we are
going to give it to the President.
Now, some years that is going to be fine, if we are in the same party
as the President in the White House. Other years we are going to
realize it never should have been done. But in the long run, the
American people are going to realize that this Congress will have
seriously tipped the balance of powers that our forefathers insisted
upon, understood how important it was. They put it into our
Constitution, and we are essentially going to take it out.
So I would hope we would think long and hard before we give such
extraordinary power to the President to punish individual Members of
the Congress, to punish the Congress as a body, but most importantly,
to be free of the balance of powers that has made this the greatest
democracy on Earth.
Now, there is a specific additional issue with regard to separation
of powers, and that is one that goes back through American history to
understand.
There was a day when a President of the United States could take the
budget from the judicial branch of government, put it together, change
it and submit it to the Congress. And, of course, when something can be
abused, invariably at some point it will be.
Well, it was a Democratic President, and that Democratic President,
when he could not pack the court and when the court did not agree with
his New Deal legislation, he decided he was going to take away the
court's money for bailiffs, to take away the court's travel money, to
punish it, the court, in every way possible. And he did that.
And so a law was passed in 1939 to say the executive branch cannot
change the operating expenses of the judiciary branch. It has to be
left to the legislative branch to do that because the legislative
branch does not have the same conflict of interest.
Now, today, when the Justice Department is the principal litigant
before the Supreme Court, when there is the greatest potential for
conflict of interest, we are going to go one step further. Not only are
we going to repeal the intent of that 1939 law that has still been on
the books for good reason, we are going to say, after the Congress has
acted on the appropriation for the judiciary branch of government, the
President can go in and repeal, can veto, can do anything he wants or
she wants, some day, to any operational function of the judiciary
branch.
And not only can he do it on a line item, as the chairman of the
committees mentioned earlier, he can reach right down into any aspect
of any line-item appropriation and specifically pull money out, can
specifically punish a particular circuit court that needs to expand or
judge that needs more clerks, can do any number of ways to punish the
judiciary branch of government. Talk about breaking the concept of
separation of powers.

{time} 1240

Talk abut making this country's democracy vulnerable to people who
would like to abuse it, that is what we are opening ourselves up to.
Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment that will be coming up very shortly
that would not allow the President to do that. It is not that we do not
trust the President, but we trust our Founding Fathers more. We trust
the U.S. Constitution more than what we will do today or this year or
during this first hundred days. We trust the Constitution, our Founding
Fathers, to know what is right and to know that the separation of
powers is intrinsic to the operation of this government.
We have some very serious problems with this bill. I respect the
people who
[[Page H1095]] put it together, but I know we are going to have a
constructive debate on those provisions. I thank the gentleman from
California [Mr. Beilenson] for yielding me this time.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr.
Beilenson] has expired.
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. LoBiondo], a member of the committee.
Mr. LoBIONDO. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania
for yielding time to me.
Mr. Chairman, this month we have taken the historic steps toward
requiring government to live within its own means by passing the
balanced budget amendment. Today we have before us another tool to cut
spending, the line-item veto.
Many of us recognize that we live in tough times. Tough times require
bold initiatives and bold leadership. H.R. 2 is a bold initiative that
demonstrates bold leadership.
I do not believe we can any longer hold the taxpayers hostage by
including wasteful and at times silly spending in important
legislation. Right now we put the President in the position of signing
a good bill that has wasteful spending in it, or vetoing the wasteful
spending, or vetoing a good bill to get the wasteful spending out of
it. It is not a good situation.
Mr. Chairman, H.R. 2 will change this. It does not give the President
the authority to rewrite the budget or to spend money on something
else, but it does allow the President to cut out pork barrel spending
for one reason and one reason only, to reduce the deficit. That is what
we want to get at.
In my home State of New Jersey, like 42 other States across the
Nation, we have a line-item veto for our Governor. It works in New
Jersey, and it can work in the U.S. Congress.
Line-item veto is another tool for deficit reduction. We all agree
that we need to reduce the deficit.
We have been working in a bipartisan nature to provide positive and
meaningful change to the American people. Let us continue that
bipartisan effort. Let us vote for deficit reduction by voting for H.R.
2.
Mr. CLINGER. As a point of inquiry, Mr. Chairman, may I inquire how
much time is remaining for all participants in this debate?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Clinger] has 23\1/
2\ minutes; the gentlewoman from Michigan [Miss Collins] has 18 minutes
remaining; and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] has 19 minutes
remaining.
Miss COLLINS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the
honorable gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Fattah].
Mr. FATTAH. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding time
to me.
Mr. Chairman, we may differ on whether the line-item veto will reduce
Federal spending. For example, Pennsylvania has a line-item veto. Its
total debt has tripled since 1982, growing from $6.2 billion in 1982 to
$16.5 billion in 1994. For all of the States, total debt has doubled in
just 8 years, growing from $186 billion in 1984 to $372 billion in
1992.
At a hearing last month on this bill, Mr. Chairman, the director of
the Congressional Budget Office testified: ``Evidence from the States
suggest that the item veto has not been used to hold down State
spending or deficits, but rather has been used to State Governors to
pursue their own priorities.''
Mr. Chairman, I had the honor of serving in the Pennsylvania
Legislature prior to being elected to the Congress. The experience from
Pennsylvania demonstrates how the executive branch can use this power.
In the 1983-84 fiscal year, the Pennsylvania Legislature initially
refused to adopt the budget submitted by the Governor, including his
proposals to increase taxes. The Governor responded by cutting from the
State Senate 62 percent of the Senate's budget, including Senators'
salaries and expenses, and by completely eliminating salary and mileage
expenses for Members of the State House.
This episode has affected all subsequent negotiations between the
legislature and the Governor, not just on budget and taxes but on
nonspending bills.
While the President may know the most efficient way to run the
executive branch, he does not know the most efficient way to run the
Congress. Indeed, a future President may want to make Congress less
effective in its oversight of the executive branch.
The appropriations bill for the Congress provides funds so that the
Congress can hire staff, such as the General Accounting Office and the
Congressional Budget Office, to do its job, even though frequently
their jobs involve presenting conclusions that the President dislikes.
This function is different from what the report of the Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight says it is seeking to eliminate in H.R.
2, which is called ``log roll, pork barrel projects.''
The appropriations bill for Congress is also more detailed than the
appropriations bills for the executive branch agencies. The committee's
report says ``We do not itemize appropriation bills and see no reason
to do so. For the most part, Congress provides large lump sum accounts
for agencies,'' but the appropriations bills for the legislative branch
are very detailed.
Mr. FATTAH. Mr. Chairman, under the bill, the President says we can
reduce funds appropriated for a particular House committee, perhaps in
response to an oversight investigation by that committee.
In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, if we pass this bill and give up control
of the details of our own budget to the President and a minority of the
Senate, it is unlikely we will ever be able to reclaim it.
Mr. Chairman, I include, for the Record, a table showing the increase
in debt for each State between 1984 and 1992.
The material referred to follows:

STATE GOVERNMENT DEBT OUTSTANDING AT END OF FISCAL YEAR
[Thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1984 1992
------------------------------------------------------------------------
United States........................... 186,378,896 371,800,683
Alabama..................................... 2,896,714 4,128,724
Alaska...................................... 6,529,672 4,941,602
Arizona..................................... 607,720 2,648,942
Arkansas.................................... 703,344 1,942,189
California.................................. 13,553,823 37,823,709
Colorado.................................... 1,256,257 2,977,116
Connecticut................................. 5,489,783 11,956,902
Delaware.................................... 1,909,003 3,541,000
Florida..................................... 3,909,566 12,295,486
Georgia..................................... 1,842,122 4,470,781
Hawaii...................................... 2,512,093 4,656,763
Idaho....................................... 574,359 1,292,022
Illinois.................................... 8,636,544 18,741,830
Indiana..................................... 1,563,271 5,171,670
Iowa........................................ 651,311 1,863,947
Kansas...................................... 356,136 485,787
Kentucky.................................... 3,384,183 5,518,526
Louisiana................................... 6,517,978 9,994,068
Maine....................................... 1,195,410 2,637,052
Maryland.................................... 4,761,182 8,334,061
Massachusetts............................... 8,885,155 24,008,036
Michigan.................................... 5,222,480 10,356,583
Minneosta................................... 3,388,868 4,143,203
Mississippi................................. 1,025,222 1,626,737
Missouri.................................... 2,631,236 6,301,143
Montana..................................... 696,071 1,887,877
Nebraska.................................... 606,254 1,764,223
Nevada...................................... 864,520 1,934,144
New Hampshire............................... 1,734,333 4,313,471
New Jersey.................................. 11,644,014 19,736,201
New Mexico.................................. 1,150,884 1,605,048
New York.................................... 29,390,713 65,888,432
North Carolina.............................. 1,885,929 3,819,102
North Dakota................................ 444,756 1,027,156
Ohio........................................ 6,664,321 12,193,154
Oklahoma.................................... 3,041,744 3,658,022
Oregon...................................... 8,544,694 4,296,060
Pennsylvania................................ 6,637,824 12,962,120
Rhode Island................................ 2,291,705 5,150,733
South Carolina.............................. 3,241,814 4,864,627
South Dakota................................ 917,562 1,060,222
Tennessee................................... 1,735,309 2,906,396
Texas....................................... 4,009,048 8,001,175
Utah........................................ 1,200,096 2,153,233
Vermont..................................... 809,901 1,542,671
Virginia.................................... 2,901,912 7,402,641
Washington.................................. 3,098,219 7,191,966
West Virginia............................... 1,633,392 2,594,324
Wisconsin................................... 3,552,127 7,296,851
Wyoming..................................... 716,320 894,768
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Tennessee [Mr. Duncan], who is a lifelong resident of Knoxville, TN. He
succeeded his father here, who was one of the most respected men in
this House. He has been a fighter, since the first day he came to this
body, for a line item veto, and he is finally getting his chance.
Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this line item
veto legislation.
Mr. Chairman, I first want to thank my good friend, the gentleman
from New York [Mr. Solomon], with whom I have worked so closely on this
issue in the past, for yielding me this time.
Mr. Chairman, when we pass this legislation a little later, I think
there is no one in this House who will deserve more credit for it than
the gentleman from New York, Gerry Solomon. I congratulate him for his
work on this very important piece of legislation.
Mr. Chairman, on the first day of every Congress since I was elected
in 1988, I have introduced a line item veto
[[Page H1096]] bill that is almost identical to the one that we are
considering now, H.R. 2. While past Congresses have been unwilling to
pass a line item veto with real teeth in it, and in fact we passed one
that the Wall Street Journal in 1993 called a voodoo line item veto
bill, I am pleased that today we are on the verge of approving a line
item veto bill that will truly be effective in reducing pork barrel
spending.
Mr. Speaker, this is not a partisan issue. Forty-three of our
Nation's Governors, both Democrat and Republican, already have the line
item veto and are using it to cut spending in their States and balance
their budgets. It is time for Congress to give this same tool to the
President, so that he can eliminate the most outrageous examples of
wasteful and unnecessary spending without vetoing entire appropriation
bills.
The General Accounting Office estimated in 1992 that more than $70
billion of pork barrel spending could have been cut between 1984 and
1989 if Presidents Reagan and Bush had had a line item veto. The Cato
Institute estimates that $5 to $10 billion a year could be saved with
the line item veto.
Just last week in his State of the Union address, President Clinton
highlighted some of the most absurd examples of pork barrel spending
approved by the 103d Congress, and said ``If you give me the line item
veto, I will remove some of that unnecessary spending.''
Mr. Chairman, I wish we did not need such things as a balanced budget
amendment and a line item veto to bring our Federal spending under
control. Unfortunately, however, Mr. Chairman, Congress has proven time
and again that it does not have the will to cut spending on its own.
That is why legislation such as H.R. 2 is so very necessary today. If
the Congress does not really want to cut spending, it will have to say
so and say so publicly.
Mr. Chairman, with a national debt of over $4.7 trillion, we simply
cannot afford to withhold this important tool from the President any
longer. Former Senator Paul Tsongas, writing in the Christian Science
Monitor a few months ago, said that if present trends continue, the
young people of today will face average lifetime tax rates of an
incredible 82 percent. We must do something about this to give a good
economic future to our children and grandchildren.
This will not solve our problems by itself, but it will be a big step
in the right direction. I urge passage of this very important
legislation.

{time} 1250

Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to a distinguished former
Governor, the gentleman from Delaware [Mr. Castle], who is a great
leader in the line item veto fight and is the only Member of this
Congress who has actually wielded a line item veto.
Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the
time.
I also, by the way, congratulate the Committee on Rules and all those
who discussed this, because I think this is an important piece of
legislation, a little more complex than some people realize, and I
think the amendment process will allow that discussion to take place. I
think we are going to have a good time with that and perhaps learn a
lot about it.
I also think that the statutory line-item veto is a good step. I
believe in the double-step process. I believe that a President should
understand if he or she vetoes something, it is going to come back over
here and if indeed it is overridden by a majority, a veto would have to
happen again, and it would be a two-thirds vote at that point. I think
that is going to make people sit up and take notice.
The history of the line-item veto in the United States of America is
long and is very important. It was first proposed by President Grant in
1873 and by more than a dozen Presidents since. Ronald Reagan said as
Governor, ``I found this item veto is a powerful tool against wasteful
or extravagant spending.'' It was introduced in this body in 1876 and
there have been 200 resolutions since that particular period of time.
It has a significant history. I did exercise the line-item veto as
Governor of the State of Delaware. President Clinton did it as Governor
of the State of Arkansas. We know that 43 Governors have this. I do not
know of a single State that is trying to rescind it. I do not know of a
single legislature or Governor who is really fighting it.
What it really means, in truth, is that you sit down and work out
your budget together and you bring the executive branch into the
process. After all, the executive, or the President in this case,
presents a budget, the President lives by the budget, and the President
is the one that has to carry it out with their various agencies.
I think the President should be involved in setting that budget
process and also, if there are the pork-barrel projects that we hear
about, I believe the President of the United States should be one named
as an involved party and having been a party to that. That is what
happens in this particular instance.
This will in my judgment address unnecessary expenditures. But it
will not balance our budget. It is not going to do that. I do not think
we should overemphasize that.
I finally do not think that this is an extreme shift of activity as
we have heard from time to time. It is really not much of a power tilt.
In fact, I think the President may underutilize it rather than
overutilize it.
I would encourage all of us to support the line-item veto
legislation.
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5\1/2\ minutes to the
gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt].
(Mr. SPRATT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SPRATT. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me the time.
Mr. Chairman, the bill before us passes up a practical solution,
expedited rescission, which this House has voted for on 3 separate
occasions, a solution that is clearly constitutional, and takes up
instead a novel solution that is constitutionally in question.
I know that the Congressional Research Service has sifted through all
the case law on delegation of powers and come to the conclusion that
this bill is probably constitutional. But as Judge Bork put it in an
article he wrote some time ago about the line-item veto, ``A solution
that nobody has thought of for 200 years has the burden of persuasion,
especially in constitutional matters.''
Those who claim that we can give the President line item veto
authority bear the burden of explaining to us how we can amend the
Constitution by statute. They have to explain to us in all fairness, I
think, why it is that no President has ever noticed that he had this
authority implicit in the Constitution for over 200 years.
Let us start with George Washington. He presided over the
Constitutional Convention. When he was asked what were his powers under
the presentment clause, he answered succinctly.
``From the nature of the Constitution,'' said Washington, ``I must
approve all parts of a bill or reject it in toto.''
William Howard Taft was both President and Chief Justice. He once
wrote, ``The President has no power to veto parts of the bill under the
Constitution and allow the rest to become law. He must accept it or
reject it in its entirety.''
Where Judge Bork and William Howard Taft have refused to tread, the
authors of this bill rush in. In effect, they say, ``Even if the
Constitution doesn't give the President this power, Congress can confer
on the President by statute powers that the President doesn't have
under the Constitution.''
The bill does not use the words, but the device it employs to confer
the item veto power upon the President is delegation. In essence, this
bill delegates to the President the power to cancel out items in a bill
in lieu of vetoing the bill in its entirety.
So this bill takes giant strides. It shifts enormous power to the
President by delegation and it is so broad, so unique, so unprecedented
that I think it fairly begs the question, ``Is it constitutional?''
Fifty years ago, the Supreme Court said, ``Sweeping delegations of
legislative power are unconstitutional.''
I know that a lot of water has flowed over the dam since the Schecter
decision came down, and that Schecter has mostly been honored in the
breach, as
[[Page H1097]] our courts have increasingly upheld delegations of power
that have become broader and broader with time.
But 7 years ago in Bowsher versus Synar, a case dealing with the
budget authority of the Congress, dealing specifically with
sequestration, which was much like a veto, the Court issued a caveat
for us to beware of. It said,

The ultimate judgment regarding the constitutionality of a
delegation must not be made on the basis of the scope alone
but on the basis of its scope plus the specificity of the
standards that govern its exercise. When the scope increases
to immense proportions, the standards must be correspondingly
more precise.

This is the caveat sent to us by Bowsher versus Synar, the caveat we
should heed here. The broader the scope, the stricter the standards.
There is no question about the scope of this bill. It is immense, it
is broad, it is as big as the powers of 13 different appropriation
bills that we pass every year, all discretionary spending.
In effect what we are saying here is the President can choose to do
whatever he pleases with 13 different appropriation bills adopted into
law each year by the Congress.
What standards, what guidelines control what the President can do?
What tells him where the purpose of Congress lies?
First of all, this bill says that when the President cuts out
spending, or rescinds, the rescission must reduce the deficit or the
national debt and limit discretionary spending.
But, ladies and gentlemen, that is tautological. By definition,
anything that cuts spending will reduce the deficit. So this is not a
standard.
Next the bill says the rescission must not impair essential
governmental functions or harm the national interest. What does that
mean?
The standard is so subjective that the President can fill it any way
he wishes. It is so vague that it is meaningless.
I know that in decisions from J.W. Hampton to Mistretta dealing with
the sentencing guidelines, courts have allowed Congress to hand over
enormous power to the executive branch, the broadest sorts of power,
the broadest kinds of discretion, but it is to carry out policies that
we spell out and enunciate.
The difference between all those cases and this bill is that this
bill delegates to the President the power not to carry out but to
cancel out legislative policies, not just to execute the will of
Congress but to, when the President wishes to, eradicate the will of
Congress.
If we want to add a line item veto to the President's powers, then I
think the right way to do it is to amend the Constitution. Until we
have amended the Constitution, the best way to give the President the
equivalent of a line item veto is by enhancing and expediting his
authority to rescind. We will offer in the course of this debate
amendments to do just that.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter].
(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks.)
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2, the
Line Item Veto Act. It is an important tool in the battle to reduce the
spending that will be given to the President through the line item veto
authority.
I particularly appreciate the time yielded to me today by the
distinguished gentleman from Florida, because it is an opportunity to
speak on what has been for me a long-time commitment to my
constituents, a contractual arrangement, you might say.
For more than 10 years now, I have been saying in response to my
constituents' concerns that I think there are two fundamental changes
that must be made to deal with our continual deficit problem: One is
the balanced budget amendment and the other is the line item veto for
the President.

{time} 1300

So, since 1985 I have been cosponsoring legislation which would grant
the President the line-item veto. It has been frequently mentioned that
43 Governors have this tool at their hand, and it has been well used in
those States. In fact, in my home State we have an extraordinarily
powerful version of it. We can actually have our Governor mark down
expenditure items, not only mark them out.
It will enable us through the President's authority to strike a pen
to the pork barrel projects that too often find their way into
appropriations bills. This power given to our Governors in 43 States
has been a successful tool in discouraging unnecessary expenditures at
the State level. I think the President can be well vested with this
power as well.
I urge my colleagues to support this legislation. It is one of the
fundamental, institutional changes we can and must make. Obviously,
with only one balanced budget in the last 20 years, we not only need a
balanced budget amendment, we need this kind of institutional change as
well.
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, it gives me great pleasure to yield 2
minutes to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Tate], a new member of
the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.
Mr. TATE. Mr. Chairman, this legislation is of monumental importance
to our country. As a cosponsor, as many other freshmen are, we are
keeping our commitment to the Contract With America.
The line-item veto means cutting spending, shrinking government and
that was the message last November.
The line-item veto provides a powerful tool for Congress to control
spending to eliminate pork barrel legislation, and it is part of our
Weight Watchers diet for Congress.
The line item veto comes on the heels of the balanced budget
amendment, another way to reduce the deficit, another way to get
Government out of our wallets.
The time to act is now. Congress must get its house in order, because
the American people are tired of more of their money going for wasteful
government programs and they are weary of the excuses by Congress for
the spending. It is out of control.
We have heard many times the national debt is over $4\1/2\ trillion,
$18,000 for every man, woman, and child. My daughter, Madeleine, who
was born 6 months ago, was saddled with this huge debt for the future.
The debt not only jeopardizes future economics and future earnings, but
it jeopardizes the future of our grandchildren and our great
grandchildren.
We can no longer allow this reckless spending without an avenue to
remove it. Just last year we spent money to study insect noise and to
study lobsters. Sounds like a lot of pork to me.
The line-item veto provides a powerful check on congressional pork.
Forty-three States have the line-item veto to balance the budget, to
cut the fat. The U.S. Congress should follow this movement.
Congress has proved incapable of making the tough decisions. The
public has asked us to pass this bill and we should, if not for
ourselves, then let us pass this for the American families we are here
to represent.
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the
gentlewoman from Michigan [Miss Collins].
(Miss COLLINS of Michigan asked and was given permission to revise
and extend her remarks.)
Miss COLLINS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I thank the honorable
gentlewoman from Illinois for yielding me this time.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the line-item veto bill.
I opposed it when the White House was Republican; I oppose it now;
and--for the sake of Congress--I would encourage my colleagues to do
likewise.
Mr. Chairman, I for one, believe in the Congress; and while we have
had our problems of late, I cannot support legislating ourselves into
irrelevance. We are not children, and we do not need a Republican or
Democratic ``daddy'' standing over us and telling us that we do not
need items x, y, or z because ``father knows best.''
Imagine, if you will, the incredible leverage which the President
will have over each and every Member of this body. Heaven help any
colleague who crosses a vindictive President with this power. The
Member will see his subcommittee's work vanish with the stroke of a
pen; and simple, routine items could require their own
``supermajority.'' Are we prepared for that? Remember, my colleagues,
Presidents can be either friendly or hostile.
[[Page H1098]] Your friend now could be your nemesis in a few years.
I ask my colleagues, can we not stop this collective hari-kari once
and for all? We have run this country for over 200 years, and our
system is the envy of governments around the world. Now, again, I will
be the first to acknowledge our problems, but this solution is far too
severe. And it is far too permanent. I will not cut off my foot to get
out of the bear trap. Absolutely not.
Mr. Chairman, why on Earth would this U.S. House of Representatives
willingly vote away its power?
We negotiate in our respective committees for programs which will
benefit our constituents. We win the battle in committee. We win the
battle in appropriations. We win in floor debate. Then a President,
with one stroke of a mighty pen, can render all of our hard work void
and useless. A President can hold your district programs hostage to
votes he wants for other bills. He can be very punitive to teach
Members a lesson.
Why? Why emasculate the Congress?
Why? Turn our responsibilities over to the executive branch?
Why? Give up our power to legislate and appropriate?
I ask, why--why--why?
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Mississippi, [Mr. Parker].
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, we also yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Parker].
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Mississippi is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. PARKER. Mr. Chairman, the minority whip recently issued a
statement in which he brands H.R. 2 as a Republican proposal under
which ``Congress would cede to the executive branch one of its most
important responsibilities--the power of the purse.''
Well first of all, here is one Democrat who supports this
``Republican'' proposal. I am an original sponsor of the legislation
before us. In fact, I have supported the concept of a line-item veto
from my first day in Congress. Here is one Democrat who is not prepared
to just toss aside his party's claim on a good idea.
Second, have not we done a fine job in carrying out our most
important responsibility? Congress has not responsibly exercised the
power of the purse for years. We have been downright irresponsible with
this power.
Opponents of a line-item veto claim this is a balance of power issue.
I agree. There currently exists vast imbalance in the power to exercise
fiscal responsibility. This is an effort to remedy that problem.
A 1992 GAO report indicated that the line-item veto will work. I
refer you to page 5 of the Rules Committee Report on H.R. 2:

If Presidential line item vote/line item reduction
authority had been applied to all items to which objections
were raised in the Statements of Administration Policy during
fiscal years 1984 through 1989, spending could have been
reduced by amounts ranging from $7 billion in 1985 to $17
billion in 1987, for a 6-year total of about $70 billion.
This would have reduced federal deficits and borrowing by 6.7
percent, from the $1059 billion that actually occurred during
that period to $989 billion. (Emphasis added.)

That is good enough for me.
What we are talking about here is the creation of an additional
deficit reduction tool. If a carpenter set out to build a house without
a hammer, he would not be able to accomplish much toward the
construction project. If you were the President of the United States,
you would also want the tools needed to carry out your duties for that
office. In an effort to provide a balanced budget or to eliminate
wasteful programs and expenditures, the line-item veto is a vital tool
for the President of either political party.
While the enhanced recission alternative is also a new tool, it is
not as strong as the line-item veto. The line item veto will require a
two-thirds vote to reverse a Presidential reduction in spending while
enhanced recission will require a simple majority. That is essentially
the only difference between these two proposals.
So the choice before you is quite simple. You are either serious
about reducing spending and want to make it as difficult as possible to
avoid doing so, or your want to protect this body's spendthrift power.
This is really not a balance of power issue. This is an expansion of
power issue. I support expanding the power of the President and/or the
Congress to engage in the practice of fiscally reponsible government.
More than 85 percent of the Nation's Governors have the line-item
veto where it has been used as a valuable tool in helping those
Governors keep their State's budgets in balance.
The time for a line-item veto has arrived. If we are going to have a
balanced budget, the President needs the tools necessary to produce
such a budget. I urge you to support H.R. 2 as introduced and take a
giant step toward fiscal responsibility.

{time} 1310

Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from Texas, Mr. Gene Green.
Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I speak today in support of
the Line-Item Veto Act, and I support the premise behind the call for
the line-item veto, that the Congress has included many questionable
items in appropriations over the years, and steps need to be taken to
remedy the problem.
Today the notion that Congress can control itself is doubted by the
public, and that is why this is a popular idea. In the public's mind
Congress defines itself with the little things we do as well as the big
things we do. It is my sense that the line-item veto may help put an
end to the funding of some of the outdated, unneeded programs or
projects that we put into appropriations bills.
This will not end, and it is not the panacea. The line-item veto does
not end Congress' responsibility for self-restraint. As my colleagues
noted in our committee hearings, Presidents, recent Presidents
particularly, are not known for submitting balanced budgets, and we
should not expect this or any other President to save us from
ourselves.
We should consider another point, that maybe we are overselling the
benefits of this bill. The item-veto could cut millions of dollars and
help Congress set better priorities on programs, for example, by
eliminating nondefense items in the defense budget, but public support
of this measure stems in large part from the size of the deficit. Many
are under the impression the item-veto will have a noticeable fiscal
impact. But what effect will it really have on the deficit?
The item-veto has been used, as we heard earlier, by 43 Governors.
And I served 20 years as a legislator and with many Governors, and they
enjoyed that authority, and I had the honor and privilege of having
projects and bills vetoed by both Democrat and Republican Governors in
Texas.
The item-veto most often is used to get the attention of those of us
in the legislature and not necessarily as a budget-reducing item. I
would hope it would be used for that, not only by our President if this
passes, but also by Governors.
I support the measure because I believe it is progress. However, the
line-item veto will not control nondiscretionary spending, the big-
ticket items like health care costs or interest on the national debt.
I believe that the point needs to be made clear to the public, let us
not oversell the benefits of the line-item veto, but we still need to
pass it.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Huntington Beach, CA [Mr. Rohrabacher].
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, the President's veto power is granted
by the Constitution, and we have heard today the question: Why, why,
why change this power now or try to have some impact on how this power
is being used in this body?
Well, I will be very happy to explain it. Something has gone totally
haywire, and spending is totally out of control and has been for
decades.
One of the reasons this system is not working is because there has
been a fundamental change, a diminution of the President's veto power.
Past legislation, especially spending bills, that went through this
body were specific and usually very, very understandable. Today we find
massive continuing resolutions and appropriations bills that are
hundreds, if not thousands, of pages long that span the issues, that
span our whole imagination, and they are very difficult to understand.
This is how our
[[Page H1099]] process has evolved, and what has happened is the
President's veto power in this evolution has been devolved along with
this.
In short, the President's veto power has been neutralized by the
evolution of how we do our business, and the reason why our spending
situation is out of control is this constitutional authority given by
our Founding Fathers is really no longer in effect.
That was never made more clear to me than when I worked at the White
House for the President of the United States. I remember when President
Reagan stood right here and in a State of the Union Message had a huge
continuing resolution. Do you remember that? And he threw it down on
this table before us and said, ``Something is wrong when we have to
consider all of this, all or nothing.'' The President is faced with all
or nothing.
What kind of veto power does he have left?
Well, a little story I would like to share with you: I was in the
Oval Office with President Reagan the day after his presentation of the
State of the Union Message that time when he actually threw down that
continuing resolution showing, demonstrably showing, that his veto
power, meaning all or nothing, you know, was irrelevant now, and I
notice that his finger was bandaged. President Reagan's finger had a
bandage on it. I said, ``Mr. President, what happened to your finger?''
He said, ``Well, Dana, when I was up in front of the Congress last
night and I threw that bill down, my finger did not get out from under
it and it smashed my finger.''
Now, most people did not understand that he was in pain during the
delivery of the rest of the State of the Union Message.
There is something wrong when the legislation that we have is so big
that it is smashing the President's finger, much less his veto power. I
think we should restore the President's finger and restore the veto
power to the President of the United States to protect us against
unnecessary spending, and that means supporting H.R. 2, the real line-
item veto.
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Cleveland, OH [Mr. Hoke], a distinguished member of the Committee on
the Budget.
Mr. HOKE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from yielding me this
time.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to associate myself with the remarks of
the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Parker], who spoke quite eloquently
in favor of this enhanced-rescission bill.
I would like to particularly point out that the gentleman from
Mississippi [Mr. Parker] is a very conservative Democrat, and I would
like to further point out that the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr.
Parker] and many other Democrats have voted in favor of every single
bill that has been passed by this Congress so far as part of the
Contract With America.
I think it is important, Mr. Chairman, that we remind ourselves that
this is a very bipartisan effort that is going forward. Democrats voted
on every part of the rules package. They voted in favor of the balanced
budget amendment. Without them we never would have passed it. They
voted in favor yesterday of unfunded mandates, nearly half the Democrat
Caucus, and on and on, and I think, no, I am sorry, more than half,
substantially more than half of the Democrat Caucus, and I think it is
important, Mr. Chairman, for the American people to remember that we
are not in the
business of doing the Republican Party's agenda or the Democrat
Party's agenda, but that we are working for America here, and we are
working in a bipartisan spirit and a bipartisan manner that many in the
press would like the public not to be aware of.

{time} 1320

You know, we have been saying that last November the American people
spoke and they declared the days of wasteful spending by the Federal
Government should stop. Today we are on the threshold of fulfilling
another part of our contract, the line-item veto. I think it is
probably a little bit myopic and maybe a little bit of bragging to
suggest we are really the authors of this. The fact is this is an idea
whose time has finally come, brought about, initially made by Ronald
Reagan. It started in the early 1980's and finally after an
extraordinarily long gestation period we are going to see this bear
fruit. Mr. Chairman, great ideas are worth waiting for.
Mr. Chairman, President Reagan is going to be 84 years old on Monday.
I cannot think of a better birthday present that we could give him.
Far too long now Congress has insulted the taxpayers of this country
by first taking its money, and it should not.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Buffalo, NY [Mr. Quinn], a distinguished member of the Joint Economic
Committee and a leader in the effort to give the President a line-item
veto.
Mr. QUINN. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me, and I
appreciate his comments.
Mr. Chairman, it is an honor for me to be here today and join so many
of our colleagues in enthusiastically supporting H.R. 2.
Twice during the 103d Congress, since I have been a Member here in
the Congress, we have had a chance to vote on the line-item veto, and
twice we fell short of those votes. In the 104th Congress now I think
we have a real opportunity to give the President of the United States
the line-item veto.
Mr. Chairman, the line-item veto will rise or fall on its own merits.
But I think we have an opportunity here to go above and beyond that. We
hear words like ``power'' and ``punishment.'' I think one of the
problems we are into right now is that we have an opportunity here,
unlike other legislation, where H.R. 2 says that the President's
rescissions will take effect immediately unless the Congress rejects
them. If the Congress rejects them within 20 days, they go back to the
President and they will be vetoed again, if he indeed wants that to
happen. Then it comes back to the House for a two-thirds majority. One
of the by-products of H.R. 2 will be some discussion, communication,
interaction between the House and the Senate and the President of the
United States. I think that is healthy for this Government.
Mr. Chairman, at the same time we have some naysayers, who are
opponents and say we are giving the President too much power. We are
back to the power and punishment words. They say that he will punish
Members for things they have done or have not done during the course of
their term here.
I think the track record that we have in city halls across the
country, in State legislatures, in the Governors' chairs--we heard a
former sitting Governor right here as our Member, the gentleman from
Delaware [Mr. Castle], say that that is not the case, that the
Presidents of this United States will use that power accordingly.
Then we hear whether or not the President will be accountable,
whether or not he punishes other Members or uses that power in the
wrong way. Let us remember Presidents are also accountable to the same
constituents that we are accountable to.
Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure for me to strongly support H.R. 2, and
I ask my colleagues to do the same.
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Cox], the distinguished chairman of the Republican
Policy Committee and a former White House counsel who worked
extensively on budget issues during the Reagan years.
Mr. COX of California. I thank my colleague for that gracious
introduction and for yielding to me.
Mr. Chairman, H.R. 2, the Line Item Veto Act, is something the
American people have wanted for a long time. It is a fitting tribute to
their tireless efforts, as well as to the tireless efforts of one man
who has been mentioned here several times in the course of this debate,
Ronald Reagan.
Next Monday, February 6, Ronald Reagan will celebrate his 84th
birthday. It is absolutely fitting that we will vote on final passage
of H.R. 2 on Ronald Reagan's birthday.
A decade ago Ronald Reagan said about the line-item veto, ``No other
single piece of legislation would so quickly and effectively put order
back
[[Page H1100]] into our budget process.'' That is as true today as it
was 10 years ago.
It will restore what the Founders saw as the strongest deterrent to
wasteful spending by Congress, an energetic executive with the power to
force a thoughtful and thorough debate on individual items of spending.
H.R. 2 will reverse some of the damage that was done by the 1974
Budget Impoundment and Control Act, passed by a liberal Congress at the
height of its powers as a slap at President Nixon, then at the depths
of his disfavor with the Congress.
It radically shifted the respective powers of the legislative and
executive branches and emasculated the President's impoundment
authority, substituting weak powers of deferral and rescission which
this Congress has ever since 1974 chosen to override.
Since 1974, this Congress has chosen to ignore almost every
rescission request proposed by every Republican and Democratic
President. In the 2 years that I worked in the White House, President
Reagan issued over 400 rescission requests, they totaled over $18
billion. Do you know how many the Congress voted on? Not a single one.
Mr. Chairman, James Madison once wrote that unless kept in check,
Congress would be everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and
drawing all power into its impetuous vortex. James Madison was right.
Congress' spending appetite needs to be controlled.
H.R. 2 is a solid step on the way to doing just that.
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, it gives me great pleasure to yield 2
minutes to a renowned deficit hawk, the gentleman from New Hampshire
[Mr. Zeliff] chairman of Subcommittee on National Defense,
International Affairs and Judiciary, and the author of the A-to-Z
spending reduction.
Mr. ZELIFF. I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2, to give the
President the line-item veto. Last November we promised the taxpayers
of America that we would manage their funds with greater care and
discipline.
We promised no more business as usual. We promised to prioritize
Federal spending just as families and businesses do.
The line-item veto, along with the balanced budget amendment and the
unfunded mandates legislation just passed, will go a long way toward
forcing this Government to prioritize.
There is no better example of the need for a line-item veto than the
California earthquake emergency appropriation passed last year.
It was amazing how much damage was actually done by that earthquake,
since the $8.6 billion emergency funding bill went way beyond
California and included money for States from Hawaii to Maine. It
included: $10 million dollars for a post office in New York City; $1.5
million dollars to build a maritime museum in South Carolina; $1.3
million dollars for Hawaiian sugarcane funding; and $1.4 million
dollars to fight potato fungus in Maine.
If the President had a line-item veto, he could have taken these
unnecessary spending programs right out of the legislation without
affecting the necessary funds for the horrible damage in California.
We see opposition to the line-item veto because it is a threat to
this type of pork-barrel politics. It is a threat to the old spending
habits of past congresses. but times have changed for the better, and
pork-barrel politics must end.
The bottom line is that America now faces a $4.6 trillion debt. We
pay over $200 billion in interest payments alone.
A line-item veto takes the power away from the wheelers and dealers
and gives it back to the President and this Congress.
A line-item veto forces accountability on the part of the Congress
and the President, and stops the blame game that now routinely occurs.
I urge my colleagues to support this legislation and take yet another
step toward ensuring our Nation's future through accountability and
fiscal responsibility.
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may
consume to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm].
(Mr. STENHOLM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. STENHOLM. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to come to the floor today to debate
proposals to strengthen the ability of Presidents to identify and
eliminate low-priority budget items. The Members of the House will have
the opportunity to consider a variety of approaches to this issue,
including an amendment which I will be offering with John Spratt.
I know that my friends on the other side of the aisle have waited a
long time to pass a pure line-item veto bill. I do want to point out
that even the amendment before us today is not a line-item veto
constitutional amendment, which I believe is what most Americans are
thinking of when they speak about ``the strongest possible line-item
veto.''
Nonetheless, I have no doubt that supporters will pass the pure
statutory line-item veto when the Committee of the Whole rises after
debating the various amendments that will be brought to the floor
during the next several days. There also has never been any doubt about
my position on this so-called pure line-item veto; I have opposed it.
For those who believe that any President--Democrat or Republican--
should have minority rule over Congress, should be able to get just
one-third-plus-one of the Congress to agree with him on the most
targeted of funding items, those people should vote for the pure line-
item veto. I respect their right to have that opinion, but I strongly
disagree with it.
What some call ``modified line item veto,'' or what I prefer to call
``expedited rescission procedure,'' is the approach that I always have
found far preferable. Under this scenario, a President still would be
given the opportunity to propose cuts to individual spending or tax
items. Within 10 legislative days after the President sent such a
rescission package to Congress, a vote on that package would be taken
on the House floor. That bill could not be amended, except that 50
House Members could request a separate vote on an individual item which
had been proposed for rescission. If a majority of Members voted to
retain funding for that individual item, it would be struck from the
rescission bill. If the remainder of the rescissions were approved by a
simple majority of the House, the bill then would be sent to the Senate
for consideration under the same expedited procedure.
This latter approach encourages deficit reduction and maintains the
balance of power established by the Constitution, thus excusing it from
the grave Constitutional concerns created by the language of the base
bill.
I also want to be careful not to claim individual or partisan credit
for this approach. Expedited rescission legislation embodies an idea
which many Members, both Democrats and Republicans, have fought hard
for over the years. Dan Quayle first introduced expedited rescission
legislation in 1985. Tom Carper and Dick Armey did yeomen's work in
promoting this legislation. On the Democratic side, Tim Johnson, Dan
Glickman, Tim Penny, and L.F. Payne spent years as particularly
effective advocates of this legislation. Numerous Republicans,
including Lynn Martin, Bill Frenzel, Gerald Solomon, Harris Fawell, and
others made meaningful contributions to expedited rescission
legislation as it has developed. And of course, the language which we
voted on last year was the Stenholm-Penny-Kasich amendment. The deficit
reduction prowess of my two cohorts in that effort is almost legendary,
and deservedly so.
Thanks to the efforts of these and other Members, the House
overwhelming passed expedited rescission legislation in each of the
past 3 years.
I do not in any way intend to imply that all of these Members have
supported expedited rescissions to the exclusion of or even in
preference to a pure line-item veto. Although this proposal was
described a few years by Gerald Solomon as ``a tremendous compromise *
* * that this house can support overwhelmingly on both sides of the
aisle,'' my friend from New York has always made it clear that he
prefers the one-third-plus-one approach.

What I am saying is that, in an overwhelmingly bipartisan way,
Members have stated through their words and their votes, that the
expedited rescission procedure is a very good one.
Let me say that again. Members have stated through their words and
their votes that the expedited rescission procedure is a very good one.
That is important to emphasize because of the way which votes will be
taken in the next few days.
My colleague from West Virginia, Mr. Wise, will be offering precisely
my amendment which was approved by a vote of 342 to 69 last July. If I
were to have my way, that is the amendment that would prevail in the
end.
But I can count votes as well as anybody, and I understand that a
majority of this body now wishes to pass language along the lines of
the Contract With America when it comes to
[[Page H1101]] line-item veto. Therefore, I will subsequently offer an
amendment which is not a substitute, but rather is an add-on amendment
to H.R. 2. In this way, my friends on the other side of the aisle can
have the best of both worlds. They can maintain their language, but
they can also support language along the lines they have approved for
each of the last 3 years.
Where we are in agreement is in the belief that we must bring greater
accountability to the appropriations process and the tax benefits
process so that individual items may be considered on their individual
merits. The current rescission process does not make the President or
Congress accountable. Congress can ignore the President's rescissions,
and the President can blame Congress for ignoring his rescissions. I
believe that it is appropriate to strengthen the President's ability to
force votes on individual budgetary items.
To my friends on the left who feel that we don't need to take any of
these actions, I would like to make one further point. The current
discharge process for forcing a floor vote on the President's
rescissions is cumbersome and has never been used. The President is
required to spend the money if Congress has not enacted the rescissions
within 45 days. In other words, Congress can reject the spending cuts
proposed by the President through inaction.
According to data compiled by the General Accounting Office, Congress
has approved barely one-third of the individual rescissions submitted
by Presidents of both parties since 1974. Congress has ignored about
$50 billion in rescissions submitted by Presidents under the existing
process without any vote at all on the merits of the rescissions.
During the vote on the Stenholm-Kasich amendment last July, my
Democratic colleagues on the Appropriations Committee correctly pointed
out that Congress had passed more than $60 billion in rescissions of
its own since 1974. That notwithstanding, I do not believe that the
fact that Congress had approved more spending cuts than the President
had submitted is a justification for not voting on the President's
rescission proposals.
The public is fed up with the finger-pointing in which each side
argues that the problem is really the other side's fault. Constituents
do not consider doing better than the other side to be a substitute for
actually dealing with a problem. When we are faced with deficits in the
$200 billion range, we cannot afford to ignore any proposals to cut
spending.
Forcing votes on individual items in tax and spending bills will have
a very real cleansing effect on the legislative process and will take a
step toward reducing the public cynicism about the political process.
It provides the President with a real tool to ferret out questionable
spending items while preserving the power of Congressional majorities
to control spending decisions.
When we rise from the Committee of the Whole into the Whole House, I
will be submitting for the Record a number of items which will be
valuable to Members evaluating this issue as well as to scholars who
might be studying it. Included in this material are legal opinions from
the American Law Division of the Congressional Research Service and
answers to the most commonly asked questions about this issue.
I urge my colleagues to strengthen the process by voting for the
Stenholm-Spratt amendment and then voting yes on final passage.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am very happy to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to
the distinguished gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs. Fowler].
(Mrs. FOWLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend her
remarks.)
Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, none of us has the illusion that the line-
item veto will be a cure-all for our Nation's fiscal woes. It can,
however, be an important tool to help the Federal Government get its
chronic deficits--like this year's $176 billion deficit--under control.
The line-item veto will give the President the power to excise
wasteful pet projects and eliminate tax provisions that only benefit
special interests.
And it can work. In the 43 States where Governors currently enjoy
this power, it has been a success.

{time} 1330

In California, Mr. Chairman, former Governor Deukmejian used the
line-item veto to trim $1.2 billion from his State's budget. In
Wisconsin Governor Thompson has used the same authority to eliminate
some $143 million in wasteful spending. A 1992 GAO study estimated that
a Presidential line-item veto could have saved $70.7 billion in pork-
barrel spending between fiscal years 1984 and 1989.
Let us act before we lose another precious tax dollar to wasteful
spending.
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Barrett].
Mr. BARRETT of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, last session I had the
pleasure of joining the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] and
virtually every other Republican to support a true line-item veto, and
a number of Democrats decided it made sense for the President to have
the authority to get rid of pork barrel spending and especially tax
giveaways, both of which are important arrows in the quiver against our
rising deficits. But I am upset today, Mr. Chairman, because the
emperor has no clothes. The bill that we have before us only does half
the job. Although it gives the President the authority to get rid of
pork barrel spending, it does not give him adequate authority to get
rid of the tax loopholes.
Newsweek magazine put it best:

The fine print of the bill now moving through the House
reveals though the Republicans are tough on spending, they
are lax on special interest tax giveaways. The bill allows
the President to target tax benefits, but then defines that
phrase to include only a tiny number of small loopholes. The
vast majority of tax breaks, worth hundreds of millions of
dollars, would remain immune from the President's veto. Any
lobbyist looking for goodies from the Federal Government
could work through the tax code instead of the spending
bills.

Mr. Chairman, that is exactly what is going to happen if we pass this
bill. Any tax lawyer in this city, any lobbyists worth their salt, are
going to say, ``Let's not spend our time on the appropriations bills.
Let's find a time bomb that we can place in a revenue bill. Let's have
a tax loophole created in a revenue bill.''
Now what has happened? Last year every Republican voted to give the
President of the United States the authority to get rid of these tax
loopholes. In the Contract With America, Mr. Chairman, virtually every
Republican signed language that gave the President of the United States
the authority to get rid of these tax loopholes. But now the rubber
meets the road, and the bill is before us today, and the new leadership
does not want to give the President of the United States adequate
ability to get rid of tax loopholes.
Mr. Chairman, last year I bolted from my party in good faith because
I felt that the Republicans were onto something here. I thought they
were sincere in wanting to get rid of both pork barrel spending and tax
loopholes. But now in the 104th Congress, when they are in control, it
appears obvious to me that, yes, they want to get rid of this port
barrel spending because there is no growth in pork barrell spending. It
is not a growth industry in this town. But they do not want to give up
their ability to slip tax loopholes into revenue bills.
The previous speaker talked about bipartisan cooperation in this
House. Since every Republican voted in favor of the language that would
give the President the authority to get rid of tax loopholes last year,
and virtually every Republican signed the contract, that would give the
President that authority. I would ask that my friends on the Republican
side of the aisle keep to their word and not break that Contract With
America on this issue. Give the President the authority to get rid of
tax loopholes.
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2\1/2\ minutes to respond to
the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Barrett].
Mr. Chairman, in the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight we
adopted an amendment sponsored by the Democrats that would expand the
number of individuals, businesses or individuals, who are receiving tax
benefits to 100, to allow the President to veto a much broader number
of tax benefits. But at the same time we felt it was important not to
give the President too much power. That is a concern. I think anything
we do that shifts power to the President, we narrowed that to a very
defined area to get after the most egregious efforts to reward certain
interests in the Tax Code. To expand that further, in an unlimited way,
would give the President far too much power and would allow the
President to veto things that we do not want the President to be able
to veto,
[[Page H1102]] such as a middle-class tax cut, for example, if we were
to pass something like that.
Mr. BARRETT of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BLUTE. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.
Mr. BARRETT of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I have a lot of respect for
the gentleman from Massachusetts, as he knows. My understanding is that
this language, for example, would not give the President of the United
States the authority to veto out one of the tax provisions that we
have, for example, that would give a special tax credit for drug
companies doing business in Puerto Rico. This tax benefit gives 24
companies $2.6 billion in tax credits.
I ask the gentleman, don't you think that the President of the United
States should have that ability to get rid of that type of tax
loophole?
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, if I get the question from my good friend
correctly, he mentioned 26 companies?
Mr. BARRETT of Wisconsin. That is correct. There are 26 companies
that get $2.6 billion. There are 338 companies that benefit overall,
but 26 of those companies get the lion's share, $2.6 billion.
Mr. BLUTE. Well, if it related to specifically 26 companies, then the
President would be able to veto that particular benefit. It it goes
beyond 100, then he would not.
Mr. BARRETT of Wisconsin. And this provision does go beyond 100. It
goes to 338 companies, but again the lion's share goes to that 26
companies.
Mr. BLUTE. I would simply respond that we wanted to narrow the scope
of this capability of the President's, to limit it and to target it at
the most egregious examples of tax pork. I think we have done that. We
adopted a Democrat amendment.
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts [Mr. Torkildsen].
Mr. TORKILDSEN. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of H.R.
2--the Presidential line-item veto.
Last week this Chamber passed a constitutional amendment to require a
balanced budget in 7 years. The line-item veto is perhaps the best
single tool to help us achieve this goal. I would hope that every
Member who voted for the balanced budget amendment would support the
line-item veto as the next logical step toward eliminating the deficit
and balancing the budget.
Today, 43 Governors possess the power of the line-item veto. Many
times just having this power does a great deal to discourage
legislative add-ons and wasteful spending.
This issue is not a question of partisan politics or political
gamesmanship. We Republicans are giving this power to the President,
currently a Democrat. This is one of the best tools available to cut
wasteful spending.
Some have argued that the line-item veto grants too much power to the
Executive and that it represents a dangerous move toward centralization
of our Federal Government, which the framers of the Constitution
opposed. We must remember that the line-item veto is a way to reduce
the size of Government. The line-item veto is simply a modern
adaptation of the original Presidential veto which can be over-ridden
by a two-thirds vote of the Congress.
If we are serious in our desire to downsize Government; if we are
serious in our desire to see a balanced Federal budget; if we are
serious in our desire to be fiscally responsible, then the time has
come to stand up and be counted on this proposal.
Mr. Chairman, what is good for 43 of 50 Governors is certainly good
enough for the President of these United States. I urge my colleagues
on both sides of the aisle to support H.R. 2, and give the President
the ultimate weapon needed to reduce the defict--the line-item veto.
{time} 1340

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire how much time is left on each
side?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] has 6 minutes
remaining, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Blute] has 5\1/2\
minutes remaining, and the time of the gentlewoman from Illinois [Mrs.
Collins] has expired.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I will close with a few brief comments.
We have had in this general debate process a preview of some of the
proposed amendments that we may be talking about, and they really
underscore what the debate is. We have got a debate on a major policy
issue of whether we want a real line-item veto with a two-thirds vote
required to overturn the President's decision, or whether we want to
stick to the simple majority rule of approval that we have had here
under various titles and labels over the years, which is not really a
line-item veto.
It is a very good debate, and it is one that has already started, and
I hope it ends up with the toughest version, but I respect very much
those proponents of the other way.
My view on the other way is it clearly has not worked; otherwise we
would not be looking at couple-hundred-billion-dollar deficits every
year, we would not be looking at a $4.5 trillion national debt, which
is growing and predicted to grow over $6 trillion despite our current
President's best efforts.
It seems to me is we have to say, ``We surrender. it does not work.
We need a better system, better machinery, and better tools.'' And that
is what this process is about.
There is a concern that this is somehow going to get out of control.
We have built in, as a result of the deliberative process through the
committees, some oversight monitoring with GAO. It is a good provision.
We have gone into streamlining the time for review by the various
bodies, the executive and the legislative bodies, so that we move this
thing more quickly and do not interfere with the normal flow of
Government business, but we have check and balance points that come
more quickly.
We created a new process to guarantee every Member of this
institution the right to get an objection to what the President does to
the floor of the House for not one vote, not two votes, but in some
cases three votes, depending on which procedure is used.
We have picked the toughest way to go, because this is the toughest
problem we have in our country right now. There has been some talk
about if we do this we will never be able to change it. Well, I hope
we are not going to be able to change it, because it is the medicine
this country needs. I do not want to change it.

But I would point out I think most people will understand these types
of measures in fact can be checked or withdrawn by actions taken on
independent appropriations bills only must pass legislation that
exempts certain provisions that would override some of the concerns I
have expressed here today. I hope that does not happen, because I think
that would be weakening, but there is always a back door, it seems, in
Washington.
I think there is a real benefit to bringing the President into the
loop. It is not just the benefit of accountability and making the
President, if he catches a bit of mischief coming out of Congress,
being complicit in it. He has the opportunity and responsibility to
erase it. And this gives the American voters one more shot at
accountability when the November elections come. Of course, it is the
November elections that really are the core of democracy.
But beyond that, that extra accountability for the President, we have
something that I think is very beneficial that has been alluded to by
several of our speakers, and that is the interaction between the
legislative and the executive branches in the process of developing the
budget for our country as we go through the year.
I think that is a process that clearly is going to yield a better
product than we have had so far, less surprises, both happy and
unhappy, more predictable results, more efficient use of tax dollars,
more on-time targeting of the way we spend our money. And I think we
all come out ahead if we do this.
We do not present this legislation lightly. This has been well
thought out. It has been through the mill, through the cooperative
committee process, and I am very pleased to be associated with this
legislation and look
[[Page H1103]] forward to the opportunities for amendments.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, now is the time to give the President of the United
States the line-item veto authority. This issue has been kicking around
up her on Capitol Hill for decades, and has been discussed and chewed
over, committees have heard testimony, and still we have not done what
needs to be done and give the President this needed tool.
We already have an example of it working in our system of government.
It has been field-tested in the 43 States that now have a line-item
veto for their Governors. We have heard testimony in the committees
from liberals and conservatives, from Republicans and Democrats, that
the line-item veto works as a tool to keep the budget in line. There
can be no doubt about that, and it is time that the President had a
similar tool.
Beyond that, Mr. Chairman, I think it needs to be pointed out that in
the last Presidential campaign, both the Republican candidate, the
Democratic candidate, and the independent candidate all supported
giving the President a line-item veto authority. It was as close to a
consensus issue as there was in that campaign. The American people
support it by the polls. I believe it is time we did what the American
people want and give the President this very important tool.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr.
Neumann], one of the original sponsors of the line-item veto bill.
Mr. NEUMANN. Mr. Chairman, I believe this particular bill is
important for a whole variety of reasons. First off, I will tell you
when I campaigned last fall, I was concerned as to whether or not we
would be able to actually keep the promises in the contract. This is
important, because it is another one of those steps to keep the
promises we made last fall during the campaigns.
More important than that, our Nation right now today is $3.8 trillion
in debt. If every man, woman, and child in the whole country were to
take out their checkbook and just pay off their share of the national
debt, they would need to pay $18,500. For my family of 5, the Federal
Government has borrowed $92,500. Just think about this. Over the last
15 years, this Government has borrowed $92,500 on behalf of my family
of five. To just pay the interest on the national debt, my family must
write out checks or pay taxes, if you like, of over $6,000 a year. The
people in my district back in southeastern Wisconsin have average
incomes of $32,000 a year, and yet they must write out checks just to
pay the interest on the national debt of over $6,000 a year.
I strongly support this line-item veto and was one of the original
sponsors, because I think it is one of two pieces of legislation that
will stop this situation.
In Wisconsin, Governor Tommy Thompson has successfully used the line-
item veto to hold down spending, to balance budgets without raising
taxes on the Wisconsin people, and I believe we should be using those
Wisconsin ideas here in Washington, DC.
The other reason I strongly support the line-item veto is because it
is a bipartisan effort and it is very encouraging to me to come out
here, being outside the world of politics, and be involved in a bill
that has bipartisan support, where both sides of the aisle are working
together to get it through. It is very, very important if we are going
to reduce the Federal spending that we get this piece of legislation
through.
I do not think this is the end-all. I think there are many, many more
steps that are necessary to actually balance the Federal budget. But
this is certainly a very important first step as we move forward on
completing the items in the contract that we have pledged to the people
last fall.
Mr. EMERSON. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of the
line-item veto legislation. As a longtime author of a constitutional
amendment to give the President line-item veto power I am pleased to
take part in this important debate today.
As long as Congress continued to send the President jam-packed all-
encompassing spending bills, the President often had to choose between
signing unnecessary spending into law on one hand and shutting down the
Federal Government on the other. Or, signing a bill that was 70 percent
necessary, 30 percent unnecessary. A General Accounting Office [GAO]
report estimated that if the President had line-item veto authority
from 1984 through 1989, the savings would have ranged anywhere from $7
to $17 billion per year.
With the national debt skyrocketing toward $5 trillion and 1995
interest payments on the national debt totaling $339 billion, runaway
spending must be stopped. The Federal deficit alone stands at $176
billion this year. To balance the Federal budget, every man, woman, and
child in the United States would have to pay an additional $700 dollars
in taxes this year. A Presidential line-item veto is the first step
toward fiscal responsibility that will save taxpayers billions of
dollars. This, coupled with the recently passed balanced budget
amendment are important fiscal tools necessary to get our house in
order. I urge support of this important legislation.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2, the
Line-Item Veto Act. As an original cosponsor of this bill, I believe it
is long overdue.
In fact, this is a historic occasion. This is the first time that
freestanding line-item veto legislation has been allowed to come to the
floor of the House. For years, the Democratic Congress refused to allow
an honest vote on line-item veto legislation, despite the request of
Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton. Finally, under Republicans
leadership, Congress will move to take this necessary and important
action.
For years, Americans have been outraged by the provisions snuck into
much larger bills by individual Members of Congress. With
appropriations bills routinely running into the hundreds of billions of
dollars, many Members of Congress grew quite adept in adding their pet
provisions. Because the President's current veto authority is limited
to an up-or-down decision on a bill, Presidents have been forced to
sign bills containing Members' pet projects.
Here are few examples: In the fiscal year 1994 Agriculture
appropriations bill, Congress added $221,000 for blueberry research at
the University of Maine and $140,000 for swine research at the
University of Minnesota. The Commerce/Justice/State bill contained
$683,000 for fish laboratory repair in South Carolina and $400,000 to
deal with the algal bloom crisis in Maui. The Energy and Water bill
contained $50 million for one road project in West Virginia and $4
million for a program at Florida A&M University. The Treasury/Postal
bill included $120 million for a courthouse in Phoenix and $96 million
for a courthouse in Oregon. All of these items were cited by the
Citizens Against Government Waste because they were either only
requested by one Chamber of Congress, not specifically authorized, not
competitively awarded, greatly increased in funding over the prior
year, mainly of local interest, or not requested by the President.
Current rescission authority under the 1974 Impoundment Control Act
hasn't worked. Last year, Congress made several sputtering attempts to
enhance rescission authority. Given the extreme reluctance of Congress
to take up actual rescissions, one wonders if the zeal for enhanced
rescission in the past wasn't more directed toward keeping the line-
item veto off the agenda than to truly improving the system.
H.R. 2 gives the President a permanent legislative line-item veto.
With this authority, the President may strike or reduce any
discretionary budget authority or eliminate any targeted tax provision
in any bill. The President must prepare a separate rescissions list for
each bill and submit his proposal to Congress within 10 days after
signing the original bill.
The key to why line-item veto authority is better than enhanced
rescission is in what comes next. Under line-item veto, the President's
proposed rescissions are approved unless Congress passes a disapproval
bill within 20 days after receiving them. Enhanced rescission
legislation, on the other hand, disapproves the recommendations unless
Congress acts. With line-item veto, the upper hand goes to the cutting
side, where with enhanced rescission, the advantage goes to the
spending side.
H.R. 2 sets out clear procedures for dealing with a line-item veto.
The list sent by the President is unamendable. There are expedited
procedures to bring a line-item list to the floor of the House and
limits on debate time in the Senate.
The line-item veto will not solve our budget crisis. It will,
however, do something equally important--help to restore the confidence
of the American people in their government. It is time to give the
President the same authority that 43 of the 50 Governors have. It is
time for Congress to enact the line-item veto.
Mr. FAWELL. Mr. Chairman, for years I have supported a
straightforward way to help solve Congress' lack of spending restraint:
the line-item veto. Today, the House begins consideration of H.R. 2, a
bill introduced as part of the Republican Contract With America,
[[Page H1104]] which would provide the President with a permanent
legislative line-item veto. Line-Item veto authority would permit a
President to strike specific, wasteful spending projects from
appropriations bills as soon as they reach his desk. The funding for
any rescinded items would be canceled unless both the House and Senate
could muster a vote of two-thirds to override the line-item veto.
In the past, the rescission procedure has proven to be too
cumbersome. The burden has always been on the President to obtain
congressional approval during a fixed period of time; Congress need do
nothing to defeat a President's proposal. H.R. 2 would reverse this
burden: Presidential proposals would become law unless Congress takes
action to stop them.
With the line-item veto, Presidents can weed out wasteful pork-barrel
spending or tax benefits that are tucked away in otherwise good bills.
While some argue that line-item veto authority will have little effect
on bringing the Federal budget under control, I submit that if we can't
cut wasteful spending we will have little chance to make the tough
decisions needed to balance the budget.
Author Brian Kelly, in his excellent book ``Adventures in Porkland,''
described how pork-barrel projects--while not amounting in themselves
enough to balance the budget--are the ``grease'' that lubricates the
entire spending machine in Congress. He estimates that pork greases
more than $100 billion annually. Members of Congress are often afraid
to take on any spending programs for fear that a project funded in
their district might be jeopardized. Thus, a few million dollars spent
in Congressman X's district might keep him or her from cutting billions
of dollars in other programs that they otherwise would oppose. This is
where the line-item veto could really make a difference--it could
change the culture of spending in Congress for good.
There are numerous examples of how the line-item veto would have
remedied wasteful legislation. One of the best examples is the 1994
emergency spending bill intended for California's earthquake victims.
In reviewing that bill, I discovered the following items, among others:
$10 million for planning and development of a train station and
commercial center in New York; $1 million for Hawaiian sugar cane
mills; and, $1.5 million to dry dock and repair the Savannah, the
world's first nuclear powered commercial ship, among others. Because
the majority did not allow amendments to strike this pork from the
bill, the President was faced with signing the bill in its entirety,
with all of the pork included, or with vetoing the entire bill leaving
California's earthquake victims without assistance.
Mr. Chairman, this floor debate on H.R. 2 this week follows on the
heels of House passage of a balanced budget constitutional amendment. I
urge my colleagues to support this long-overdue reform. A line-item
veto will not, by itself, balance the Federal budget. It will, however,
be another effective weapon in the fight to reduce the Federal deficit.
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired. Pursuant to
the rule, the amendment in the nature of a substitute as printed in
House Report 104-15 is considered as an original bill for the purpose
of amendment and is considered as read.
The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute made in order
by House Resolution 55 as an original bill for the purpose of amendment
under the 5-minute rule is as follows:
H.R. 2

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Line Item Veto Act''.

SEC. 2. LINE ITEM VETO AUTHORITY.

(a) In General.--Notwithstanding the provisions of part B
of title X of The Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974, and subject to the provisions of this
section, the President may rescind all or part of any
discretionary budget authority or veto any targeted tax
benefit which is subject to the terms of this Act if the
President--
(1) determines that--
(A) such rescission or veto would help reduce the Federal
budget deficit;
(B) such rescission or veto will not impair any essential
Government functions; and
(C) such rescission or veto will not harm the national
interest; and
(2) notifies the Congress of such rescission or veto by a
special message not later than ten calendar days (not
including Sundays) after the date of enactment of an
appropriation Act providing such budget authority or a
revenue or reconciliation Act containing a targeted tax
benefit.
(b) Deficit Reduction.--In each special message, the
President may also propose to reduce the appropriate
discretionary spending limit set forth in section 601(a)(2)
of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 by an amount that
does not exceed the total amount of discretionary budget
authority rescinded by that message.
(c) Separate Messages.--The President shall submit a
separate special message for each appropriation Act and for
each revenue or reconciliation Act under this section.

SEC. 3. LINE ITEM VETO EFFECTIVE UNLESS DISAPPROVED.

(a)(1) Any amount of budget authority rescinded under this
Act as set forth in a special message by the President shall
be deemed canceled unless, during the period described in
subsection (b), a rescission/receipts disapproval bill making
available all of the amount rescinded is enacted into law.
(2) Any provision of law vetoed under this Act as set forth
in a special message by the President shall be deemed
repealed unless, during the period described in subsection
(b), a rescission/receipts disapproval bill restoring that
provision is enacted into law.
(b) The period referred to in subsection (a) is--
(1) a congressional review period of twenty calendar days
of session, beginning on the first calendar day of session
after the date of submission of the special message, during
which Congress must complete action on the rescission/
receipts disapproval bill and present such bill to the
President for approval or disapproval;
(2) after the period provided in paragraph (1), an
additional ten days (not including Sundays) during which the
President may exercise his authority to sign or veto the
rescission/receipts disapproval bill; and
(3) if the President vetoes the rescission/receipts
disapproval bill during the period provided in paragraph (2),
an additional five calendar days of session after the date of
the veto.
(c) If a special message is transmitted by the President
under this Act and the last session of the Congress adjourns
sine die before the expiration of the period described in
subsection (b), the rescission or veto, as the case may be,
shall not take effect. The message shall be deemed to have
been retransmitted on the first Monday in February of the
succeeding Congress and the review period referred to in
subsection (b) (with respect to such message) shall run
beginning after such first day.

SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

As used in this Act:
(1) The term ``rescission/receipts disapproval bill'' means
a bill or joint resolution which only disapproves, in whole,
rescissions of discretionary budget authority or only
disapproves vetoes of targeted tax benefits in a special
message transmitted by the President under this Act and--
(A) which does not have a preamble;
(B)(i) in the case of a special message regarding
rescissions, the matter after the enacting clause of which is
as follows: ``That Congress disapproves each rescission of
discretionary budget authority of the President as submitted
by the President in a special message on ________'', the
blank space being filled in with the appropriate date and the
public law to which the message relates; and
(ii) in the case of a special message regarding vetoes of
targeted tax benefits, the matter after the enacting clause
of which is as follows: ``That Congress disapproves each veto
of targeted tax benefits of the President as submitted by the
President in a special message on ________'', the blank space
being filled in with the appropriate date and the public law
to which the message relates; and
(C) the title of which is as follows: ``A bill disapproving
the recommendations submitted by the President on ________'',
the blank space being filled in with the date of submission
of the relevant special message and the public law to which
the message relates.
(2) The term ``calendar days of session'' shall mean only
those days on which both Houses of Congress are in session.
(3) The term ``targeted tax benefit'' means any provision
of a revenue or reconciliation Act determined by the
President to provide a Federal tax deduction, credit,
exclusion, preference, or other concession to 100 or fewer
beneficiaries. Any partnership, limited partnership, trust,
or S corporation, and any subsidiary or affiliate of the same
parent corporation, shall be deemed and counted as a single
beneficiary regardless of the number of partners, limited
partners, beneficiaries, shareholders, or affiliated
corporate entities.
(4) The term ``appropriation Act'' means any general or
special appropriation Act, and any Act or joint resolution
making supplemental, deficiency, or continuing
appropriations.
SEC. 5. CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF LINE ITEM VETOES.

(a) Presidential Special Message.--Whenever the President
rescinds any budget authority as provided in this Act or
vetoes any provision of law as provided in this Act, the
President shall transmit to both Houses of Congress a special
message specifying--
(1) the amount of budget authority rescinded or the
provision vetoed;
(2) any account, department, or establishment of the
Government to which such budget authority is available for
obligation, and the specific project or governmental
functions involved;
(3) the reasons and justifications for the determination to
rescind budget authority or veto any provision pursuant to
this Act;
(4) to the maximum extent practicable, the estimated
fiscal, economic, and budgetary effect of the rescission or
veto; and
[[Page H1105]] (5) all actions, circumstances, and
considerations relating to or bearing upon the rescission or
veto and the decision to effect the rescission or veto, and
to the maximum extent practicable, the estimated effect of
the rescission upon the objects, purposes, and programs for
which the budget authority is provided.
(b) Transmission of Messages to House and Senate.--
(1) Each special message transmitted under this Act shall
be transmitted to the House of Representatives and the Senate
on the same day, and shall be delivered to the Clerk of the
House of Representatives if the House is not in session, and
to the Secretary of the Senate if the Senate is not in
session. Each special message so transmitted shall be
referred to the appropriate committees of the House of
Representatives and the Senate. Each such message shall be
printed as a document of each House.
(2) Any special message transmitted under this Act shall be
printed in the first issue of the Federal Register published
after such transmittal.
(c) Introduction of Rescission/Receipts Disapproval
Bills.--The procedures set forth in subsection (d) shall
apply to any rescission/receipts disapproval bill introduced
in the House of Representatives not later than the third
calendar day of session beginning on the day after the date
of submission of a special message by the President under
section 2.
(d) Consideration in the House of Representatives.--(1) The
committee of the House of Representatives to which a
rescission/receipts disapproval bill is referred shall report
it without amendment, and with or without recommendation, not
later than the eighth calendar day of session after the date
of its introduction. If the committee fails to report the
bill within that period, it is in order to move that the
House discharge the committee from further consideration of
the bill. A motion to discharge may be made only by an
individual favoring the bill (but only after the legislative
day on which a Member announces to the House the Member's
intention to do so). The motion is highly privileged. Debate
thereon shall be limited to not more than one hour, the time
to be divided in the House equally between a proponent and an
opponent. The previous question shall be considered as
ordered on the motion to its adoption without intervening
motion. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion
is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order.
(2) After a rescission/receipts disapproval bill is
reported or the committee has been discharged from further
consideration, it is in order to move that the House resolve
into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the
Union for consideration of the bill. All points of order
against the bill and against consideration of the bill are
waived. The motion is highly privileged. The previous
question shall be considered as ordered on that motion to its
adoption without intervening motion. A motion to reconsider
the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to
shall not be in order. During consideration of the bill in
the Committee of the Whole, the first reading of the bill
shall be dispensed with. General debate shall proceed without
intervening motion, shall be confined to the bill, and shall
not exceed two hours equally divided and controlled by a
proponent and an opponent of the bill. After general debate
the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House.
The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the
bill to final passage without intervening motion. A motion to
reconsider the vote on passage of the bill shall not be in
order.
(3) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the
application of the rules of the House of Representatives to
the procedure relating to a bill described in subsection (a)
shall be decided without debate.
(4) It shall not be in order to consider more than one bill
described in subsection (c) or more than one motion to
discharge described in paragraph (1) with respect to a
particular special message.
(5) Consideration of any rescission/receipts disapproval
bill under this subsection is governed by the rules of the
House of Representatives except to the extent specifically
provided by the provisions of this Act.
(e) Consideration in the Senate.--
(1) Any rescission/receipts disapproval bill received in
the Senate from the House shall be considered in the Senate
pursuant to the provisions of this Act.
(2) Debate in the Senate on any rescission/receipts
disapproval bill and debatable motions and appeals in
connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than ten
hours. The time shall be equally divided between, and
controlled by, the majority leader and the minority leader or
their designees.
(3) Debate in the Senate on any debatable motions or appeal
in connection with such bill shall be limited to one hour, to
be equally divided between, and controlled by the mover and
the manager of the bill, except that in the event the manager
of the bill is in favor of any such motion or appeal, the
time in opposition thereto shall be controlled by the
minority leader or his designee. Such leaders, or either of
them, may, from the time under their control on the passage
of the bill, allot additional time to any Senator during the
consideration of any debatable motion or appeal.
(4) A motion to further limit debate is not debatable. A
motion to recommit (except a motion to recommit with
instructions to report back within a specified number of days
not to exceed one, not counting any day on which the Senate
is not in session) is not in order.
(f) Points of Order.--
(1) It shall not be in order in the Senate to consider any
rescission/receipts disapproval bill that relates to any
matter other than the rescission of budget authority or veto
of the provision of law transmitted by the President under
this Act.
(2) It shall not be in order in the Senate to consider any
amendment to a rescission/receipts disapproval bill.
(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) may be waived or suspended in
the Senate only by a vote of three-fifths of the members duly
chosen and sworn.

SEC. 6. REPORTS OF THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE.

Beginning on January 6, 1996, and at one-year intervals
thereafter, the Comptroller General shall submit a report to
each House of Congress which provides the following
information:
(1) A list of each proposed Presidential rescission of
discretionary budget authority and veto of a targeted tax
benefit submitted through special messages for the fiscal
year ending during the preceding calendar year, together with
their dollar value, and an indication of whether each
rescission of discretionary budget authority or veto of a
targeted tax benefit was accepted or rejected by Congress.
(2) The total number of proposed Presidential rescissions
of discretionary budget authority and vetoes of a targeted
tax benefit submitted through special messages for the fiscal
year ending during the preceding calendar year, together with
their total dollar value.
(3) The total number of Presidential rescissions of
discretionary budget authority or vetoes of a targeted tax
benefit submitted through special messages for the fiscal
year ending during the preceding calendar year and approved
by Congress, together with their total dollar value.
(4) A list of rescissions of discretionary budget authority
initiated by Congress for the fiscal year ending during the
preceding calendar year, together with their dollar value,
and an indication of whether each such rescission was
accepted or rejected by Congress.
(5) The total number of rescissions of discretionary budget
authority initiated and accepted by Congress for the fiscal
year ending during the preceding calendar year, together with
their total dollar value.
(6) A summary of the information provided by paragraphs
(2), (3) and (5) for each of the ten fiscal years ending
before the fiscal year during this calendar year.

During consideration of the bill for amendment, the Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole may accord priority in recognition to a Member
offering an amendment that has been printed in the designated place in
the Congressional Record.

{time} 1350

Those amendments shall be considered as read.
Are there any amendments to the bill?

amendment offered by mr. blute

Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Blute:
In section 2(c), strike ``paragraph'' and insert
``section.''

Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, this is a technical amendment called to our
attention this morning by the Office of Legislative Counsel. It is due
to a drafting error in that office.
It simply makes clear that the special message being referred to is
the one described in section 2 as opposed to a nonexistent paragraph.
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last
word.
Mr. Chairman, we have no objection to the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Blute].
The amendment was agreed to.

amendment offered by mr. clinger

Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Clinger: In section 2(a), strike
``discretionary budget authority'' and insert ``the dollar
amount of any discretionary budget authority specified in an
appropriation Act or conference report or joint explanatory
statement accompanying a conference report on the Act,''.

Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, the statutory line-item veto proposed in
H.R. 2 is broader and stronger, as we have heard in general debate,
than a constitutional amendment. It fulfills the President's request
that we give him the strongest possible bill, which is what we are
attempting to do.
Unlike a constitutional amendment, which simply permits the President
to
[[Page H1106]] line out spending items from appropriations acts, H.R. 2
permits the President to reduce or eliminate spending from bills and
accompanying bill reports.
In addition, H.R. 2 permits the President to veto targeted tax
benefits for 100 or fewer.
The purpose of my amendment is to clarify an area of potential
misunderstanding in H.R. 2. Our bill is intended to permit the
President to eliminate or rescind congressional earmarks for wasteful
spending.
We all know that these earmarks can occasionally be found in bills
but are more often hidden in report language to accompany those bills.
I think probably all of us have been sort of victimized by finding
things that we were not aware of at the time. My amendment simply
clarifies the understanding of our committee, I think, that the
President may look to both bills and accompanying reports or manager
statements in specifying rescissions proposals. In addition, my
amendment makes clear that the President may not look to OMB or agency
justifications or other types of documents to rescind funds for
programs not specified by Congress.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment will relieve the concerns expressed, I
think, legitimately expressed by some, that the President might, for
example, retaliate against a particular judicial circuit, and that, I
know, has been raised by the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr.
Kanjorski], by going beyond bill or report language to zero out funding
for that circuit. As was discussed in my committee, that was not the
intent and never was the intent of H.R. 2. This amendment simply spells
out in statutory language that understanding.
In addition, my amendment addressed the concerns of some Members that
the President might attempt to strike statutory language he finds
objectionable in an appropriations bill.
While I have been assured by both legislative counsel and CRS that
H.R. 2 does not permit such action, my amendment reaffirms that
limitation by specifying that the President may only rescind dollar
amounts, not bill language.
I think this confusion arises from the fact that in some States the
Governor does have the power to actually effect statutory language. It
was never our intent to give the President that additional authority,
which would really enable him to effect policy and change or undercut
congressional actions by changing statutory language.
This will just merely make it very, very clear that all we are
talking about is dollar amounts.
I would urge the amendment's adoption.
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last
word.
Mr. Chairman, I do so for the purpose of asking the gentleman from
Pennsylvania a question regarding his amendment. I know that the
language of the amendment is identical to language already in the
committee report that purports to describe the bill as reported.
On page 12 of the committee report on H.R. 2, it is stated, and I
quote,

we decided on enhanced rescission for several reasons. It
permits Congress to continue appropriating with lump sums.
After a President signs an appropriations bill, he may
propose for reduction or elimination any dollar amount
specifically identified in a bill or committee report or
joint explanatory statement accompanying a conference report
on that act.

Should we conclude then that the description of the President's line-
item veto authority which I read refers to the language in the
gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Clinger's amendment rather than the
language of the bill as reported?
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of the amendment, I am sorry,
I did not her the entire statement, but the purpose, I want to
reemphasize, is to make it very clear that it was our intent that the
President not be able to look beyond statutory or report language. That
is the absolute limit as to what he is able to look at or impact. There
had been some suggestions that this was kind of an open sesame, that we
were going to allow the President sort of to roam through all kinds of
extraneous documents and extraneous material to affect the report. We
are going to make it very clear that this is a severely limited power
and that it is limited to appropriations bills, statutory bills, and
committee reports.
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Let me ask then what might be an accurate
description of the bill as reported? I understand that the original
draft of the committee report, which was distributed to each member in
our markup, was actually written by the Congressional Research Service
of the Library of Congress and the CRS experts on these matters
described the authority this bill gave the President quite differently
than the way it is described in the version of the report which I read.
Let me quote from the original draft report which the Congressional
Research Service prepared. It said, ``moreover, after a President signs
an appropriations bill, he may go as deep as he likes within an
appropriations account to propose specific rescissions.''
Clearly, this describes the President as having unlimited authority
to reach within a particular appropriation passed by the Congress and
to cut spending for specific projects and programs such as
administrative expenses for a Federal court that may have rules against
a President on an important matter.
The question then is does the gentleman agree with the CRS assessment
that the President's line-item veto authority under H.R. 2, as
reported, is in fact unlimited, that a President may go as deep as he
likes within an appropriations account to cut specific projects?
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, if the gentlewoman will continue to yield,
he may within the appropriations bill. The purpose of this is to say
that he cannot go outside of these specifically enumerated sources to
do that. It would allow, yes, deepening. CRS was cooperating with us in
that language.
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. If the language in H.R. 2 concerning the
President's line-item veto authority did not change, the question is,
why was this section of the report changed from the original CRS draft
in which the President is identified as having unlimited authority to
the version in the filed report which identifies limitations on the
President's authority. There seems to be considerable confusion on the
part of the proponents as to just how broad the President's authority
in this bill actually is.
The description of the President's authority in the filed committee
report is clearly not accurate. I believe this is a good example of why
the majority should not be racing through the legislative process to
bring complicated matters like the line-item veto act to the floor of
the House. We should first make sure we fully understand what these
proposals do.
The gentleman's amendment also makes dollar amounts in committee
reports subject to the Presidential rescission. Why does the amendment
refer to committee reports? Is it intended to give the President a
basis for describing the budgetary authority he is rescinding? Is it
not the result that the President is being constrained by Congress
through something short of public law, and is that not an action that
would run counter to the Supreme Court's decision in INS versus Chadha?
It appears that this would be using the committee report to alter,
and I quote, ``the legal rights, duties and relations of persons
outside the legislative branch.''
What then is the practical effect of this amendment and does not the
amendment merely provide the appearance of definiteness and
specificity?
{time} 1400

Mr. CLINGER. If the gentlewoman will yield, the amendment's point, I
think, is to try to make clear the limitations that we are imposing
with this amendment.
I think that the gentlewoman is right, there has been some confusion
about this. We have been trying to say, Look, we are trying to limit
this to dollar amounts, and we are limiting to dollar amounts in
committee reports as well.
The suggestion that somehow we are going to be affecting policy
decisions made in committee reports or changing the emphasis is just
not right. The whole point of this is to make it very
[[Page H1107]] clear that this is a limited authority we are giving,
that we are not allowing a broad-ranging, free-wheeling President to go
around changing all kinds of things, so it is a limited thing.
Obviously, the gentlewoman does not think that it is specific enough,
but I think from my vantage point it does make it much clearer what we
are trying to accomplish.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Clinger].
The amendment was agreed to.

Amendment offered by Ms. Pelosi

Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment offered by Ms. Pelosi: Section 2 is amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
(d) Limitation.--No special message submitted by the
President under this section may change any prohibition or
limitation of discretionary budget authority set forth in any
appropriation Act.

Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment which states that no
special message submitted by the President under this section may
change any prohibition or limitation of discretionary budget authority
set forth in any appropriation act.
That is what the amendment says.
Mr. Chairman, I propose this amendment as one who rises in opposition
to the line-item veto legislation. I oppose the legislation strenuously
because I think that it does damage to the balance of power and
separations of power set forth by our forefathers in the Constitution.
In fact, I believe that in order for us to truly have a line-item
veto as is contained in this legislation, that it should require a
constitutional amendment and change in our Constitution, so disruptive
do I believe it to be of the balance of power.
Others have referenced in the previous amendment, in fact, and then I
know my colleague, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Moran], will have
one addressing the judiciary, but it would enable a President to even
be able to affect not only the actions of Congress, but also affect the
activities of the judicial branch, the
third branch of Government, so it is from that perspective, the
perspective that says that our forefathers did not want the executive
branch to have this much authority.

Indeed, the Presidency of the United States is a very strong
position, but our forefathers did not want a king. Hence, they wrote a
Constitution which gave the executive branch powers which were
appropriate to a system where we had a balance of power, and not a
monarchy.
Again, I say, Mr. Chairman, it is from that perspective that I offer
this amendment, not in support of the legislation that is on the floor,
but in clarification and mitigation of the powers that this legislation
gives to the President of the United States.
Mr. Chairman, frequently in legislating appropriation bills Congress
retains power to prohibit spending through clauses such as ``no such
funds appropriated under the act may be used for,'' and then the list,;
for example, years ago that was how funds were withheld from funding
the Vietnam war; or to limit spending through such provisions as ``no
more than x number of dollars shall be used for,'' and then you fill in
the blank for what that limitation may be.
So the purposes of the amendment, Mr. Chairman, is to clarify that
under this legislation the President does not have the authority to use
the line item veto to strike congressional prohibitions or limitations
on spending in any appropriations bill.
While I believe this language is consistent with what was reported
from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, I believe that
this amendment is necessary to make it very clear that this is the
congressional intent.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I would like to engage the chairman of the
committee, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, [Mr. Clinger], in a
colloquy.
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield to me?
Ms. PELOSI. I am pleased to yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania,
the chairman of the Committee.
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I support the gentlewoman's amendment. I
think it makes a valuable addition to the bill. It makes it very
crystal clear that this authority that we are giving to the President
is very limited in what he can do. It is limited to dollar amounts. I
think it is a very constructive and helpful amendment.
Ms. PELOSI. Reclaiming my time, Mr.Chairman, that would say, then,
that the understanding of this legislation of the chairman of the
committee, with the passage of this amendment, is that the President
does not have the power to remove prohibitions or limitations on funds?
Mr. CLINGER. If the gentlewoman will continue to yield, that is
right, has no power to change authorizing language in any respect
whatsoever. I think that is the intent of the gentlewoman's amendment.
That is what it does.
Ms. PELOSI. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. PELOSI. I am pleased to yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman. I certainly
concur with the chairman of the committee, the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Clinger].
Mr. Chairman, I wanted to tell the gentlewoman she was making great
progress on this issue until she mentioned Vietnam. We will let that go
by and just say that we prefer that if we accept her amendment, that
she be in favor of the bill. However, nevertheless it is redundant, but
it does speak to the clear intent of the bill, and we would certainly
have no objection to it, either.
Ms. PELOSI. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Chairman, I think this is an
example of where, as the gentleman is a supporter of the bill and I am
an opponent of the bill, that I am seeking to mitigate the impact of
the legislation, and I am pleased that it is acceptable to the majority
side.
I thank the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] and the chairman of
the committee, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Clinger], for their
support of the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from California [Ms. Pelosi].
The amendment was agreed to.
amendment offered by mr. moran
Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer amendment No. 1.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Moran: At the end of section 2,
add the following new subsection:
(d) Limitation on Application.--This Act shall not apply to
any discretionary budget authority for the judicial branch of
the Government.

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this amendment is simple. It
exempts the judicial branch from the provisions of this bill. It is not
meant to gut the intent of this bill in any way, and certainly is not
any kind of dilatory tactic. In fact, I trust that there are as many
constitutional scholars on the Republican side of the aisle as the
Democratic side of the aisle, so I would assume this would be a
bipartisan amendment.
Imagine, Mr. Chairman, this scenario: a new President comes to
office, promising an activist agenda. In his first 100 days he offers
sweeping new initiatives that create new Government programs, impose
new regulations on different sectors of the economy, and greatly
revolutionizes the current system of Government, but this President's
new ideas run up against a very resistant judiciary.
The Supreme Court does not agree with what he wants to do, so one
provision after another of this New Deal of legislation is overturned
and declared unconstitutional. The President becomes frustrated, and
tries to bend the will of the courts. The courts resist, and become
even more intransigent. The President tries to pack the court with
people that
agree with him, but he is unsuccessful.

What does he do? He punishes the courts, but in a number of very
subtle ways. He cuts their funds for bailiffs,
[[Page H1108]] he cuts their travel funds so they cannot travel
anyplace, he refuses the request for new judgeships, he cripples the
court.
Does this sound farfetched? Well, it happened. It happened under
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Mr. Chairman, this scenario could
happen again if this legislation is passed without this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, one of the most important foundations of our system of
Government is the separation of powers. It is advanced and guaranteed
by the independence of our judicial branch, and the independence of our
judiciary is secured by its independent budgeting authority.
This was not always the case. Before 1939, Mr. Chairman, courts were
administered through the Justice Department, within the executive
branch. They had to submit their budgets through the President, and
this placed the power and authority over the fiscal affairs that were
necessary for the conduct of those courts in the hands of the chief
litigant before those very same courts.
Congress recognized the inherent conflict of interest that dependence
of the judicial branch upon the executive branch could cause.

{time} 1410
And so it created the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, to
ensure that the courts were removed from that undue influence.
Today the President does not have the authority to modify the
judiciary branch's budget requests. He has to submit them to the
Congress unchanged. That is a law. Congress then has the full authority
to appropriate funds for the judicial branch. But under no
circumstances can the President punish the court because he disagrees
with its judgment.
This law would repeal that law, because it returns us to the
situation before 1939 and once again gives the chief litigant before
the U.S. courts the authority to reduce or to eliminate specific
appropriations for those courts.
As the gentleman just explained, he can reach in, inside the line
item appropriation that funds the Supreme Court or any other court of
appeals, and he can pick out individual activities that would not
represent a blip on the budget. They are less than 0.01 percent. But
those kinds of activities are dependent upon those thousands of
dollars, taking them away could cripple the ability of our courts to
conduct the
business of this Government, because the law says he can veto all or
any part of a line item of an appropriations bill.

That is exactly what some President in the future, will do with this
line-item veto authority, and I would remind our colleagues, we are not
just passing legislation for 100 days or one term of Congress but in
fact for the rest of American history. This is profoundly important.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore [Mr. Hobson]. The time of the gentleman from
Virginia [Mr. Moran] has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Moran was allowed to proceed for 3
additional minutes.)
Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, I want to emphasize that this amendment has
nothing to do with busting the budget, it represents less than .1
percent of the budget, but has everything to do with busting the
principle of separation of powers.
The gentlewoman from the District of Columbia [Ms. Norton], just
joined us. I want to mention a point she made in committee, because it
is terribly important for us to focus on this. Sometimes when we can
focus on specific situations, we understand the principle involved.
The gentlewoman from the District of Columbia [Ms. Norton] reminded
us of how President Eisenhower contacted Chief Justice Earl Warren
during consideration of Brown versus Board of Education and told the
Chief Justice he did not think the country was ready to desegregate our
public schools. But the Chief Justice was able to ignore the President
and do what I think was right, what I think the American people know
was right, because he did not have to go to the President the next
January hat in hand and ask for the money to conduct the Court or for
whatever additional bailiffs or clerks were necessary, because he had
independence from the President of the United States, from the
executive branch.
The goals of this legislation are noble. We must reduce Federal
spending and protect the taxpayer from unauthorized and unjustifiable
pork spending. But the judiciary is not and never has been part of the
problem. Not one dime in the judiciary account is spent for Members'
projects or for pork. In the process of accomplishing something else,
let us not destroy the independence and the autonomy of our judicial
system to cure a disease that simply does not exist.
I implore my colleagues, please pass this amendment. Maintain the
separation of powers and show the respect of our Founding Fathers in
the Constitution that has endured for the last 200 years.
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, let me say that this issue is an important issue. It is
an important one that was considered at great length during
deliberations on this matter in the committee. The amendment was
offered by the gentleman from Virginia and was defeated 29 to 17 on a
bipartisan basis.
I must say that I really respect the gentleman from Virginia a great
deal and I know of his interest and concern in this matter. I
appreciate his concern for the judicial branch. I certainly share his
interest in ensuring that our Federal court system obtains the
resources it needs to remain strong. That is the gut issue here.
I am not convinced, however, that an exemption from the item veto is
required in order to maintain that strength.
Our Founding Fathers were very deliberate when they established our
tripartite system of Government, and I do not believe they accidentally
stumbled onto a system where Congress appropriates funds subject to
Presidential approval and veto. They devised that system intentionally,
made no exception to the general appropriations presentation-veto
process for the judiciary. They treated all branches the same, just
like any other program, branch or agency, including Congress and the
executive branch where there are equal opportunities to engage in the
sort of mischievous conduct that the gentleman from Virginia foresees
in this instance if we do not exempt the judiciary.
The judiciary was required to seek and justify the funds it needs
before both Congress and the President. That process has not been
substantially changed in over 200 years. The judiciary is not currently
exempt from either the traditional veto or the existing empowerment
process.
This would represent a change from existing procedures. Under the
empowerment process, the judiciary is not exempted. For Congress to
provide what I consider to be a really sweeping and unique exemption
without careful consideration would in my judgment be imprudent.
Even though the House and the Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight in particular have considered the Federal empowerment process
numerous times over the past 20 years and have held dozens of hearings
on the issue, I must tell the Committee that our entire consideration
of the judicial exemption issue, in addition to the debate we had on
the gentleman's amendment, was rally a 15-minute presentation at a
single hearing that we held by one Federal court judge about 2 weeks
ago.
I might also state that we have reviewed all of the 43 States that
have a line-item veto to see if in fact there is an exemption provided
for the sort of thing that the gentleman from Virginia seeks to do at
the national level, and there is no such exemption on any of the States
that have the line-item veto.
Because I do not believe that it is wise for the House to provide an
exemption which fundamentally alters the treatment of the judiciary
vis-a-vis the other branches and every other Federal account without
careful consideration, I must oppose the gentleman's amendment.
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the
requisite number of words and to support the Moran amendment that
exempts appropriations for the judiciary.
[[Page H1109]] Mr. Chairman, this amendment points out very clearly
that this bill has implications for our whole system of Government that
go far beyond cutting the Federal deficit.
The independence of the Federal judiciary is a cornerstone of our
democracy and it is directly threatened by the power H.R. 2 gives the
President.
Do we really want the President to have the extraordinary power this
bill would give him to cut funds for the administrative expenses of
courts whose decisions he might not like?
Some would say the Congress already appropriates funds for the
judicial branch, so why not give the President this role?
However, there is an important difference. The legislative branch is
not a party to many cases before the Federal judges. However, about 50
percent, half, of all cases before the Federal courts involved the
executive branch as a litigant. Clearly the executive branch has plenty
of reason to want to influence Federal judges.
Unfortunately, this bill gives the President the ability to exercise
that influence in a very deliberate and a very direct way.
I would ask my colleagues to just stop a moment and think back to
past Presidents who have had major issues before the courts. As has
already been mentioned by the gentleman from Virginia, President
Franklin Roosevelt went to great lengths to defend the New Deal
programs against challenges before the courts.
{time} 1420

President Nixon fought bitterly to prevent the release of the
Watergate tapes.
It was also President Nixon's refusal to spend funds Congress
appropriated, I would remind my colleagues, that caused Congress to
enact the Impoundment Control Act.
Can anyone here say that a strong and determined President would not
use the line-item veto authority in H.R. 2 to influence judicial
rulings? Of course not. It is far too great a risk for this Congress to
be taking in the name of deficit reduction.
I would remind my colleagues that it was concern about Presidential
pressure on the judiciary by President Franklin D. Roosevelt again that
led to the enactment of the Budget and Accounting Act. We talk about
accountability. The Budget and Accounting Act, under this law, the
judiciary submits its budget requests to the President, and the
President is required to transmit them on to the Congress without
change.
If we do not adopt the gentleman from Virginia's amendment, we will
have effectively nullified the Budget and Accounting Act. Even though
the President would not be able to change the judiciary's budget before
it is submitted to Congress, he could use his authority in H.R. 2 to
line-item veto the judiciary budget after it is enacted by Congress.
Does this make any sense? I do not believe the American public will
think their interests have been well-served when they find out this
bill compromises the independence of the Federal court system.
To millions and millions of Americans--minority citizens, women, the
poor--the Federal courts have been their strongest, and at times their
only defender. In many cases, the issues before the courts have not
been popular, and judges have had to make difficult decisions.
I, for one, do not want to make it more difficult for the courts to
uphold and protect the civil and constitutional rights of our citizens.
Whether you are for the line-item veto, or not, I firmly believe that
it is in all of our interest not to tamper with the independence of our
Federal courts. I urge each and every one of my colleagues to vote for
this amendment.
It makes good sense to do so, it is constitutional to do so, and it
is the right thing to do.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words, and I rise in opposition to the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Clinger] has made
for Members all of the good arguments against this amendment. So we
will try not to repeat those.
But as far as the salaries of judges are concerned, article III,
section 1 of the Constitution, and you have a copy of it over there,
prohibits this body from fooling around with their salaries.
As far as courthouses are concerned, they do not even come under the
judiciary budget.
I used to be on the Public Works and Transportation Committee with my
friend from Pennsylvania, Mr. Clinger, over here. Courthouses come
under the Treasury and Post Office appropriation, not under the
judiciary budget.
But the thing that really gets under my skin is when I hear my good
friend, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Moran], stand up and he says
this item only counts for one-tenth of 1 percent of the budget. How
many times have I heard that?
You know, last March I introduced a
balanced budget on behalf of about 50 Republicans and Democrats. It
cut everything almost across the board, some more than others because
it was program specific. But I got calls from all over this country
saying, ``You know, this program only takes one-tenth of 1 percent.''
Well, one-tenth of 1 percent of the budget adds up to a lot of money.
We just finished putting people like me in that bind.

My friend, the gentleman from Massachusetts, Joe Moakley, who was
chairman of the Committee on Rules, had so much staff running around
that they were coming out of his ears, and we cut his staff back in
this Congress by a whole third. Do my colleagues know what? It is
functioning very, very well. I got about half of what he had, and we
are still doing the job.
But we set the example for the rest of the Federal bureaucracy. Now
we are going out and we are going to shrink the rest of the Federal
bureaucracy, hopefully by a third or more.
And that is true of the judiciary as well. They have got a lot of
employees over there. But if we are going to shrink the Congress, and
if we are going to shrink the Federal Government, and General Motors
and G.E. and IBM and everybody else are going to downsize, I think the
judiciary could be downsized a little bit too, if a President saw fit
to do so. That is all. It is very clear.
Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SOLOMON. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Virginia.
Mr. MORAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
First of all, I never mentioned the actual salaries of judges and we
know that that is not affected. But certainly the salaries of the
clerks, the administrative personnel, any travel money, bailiff money.
Now there are incidental expenses, and I think it is an important point
to make that this is not really relevant to the budget issues before
us.
I would ask the gentleman, has he ever heard of any pork on any issue
within the judiciary appropriations? I was on the appropriations
subcommittee that provided the money. It is a small amount; it does not
increase much each year.
The courthouses which have been controversial, come under the General
Services Administration. That is not under this budget, we are talking
about that. We are talking about just incidental expenses to conduct
the operations of the Supreme Court and the U.S. Circuit Court. Their
caseload has gone way up, there is a long delay. We are trying to
expedite the process of the criminal justice system in this country and
here we are going to make an issue out of this relatively small amount,
all in the guise of line-item veto.
Mr. SOLOMON. Let me just reclaim my time by saying last year the
judiciary request was for $3.1 billion, a lot of money. This Congress
did not give them $3.1 billion, I think we gave them $2.8 or $2.9
billion, because we did not feel they needed it.
We are the keeper of the purse strings.
Mr. MORAN. That is five one-hundredths of 1 percent of the budget.
Mr. SOLOMON. Now a billion here, a billion there, we are talking
about a lot of money.
The gentleman's amendment is not the only amendment pending. There
are 31 of them out there. A number of them have exemptions in them.
There is another one coming up to exempt the legislative branch. Should
the legislative branch be exempted? No; the
[[Page H1110]] answer is no. And we should not exempt anybody. Let us
put them all in the pot and I think any President, Democrat or
Republican, is going to be fair. It is his responsibility to run this
Government. Ours ought not to be micromanaging, but legislating and
passing laws. Let the President run the country.
Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite
number of words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the amendment which I am
cosponsoring today with my friends, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr.
Moran] and the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia [Ms. Norton].
Mr. Chairman, at the outset I want to assure my colleagues that this
amendment is not some frivolous attempt to cripple this bill.
It is not our purpose to argue with or pull a fast one on those who
feel that the line-item veto is needed to control spending.
The budget of the judicial branch is a minuscule part of the Federal
budget. This is not about balancing the budget or cutting pork.
Our amendment is even more important: safeguarding the judicial
branch from the possibility of intimidation, the possibility of
pressure from the President.
For 200 years, the Federal courts have been the guarantor of
individual rights and the dispenser of both justice and mercy in our
legal system.
More than any other institution of our Government, the courts made
possible--despite enormous opposing power--the full rights of
citizenship for millions of African-Americans and other minorities.
The judicial branch of Government also deals with some of the most
controversial and emotional issues in our society--issues that are also
among the most difficult for us to deal with.
As my colleagues have pointed out, our history is replete with Chief
Executives using whatever tools at their disposal to pressure or
intimidate the judiciary and thereby exercise improper influence over
its decisions.
The Nation's founders did not trust, nor should we trust, the
President's good sense, or his sense of duty or honor, to protect the
judiciary from undue influence and to insure its independence.
Mr. Chairman, we are all politicians here. All of us know the
practical uses of political power in all of its subtleties. We use our
power to send messages, to change policy, to influence decisions, and
to get results.
Maybe not today, maybe not 10 years from now, but someday in our
future--as has been the case in our past--some President will be locked
in battle with the courts.
I say to my colleagues, if you believe that every President of the
United States will always ``do the right thing''--that the President of
the United States will always use his power responsibly, then you
should vote against us.
But if you mistrust too much power in the hands of the Executive--as
did this Nation's founders; if you believe in our system of checks and
balances; if you believe in a free and independent judiciary; if you
believe that Congress has the responsibility and the obligation--as we
all swore on this floor 4 weeks ago, when we took the oath of office--
``to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United
States,'' then you should vote for our amendment.
{time} 1430

Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I think those of us in the majority have a great deal
of respect and admiration for the gentleman from Virginia. He is an
able member of the Government Reform and Oversight Committee and adds a
lot to the debate on that committee and did on this particular issue
which was dealt with extensively in the committee.
We join him in believing in an independent judiciary. We do think
that that is a cornerstone of our democracy. But we also believe that
his amendment puts the judiciary on a higher plane than the other
branches of Government, and in so doing tilts the balance of power
toward one branch.
The Founders clearly wanted a system of checks and balance where each
branch would be able to counteract the excesses of the other branches,
and they particularly wanted that to happen when two branches got
together on something, as the gentleman's amendment is putting forward.
The Founders dealt with this particular issue and decided that only
salaries--only salaries would be cordoned off and protected in the
Constitution, but that everything else would be in play in terms of our
system of checks and balances. They did that, I think, in a narrow way
for a very good reason, that the judiciary is not above scrutiny, is
not above the checks and balances that we seek in our system of
Government.
This bill does not change the Budget and Accounting Act. The judicial
budgets would still flow through the executive to the legislature
unchanged, but after the legislature intervened and dealt with the
judicial budgets, then it is proper that the President would be able to
exercise his ability to act as a check and a balance on that budget,
and that is what the existing situation is, and that is what the line-
item veto would allow the executive to do.
We heard great testimony from the State governments and the Governors
who have a line-item veto, and in most cases, if not in all cases, the
Governors are not precluded from using their line-item veto with regard
to judicial expenditures, and that is as it should be. Governor Weld of
Massachusetts described a situation that often happens, not only in
Massachusetts but in many States in which legislative appropriators get
together with the judiciary to form a kind of deal in which levels of
budgets are set and, indeed, numbers of court officers are set, and at
what court they will be stationed and even to the extent of who will
hold those court officer jobs, and more often than not those jobs
ultimately end up being held by the political cronies of the
legislative appropriators.
I believe that the executive, the Governor, should have the right to
discipline that process, to act as a counterbalance when the
legislature and the judiciary get together on something like that.
And so it is proper that they would be able to veto, use a line-item
veto, to say, ``Hey, folks, wait a minute, that is not proper. It is
not good for the taxpayers, the deal that you struck on court officers
and the level of your budget, and the Governor is going to veto that.''
That is a proper check and a proper balance.
I would ask, how is the relationship between the Legislature and the
judiciary somehow above these checks and balances? They deserve to be
scrutinized as forcefully and as vigorously as any other branch.
And finally, with regard to the fact that the Executive is a litigant
before the Federal courts, which is true, but it is also true that the
courts can interpret legislative laws and, indeed, from time to time
strike down congressional action as unconstitutional. So it is not a
complete separation with regard to that.
I think the amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia is a
mistake. I think we should reject it. I think we should pass a strong
line-item veto bill for the President of the United States.
Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, we spent a lot of time in committee. I do not think
that it was expected that we would spend as much time, but the debate
was, indeed, revealing, and many Members simply had not spent a lot of
time thinking about the judiciary and the role it plays or might play
generally.
For this amendment, for example, there were Members who thought that
in effect what you could do is to strike a line from the judiciary
budget, and the debate clarified that you could get down to the lowest
level of expenditure, because you could strike a partial expenditure as
well.
What was fascinating about the debate was that there was not always a
deep appreciation for the uniqueness of the judicial branch. Many
Members think of the judicial branch--and you have heard some of the
debate this evening--as just like the rest of us, just one of the rest
of us. That is what I want to speak to.
Indeed, I rise to speak for the branch that cannot speak for itself,
and in that respect it is particularly different
[[Page H1111]] from the two other branches. I do not rise to speak as a
lawyer partial to the judicial branch. On the contrary, I was one of
the leaders in committee in the 103d Congress to cut 10 percent from
courthouses, but we were cutting from the GSA budget, not the Article
III budget, the Article III court budget.
This House, of course, can cut from that budget in open debate for
the world to hear and see, and you would have to be able to do that
because the Framers understood they would have to leave the purse power
for all branches here. When we found that there were luxurious
courthouses that were heavily influenced by the judges themselves, we
took the judges out of what the judges should not be in, the
courthouse-building business.
But we do not ever want to give even the appearance of getting into
judges' business, and what I have heard here does not show a true
appreciation for both fact and appearances from the Congress, a branch
for whom appearances do not mean nearly what they must mean for the
courts.
Of course, we have a precedent of actual interference with the
judiciary through the budgetary process, and I do not speak, of course,
of the F.D.R. packing of the Court, because perhaps that kind of overt
activity is most easily checked. It is the chipping away at the budget
that is far easier to cover up or pass off as budget-cutting,
especially when you need a two-thirds vote to override a veto.
Retaliation to the courts does not have to be very large to be very
effective or to put in play a branch that should never be in play with
us and where we should only have something to say about how much money
they spend and just leave it as it be, and particularly leave them far
away from the executive.
{time} 1440

The courts are a sitting target for the Executive because it is the
Executive that is the prime litigator before the courts, and they have
a massive opportunity to tick the Executive off precisely because the
Executive is always there before them. The Congress was so concerned
about what in fact exists in actual precedent that the Budget and
Accounting Act says that the Executive has to submit the budget of the
Judiciary as is. We are told that nothing here would change this.
Nothing would change that, of course; instead of a crack on the front
end we open a crack on the back end. If you mean the Budget and
Accounting Act, and you act like you mean it, then you don't give up a
whole lot when you leave the judiciary independent; you do give up a
whole lot when you say we are going to treat the Executive the way we
treat everybody else, no different from anybody else.
Go back to Civics 101: You do not have to go to law school to
appreciate that the courts are different, and we have to concede that
they are different. There are reasons for safeguards here. You have to
ask yourselves, ``Yes this will be another check.'' But I ask you is
that check on the courts worth it? Is it worth giving the appearance
that the Congress would like to get to a part of their independence,
allow the Executive to get to a part of their independence, as indeed
he could do.
The Executive and the Congress are not independent branches; we are
meant to be responsive branches. In that way we are very different from
the judiciary. We, the Congress, and the Executive are much more alike
than the judiciary is like either of us. They deal with cases and
controversies, especially cases and controversies involving the
Executive. We do not. We must keep them out of the fray.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Hobson). The time of the gentlewoman
from the District of Columbia has expired.
(By unanimous consent Ms. Norton was allowed to proceed for 2
additional minutes.)
Ms. NORTON. I thank the Chairman.
We must keep them out of the fray, we must keep them from appearing
even to be in the fray. There is such a strict sense of ethics in the
profession that the judiciary may only come to Congress and testify on
limited matters, even when those matters involve themselves. We must
engage in conflict avoidance when it comes to the judiciary. We must
show restraint when it comes to the judiciary.
It was no part of the intent of the sponsors of this bill to alter
the balance of power between the Executive and the judiciary. The
intent clearly was to alter the power balance between the Executive and
the Congress.
We do not seek to alter this balance here. We do not need to alter
this balance here. It has never been much of a temptation. Yet we are
creating the impression we would like to open up that temptation.
The judiciary cannot speak for itself today. There is a good reason
for that. That reason is to completely depoliticize the judiciary.
Ironically, their silence, their mandated silence is part of their
independence.
So I rise to speak for an independent judiciary. Our bill loses
nothing by insisting that the judiciary remain impregnable as a matter
of fact and as a matter of appearances.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I missed some of the debate, but if I heard correctly,
the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Moran] says the President cannot alter
the budget of the judiciary submitted to him by that branch. I do not
think the gentleman from Virginia would argue that somehow the Congress
is bound not to alter the request that we get from the judiciary in the
appropriations bill. That just would not make sense. Of course, as I
believe the chairman of Committee on Rules pointed out, the judicial
branch last year actually got a little less from us than they wanted,
than they submitted.
The point I am trying to make is I do not think we should treat the
branches of government differently and put one above and out and off
the reservation because of some concern that someday we might have
intimidation or some other thing.
That is all part of the give and take of the process. We are trying
to open up the process, open it up to the sunshine, saying this is an
orderly way to submit a budget, everybody will honor the budget. Then
it goes through a process. Then when we add the powers we have to do
the business of governance in our Nation and clarify what should be
done and should not be done, that is the process. If we find we are
spending more than we are taking in, then we have the opportunity for
some rescission.
It is at that point that we work together with the executive and say,
together, how do we deal with this prioritizing where we want to spend
our money. I think that is the point we are trying to make. I think the
point you all are trying to make is that we are somehow going to have
to set the judiciary off the reservation; it would be out of the
process because they are somehow sacrosanct. I just do not think that
is an accurate description of the way it is supposed to work. I think
we are all supposed to equally participate. If there is belt
tightening, it is everywhere. If we accomplish all budgets that are
appropriate, then we will do that.
Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GOSS. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Virginia.
Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for giving me the
opportunity to clarify.
There is a 1939 law that prohibits the executive branch from altering
the budget request of the judiciary.
Now, it is up to the legislative branch to pare back, to make sure
that it is an appropriate request. We have done that every year. Last
year I think we cut it--I think the gentleman mentioned $3.1 down to
$2.8 million. They took their share of the cut along with everyone
else. We do not have a conflict of interest with the judiciary. We do
not litigate half of the cases before the Supreme Court. That is why
that 1939 law was put in.
So I have to correct what the gentleman suggested. The President, the
executive branch does not have the right to alter the judiciary
appropriation, which is a budget request at that point. This law would
give the President the ability to change our appropriation level, which
does not have to be what was requested. The Appropriations Committee
has full latitude to appropriate whatever we want. But we have no
conflict of interest with the judiciary. This law says that after we
make our decisions then the President can change those decisions and,
for
[[Page H1112]] what would not be certainly budgetary reasons but would
be political reasons, can change the budget of the judiciary branch; a
very small amount of money.
Mr. GOSS. Reclaiming my time, I would say there are no guarantees in
any legislation that we are proposing that I am aware of that is going
to provide all of the protections from politicalness. I do not believe
anybody has come up with that legislation. I think the gentleman has a
point on his side of it and we have ours, I think.
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. BLUTE. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. Chairman, this bill does not affect the Budget and Accounting
Act. The budget would still flow through the executive untouched. But
once the legislative branch was involved then, rightly so, the
executive branch should be involved also in our system of collection
and balances.
If there are tremendous changes made by the legislative, it seems to
me the executive should be involved also.
Again, with regard to this idea that somehow the legislature has
nothing to do with the courts, there are no conflicts there, there are.
The courts ultimately interpret our laws and from time to time strike
them down as unconstitutional. That is a pretty intimate relationship.
Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss]
further yield?
Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.
Mr. MORAN. I thank the gentleman for continuing to yield.
Mr. Chairman, I have to remind the gentleman that the legislative
branch is not a litigant before the Court. That is a problem. The
Justice Department, the executive branch litigates half of the cases
that come before the Court. That is where the conflict of interest
exists. We do not have a conflict of interest here except in very minor
areas.
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I wish I had the eloquence and the power to try to
reach out to the Members of this House today and give some idea of the
depth of harm we are doing. But I know that the die is cast on this
bill and that my words would just go into the Record and be forever
lost.
The Delegate from the District of Columbia was right, we had a
lengthy debate on this issue in the committee, and I think frankly it
is one of the best that I have ever heard.
I suppose those of us who stand up on the floor from day to day and
try to talk about the Constitution, the separation of powers, must
sound quaint and even old fashioned because I know that the new day has
dawned and the thing they are going to do is to keep their word with
the contract.

{time} 1450

The question that keeps plaguing me is: What possible reason does
anyone have to believe that a President of the United States is going
to be infallible, benign, upright, and totally altruistic? As a matter
of fact, when someone said awhile ago we did not want to raise the
judiciary above the other branches, what we are doing is raising the
executive above all other branches, and, as someone said again this
morning, that we are giving the ultimate weapon to the executive. When
our Founding Fathers decided the best way to keep politics out of
government was to have three equal branches of government, they knew
what they were doing. If we do not believe in checks and balances
anymore, then let us go headlong into this business of simply giving to
someone at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue the right to decide whatever is
going to happen in the Congress of the United States.
I have talked to some of the Members whose States have line-item
vetoes, and in many cases it amounts to little more than an opportunity
for blackmail. One Member told me in his State every member puts in
everything in the world in the bills that anybody asks them to knowing
they will get about a third of it, and they say, ``The Governor killed
it,'' and the Governor can also say, ``If you want that water project
in your district, son, you better support me for reelection.''
There is no protection from that and no reason for us to believe that
what we are handing over today, would not be a weapon that could be
used in a political way. The only protection we have is what we have
now, and this is a strong three-part government that we are quickly
dismantling.
I do want to make a plea for the amendment offered by the gentleman
from Virginia [Mr. Moran] that the courts are different. We are not
talking about the bricks and mortar. It is not the buildings that we
are so concerned about, and Lord knows we are going to keep costs down,
and we have done that; that is our job here. We are talking about their
freedom to make the best judicial decision they can make unfettered by
pressure.
Why in the world would we go back to the days that many of us lived
through in the Watergate era when a President of the United States did
everything he could to influence the courts? But thank G-d for the
Constitution of the United States that he was unable to do it.
Surely, as we rush to dismantle the Constitution and the government
that has been the envy of the world and that has stood us in such good
stead for over 200 years, we can at least make some sense out of what
we are doing today, and, if we think, and many Members in this House
think, that they do not have the brains, or the will, or the backbone,
or the gumption, or the honesty, or even the decency to do the right
thing, and they have got to let the President do it for them, at least
let us do what has been suggested before. Let us speak for the branch
that cannot speak for itself. Let us not destroy the judiciary of the
United States which has made sure over the years that we have
maintained who we are and maintained what we are.
Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I love the fact that we have for the first time in
many, many years an open debate on what truly is a very important piece
of legislation, and I know there are some Members who think it may take
too long, but I have learned a lot from my colleagues on the other
side, and I also have thought a lot about this issue, as they have, and
want to weigh in.
I hear talk about an independent judiciary, and I want to say without
any hesitation that I want the same independence, that I want the same
independence that I see in the judiciary. I want to see that
maintained, and I take some exception to an argument that says that
somehow this amendment will give them the independence that they would
not have if this amendment were not to pass.
This amendment is wrong because it flies in the face of separation of
powers. We in this amendment would give to the legislature a power that
it does not deserve. We would give the power for the legislature to
have the same kind of manipulation that is seen in the President
because the President maybe has been a Republican President for so long
that they tend to think that way and think that all virtue is in the
legislative branch. It is not. That is why our Founding Fathers made
sure there were three separate branches with three separate powers.
I want the judicial branch to be the judicial branch. I want the
legislature to be able to bring forward appropriations. I want the
President to utilize the power to veto when he thinks there is excess.
I do not want to create an island unto itself within the judicial
branch, so I stand firmly in support of an independent judiciary.
What I think happens if this amendment were to pass is, when the
judges come or their people come and sit down in that room with the
legislative branch, there is a cozy possibility of a relationship, and
somehow the argument that 50 percent of the litigation is the executive
branch, implying that the executive branch, as the lawyer for the
legislative branch, is totally in agreement with everything it brings
before the court, it is enforcing our law, my law, the law of the
legislative branch passed into and signed by the President. But maybe
it was a previous President. Maybe it was not the President who is now
President. He may not even agree with the legislation that he is having
to defend because he is required to as the executive branch person.
When I hear questions to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr.
[[Page H1113]] Blute] and to others implying that somehow the President
is the litigant, he is the attorney representing the client. We are the
client. But somehow it is all right for the client and the judiciary to
be in bed together in the sense of making their budget without the
oversight of the executive branch. I think the executive branch should
weigh in.
And when I look back at the Federalist Papers, that is what our
Founding Fathers thought as well. Madison in Paper 47 said he
proclaimed that accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive and
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, of many, and
whether hereditary, self-appointed or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.
I say to my colleagues, you think, as you argue this, that you are
protecting the judicial branch in our government. I think you are
hurting it. I think that we want separation. I believe with all my
heart and soul, whether you agree with me or not, that I want the
separate power. I don't want the executive branch being a judiciary
branch. I don't want the judiciary branch being a legislative or
executive branch. I want to keep them separate, and by keeping them
separate we have a check and a balance.
So, I calmly, I calmly, object to the kind of comment that says that
maybe we do not understand what is happening. I think we do, and I
think my colleagues do as well. I just think that we come from it from
a different perspective.
I believe that our Founding Fathers were right. I say to my
colleagues, I believe our Founding Fathers didn't want two to team up
against one. I don't think they wanted to leave one branch out so it
couldn't weigh in, and I think, when you have three, you guarantee
there will be fairness and that one won't become dominant, and just as
some of my colleagues, who rightfully know that the judicial branch, in
particular as it relates to civil rights issues, has been your
champion, just as it has been, there may be some day when it isn't your
champion. It may be that the executive branch is your champion, and it
may be the judicial branch----
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Hobson). The time of the gentleman from
Connecticut [Mr. Shays] has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Shays was allowed to proceed for 2
additional minutes.)
Mr. SHAYS. It may be that the executive branch is your champion and
my champion on this issue and that the judicial branch isn't. It could
be a different court. It could be filled with different people.
In response to the question, do I think all virtue is in the
executive branch: of course not. In response to the question, do I
think all virtue is in the judicial branch: of course not. In response
to the question, do I think all virtue is in this place: no, I think it
is not, and that is why I want that balance, and that is why I want
those powers separate, and I will fight as hard as I can to somehow cut
out one branch from the process that it was given to us by the Founding
Fathers.
I know we are all sincere here, and at the end I could be wrong, but
I feel this as passionately as my colleagues do on the other side.
{time} 1500

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number
of words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment of the gentleman
from Virginia [Mr. Moran] and against the line-item veto.
Mr. Chairman, when the 20th century concludes, there will be but two
nations who end this period of history with the same form of government
with which the century began. All others have fallen victim to
revolution or tyranny, internal or external. Only the United States and
Britain remain. And if there is a common thread through their forms of
government that may account for their survival, it is the concept of
limited executive power and the separation of the powers of government.
Our Founding Fathers believed that the principal threat to American
liberty would never be a foreign foe, no invader or tyrant. It would be
within us, if anyone succeeded in concentrating executive powers. So,
based on their own experiences with the British monarchy, they sought
to divide the executive powers of this country to assure that there was
no concentration. They recognized, as we have experienced, that it
would often be inefficient, sometimes wasteful, always slow, and, as
indeed history has proven, it would be very frustrating, but that
indeed nothing else could assure the continuation of liberty.
Under this system we have seen the appointment of Presidential
powers; taxation powers to the Congress, appropriation powers;
declaration of war to the Congress; Commander in Chief to the
President. But the balance has worked.
Now some would have us believe that one man, a President, would
better serve this country by having the power to rewrite or eliminate
entire appropriations. Their argument rests first on the notion that
there is no other alternative to reducing spending. This ignores the
fact that in our constitutional scheme, there is already a right to
reduce spending through rescission. Indeed, in the last 20 years
Presidents have proposed 72 billion dollars' worth of rescissions, and
this Congress has approved 92 billion dollars' worth of rescissions.
Second, their argument rests on the fact that they believe we are
duplicating a constitutional arrangement that is already successfully
implemented in the States. But a President, with his vast powers of war
and peace, control of our liberties and our economies, is not simply a
larger Governor. He has powers of a vastly different proportion.
But even if the argument were accepted, the power of rescission to
both reduce and eliminate appropriations is denied 40 Governors,
specifically denied them, for the very reasons we cite here today.
So we do not duplicate the experience of the States, we greatly
exceed it.
Third, even if these arguments are not accepted, there is not
evidence that these powers being given to each executive would in fact
have a meaningful impact on expenditures.
Indeed, the Public Administration Review has studied 45 States that
have a line-item veto, and concluded:

It is easier to portray the line-item veto as an instrument
of executive increasing power, rather than an instrument for
fiscal efficiency. The line item veto probably has had a
minimal effect on making state government more fiscally
restrained.

Fourth, the entire proposal is based on the assumption that somehow
Presidents have a monopoly on good judgment, that somehow they would be
fiscally more responsible.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr.
Torricelli] has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Torricelli was allowed to proceed for 2
additional minutes.)
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, the experience of this Congress in our
own time has been exactly the opposite. Our national debt has increased
by fourfold not because of a Congress, but because of the very
executive power that you are using today to control spending. It was,
after all, during the Reagan and Bush administrations where they
proposed spending in excess of the spending proposed by budgets within
this Congress against restraint attempted in this Congress that this
deficit was created.
But indeed, Mr. Chairman, none of these arguments compare with the
concern for our constitutional government. Our country has been blessed
with leaders like George Bush, Bill Clinton, Gerry Ford, and Jimmy
Carter, who, even if they possessed executive power, would not have
abused it. But who here can be certain that will be true for all time?
Who would serve on a Watergate Committee if Richard Nixon had this
power over your district? How would the Vietnam war have been different
if Lyndon Johnson had had the power to control your districts if you
voted against appropriations? And what of Harding and Teapot Dome, or
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, as the gentleman from Virginia has
suggested, over the courts? How would American history have been
different?
I know that our country is troubled, and I know that we have
problems. But this constitutional arrangement has withstood civil wars,
international conflict, and a depression, and served
[[Page H1114]] this country well. Certainly no problem before us today
is so great that it would require us to change this balance of powers,
as our fathers before us refused to do in times of much greater
national peril.
The proper power of this country with regard to appropriations
belongs in the People's House. If that power is not handled well, the
people have a remedy with elections. It is best not taken away from the
people themselves.
Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I would just like to take probably less than 5 minutes
to bring forth a couple of points that have been made here. One is, I
do not think there is anybody in this Chamber who is any less
protective than anybody else of the 435 of us of the three separate
branches of government. I think it is something we have all learned and
we all recognize. I have never heard anyone in this Chamber at any time
before I got here or since I have been here who has in any way attacked
that particular premise, and my judgment is that this legislation, the
line-item veto legislation, does not really attack that particular
premise.
I believe that the three branches of government continue to be
protected. If we were really concerned about the involvement of the
President with respect to the Federal judiciary, I would think we would
have legislation before us to take away the right of the President to
appoint the members of the Federal judiciary, who I might add are paid
very well, they are paid for life, and they have lifetime appointments.
So I do not think they feel very threatened by what this Congress may
do in this particular legislation.
Obviously, as has been explained here, I think the gentleman from
Virginia [Mr. Moran] explained it, the money we are dealing with here
is really funding of some of the clerical and other functions of the
judiciary. It is clearly an issue of concern to them, but I do not
think in any way could this Congress or the President of the United
States either overturn or influence the judiciary with changes in that
particular area.
But I have looked back, and it has been said on this floor before and
it should be repeated, that as far as I know, none of the line-item
vetoes in any of our 43 States pertains to an exception for the
judiciary. It just does not exist. I do not know of any exceptions for
any parts of those governments.
Generally when a line-item veto has been granted, when it has been
sought in the history of this Congress, it has been sought for the
entire spending programs that may be in a budget, and nobody has been
exempted before, no part of the budget has been exempted before.
I should also point out that under this particular legislative line-
item veto, that Congress can override a presidential veto. Yes, you
have to go through a majority vote and a two-thirds vote, but indeed it
can happen.
{time} 1510

I would suggest by that that if a President would do what some
Members have insinuated that a President might do or possibly could do,
they would do this at high political risk. There is not a single Member
who is opposed to that who would not rise to it and say that the
President had no right to line-item veto that particular item. We feel
that was wrong and we feel that President should pay for it. I think
politically they would pay for it.
I would also point out that in the framework of the work that is done
by the Budget Committees and within this Congress and by the President,
we have always set the budget of the judiciary. It is something that
has always been up to the other two branches of Government. It is not
set by the judiciary. I think we need to remember that as we continue
to debate this argument.
Also, if we start here with the judiciary, and admittedly we are
talking about a branch of Government so it seems to have a greater ring
of importance to it, but the bottom line is, if we start there, are we
going to start to exempt other areas of importance. How about a
President who does not like defense? Are we going to start to deal with
that, or EPA or something of that nature?
I think for all of these reasons that the argument is actually, while
it is important and the earnestness of those who are making it is
absolutely sincere and real, and I believe that, my view is that this
particular argument, while it is not de minimis, is of much less
importance in terms of the ability to influence the judiciary than has
been made here today.
For all these reasons, I oppose this particular amendment. And I
assert that the line-item veto should continue as it is, unfettered by
any exemptions to it so the President and the Congress can work
together to have better budgetary processes in this country.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment. I might add I knew
nothing of the purpose or the need for such an amendment until I
attended the hearing which our committee held on this particular bill.
I think it bears emphasizing that this amendment was not originated in
our committee. It was requested by the judiciary conference and a
representative of the judiciary came and asked for it specifically.
Basically I think it is worth stressing that if we adopt this
amendment, we lose very little in terms of strengthening, bolstering,
building up the budget process, which is the purpose of this bill, but
we gain a great deal in terms of protecting our political processes.
What are the purposes of this bill after all, H.R. 2?
No. 1, it is to cut spending, cut spending and reduce the deficit.
Frankly, I think it is vastly oversold. I doubt that it will really
have more than a footnote's impact on the deficit reduction when the
history of the rest of this decade is written, if it is indeed passed.
I think the more important purpose of it is to restore public
confidence in the appropriations process in this Government,
particularly in this Congress. The people want to know that the budget
has been scrubbed. They want to know that we have culled out and the
President has the power himself independently to cull out and clean up
the budget and get rid of anything that is unwarranted or wasteful. It
gives the public some additional authority, a little more confidence in
this institution, which is sorely wanting.
But we can adopt this amendment and should adopt it and not detract
one wit from either one of those purposes because the amount of money
we are talking about here is miniscule. This will leave, even if we
adopt the amendment, the entire discretionary budget, $545 billion on
the President's veto pad. He can still wield his veto pen as to all of
the expenditures in defense and everywhere else in the budget.
Indeed, if the proponents of this bill, H.R. 2, are concerned about
this amendment because it is a tiny exception, it is a small loophole,
they really should focus on two amendments that we are going to
offer later in this process. One is to expand the coverage of the
President's veto so it extends the contract authority implemented in
public works bills. That is worth considering. It has vastly more
significance than this particular amendment here. Or they should look
at the Tax Code and the amendment we will offer that deals with tax
expenditures which is spending by another name implemented through the
Tax Code.

Those two amendments would vastly expand the reach of the President's
veto power and undergird the purpose of this bill a lot more than this
minor amendment which we are talking about here, minor in terms of
detracting from the budget process.
So we have an alternative, if we want to make this bill more
effective. We can pass this bill, as the gentlewoman from the District
of Columbia said, and lose nothing, really. But we gain a great deal in
terms of our independence. We do not detract in the least from the
line-item veto power, but we do defend a concept that has lasted for
200 years, a concept that we cherish in this country, that is judicial
independence, the independence of our judicial branch.
Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Moran].
Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, I certainly thank my friend, the gentleman
from South Carolina. In fact, there is less need to stand up, after
listening to my colleagues make the arguments so
[[Page H1115]] eloquently, more eloquently than I have been able to,
but I would certainly underscore the point that we are not talking
about anything that is particularly relevant to balancing the budget
here, we are talking about approximately one one-hundredths of 1
percent of the budget.
So it is not an issue of money and there has never been an issue with
regard to the judiciary branch appropriation. We cut it each year, the
legislative branch does. And it amounts to a little bit of money.
But even if we eliminate it entirely, all the functions of the
judiciary branch, it is not going to create a blip on the Federal
deficit. But I think it would do profound damage to the structure of
this Government.
And my friend from Connecticut, who has left, said that we might have
a different opinion if there was a different party in the White House,
if it was a friend versus someone we oppose politically. I would remind
my friend from Connecticut and anyone else who was persuaded by that
argument that in 1939, when the law was passed that we are really
addressing, it was an overwhelmingly Democratic Congress. They had to
show a tremendous amount of political courage to say: Wait a minute,
there is something wrong here. There is something wrong. The President
is abusing the fundamental principle of separation of powers.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment of the gentleman
from Virginia [Mr. Moran] which would exempt spending for the judicial
branch from the scope of the line-item veto legislation.
In the debate on another amendment, I rose in opposition to this
legislation, the line-item veto legislation, because I believe it gives
too much power to the executive branch. And the tradeoff, in turn, to
reduce deficit spending is not enough to justify that exchange.
But whether we agree or disagree on what form the line-item veto
should take, whether it is two-thirds to override a President's veto or
whether we agree or disagree on whether there should be enhanced
rescission with a simple majority to get a particular project back into
the appropriations bill, I think we should remove all doubt in
everyone's mind that we all do agree that the separation of power is
important to us, that we are true to the commitment of our Founding
Fathers of separation of power.
I think this is a sad day when we are abdicating to the executive
branch what our Founding Fathers did
not give them.

My only hope and encouragement I received is from the leadership of
the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Moran]. I think it is completely
appropriate that he is presenting this amendment, that he has worked so
hard on it, and it is in the spirit of our Founding Fathers from
Virginia that he carries on their legacy.
Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Moran].
Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank my very good friend from California
so much, particularly for her very kind words.
There is no question that whereas the Founding Fathers, many of whom
came from Virginia, will remain in our memory, I am not going to remain
in anybody's memory after I am out of this House. And in fact, the
people that stood in this very body and that cast the vote in 1939 to
establish a law protecting the separation of powers are lost from
memory. We do not remember their faces or their names or even their
words.

{time} 1520

However, their action was remembered because they did the right
thing. They showed a whole heck of a lot of political courage in
standing up to an extremely popular and almost domineering President.
Members can be sure that there was a lot of pressure on them to do
the easy thing, to let it go, but they would not, because they
understood that the structure of our Government was threatened, so they
said, ``No, Mr. President, you cannot do that. We have got to make the
judicial branch independent,'' because we have three branches of
Government.
When we are in conflict, we need that third branch of Government to
render an independent judgment. That is what the American people ought
to be able to depend upon. Every American voter ought to have the
security that the structure of our Government, which has endured for
200 years, which has been a model for the whole rest of the world, will
continue in its enduring form.
Mr. Chairman, I do not want to get too melodramatic here on this
vote. I do not want to overstate the case. However, I think it would be
difficult, really, to overstate this case, because in the process of
trying to respond to what the polls tell us and to what the public
sentiment seems to be, to cut the budget, to give the President
extraordinary powers, to eliminate pork and so on, we are going to do
real damage to the fundamental underpinnings of our democracy.
Mr. Chairman, I would urge my colleagues to act as that Congress in
1939 acted, to show the kind of political courage that they showed, to
do the right thing as they did, to sustain our separation of powers,
and to maintain the independence of the judicial branch of Government.
Mr. Chairman, the issue cannot be overstated. I thank all of my
friends and colleagues who have stated the argument so much better than
I. Mr. Chairman, I would urge this body to support the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Moran].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.

recorded vote

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 119,
noes 309, not voting 6, as follows:

[Roll No 85]

AYES--119

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Barrett (WI)
Beilenson
Berman
Bishop
Bonior
Borski
Boucher
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Clay
Clayton
Clyburn
Coleman
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Conyers
Coyne
Danner
de la Garza
Dellums
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Durbin
Engel
Eshoo
Evans
Fattah
Fazio
Fields (LA)
Filner
Flake
Foglietta
Ford
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gonzalez
Green
Hastings (FL)
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hoyer
Jackson-Lee
Jefferson
Johnson, E. B.
Johnston
Kennedy (RI)
Klink
LaFalce
Lantos
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Maloney
Manton
Markey
Mascara
McDermott
McKinney
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Mfume
Mineta
Mink
Mollohan
Moran
Obey
Olver
Owens
Payne (NJ)
Pelosi
Peterson (FL)
Pomeroy
Rahall
Rangel
Reed
Reynolds
Richardson
Rivers
Rose
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Schroeder
Scott
Serrano
Skelton
Slaughter
Spratt
Stark
Stokes
Studds
Stupak
Tejeda
Thompson
Thornton
Thurman
Torricelli
Towns
Tucker
Velazquez
Vento
Waters
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Wise
Woolsey
Wynn
Yates

NOES--309

Allard
Andrews
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baesler
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Baldacci
Ballenger
Barcia
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bentsen
Bereuter
Bevill
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Brewster
Browder
Brownback
Bryant (TN)
Bryant (TX)
Bunn
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Cardin
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chapman
Chenoweth
Christensen
Chrysler
Clement
Clinger
Coble
Coburn
Combest
Condit
Cooley
Costello
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cremeans
Cubin
Cunningham
Davis
Deal
DeFazio
DeLauro
DeLay
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Dooley
Doolittle
Dornan
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Ensign
Everett
Ewing
Farr
Fawell
Fields (TX)
Flanagan
Foley
Forbes
Fowler
Fox
Frank (MA)
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frisa
Frost
Funderburk
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Geren
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
[[Page H1116]] Goodlatte
Goodling
Gordon
Goss
Graham
Greenwood
Gunderson
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hamilton
Hancock
Hansen
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Heineman
Herger
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Holden
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Jacobs
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kelly
Kennedy (MA)
Kennelly
Kildee
Kim
King
Kingston
Kleczka
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Laughlin
Lazio
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Lightfoot
Lincoln
Linder
Lipinski
Livingston
LoBiondo
Longley
Lucas
Manzullo
Martinez
Martini
Matsui
McCarthy
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
McNulty
Metcalf
Meyers
Mica
Miller (FL)
Minge
Molinari
Montgomery
Moorhead
Morella
Murtha
Myers
Myrick
Neal
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Norwood
Nussle
Oberstar
Ortiz
Orton
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Parker
Pastor
Paxon
Payne (VA)
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pickett
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Pryce
Quillen
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Riggs
Roberts
Roemer
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roth
Roukema
Royce
Salmon
Sanford
Sawyer
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer
Schiff
Schumer
Seastrand
Sensenbrenner
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skeen
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Stearns
Stenholm
Stockman
Stump
Talent
Tanner
Tate
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Torkildsen
Torres
Traficant
Upton
Visclosky
Volkmer
Vucanovich
Waldholtz
Walker
Walsh
Wamp
Ward
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Williams
Wilson
Wolf
Wyden
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer

NOT VOTING--6

Becerra
Collins (GA)
Harman
Miller (CA)
Moakley
Nadler

{time} 1540

The Clerk announced the following pair on this vote:

Mr. Moakley for, with Mr. Collins of Georgia against.

Mr. BRYANT of Texas and Mr. KANJORSKI changed their vote from ``aye''
to ``no.''
Mr. WYNN changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

personal explanation
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, during Rollcall Vote No. 85 on H.R. 2 I was
unavoidably detained. Had I been present I would have voted ``no''.
Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Today, I rise to fulfill my promises to the people of Florida's 15th
District.
We have a debt of nearly $5 trillion.
Our Government has run a deficit in 33 of the last 34 years
Today each newborn's share of the national debt is about $17,000, and
will reach over $28,000 by the time this child reaches the 1st grade.
We will spend $310 billion to pay the interest on our debt this year.
The interest alone is about $4,600 per year for a family of three, such
as my own family.
We must stop burdening our children.
Like the balanced budget amendment, the line-item veto is long
overdue.
In combination, these two bills will go a long way in limiting
expenditures and helping cut waste out of the budget.
Past attempts at line-item veto legislation have failed to produce
cuts, primarily because these bills left the final authority for
cutting the funding with those who appropriated it in the first place.
We have all heard the examples of waste that numerous private and
government studies have pointed out.
This line-item veto has teeth and gives the President permanent
authority to cut out wasteful spending.
For the first time, the weight is in favor of cuts, not against them.
Along with the balanced budget amendment, this will help us bring
fiscal responsibility to our Government.
Every expenditure will be forced to stand on its own merit.
Democratic Congresses rejected giving a Republican President the
line-item veto, they even rejected giving a Democrat President a true
line-item veto.
Today the Republican Congress gives a Democrat President and every
future President line-item veto authority.
This is the clearest demonstration of just how serious the new
Republican Congress is to ensuring a bright future for our children.
We recognize that our children's future is on the line.
Republicans continue keeping our promises to the American people.
amendment offered by ms. slaughter

Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment offered by Ms. Slaughter: Paragraph (3) of
section 4 is amended to read as follows:
(3) The term ``targeted tax benefit'' means any provision
which has the practical effect of providing a benefit in the
form of a different treatment to a particular taxpayer or a
limited class of taxpayers whether or not such provisions is
limited by its terms to a particular taxpayer or class of
taxpayers. Such terms does not include any benefit provided
to a class of taxpayers distinguished on the basis of general
demographic conditions such as income, number of dependents,
or marital status.

Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Chairman, I offer this amendment in cooperation
with my colleagues, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Barrett]. This
language has attracted strong bipartisan support in the past and we
hope that it will continue today.
Mr. Chairman, the title of H.R. 2 says the bill's purpose is, ``to
give the President item veto authority over appropriations and targeted
tax benefits in revenue Acts,'' but if we examine the statement more
deeply we discover it is only half true. The legislation does extend
the President's authority over appropriations quite dramatically.
The second half of the stated goal is not fulfilled. The definition
of a targeted tax benefit in H.R. 2 is extremely narrow and arbitrary,
and as a rule the President is unable to rescind special tax loopholes
that are hidden in revenue bills.
I have concerns about the potential I see in H.R. 2 to upset the
careful balance of power established by the authors of the
Constitution.
I also have doubts about the implicit assumption that the President
is necessarily tougher on the deficit than Congress. In the last 20
years Congress has approved $92 billion in rescissions, $20 billion
more in cuts than the President has requested in the course of those
two decades.
But if the majority party in committed to shifting this power to the
executive branch, then I would at least urge that we put everything on
the table, both appropriations and tax loopholes.
As introduced, H.R. 2 only allowed the President to use the veto on
tax provisions that benefited five or fewer taxpayers. By voice vote,
the committee increased this threshold to 100 people or companies.
But whether the number is 5 or 100, however, it does not go far
enough. The legislation still protects tax breaks which pander to
special interests and add billions of dollars to our budget deficit.

{time} 1550
We have all seen the lobbyists lingering in ``Gucci Gulch,'' the
famous corridor outside the Ways and Means hearing room. Their sole
purpose is to secure sweetheart deals for their wealthy clients. The
Slaughter-Barrett amendment recognizes that any Washington tax attorney
worth his salary could get around the ``100 or fewer taxpayers''
provision. As spending caps get tighter, inserting special tax breaks
will be the only way Members can take home the bacon. Every forward-
looking lobbyist knows that tax breaks are the future of pork.
Simply stated, our amendment ensures that the President can rescind
any tax benefit which gives special treatment to a group of taxpayers.
I cannot claim, Mr. Chairman, to be the first office holder to spot
this disparity, nor the first to support a broader definition of tax
benefits as the solution. In fact, the Slaughter-Barrett
[[Page H1117]] amendment has a long and distinguished pedigree in
conservative circles. Republicans have offered the exact same language
not once, not twice, but three times. We hope that Republicans and
Democrats alike will again support it.
Our definition of ``targeted tax benefit'' was first offered on the
floor of the House by former minority leader Bob Michel in April 1993,
when he offered a friendly amendment to the Solomon-Castle substitute
to H.R. 1578. This amendment passed by a vote of 257 to 157, on an
extremely broad bipartisan basis.
I would like to emphasize again that our language is exactly the same
as Mr. Michel's, word for word.
This year, our precise definition is found again in S. 14, the line-
item veto bill introduced by Senate Budget Committee Chairman Pete
Domenici, word for word.
More significant, Republicans continued to think that this broad
definition of ``tax benefit'' was a good idea, because they included it
in the Contract With America. In the best-selling version of the
contract that you can find in bookstores today, right on top of page
33, our distinguished Speaker and majority leader explain that a
targeted tax benefit is ``a provision that provides special treatment
to a particular taxpayer or limited class of taxpayers.'' That language
is found here in our amendment, but not in the bill.
When the Republican Conference released the legislative language for
the contract, the line-item veto bill again included language identical
to the Slaughter-Barrett amendment--word for word. But when the bill
was introduced, this broad definition was gone--replaced by the ``five
or fewer taxpayers'' wording.
Our amendment also has the support of the Concord Coalition,
certainly a leader in efforts to reduce the deficit. In a letter to me
written yesterday, the coalition's executive director wrote:

Many tax provisions function as back-door entitlements and
confer substantial economic benefits to upper income
individuals and special interests. If Congress passes
legislation that creates new tax entitlements or expands
existing ones, the President should have the opportunity to
veto them.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Hobson). The time of the gentlewoman
from New York [Ms. Slaughter ] has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Ms. Slaughter was allowed to proceed for 1
additional minute.)
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Chairman, the line-item veto aims to extract pork
from legislation passed by Congress. This amendment recognizes that tax
pork is every bit as insidious as spending pork.
So I urge my colleagues to practice some truth in advertising. When
the reading clerk stood up on the House floor earlier to designate this
bill, he said:

A bill to give the President item veto authority over
appropriation acts and targeted tax benefits in revenue acts.

We do not want a half-truth right in the title of this bill. If our
goal is truly to continue the progress we've made in cutting our budget
deficit, then we must scrutinize both spending and taxes. If they are
serious about cutting the pork, then both sides of the aisle will vote
for this amendment.
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, I yield to the distinguished gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon].
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I thank my distinguished
colleague for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I wanted to respond to my good friend, the gentlewoman
from New York.
I was the original author of the Targeted Tax Relief Disclosure Act
for the last five sessions of Congress. I reintroduced it yesterday. I
have introduced that legislation in every session of Congress since I
have been here, starting in 1987. In fact, Mr. Chairman, I introduced
that legislation as a result of a series in the Philadelphia Inquirer
about the 1986 tax reform act written by Bartlett and Steel.
That legislation had up to $30 billion of targeted rifle-shot tax
provisions stuck in that bill. As a result of that, I introduced my
legislation which I have again reintroduced in this session that does
not eliminate rifle-shot provisions.
What it says is we must identify ourselves up front, who is going to
benefit up front, how much the transition rule or tax break is going to
cost the American people.
I find it somewhat ironic that we are debating this on the floor
today, because the previous chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means
stopped talking to me when I introduced the legislation. As a matter of
fact, for the past four sessions I could not even get that amendment
ruled in order on the House floor.
I went to the Committee on Rules on every tax bill that came before
this body, and the chairman of the Committee on Rules on the majority
side and the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means would not let
me offer my amendment, and here we are saying that our side does not
want to go far enough.
Well, Mr. Chairman, I find that somewhat ironic, because I have been
pushing this issue for the last 9 years.
Now, I am not satisfied. I think we should have a total prohibition
in Ways and Means of giving these anonymous transition rules, not that
sometimes they are not deserved, but a Member should identify himself
or herself and be willing to make the case on this floor or in
committee publicly when they want to give those breaks out.
So I think we ought to go further, but to say somehow we have a
double standard is just not true.
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentlewoman from New York
[Ms. Slaughter].
Ms. SLAUGHTER. The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon] is one of
my dearest friends. I am sure he is absolutely accurate. The Committee
on Rules probably did not accept his amendment but it has been voted
for on the floor.
It may have been they gave Mr. Michel precedence over your request 2
years ago. It was Mr. Michel who made the amendment on the floor.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. If the gentleman will yield further, it
was Mr. Michel. For the past five sessions it has been my bill called
the Targeted Tax Relief Disclosure Act which has had bipartisan support
which I have argued on every tax bill coming up before the Committee on
Ways and Means and eventually on this floor that has been ruled out of
order.
Mr. BARRETT of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last
word.
Mr. Chairman, I feel betrayed. I feel betrayed standing before my
colleagues in the House of Representatives, because last session I went
out on a limb, and I did what I thought was right for the American
people.
The language that we have before us today is the identical language
that was presented to this House by the Republican floor leader last
year, Mr. Michel.
I and a number of my Democratic colleagues bolted from our party to
support this, because we thought, mistakenly it appears, that he was
sincere and that the Republicans were sincere about having a line-item
veto be a true weapon in the fight against our deficit.
Let me tell you what Mr. Michel said at that time about the exact
same words we have before the House today. Mr. Michel said:

Quite frankly, if you are for special interests, then vote
against my amendment. If you are for a more complex Tax Code,
then vote against my amendment. If you believe the President
should not be held hostage to special interests, then I say
vote for my amendment today. It will make a better piece of
legislation.

The cock crowed once.
But that is not the end of the story. During the campaign I spoke out
against the Contract With America, but I made it clear that I was in
favor of one component of the contract, the component that gave the
President the line-item veto, and prior to the election, the
Republicans put forth the Fiscal Responsibility Act, and they said that
the House Republicans will introduce the following bill. The language
in this bill is identical to the amendment we have before us today.

{time} 1600

Mr. Chairman, the cock crowed a second time.
Following the election, I went out and bought this handy Contract
With
[[Page H1118]] America. It is available in your local bookstore for
$10.
I went into this book and again for the third time the Republicans
said that they supported giving the President of the United States the
authority to get rid of tax loopholes. They went further than that.
They said, and I quote from the contract, ``If we break this contract,
throw us out.'' Ladies and gentlemen, they are going to break the
contract today, because now is the time when we are going to make the
decision as to whether or not the President can get rid of tax
loopholes.
This is a do or die moment, and this is where the Republicans who
unanimously last year said ``Let's give the President the authority to
do this'' are going to back off on their word. When they introduced
this language last session, I thought ``You know, they are actually
sincere about this, they are actually sincere about giving the
President the authority to get rid of loopholes.'' But now today we are
going to get a chance to vote on it on the House floor, and I do not
think they are going to vote for it today.
What is going on here? Why cannot the Republicans get rid of this
power? If you were to draw a caricature of a Republican, you would
think he was interested in tax loopholes for the rich.
I would argue, I will personally set up a Loopholes Anonymous Club in
this House of Representatives for those Members of the majority party
who are willing to say ``We are also against loopholes,'' because
anybody in this House of Representatives who is serious about the
deficit wants to get rid of two things. They want to get rid of pork-
barrel spending, and they also want to get rid of tax loopholes for the
rich.
So let us not draw this arbitrary number of 100 because if you are
going to draw the number of 100 for the tax loopholes, then draw 100
for the tax appropriation. I do not think you should be drawing a
number for either. I do not think appropriation bills or revenue bills
in this House of Representatives should have either pork-barrel
spending or a tax loophole for the rich or tax loopholes for special
interests.
But to do that is going to take courage. I have talked to a lot of my
new colleagues who are very gleeful because they are here, and they
tell me that we are in the midst of a revolution, in the midst of a
revolution that is going to change America.
What have we done in the first couple of weeks? We passed the
Congressional Accountability Act. A very good bill. Of course, there is
no personal liability to it. If someday violates it, the Government
pays.
We passed the balanced budget amendment, which does not take effect
for at least 7 years. This is the first bill that we have before us
today that is going to affect the Members of this House of
Representatives today or tomorrow or when this bill passes.
So what happens? The Republicans blink, they do not want to give up
that precious power to slip special tax loopholes into revenue bills.
Again, I beg my Members, my fellow Members; last year probably 40
Democrats bolted across this aisle and said ``Mr. Michel and the
Republicans were right.'' We defied our party leadership and said let
us do what is right for the American people. This is the first
opportunity this session where I think the Members of the Republican
side should say to their leadership ``Leadership, you are wrong. We
think it is wrong to be the party of loopholes.''
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Hobson). The time of the gentleman from
Wisconsin [Mr. Barrett] has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Barrett of Wisconsin was allowed to
proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
Mr. BARRETT of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, this is the first opportunity
where I think the Members of the Republican Party should go to their
leadership and say ``Mr. speaker, we do not want to be known as the
party that cares only about special tax loopholes. We want to be the
party that cares about middle America. Let's do the right thing. Let's
give the President the authority to get rid of pork barrel spending,
and let's give the President the authority to get rid of the tax
loopholes for the wealthy.''
Mr. Chairman, we can do it today. We should do it today. I ask you to
do it today.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the
requisite number of words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise because I have to respond to some of the
comments I have heard on the floor. It is absolutely amazing to me;
this is my ninth year in Congress. I was not planning on speaking on
this bill, but to hear my colleagues on the other side saying they have
been steadfast in their support to eliminate targeted tax breaks, that
is mind-boggling to me, because in the 8 years that I have been here
the minority party now was the majority party that controlled the
Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Rules.
Mr. Chairman, every one of the sessions that I have been here I went
before the Committee on Rules and went to the chairman of the Committee
on Ways and Means, and I said, ``Please accept my Targeted Tax Relief
Disclosure Act,'' which does not eliminate them, but it says publicly
identify yourself. I did that because the year before I came to this
body the majority party passed the 1986 Tax Reform Act.
Mr. Chairman, the Philadelphia Enquirer, in analyzing that act in a
five-part series, which I distributed to every Member of this body as
well as the other body, identified up to $40 billion of rifleshot
provisions stuck in that bill, primarily anonymously, by Members of the
majority party, which I thought was ridiculous. There was a paragraph
in the 1986 Tax Reform Act that went something like this: Any citizen
residing in Tarrant County, TX owing a tax liability of x amount and
being born between such and such a year and such and such a year is
hereby forgiven that tax liability. I thought that was outrageous.
There was also a provision in that bill that gave special tax
treatment to an individual to finance two ships in Japan that are
currently hauling Japanese cars to our American shores. As a matter of
fact, I was ready to hold a press conference at the Port of Baltimore
to identify this ship and say: ``Who is the Member of Congress that
stuck this special tax treatment in the bill?'' Because the Committee
on Ways and Means chairman would not let us have access to the records
to tell us who put that provision in that bill.
Mr. Chairman, these things have been going on since I have been here
for 9 years, and the current minority party did nothing--nothing--to
take any one of those provisions out nor to support my effort in the
Rules Committee or on the floor of this House, in the Ways and Means
Committee, or when I testified before the bipartisan Commission to
Reform the Congress, where I said, ``Please accept my targeted tax
relief disclosure.''
By the way, Mr. Chairman, that provision was accepted by the
bipartisan Commission which my friend and colleague was cochair of. But
as it worked its way to the floor last fall, the Speaker and the
leadership pulled that provision out.
Now, we hear that our party really does not care about targeted tax
relief. I am not a member of the Committee on Ways and Means, I am not
a tax lawyer, and I am not an expert on tax policies. I have been told
the reason why they will not accept what was the Michel legislative
language last year was because it was unworkable and in fact it could
be a killer. Now, if it can be workable, I will accept it. I am not a
tax lawyer. I will leave it up to the Ways and Means Committee staff
and counsel. But to have our colleagues on the other side stand up and
say somehow that the majority party does not care about this issue or
that somehow we are for giving tax breaks to wealthy citizens and
corporations is absolute hogwash--absolute hogwash.
Mr. BARRETT of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from
Wisconsin.
Mr. BARRETT of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman could not have
made the point better for me. He talks about what happened in the past.
I did not vote with Mr. Rostenkowski in the past. A number of us did
not vote with him because we disagreed with him. But that was
yesterday, and yesterday is gone.
This is a new day in Congress, and now the gentleman is in the
leadership, the gentleman is in the majority, and
[[Page H1119]] three times the Republican Party publicly stated that
they were for getting rid of these tax loopholes. This is the do or die
moment. Are you or are you not ready to get rid of your tax loopholes?
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Reclaiming my time, I will say to my
colleague and my friend and distinguished gentleman, I am very happy
that we have legislation in this particular piece of legislation which
gives the President authority that your party would not give him,
despite the fact that he is of your party, which we are going to give
him. I am happy we have something here. But I will pledge to the
gentleman that I will work with him as long as counsel on the Ways and
Means Committee says we can do it to bring this legislation or have it
even broadened to eliminate all provisions that would give special tax
breaks.
I will work as a Member who is not on the Ways and Means Committee to
accomplish that. What I object to is Members of the other side all of a
sudden seeing a spirit coming down from the skies that they have been
pushing this issue for years. That is the absolute most disgusting
thing I have heard on this House floor.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania
[Mr. Weldon] has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Weldon was allowed to proceed for 1
additional minute.)
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I yield to the gentlewoman from Illinois.
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, the thing I am so amazed about now is that the
gentleman from Pennsylvania is so fired up when we have this amendment
here, and I am hoping that his side of the aisle is going to vote for
it and we are going to vote for it and the gentleman is finally going
to get his wish after 9 long years. It seems to me the gentleman should
be happy about that.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I am happy that the gentlewoman has
brought the issue up. What I am saying is in my opinion it is
superficial. I saw no effort over the past 9 years to move this
legislation. Now that we have taken the lead, the other side of the
aisle wants to come in and try to make it look as though we are not
going far enough. I promise to the gentlewoman that I will work with
her to toughen up this particular provision.
Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I did not intend to engage in this debate either, but
it is very interesting that my colleague from Pennsylvania says we are
confessed sinners. We are confessed sinners. I agree with his
proposition and would have supported it if it had been part of the bill
in previous years.
{time} 1610

We do know that one of the most disgraceful things in the Congress of
the United States is these special loopholes for wealthy people and
wealthy corporations in America. I say to my colleagues: ``Here is the
opportunity, if you trust the President, to carry out the stoppage of
special loophole provisions. We can give him that authority.''
Now let me suggest that we are about--and I know the majority side
with the minority have been working on welfare reform--this is an issue
of corporate welfare, of rich persons welfare. As my colleagues know,
we can identify a lot of things in this country that the average
citizen can learn to hate, but it is a type of corporate welfare with
special tax provisions with the very wealthy corporations and
individuals of this country that really cause a great portion of the
deficit that we are all into the burden of today.
Now my colleagues know we can argue it started out in committee, and
I happen to sit on the committee. We wanted to stop a tax loophole for
five persons; how ridiculous, for five persons. We finally raised a
little devil on that. Some of us wanted to make it without limitation
because we really believe, and I fundamentally believe, that the Tax
Code of America is only to be practiced if it is fair and equitable to
all taxpayers of America equally. This idea that wealthy corporations
or wealthy Americans can come and hire the Gucci lobbyists that the
majority party campaigned against just last November, and they lined up
at the Committee on Ways and Means, and they bring in their high-
powered, multimillion-dollar lawyers, and they win these special
phrases, these special clauses, or, as the gentleman from Pennsylvania
[Mr. Weldon] indicated, the gentleman who is born in some particular
county between the years such and such and such and such that only
applies to one known living human being on Earth, and they forgive the
tax responsibility of this Government, is insane, it is dishonest, it
is intellectually dishonest, and it will bring down this Government.
Now, if we are serious, if we are serious about the line-item veto,
we ought to stop earmarking for special provisions. We are going to
vote for that. We ought to also, on the other side of the ledger, give
the President of the United States the authority to strike out special
tax provisions for very few people who are smart enough to work the
inside Beltway of Washington, DC. Some of us have been here 10 years,
and have fought against it for 10 years, and have lost.
If, in fact, this is a new Congress with a new breath of fresh air,
and if they are going to live by their contract that they signed in
September 1994, this is the true test.
I joined my friend on the committee, the gentleman from Wisconsin
[Mr. Barrett], when he said this is the real test of whether or not the
majority party is going to do away with special provisions and special
loopholes. This is the time when they are going to decide that
corporate reform is as important to do away with corporate welfare as
it is to do away with misuse and abuse in public welfare in this
country, and it is unfair for us to strike up here and sound like we
are suddenly reborn from sinners and that we become pure, but when it
goes to the wealthy side of America, we refuse to stop the loopholes
and the special taxation favors.
Mr. VOLKMER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. KANJORSKI. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.
Mr. VOLKMER. Mr. Chairman, I was anxious, and I wish that the
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon] who started this discourse,
would have stayed here because I wanted to commend the gentleman
because he is accurate, and we are not without sin on this side. He is
true; what he has said is true. In the past there have been examples in
those tax bills where there have been special benefits for, like the
gentleman from Pennsylvania said, the wealthy or special corporations,
for special individuals, et cetera. That has been there. Many of us on
this side of the aisle did not like that either. We think it is wrong.
And this is not the first time though that we, as Democrats, have
attempted to do something about it. The gentleman from Pennsylvania is
wrong. We have. We passed the bill, the line item veto, with just a
majority provision last year with a large amount of both Democrat and
Republican support. It did no go anywhere in the Senate; like a lot of
other things, got stopped by a little filibuster over there, or
whatever. It got stopped by both Democrats and----
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr.
Kanjorski] has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Kanjorski was allowed to proceed for 3
additional minutes.)
Mr. VOLKMER. But in there there was a provision for the President
having this basically same identical authority. That was a Democratic
bill, but basically a bipartisan bill. But it was sponsored by,
primarily, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] and we passed that.
So, we have done things. I say to my colleagues, don't tell us we
haven't done things. Some of us have been able to do that, and we feel
just as strongly as some of your Members because some of us feel that
that is not fair.
Mr. Chairman, as the gentleman says, it is not fair that certain
people can use their money to get lobbyists down here to be able to get
special treatment in the Tax Code, and therefore we need to stop it,
and I agree with the gentleman, but we think right now that the
language in this amendment does go better than the language in the
bill. I say to my colleagues, the
[[Page H1120]] language that you have in the bill, if you got 101 or
105, you got to make sure you get 105 people there. Then the President
can't line-item it. I think that you need to look at that and saying
only those are tax benefits.
Before I yield back, and I will get the gentleman from Pennsylvania
[Mr. Kanjorski] additional time, but I just want to make one other
observation. I will go back a little further than the 1986 tax bill. I
will go back to one in 1981, and, if my colleagues want to talk about
some special benefits, I can tell them about some special benefits in
1981 to certain people.
There is a corporation known as General Electric. In the 1981 tax
bill, which is known as a Reagan tax bill, General Electric, as a
result of that tax bill, not only did not have to pay any taxes on all
of their income in 1991 fiscal year, but guess what, folks? They were,
because of special provisions in that bill for General Electric under
the Reagan tax bill, were able to go back for 2 proceeding years and
get all the money back that they had paid in.
And I say to my colleagues, ``They got more back, folks, than you
will earn in a lifetime--you will earn, not pay tax, but you will earn
in a lifetime.''
That was the Reagan tax bill.
Mr. KANJORSKI. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, so that this debate
is very clear, in committee the markup started out with only five. It
was the minority side of the committee that asked the question, ``Why
only five? Why should there be limits?'' So apparently between markup
and rules, Mr. Chairman, it was raised to a hundred.
I would like the majority to defend why we should allow protection
for special tax loopholes for 101 and 102. What is the magic number
there? Why?
Mr. FOX of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite
number of words.
Mr. Chairman, line item veto is an idea whose time has arrived to
give the President the right to cut out wasteful spending here in
Congress.
Mr. Chairman, the grave concern for my colleagues on the other side
of the aisle has been that we are giving the President too much power.
The current proposed amendment seeks to give the President the veto for
an entire middle class tax cut, if he so desires. The way the bill is
currently drafted, the President can veto narrow, special tax benefits
for favored friends of powerful Members of Congress, which is good.
However the current amendment gives the President far too much power
and expands the scope of the veto well beyond that which was intended
by the line item veto. Well, H.R. 2 permits veto of special benefits
for special friends. The current amendment would open the entire Tax
Code to individual line item vetoes. This amendment is too powerful,
too expansive and dangerous and should be defeated.
{time} 1620

Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. FOX of Pennsylvania. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate what the gentlewoman from New
York and my good friend the gentleman from Wisconsin are trying to do
in support of their intent. Unfortunately, I don't believe the
amendment fixes the problem H.R. 2 is trying to solve.
The language included in the contract version of the line item veto
was intended to accomplish what H.R. 2 does now. The provision's
purpose was to permit the President to item veto special tax breaks for
special friends of powerful Members of Congress.
Unfortunately, the contract language was unartfully crafted. By
stating a targeted tax benefit is one that applies to ``a particular
taxpayer or limited class of taxpayers,'' the contract language
inadvertently opened the entire Tax Code to possible item veto much in
fact, every single item in the IRS code must by its very nature apply
to some ``limited tax class of taxpayers.''
Because the intent of the contract language was to permit the veto of
rifle shots or special deals for special friends, our committee worked
with the Committee on Ways and Means and the Joint Committee on
Taxation to more precisely define the term ``targeted tax benefit.''
Following discussions in committee where members concluded that the
language of H.R. 2 which limited the category to five or fewer
taxpayers was too restrictive, we accepted a bipartisan amendment to
change the definition to include 100 or fewer taxpayers, again seeking
to get at rifle shots or special deals.
I can tell you the Committee on Ways and Means people are not happy,
believing that we have once again broadened the category well beyond
fixing the problem. Nevertheless, we support the language reported by
our committee and included in the base text as sufficiently broad to
fix the problem of special deals, while narrow enough to prevent the
President from vetoing such general purpose provisions as the middle
class tax cut or child care tax credit.
This is a responsible, well-crafted, middle-of-the-road approach
which should be supported, and I urge Members to support the base tax
and defeat this amendment.
Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to respond to my colleague that this would
not apply to the middle-class income tax. It specifically states in the
Contract With America, ``Such term does not include any benefit
provided to a class of taxpayers distinguished on the basis of general
conditions such as income, number of dependents or marital status.''
Mr. Chairman, I rise very strongly in support of the amendment
offered by my distinguished colleagues from the great States of New
York and Wisconsin. The line item veto bill addresses the deficit by
giving the President the power to cut pork-barrel projects out of
appropriations bills. It gives the President broad authority to line
item veto any spending, regardless of the amount, from the entire
spending to only one dollar of spending.
Yet the authors on the other side of the aisle of this legislation
have left the job half done. It gives the President very narrow
authority to line item veto tax provisions, only those which benefit
100 or fewer people.
Mr. Chairman, if we are going to be tough on spending, should we not
likewise be tough on a tax giveaways? In the committee, and I was a
member of the committee, in the original text of H.R. 2, we addressed
the problem of targeted tax benefits only in the most limited way. It
allowed the President to rescind these sweetheart tax deals, but
defined them as provisions which benefited five or fewer people. The
Democrats on the committee worked with some of the Republicans and
managed to raise the limit to 100 in the markup. But the fundamental
problem remains. The artificial numerical number can easily be fudged.
Any smart lawyer will easily write tax loopholes to avoid the
President's veto. It will simply benefit 101 or 102 people. Then the
President will not be able to strike it out.
As we have heard, the Republican Party has long been the champion of
a much broader definition, right up to the point that they gained the
majority. Now we see a sudden switch. The Republicans' Contract With
America, signed by practically every Member on the other side of the
aisle, contained the very same language being offered in this amendment
today.
Make no mistake, this is a critical vote. Many would view this
amendment as the first step on the slippery slope of selling out to
special interests. If you are for special interests, then vote against
this amendment. I challenge my Republican colleagues to support the
amendment and to keep the promises they have made to the American
people.
Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from
Illinois [Mr. Gutierrez], who has worked on this issue.
Mr. GUTIERREZ. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding,
because I want to make one point very clear: This Democrat in the last
Congress of the United States voted for the strongest line item veto
that was proposed, including this provision. So do not try to argue as
though no one on this side of the aisle was supporting the strong kind
of line item veto.
As a matter of fact, I suggest to the freshmen and the sophomore who
I am in the same class, he defy your leadership. True, it was a little
difficult in
[[Page H1121]] my cloakroom, but they still fed me, they still gave me
water to drink, and, as you can see, I am still here.
So stand up for what you believe in and do the right thing and vote
your conscience. you know what is right. Do it. Others have done it,
and we are still here, alive and well, and, thank, God, healthy.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I have listened to this debate very attentively. It has
been very intense, and I think we have gotten most of the points out.
It has motivated me to go back to the Record, however, and try to find
out who said what when and what was expected and that was not, because
I have great respect for the efforts of the gentlewoman from New York
who has offered this amendment.
My problem with it is that it seemed very broad, and it seemed, in my
view, a little bit unworkable in that it is overbroad. I have some
feeling, as we have heard from some of the debate, that the question of
over-broadness may very well be a judicial question someday with this
legislation.
I went back to the amendment, and if I read the amendment correctly
that has been offered, we talk about what the term targeted tax benefit
actually means, trying to put a description on something that Mr.
Michel himself did describe in his words before this body, and I will
get to those words.
But when we get into the definition of the amendment, and I am
reading from this, it says, ``Such term does not include any benefit
provided to a class of taxpayers distinguished on the basis of general
demographic conditions.'' That is very broad, but it has been further
qualified, ``such as income, number of dependents, or marital status.''
Well, that leaves a very serious ambiguity about other demographic
questions such as gender, race, age, sexual preference. These are all
points that I think now become an ambiguity. I know that the
gentlewoman does not wish to give us am ambiguous piece of legislation.
I did go back and look into the exact language that Mr. Michel used
on April 29, 1993, in the Record, and he said, using his words in
paraphrase, ``You will hear that it is uncertain what I mean by the
term `targeted tax benefits' by those who oppose this.''
I think that is exactly what we have got here. Those who are
basically opposed to trying to get at closing these loopholes are
basically trying to put words in Mr. Michel's mouth here about what he
meant.
If you read the record, it is rather clear that Mr. Michel went
through what I am calling special interest tax breaks, all the things
we are trying to get at here.
When you get to the bottom of what he said, he said, ``I will confer.
I will sit down with the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means,''
who was his good friend, who is unfortunately no longer here, as Mr.
Michel is not, ``and we will work out the details of this.''
We did work out the details. We did it with slightly different people
in different areas. We went through the Committee on Ways and Means,
the Joint Tax Committee, and now the Committee on Government Reform,
and we have done this in the Government in sunshine, openly, and come
to a conclusion of what the best definition is that will work, that
will withstand the judicial overview and any other test that can be
made of it, and I think we have come up with a better solution than the
gentlewoman from New York has.

{time} 1630
Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr.
Blute].
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida for
yielding to me.
I think one point that is glaring here is that throughout this debate
on the line-item veto authority, the minority, during the general
debate, during the debate on the amendments, made a strong case that
they felt that this bill ceded too much power to the executive, that it
tilted the balance of powers in a way that was not a good thing for our
democracy.
And in this amendment, there is a reverse argument that we need to
expand the President's power broadly, as this amendment would do.
This bill is attempting to narrow the scope of the President's power.
We do not believe he should be all powerful, and we agree with the
minority on that. But we do think he should have the power in this
narrow sense.
So I would just say that there seems to be two different arguments
coming from minority on this bill.
Mr. GOSS. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I yield to the
gentlewoman from New York [Ms. Slaughter].
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] is
certainly one of the most thoughtful Members of this House and a good
friend of mine.
I should say to him that I did not do a lot of research on this. I
took the words directly out of the Contract With America, I assumed
that after Mr. Michel had done his consultation with Mr. Rostenkowski
and come up with what is language is that what----
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, I did not hear everything.
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Chairman, my microphone was not on. As I heard the
gentleman's remarks, that after Mr. Michel spoke on the floor on the
amendment, he decided it was too broad and conferred with Mr.
Rosteknowski to come up with what was determined to be the proper
language, which is what we have now.
Mr. GOSS. Unfortunately, as the gentlewoman knows, that never
transpired into final fruition. So what happened is, we have put it
back into a process to complete the concern that Mr. Michel had about
what does this really mean. And we have done that process of completing
what it means.
Mr. GUTIERREZ. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to rise in support of this essential
amendment. We have heard a lot of rhetoric today about the importance
of eliminating wasteful spending from our budget. And I agree with much
of that rhetoric. Far too often taxpayers have been forced to carry the
burden in this Nation for our inability to stand up for them and to say
no to pet projects of lobbyists and pork barrel projects of special
interest groups.
However, today supporters of this bill, despite all of the rhetoric
about protecting the taxpayers and promoting fiscal responsibility,
have engaged in a sneaky end run around the American people.
This bill does help the President go after pork, some pork. But this
bill, without the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from New York
[Ms. Slaughter] and the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Barrett], also
goes on record as saying, you know what, some pork is okay. We might be
able to go on a little diet, but we are not kicking the habit
completely.
Yes, wasteful spending is a problem that is diverting money from the
real needs of America. But just as importantly, just as importantly, so
are those targeted tax giveaways designed to give a break to your
favorite lobbyist, powerful interest group or a privileged group of
people. These free rides cost the treasury just like wasteful spending
does.
Every time we pass a tax credit, a refund or a break that benefits a
particular group or special interest at the expense of America, we are
creating more pork. Without the Slaughter-Barrett amendment, we are
saying that with one swipe of the pen, the President can eliminate any
spending, any spending he so chooses. What if the President decides he
wants to eliminate tax benefits for foreign corporation or giveaways to
foreign investors?
More importantly, what if the President decides that a capital gains
tax cut that overwhelmingly benefits only the richest 5 percent of
America deserves the swipe of his veto pen? What if our President
decides that we absolutely cannot afford to drain our treasury of
billions, yes, my colleagues, billions of dollars for a tax cut for the
wealthiest Americans at a time when we are trying to save and cut every
dollar that we possibly can?
What if our President decides he wants to side, for a change, with
working men and women and say no to a tax giveaway, to a narrowly-
directed group of people?
Well, this bill says he cannot do it. You cannot do it, Mr.
President, because we are not interested in that
[[Page H1122]] kind of pork. Your veto pen is dry if you want to use it
to stop tax giveaways.
That, my colleagues, is a fatal flaw in this bill. But the remedy is
simple. There is a cure. The remedy is this amendment.
If we are truly on the side of the American people and against
wasteful spending today, then let us go all the way. Let us kick the
habit. Let us not protect the special interests, the lobbyists, the
favor seekers in these halls who want to leave here today with their
tax breaks intact.
My colleagues, I did not know until today that this Contract With
America could be amended. I knew there were a lot of amendments to the
Constitution in this contract, but I did not know this could be
amended. But today we have heard that is was unartfully crafted, not my
words, the gentleman from Massachusetts stated that it was unartfully
crafted.
Well, I am going to read it again with a good lawyer by my side.
Another gentleman on the other side said, well, we have finally come
up, these are not my words, with the best definition to date. It is
written, it is printed, but today we came up with the best definition.
Maybe we will have to add an appendage for definitions to this so we
can all know what it really means.
And lastly, it is certainly good to raise the flag of bipartisanship
when it is on the balanced budget amendment, applaud for the
bipartisanship; when it is on unfunded mandate, applaud for the
bipartisanship; and when Democrats stand up to say, let us do the right
thing together and it is good, but I am with you.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Gutierrez]
has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Butierrez was allowed to proceed for 2
additional minutes.)
Mr. GUTIERREZ. I tell the gentleman from Massachusetts, he and I know
each other. He knows I have been for a line-item veto. My record is
clear. There are many of us on this side, the gentleman from Wisconsin
[Mr. Barrett], many of us. So do not chastise us. Do not ridicule us by
saying that somehow we are hypocritical and Johnny-come-latelies on
this when we have stood up and now that the gentleman is in the
majority, it is bipartisan, too, when I am with him, just like it was
bipartisan when other Members of my party joined the gentleman in the
past 2 weeks.
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GUTIERREZ. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I have a great deal of respect for the
gentleman from Illinois. I think his courage is pretty obvious to
everyone in this Chamber. I would just simply point out that the
amendment in the committee that set the limit of 100 was offered by
Members of the minority party and adopted and voted for by Members of
the majority party in a bipartisan way. So I agree it should not be a
partisan issue.
And in the committee, the committee adopted a Democratic amendment.
Mr. GUTIERREZ. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I would just simply
suggest one thing. We all know what happens in the committee. We all
know how Members get on these committees.
But here we are, in the Committee of the Whole. We can correct and
rectify any problem. Because we know they make mistakes in that
committee. They get too cozy with each other in that committee. They
spend so many years together. It is get along, come along.
This is the Committee of the Whole right here. Let us do the right
thing right here. The gentleman and I can do it. I ask the Republicans
to join us. They are in the majority. Let us do what we have got to do
and let us eliminate these tax breaks.

{time} 1640

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number
of words.
Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Gutierrez], my good
friend, we have chatted many, many times. I also know he has had great
courage in the past. I know by his own leadership he was chastised for
coming out in support of what he really believed, and I respect the
gentleman for that.
However, I would like to reiterate this is a Democratic amendment,
the amendment of the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt], an
amendment in the committee. I do not know what the gentleman meant
about how we get appointed on those committees. I asked for my specific
committees, and I am sure that my friend, the gentleman from Illinois,
asked for his committee, as I did.
The only thing that I would say, we are being chastised for coming up
with a line-item veto when the minority party had power for 40 years,
and refused to come up with a line-item veto. It is like I wanted to
buy a Ford all these years, and now I am buying Chevys and Fords and I
am getting chastised for it. It is just not logical.
The line-item veto is very important, whether it is a Republican
President or a Democratic President. The pork that we need to take a
cut at is all the pork. I agree with the gentleman on that.
However, we are trying to do something in the contract that we feel
is very, very important. That is to give the President of the United
States what many of the Governors have. That is a line-item veto.
I think that this case of 100 play level, especially since it was
adopted in the committee, I am quite serious, I have not looked at it.
I am not even sure what it is. However, I also know if it was adopted
in the committee, it must have had pretty good bipartisan support to
make it. I will take a look at it seriously before we come up on it.
Mr. BARRETT of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.
Mr. BARRETT of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I serve on the committee, so
I am certainly familiar with what happened on the committee. This
amendment that raised it from 5 to 100 was not the first amendment that
was offered on this issue.
The first amendment offered on this issue was offered by the
gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Spratt. That was defeated. It was a
wider amendment than the one we have before us today. That was defeated
with every Republican voting against it and one Democrat voting against
it. The rest of the Democrats voted in favor of it.
Obviously at that point, Mr. Chairman, having failed to get the wider
and the version closer to the Contract With America, there still was a
belief, I think, at that time by both parties that 5 was just
ridiculously low, and it went from 5 to 100. That was not
controversial.
However, the major debate, Mr. Chairman, actually occurred around the
amendment, the first amendment from the gentleman from South Carolina,
Mr. Spratt. I understand the gentleman from South Carolina will
probably be introducing that amendment tomorrow, as well.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the
gentleman for the clarification, but again, I would repeat, he has had
the majority for 40 years and they have not come up with a single line
item veto. We are trying to do that today, but yet they are still
trying to chastise us, or maybe to look at it better, maybe they are
trying to improve it. I compliment the gentleman for that.
However, it is very, very important that we get it. It is bipartisan.
I ask for the support of the line item veto.
Mr. GUTIERREZ. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. GUTIERREZ. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I just want to suggest that, No. 1, we are all friends on the
committees. We are close to one another on the committees and we do a
lot of work there.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Most of the time.
Mr. GUTIERREZ. Mr. Chairman, that is simply my point. I do not want
anybody to make any other inference of that point, and I apologize if
anyone took it any differently, No. 1. No. 2 is, the gentleman is lucky
if he gets the complete assignments he wished.
I bought a book called ``Adventures in Pork Land,'' sent it out to
the 75 winners of the primary, of the general election in November
1992, sent it out to them. Really, they all got it. I said,
[[Page H1123]] ``Read this book, because I think it is something good
for us to get to when we organize as a freshman class in 1992.''
How do I get on the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs?
Great committee, but I got there because there were four slots they
could not fill. They could not deny me that committee slot.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Reclaiming my time, they begged us to take them, too,
right after the S&L, and no one would take them.
Mr. GUTIERREZ. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will continue to yield,
I have not quite gotten the committee assignments I have asked for, but
I have been able to work well here with the gentleman from California
[Mr. Cunningham] with my Democratic colleagues, and look forward to
working with all of them.
However, I just suggest that there are some of us, a few of us,
maybe, that were for the line item veto, the strongest line item veto.
To simply suggest that now, with a stroke of the pen, that we were all
against it, just is not quite fair to us and our position.
I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. ORTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I also rise in strong support of the Slaughter-Barrett
amendment. Since my first election in Congress, I have been a very
strong proponent and supporter of giving the President enhanced
rescission authority or a line-item veto. As a self-acknowledged
deficit hawk, I believe we have to address all legislation, which
includes a large number of special interest provisions, which can
increase the deficit.
There are essentially three ways in which we spend money and increase
the deficit. They are through direct spending of appropriations money,
appropriated spending; they are through contract authority, spending on
contract, not appropriated; and they are through special tax
incentives, or called tax expenditures. I favor including all three of
those in a line-item veto bill, and tomorrow I will be proposing an
amendment to include contract authority as well as tax expenditures.
Mr. Chairman, it has been said many times on this side of the aisle,
``I'm not a tax attorney and I don't know,'' or ``I'm not a tax
attorney and I can't tell you this.'' I am a tax attorney. I spent 12
years with the Internal Revenue Service, 11 years in private tax
practice, and I can tell the Members that the wording of this amendment
is no less enforceable or operational than the wording in H.R. 2.
I have very severe questions about and problems with the wording in
H.R. 2. As currently defined, it would limit the provisions to those
which benefit 100 or fewer beneficiaries.
Two main problems: First of all, it is not clear to me how in the
real world the President or we in Congress specifically determine which
specific provisions are in fact going to affect 100 or 101 or 99
specific individuals.
To outline this, I think that it is clear to me that this is far too
narrow, being the second problem I have, to demonstrate. Let me just
cite from the committee's report on H.R. 2, page 8, dealing with
enhanced rescission authority.
To start from the committee report, it says ``The special tax
benefits Congress added,'' and they are talking about the 1992 Revenue
Act, citing that as an example where Congress, in an attempt to do one
thing, which was create enterprise zones, Congress added on many
different tax benefits: ``The special tax benefits Congress added
covered such interests as special exemptions for certain rural mail
carriers, special rules for Federal Express pilots, deductions for
operators of licensed cotton warehouses, exemptions for some small
firearms manufacturers, and exemptions for certain ferry operators.''
That is from the majority's committee report. I would ask the Members
of the majority, which of these provisions affect more than 100 and
which affect fewer than 100? I would suggest to them that it is
impossible under the language in H.R. 2, Mr. Chairman, to accomplish
the very purpose and intent which the committee report suggests they
are including this language to accomplish.
More importantly, Mr. Chairman, I think that we ought to take a look
back at the line-item veto provisions we have already passed in the
last session, and to suggest we had the control for 40 years and we
have never passed a line-item veto, not true.
We passed a line-item veto bill in the last session of this House. We
passed it with bipartisan support. In fact, the language that is
proposed in this amendment is not only the identical language which Mr.
Michel proposed, and which several of my friends sitting here in the
floor and who have been here, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Armey], the
gentleman from New York [Mr. Boehlert], the gentleman from California
[Mr. Cunningham], the gentleman from Texas [Mr. DeLay], the gentleman
from Georgia [Mr. Gingrich], the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss], the
gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Hobson], the gentleman from New York [Mr.
Solomon], all of whom voted in support of this specific language, not
only in the Michel substitute back in April 1993, but also voted for
this bill, which we passed with this language in the last session of
Congress, now to suggest somehow that is unworkable language, that it
is too broad, that it has language which we cannot put back into the
bill, simply is something, I don't understand that argument. I am
baffled by it.
Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, the gentlewoman from New York earlier today raised the
question about what made anybody think that the politician who ends up
on the top of the heap in the White House acquires some rectitude or
some goodness that is denied to the rest of the participants in the
government.
I do not know the answer to that question, because I have served with
seven Presidents and I have not seen one yet who underwent that
miraculous transformation.

{time} 1650

Give this some exercise: How about the term ``presidential pork''?
Let me give one example of that.
In the election year of 1992, we had a person in the White House with
whom I served in this House and whom I like very much, but he was in a
pretty tight spot. He went down to Florida and announced that an
obsolete Air Force base would be rebuilt and reestablished. He did not
need the line-item veto to do that. He went out to St. Louis and said
an airplane that clearly was unneeded for our national defense would be
put into production, anyway, if he were reelected. He did not need the
line-item veto for that.
Our founders gave to the President one-sixth of the legislative
power, and there were no PAC contributions to those Members of that
Constitutional Convention. There was no distortion of their point of
view. There was no need to contort their wisdom. They thought it
through very carefully how much authority would be given to each branch
of the government.
But if you are going to enact this surrender of authority in the
Congress and you only do it halfway, you are making a sad, sad mistake.
I serve on the Committee on Ways and Means and a few years ago we had
an amendment. It was in the usual hieroglyphics of legislative language
and hardly anybody knew what it meant. My mother always said, ``Never
sign anything you can't read or didn't read'' so I voted against it.
The next morning, Washington Post headlines, Ways and Means Committee
Votes Multimillion-Dollar Gift to Certain Group. That certain group was
the Gallo Wine Co.
On my way down to work the next day, I stopped by the supermarket and
I bought a jug of that foul stuff--oh, it's wonderful stuff--I bought a
jug of the Gallo wine and a sheaf of paper cups, and I went up to each
member of the committee when they assembled, put the cup down, poured a
little bit for each one that voted for it and each time I said,
``Ernest and Julio said thank you.''
Anybody who does not pay his fair tax is stealing from those who do.
It is difficult for 6 people to carry a piano, but it is especially
difficult if 2 of the biggest ones are riding on it.
I have just this advice: Those of you who have
been told to go to the rear and march, let me tell you that when I
entered Congress, I was told to go to the rear and march because I ran
with
[[Page H1124]] Lyndon Johnson the first time I ran, and we all ran
against the Vietnam war. We were going to get out of the Vietnam war. I
kept my promise, the President reversed his position and somehow or
another with all the PR they had, I was the traitor to my party and I
was the traitor to my country.
Be a traitor to your party if you have to be a traitor to your party
to keep your promise to your constituents. You will sleep better
tonight.
Mr. FATTAH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that even though it may not appear it is the
case, that this is indeed a defining moment for the new majority here
in this House. The Contract With America is on the best sellers' list.
People are reading it all across the land. The words, as inartful as
they have been deemed to be, are fairly clear. That is, that it has
been asserted and promised and contracted with that there would be a
line-item veto that would allow the President of the United States the
opportunity to correct the Tax Code and to do away with special
provisions that allow the rich and powerful in this country to get away
with not paying their fair share.
Now we have arrived at the moment of decision and we hear this notion
about the problem with this language. David Brinkley, whom many of us
watch on Sunday morning, once said, ``I was told that campaigning time
is promising time and after that is alibi time.''
We have a majority who has read the contract every morning on the
floor, at least some of their leadership carry it around in their vest
pocket, and that they are determined under all circumstances to
implement this contract.
However, when it comes to the point of addressing what is the most
outrageous example of improper action by this House, that they are
unwilling to step up to the plate and live up to their commitments.
When it comes to taking away a few dollars from a promising kid who
is trying to go to college, they are all willing to stand up for that
or to attack the few measly dollars that are provided to a single
parent on welfare, or to go after affordable housing programs or to
attack mass transit funding, they are all eager to march in a straight
line towards that goal.
But now when in face of the multi-national corporations and
billionaires in our country who have somehow ripped off the American
taxpayer by their lobbyists making room in the tax code to benefit
them, they are unwilling to turn over to the President an opportunity
to veto these types of unfortunate loopholes.
Let me just conclude by saying that what we have now is a loophole in
the contract. Loose language that has now been added to H.R. 2 makes
the entire commitment that has been made by the new majority to be
called into question.
I would just suggest, not to the majority because I know they will
not change their position, but to the American people, that they look
very, very carefully at the votes on this amendment and that they
understand that the contract that was promoted as a Contract With
America really was a contract that the hands were shook on later on
that night in a roomful of lobbyists who were fund raisers at a fund
raiser that was a part of that campaign.
Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, there have been a lot of pundits that have been talking
already about what the 1994 November elections meant. And some people
have been saying that they were an endorsement of the contract and some
people have been saying that Democrats did not turn out to vote.
I think an interpretation of the 1994 elections were about what we
have been doing for the last couple of days. They are about common
sense and bipartisanship. They are about common sense: Many of us on
both sides of this aisle working together to pass a balanced budget
amendment, to prohibit unfunded mandates, to make Congress live under
the same laws that it wants other people to live under. We have done
that together in a bipartisan way.
Now we have got an amendment before this body that is asking some of
your on the Republican side to work in a commonsense bipartisan way
with us. We are asking you not to get away from your party and tell
them they are wrong. We are telling you that this is language that you
voted for, not on one previous occasion but on two previous occasions.
Not just to get at pork-barrel spending but to get at special tax
breaks when we are going to take provisions and try to balance the
budget.
Let me remind some of my colleagues about some of these specific
votes. Mr. Michel offered an amendment on April 28, 1993. It passed 257
to 157. Eighty-seven Democrats, 87 of us voted with you to pass that
amendment by Mr. Michel. I think every single one of you on this floor
probably voted in favor of it.
On July 14, 1994, there was another bill, the Stenholm-Penny-Kasich
bill that passed 298 to 121. One hundred twenty-eight Democrats again
voted with the Republicans to pass that. Again, many of you Republicans
voted for that provision.
I would hope that you see it in your interests to abide by what those
elections were about: Common sense and bipartisanship.
The American people get incensed when they hear 6 words: Pork-barrel
spending, and we are going to take care of pork-barrel spending with
this line-item veto. But they get equally incensed when they hear
special tax breaks.

{time} 1700

Now we have the opportunity to do something about that, and we have
acted in a bipartisan way to do something about that in the past. Let
us work together as we have been working together for the last 3 weeks
and pass this bipartisan, commonsense amendment.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number
of words.
Mr. Chairman, I spoke at a previous time on this question of the
line-item veto. I think those of my colleagues who know me here in the
Congress, and certainly those who have known me over my legislative
career, know that while I may hold strong opinions I do not believe I
have ever lectured any other Member of a legislative body in which I
served on whether my ideas were superior or my views were superior. But
I want to say, and I feel I must say at this juncture with respect to
the line-item veto that as a legislator I find it unconscionable.
The entire history of freedom and the march of freedom and democracy
has been the commons against the king. We can go back to the time of
the Magna Carta and the establishment of the idea of the common people
being able to exert their will against the king. Or go back to the loss
of what freedoms were defined as freedoms throughout antiquity to the
time of the Roman Empire when the Roman Senate ceded its power to the
Emperor, after the assassination of Caesar and the ascension of
Octavian and Augusta, and even he wanted to give it back to the Senate
and back to the people. Oh no, it was turned over to the king, and that
is what this is about.
No matter who is the Executive in our contemporary world, it is the
legislative against the executive power. If we turn over our
responsibilities to the executive, we are undermining the basis of
freedom
Nothing so ill becomes any legislative body as to turn over its
authority and its obligations and its duties to the executive. The
executive has submitted budgets, whether it is under Republicans or
Democrats, and this Congress, Republican and Democrat and Independent,
has always come in with a budget under that which has been presented.
It is not a question, then, of whether or not we are going to
exercise self-discipline. If we do not our constituents can remove us.
But we are setting up a situation in which the executive will play one
legislator off against another.
We are setting up a situation in which the small States will have to
compete against the large States. We are setting up a situation in
which we are saying we as legislators are incapable of acting other
than in a political fashion, but if we turn over this authority to the
executive, the executive somehow will
act in an objective, analytical fashion and not in a political
fashion.
[[Page H1125]] My friends, I cannot emphasize enough that we are
about to embark on something which to me violates the most fundamental
tenet which I hold as an elected official. There is only one thing
worse in politics than being wrong, and that is being right.
History and sometimes people forgive us being wrong, but we are very
seldom forgiven for being right. And I am telling Members today, if we
give the line-item veto to this or any other President, we are
undermining democracy, we are taking everything that we hold dear in
terms of freedom and turning it upside down and saying to the world and
everyone in it, all of our voters, we do not believe in democracy, we
do not believe in the legislative process, we do not believe in the
legacy that has been handed down to us by literally the death of
millions in order to provide for us the opportunity to legislate.
If we have any argument about what we do, we have given in our
Constitution the power of the President to veto entire pieces of
legislation and we must come up with two-thirds of our voting Members
in order to overturn that veto. That is incredible power that the
President has. And now we want to say that on any given item, in any
given piece of legislation where there is an appropriations
implication, that the President is to be able to line-item veto that.
This is not a State. We failed earlier to differentiate between
capital budgets and operating budgets. I know how scoring goes in my
Committee on Armed Services, how we include housing for our military to
be included as an item of expenditures in the first year no matter how
many years that housing is occupied. I can give example after example
where this kind of line-item veto will undermine democracy in the
particular and in general.
I pray that we will not be in the situation in which we find
ourselves having to say oh, if we had only done the right thing. The
right thing to do is to be against the line-item veto and to stand up
for freedom and democracy.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from New York [Ms. Slaughter].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.

recorded vote

Mr. BARRETT of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 196,
noes 231, not voting 7, as follows:

[Roll No. 86]

AYES--196

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allard
Andrews
Baesler
Barcia
Barrett (WI)
Beilenson
Bentsen
Berman
Bevill
Bishop
Bonior
Borski
Brewster
Browder
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant (TX)
Bunn
Chapman
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coburn
Coleman
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Condit
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Danner
de la Garza
Deal
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Durbin
Edwards
Engel
Eshoo
Farr
Fattah
Fazio
Fields (LA)
Filner
Flake
Foglietta
Foley
Ford
Frank (MA)
Frost
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Geren
Gibbons
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green
Gunderson
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hamilton
Hastings (FL)
Hayes
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Holden
Hoyer
Jackson-Lee
Jacobs
Jefferson
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
Kleczka
Klink
Klug
LaFalce
Lantos
Laughlin
Lewis (GA)
Lincoln
Lipinski
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Maloney
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy
McDermott
McHale
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Minge
Mink
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moran
Murtha
Nadler
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Orton
Owens
Pallone
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Pelosi
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Pickett
Pomeroy
Rahall
Rangel
Reed
Reynolds
Richardson
Rivers
Roemer
Rose
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sawyer
Schroeder
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skelton
Slaughter
Stark
Stenholm
Stokes
Studds
Stupak
Tanner
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Tejeda
Thompson
Thornton
Thurman
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Traficant
Tucker
Upton
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmer
Ward
Waters
Watt (NC)
Whitfield
Williams
Wilson
Wise
Woolsey
Wyden
Wynn
Yates

NOES--231

Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Baldacci
Ballenger
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bereuter
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Boucher
Brownback
Bryant (TN)
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Cardin
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Christensen
Chrysler
Clinger
Coble
Combest
Cooley
Cox
Crane
Crapo
Cremeans
Cubin
Cunningham
Davis
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Ensign
Evans
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Fields (TX)
Flanagan
Forbes
Fowler
Fox
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frisa
Funderburk
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Graham
Greenwood
Gutknecht
Hall (TX)
Hancock
Hansen
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefley
Heineman
Herger
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kasich
Kelly
Kim
King
Kingston
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Lightfoot
Linder
Livingston
LoBiondo
Longley
Lucas
Manzullo
Martini
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
Metcalf
Meyers
Mica
Miller (FL)
Molinari
Moorhead
Morella
Myers
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Norwood
Nussle
Ortiz
Oxley
Packard
Parker
Paxon
Payne (VA)
Petri
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Pryce
Quillen
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Riggs
Roberts
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roth
Roukema
Royce
Salmon
Sanford
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer
Schiff
Seastrand
Sensenbrenner
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Skeen
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Spratt
Stearns
Stockman
Stump
Talent
Tate
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Torkildsen
Vucanovich
Waldholtz
Walker
Walsh
Wamp
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Wicker
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer

NOT VOTING--7

Becerra
Collins (GA)
Dixon
Harman
Manton
Moakley
Waxman

{time} 1722

The Clerk announced the following pair:
On this vote:

Mr. Manton for, with Mr. Collins of Georgia against.

Mr. LARGENT changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Messrs. HEFNER, PASTOR, and KENNEDY of Massachusetts changed their
vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
personal explanation
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, during rollcall vote No. 86 on H.R. 2 I was
unavoidably detained. Had I been present I would have voted ``aye.''
parliamentary inquiry

Mr. WISE. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.
Mr. WISE. Mr. Chairman, since the previous question which was just
voted down was an item in the contract, does this constitute a breach
of the contract?
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would state that is not a parliamentary
inquiry.

amendment offered by mrs. thurman

Mrs. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mrs. Thurman: Section 5(d)(2) is
amended by striking the eighth and ninth sentences and
inserting the following: No amendment to the bill is in
order, except any Member may move to strike the disapproval
of any rescission or rescissions of budget authority or any
proposed repeal of
[[Page H1126]] a targeted tax benefit, as applicable, if
supported by 49 other Members. At the conclusion of the
consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall
rise and report the bill to the House. The previous question
shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments
thereto to final passage without intervening motion.

Mrs. THURMAN (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the
Record.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Riggs). Is there objection to the
request of the gentlewoman from Florida?
There was no objection.
Mrs. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, so everyone will know, this amendment is
nearly identical to my amendment No. 7, but at the request of
legislative counsel the words ``disapproval of'' have been inserted
prior to the words ``any rescission'' to clarify the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to thank the many
Members in this body who have helped along the way to see this
amendment to the floor today. I know the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr.
Zimmer] and the gentlewoman from New York [Mrs. Lowey] are involved
with this. I would like to make a few comments about it.
Mr. Chairman, as I have listened,
proponents of this legislation have claimed that this legislation
grants the President line item authority that 43 of our Governors
enjoy. The fact is, only 10 Governors have the kind of broad powers
outlined in H.R. 2. My amendment to the Line Item Veto Act seeks to
prevent the possible misuse of authority.

The amendment will give the Members of this body the opportunity to
carefully consider a President's proposed rescissions and then,
supported by 50 Members, vote to remove individual rescissions from a
disapproval resolution. As H.R. 2 is currently drafted, there is no
mechanism in place for Members to strike individual rescissions from a
disapproval resolution. The resolution is only subject to an up or down
vote.
It is important that my amendment be adopted. If a President has a
package of numerous cuts that are indeed wasteful spending, but
decides, for political reasons, to veto an item important to a number
of Members, then it is conceivable that the entire disapproval
resolution could be approved because of that one important project the
President decided to veto, thus leaving items that everyone agrees are
wasteful intact.
Members should be given the opportunity to make their case to the
entire House as to why individual rescissions should be saved and, in
the process, ensure that those wasteful items are indeed canceled.
Under this amendment, the process for striking individual rescissions
is as follows: If a Member can convince 49 other colleagues to join in
objecting to an individual item in a disapproval resolution, then those
Members will be able to debate why an individual line item should be
saved. The entire House would still have to vote on that individual
rescission and then vote on the whole disapproval bill.
A similar provision was included in the Stenholm-Penny-Kasich
substitute to the expedited rescissions bill we considered last July.
In addition, the procedure is based on existing provisions in the
Impoundment Control Act, wherein, if a requisite number of Members
stood to be counted, a motion to strike a rescission would be debatable
for 5 minutes.
I believe that my amendment also preserves one of the key concepts of
this legislation--accountability. Any Member who wishes to save an item
the President has vetoed will have to make a strong argument to
preserve the rescission and then convince a majority of the House to
agree. Members would have to go on the record and defend saving the
proposed rescission and thus be accountable to their constituents.
{time} 1730

In addition, I would say to Members that by adding this provision we
can maintain our constitutional duty as a part of the legislative
branch for appropriating and raising money while still allowing the
President the tool to veto appropriations. We can also protect
ourselves from the actions of a President who might use the tool to
exact retribution against a Member who did not act in a manner that the
President desired.
I would urge my colleagues to adopt this amendment and give an even
greater degree of accountability to this legislation, and I would also
just like to take this time, Mr. Chairman, to also thank the gentleman
from Pennsylvania [Mr. Clinger] for his leadership, and commitment and
support to this amendment, and I appreciate it.
Mr. ZIMMER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered
by the gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs. Thurman].
Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs.
Thurman] for proposing this amendment. I am delighted to have played a
part in its formulation.
The basic purpose of this amendment is to give Congress an additional
opportunity to cut a particular item of pork that may have found its
way into an appropriation bill. The President, under current law, is
forced, when he is confronted with an omnibus appropriation bill, to
sign the bill or to veto the bill in its entirety. He has no choice but
to take it or leave it as a whole. This is the choice that the Congress
would be faced with under the legislation before us without this
amendment.
When we are faced with an omnibus disapproval bill, which would
restore spending as provided by H.R. 2, we want to make sure that there
is not pork stowed away in the omnibus bill that does not bear the
scrutiny of an up-or-down vote on its own merits. This amendment would
simply allow 50 Members to force a vote on that particular spending
program so that we are not stuck with a take it or leave it, all or
nothing situation, as the President is today.
I believe that the result of this will be an enhanced opportunity to
get rid of pork-barrel items which find their way into legislation all
too frequently.
This is a pro-taxpayer, anti-pork vote, and I urge my colleagues to
support this amendment.
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last
word, and I rise in support of the amendment offered by the gentlewoman
from Florida [Mrs. Thurman].
Mr. Chairman, proponents of H.R. 2 argue that current veto authority
forces a President to take all or none of the spending in an
appropriations bill. To deal with specific spending to which he
objects, we are told the President needs more flexible powers such as
the line-item veto would give him.
For those same reasons, I believe we should all support the
gentlewoman's amendment. Without this amendment, Congress will be
forced to accept all or none of the rescissions the President proposes
for a particular appropriations bill.
H.R. 2 requires the President to submit one special message
containing his rescissions for each of the appropriations bills
Congress passes. Members of Congress can only introduce a resolution to
disapprove all of the rescissions in each special message submitted by
the President. Why should Congress have to reject all of a President's
rescissions just because it may disagree with a few of them?
The gentlewoman's amendment would give Members some of the
flexibility this bill would give the President.
Under current law, Congress has the flexibility to package
rescissions in any way it chooses. Over the last 20 years, Congress has
used this authority to enact rescission packages that have reduced
Federal spending by more than $92 billion. During this same period, all
Presidents, Republicans and Democrats, have proposed rescissions that
total only $72 billion, that is $20 billion less than Congress has
approved.
If flexible powers are considered important to deficit reduction, I
think we want Congress, which has the better track record on
rescissions, to have the same kind of flexible powers this bill would
give the President.
I urge my colleagues to support the gentlewoman's amendment.
Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words in support of the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from
Florida [Mrs. Thurman].
Mr. Chairman, as my colleagues well know, the legislation before us
permits
[[Page H1127]] the President to send back to the Congress a package of
rescissions which will go into effect if we do not pass legislation to
reinstate them, but, under H.R. 2, when the rescissions are sent to us,
we have one choice and one choice only, take it or leave it. For a
number of reasons I think that is ill advised, and this amendment is
designed to enable us to look at each proposed rescission item
individually and act on its merits.
First, the stated purpose of this legislation is to rid spending
bills of unnecessary and wasteful items. That is a goal we all share.
But under H.R. 2, with its all-or-nothing approach, it is conceivable
that the Congress would find ourselves in the position of voting to
reject a rescission package because it includes one or a few items that
was strongly felt are important to maintain. In doing so we would have
no choice but to protect projects that a majority of us might agree
with the President should be cut. The end result: more spending, not
less spending.
Let me give my colleagues an example:
The President might decide that we have appropriated funds that he
thinks unnecessary for the State revolving loan fund which helps
finance sewer treatment plants' upgrades, but a majority might disagree
with his judgment. That would be in the VA-HUD appropriations bill.
That same bill might include another item that the President feels is
pork, and a majority of this House might agree on that. Under the
committee bill, without this amendment to save those sewerage treatment
funds, we would have to also save that project which we otherwise would
be willing to kill. That does not help reduce the deficit.
Second, all of us know that this legislation does directly impact the
balance of powers between the three branches of our Government that was
carefully developed by the Founding Fathers. In doing so I think we
have a responsibility to consider how far we want to go in shifting the
balance, and in this instance I firmly believe that this legislation,
as currently drafted, goes too far. In effect the bill,
in giving the President the power to pick and choose among individual
items in appropriations and revenue measures, has denied the Congress
the final authority to do the same thing.

Third, advocates of the line-item veto have said time and time again
that they are only attempting to give the President of the United
States the same line-item veto authority which Governors of various
States enjoy. If indeed our goal is to narrow the authority of the
various governors, then we should duplicate at the Federal level the
authority that most of them in their legislature have.
In my home State of New York, for example, and dozens of others where
Governors have line-item veto authority, the legislatures have retained
the power to selectively approve or reject from among the line items.
Let me share with my colleagues a list of States where the line-item
veto protects the role of legislators to examine these items:
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
York, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, and Wisconsin.
In only four, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, and Pennsylvania, do
legislatures face the all-or-nothing situation that this legislation
would impose on us, and in the case of Wisconsin, Mr. Chairman, the
State constitution would allow item by item consideration, but the
legislature has decided in its own rules to respond to line items en
bloc. With regard to the balance of the States, our review of
constitutional provisions shows that at least in their constitutions
their legislators are not restricted to the all-or-nothing option.

{time} 1740

Mr. Chairman, I offer this amendment with the gentlewoman from
Florida in an effort to improve on this legislation, not to destroy it.
When it comes to altering the balance of power under which our
Government has functioned for over 200 years, caution should be our
guiding principle.
Mr. Chairman, I urge the adoption of this amendment. Ideally I would
have preferred that this amendment not include the 50 Member threshold
before an item can be voted on separately, but I am pleased to join the
gentlewoman from Florida in this compromise. It is an important and
valuable step in the right direction, and I urge support of this
amendment.
Mr. KLECZKA. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, as I read H.R. 2, I discovered two serious flaws or two
problems that I personally had with it. One was addressed in the
previous amendment, and that is limiting the corporations or the
individuals who are getting a tax break to only 100. I think that is
not advisable public policy. However, the floor has spoken and that did
not get adopted, or the deletion did not get adopted.
When I first saw the section indicating that we could not pull out
various line item vetoed items and vote on them separately, I thought
that was a very serious mistake. So when the gentlewoman introduced her
amendment, I called and said I would like to support it and would come
to the floor and speak in favor of it. However, in speaking to the
chairman of the committee, he indicated he did not like that approach
and would be supporting the amendment of the gentlewoman from Florida
[Mrs. Thurman].
I thing the compromise gets at the problem, although I think the
better way would be to eliminate the necessity for 49 or 50 Members.
However, since that is not going to be the will of the House, I think
at least by having the 50 Member requirement when there are items in 1
veto message, and let's say there are 10 items, and there is one which
I think almost everybody in the House would agree to, we could have the
ability to pull that one out, knowing full well we do not need 10 votes
because the other 9 will not survive.
The gentlewoman from New York indicated that Wisconsin had a policy
on this. As a former State legislator in Wisconsin, that is exactly how
we did it. When the Governor sent back line item vetoed items in the
budget bill, we would select the ones, with the minority, which would
necessitate a vote. The bulk of them were voted en bloc, and the
sufficient two-third was not garnered.
So that is the correct procedure, it is one which worked there, it is
one which would work here, but that is not going to be the way it is
going to go. So let us try the 50 Members signing to request a separate
vote and see if that provision works.
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I do so to commend the gentlewoman for her amendment.
There have been points made here today that we were going to be ceding
too much power to the President, and that we should in some way limit
that. I think what this amendment does is make the case that were the
President is deemed to have done an egregious thing in the exercise of
the line-item veto, something that was punitive or an improper use,
shall we say, of the line-item veto, and that was apparent to 50 or
more Members, that that would rise to the level where we should be able
to pull that back and say no, he has gone too far.
Our concern with the gentlewoman from New York's amendment is
allowing one Member to do that it seemed to us was going to open up
perhaps a Pandora's box, where a lot of Members would have various
things they would like to see pulled out of that, and we have a cherry
picking.
I really think where we are talking about the kind of egregious thing
the President might engage in, the gentlewoman's amendment allowing 50
Members to indicate that is strong, and I am pleased to accept the
gentlewoman's amendment.
Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CLINGER. I yield to the gentlewoman from New York.
Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for accepting the
amendment. I would have been willing to live with the responsibility to
take a vote on each of the amendments, but since it is very obvious it
would not have been accepted, I am very happy to support this
amendment.
[[Page H1128]] Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CLINGER. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. GOSS Mr. Chairman, I think there is one further point: We worked
very hard to try in the committee process to work out a formula that
would expedite the procedure to allow any Member to get something to
the floor that was of great concern to them. We were concerned at first
that this might not fit into the procedures that we worked out. This
actually could improve it. I think it is untested. We shall see. But I
am very happy from our perspective, from a legislative process point of
view, to accept the amendment as well.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number
of words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise to oppose this amendment in the strongest
possible terms.
I do not know how many are going to listen, I do not know how many
heard before about the line-item veto. But how can you say you are for
the line item veto the turn over the authority, the explicit, direct
authority and obligation that we have in swearing to uphold and defend
the Constitution, defend our prerogatives and obligations as a
legislative body, a line-item veto, you say, and then when the
President comes back with all of those line items taken out which you
have just voted to give to him, say, ``But what if we don't like it?
What if there are some items we don't want?''
So this is a fewer items bill you are about to pass if you have this
in, not a line item. Fewer items. You want to pass a legislative line-
item veto bill.
One of the Members from the other side, who I believe is chairing it
for the Republican Party, says, ``What if the President does something
egregious? Then it comes back to us, and we get to pick 50 Members to
go against everybody else and get the rest of us to go along with me on
this.''
If you think deals have been cut in the Committee on Appropriations,
I now see the Committee on Appropriations as the enemy of us all.
Please, I have been in a legislative body too long. I understand how
politics works. I am proud to be a part of that tradition. I am not
going to quiver and be some craven cur down there, saying, ``Well, if
the President sends us back something that we volunteered on this floor
to give him, then if we find some items, we can get 49 other people to
stand up with us, we will take it back.''
How can you have the gall to stand up and parade yourselves in front
of the American people, talking about, ``We do not have the discipline
to do anything for ourselves, we are going to have the President do it
for us; however, if there are some items that are taken out that we
want and we can get 49 of our buddies to go along with us, then we are
going to see if we can't get the other 218 that we need to go along,
and we will be able to get ours''?
I warned that the small States were going to be at risk here. You
know that the big States and the big-power, special interests you talk
about, private interests--I do not care whether you are talking about
the space station, I do not care whether you are talking about a
particular item, a dam or a river, whatever it is you want to deal with
the public works--this is going to open the whole thing back up again.
The hypocrisy of this whole line item veto is made manifest by this
amendment.
I am waiting to see whether this is voted through to not, because if
it is, let the record state here clearly that this means we have a
legislative line item veto bill in which the deal-making and the
logrolling will be something like you have never witnessed in the 200-
plus years of this Republic.
This is going to be the granddaddy, the mother of all pork-barrel
bills, when this comes out if you folks pass this, and it is going to
be on the record.
And in honor of this final decline and fall of the Constitution of
the United States and the House of Representatives in particular, Mr.
Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to be able to enter into the Record
the disquisition made in the Senate in 1993 by the Honorable Robert
Byrd on the line item veto.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, is it
parliamentary correct to enter into the Record a document?
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Riggs). That request cannot be made in
the Committee of the Whole.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, I will do that at the proper time.
I commend them to you, in conclusion, before you engage on this
reckless course for which you will have to answer, read the record as
entered by Senator Byrd in 1993. I am sure his office will be happy to
present you with some copies. I will be happy to do the same.
We can go over the entire history of the line-item veto as practiced
in other times, directly attributable to the decline and fall not just
of this Nation, which is what this will be, the decline and fall of
this body as a honorable body engaged in legislative practice that it
should be engaged in.

{time} 1750

Let us stand up for the Constitution that we swore to uphold and
defend. Do not pass this amendment and bring shame on ourselves at the
very time when we say we are already willing to give up what we should
be hanging onto, clinging to with dear legislative life.
This amendment bespeaks the disquietude that is in this body with
respect to the line-item veto. It shows that we do not really mean it.
If this amendment passes, this is not a line-item veto bill. It is a
legislative line-item veto bill, and we will rue the day we passed it.
Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I hope my colleagues heard the remarks of the gentleman
from Hawaii, because he is talking good sense. I do not intend to
elaborate on what it was that he said about this amendment. But,
rather, I want to remind my colleagues about who we are, why we are
here and what we are.
I would never support a line-item veto for a Republican President.
But I would never support a line-item veto for a Democratic President
either.
We have been engaged in a headlong rush over the last 3 weeks or so
now to pass the contract on America. This is a remarkable device,
because essentially it says a lot of things. It says that when we
passed legislation to clean up the environment or deal with the
problems of the health of our people or to take care of the young or
the unfortunate or the poor, we really did not mean it. And where we
mandated the States to do something, we really did not mean that either
because, after all, now they are complaining. We only give the States
$750 billion a year, and the local units of government get a large part
of that. And were we to take that back, we could balance the budget
very comfortably.
But I want to talk a little bit of history to my colleagues, because
history is important.
As George Santayana observed, ``He who does not learn from history is
doomed to repeat it.'' That means if you do not listen to what happened
in the past and you do not learn from it, you are going to make the
same mistakes. And you are probably going to pay the same price.
My old Daddy used to tell me, Son, there are two kinds of people:
there are those who learn from experience and those who learn from the
experience of others.
It started at one point in history back around about 1500, when the
British parliament and the British people were involved in an intense
controversy with the king who said that he ruled by divine right, not
by the gift of the people. And that began a battle which culminated
with the works of Oliver Cromwell, the great commentator, the man who
pulled down the British monarchy. Why? Over the budget. Over the purse,
over the power of the people to have control of their budget and their
moneys. That is why.
And just a few years later, about 200 years later, a little more, the
United States was formed, the colonies. Why? For exactly the same
reason, over taxation without representation. We can spend our careers
here denigrating and criticizing this institution, and I would say
those who do this deserve to be denigrated, because this is a great
institution. I would urge my colleagues
[[Page H1129]] to stand up, not only for what they believe right, but
to stand up for the constitution, for the powers of the people.
I do not believe any President ought to have the line-item veto
power. I think that what it constitutes is a wonderful power that he
can use to swing every one of us by the ear or the nose. And he can cut
deals that are as every bit or more corrupt than those which my
colleagues complain about.
This is a public body. It is a public institution. We try to do our
business in the public with openness, with respect for our
constituents. Are bad things done here? Of course, this is a human
institution. As my colleagues may remember from history, the good Lord
got one bad apostle out of 12. But by the large the Members here are
keenly aware of their duties and their responsibilities.
Now, I know my new colleagues came in here running against the
institution. Well, perhaps after they have served here for a while,
particularly the Members on the majority side of the aisle, they will
recognize that there is something more at stake here than they might
like to admit at this time, the Constitution. We take an oath at the
beginning of every session to support and defend the Constitution of
United States.
The Constitution was founded on a couple of very important
principles, one man, one vote, and that the power of the purse resides
in the people.
We carry that delegated responsibility. This body has over the years
I have served here been so sensitive that in the old days they would
not let the Senate start a piece of legislation which would appropriate
money.
It is important that we know why this power is here. It is important
why we know we must defend it. There is a constant tension between the
executive and the legislative. A weak legislative encourages the
encroachment of the executive.
Again, I do not care whether it is a Republican or Democrat in the
White House. It is not in the interest of the country, nor is it in the
interest of this legislative body to afford the line-item veto power to
the President of United States. Let him consider the legislation we
send him. Let him veto it.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Dingell]
has expired.
(On request of Mrs. Collins of Illinois, and by unanimous consent,
Mr. Dingell was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, if it is in the public interest that we
should have the power of the purse, we should also have the
responsibility for it. And we should bear both. If we come to a
decision that something is a good project and the President does not
like it, let him veto it. Let him send a veto message up here and let
us deal with it as the Founding Fathers intended.
This question of the line-item veto is like a lot of other things, a
matter which was discussed in the convention in Philadelphia. They
looked to see how the purse should be managed and by whom, and they
came to the conclusion that it, first of all, should be in the Congress
and, second of all, that the primary power for that should be in the
House of Representatives.
Again, I have heard a lot of Members talk about how corrupt this
institution is. There seems to be a great deal of that sort coming from
the majority side of the aisle. That is not a majority view in the
country, and it should not be a majority view in the country. And it
should not be a majority view here.
If there is something wrong, let us clean it up. But let us not throw
away the constitutional powers of United States, the Congress of United
States, the people of United States. Let us not give them to a
President or anybody else unless we are convinced that that is the
proper carrying out of our constitutional responsibilities. I assure
you, it is not.
The Constitution is to be protected by all of us. We take an oath on
that point. And we should understand that the protection of the power
of the purse and the protection of the prerogatives of the House of
Representatives are an essential and important part of that oath.
I would urge my colleagues to reject the amendment, and I would urge
my colleagues to reject also this outrageous piece of legislation which
does nothing other than to denigrate the House, the Congress, and to
confer power upon the President of United States, which was the subject
of a long struggle between the people and the sovereign and a part of a
long struggle on the part of the people of United States.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Dingell]
has again expired.
(On request of Mrs. Collins of Illinois, and by unanimous consent,
Mr. Dingell was allowed to proceed for 4 additional minutes.)
Mr. DINGELL. This was not a struggle which was won easily. In England
it cost the head of one king and the throne of another. And it caused a
revolution which caused thousands of British subjects to die. It caused
a war between the United States and Great Britain, a war which we all
revere, which is an essential part of our history, which reminds us of
how Americans died at Valley Forge and elsewhere.
{time} 1800

Why? Because they wanted independence, because they wanted self-
government, because they wanted representative government, and because
they wanted the ability to control their own destiny and their own
purse. Members can criticize the way we spend the money, but remember,
we are all answerable to the people. Every 2 years we go home and we
talk to them about the budget.
Mr. Chairman, I have heard my colleagues on the Republican side of
the aisle talk about the budget and how irresponsible Congress is.
Again, as George Santayana says, ``He who does not learn from history
is doomed to repeat it.''
Let me remind Members that during the 12 years of Republican
presidency, between 1980 and the commencement of President Clinton's
administration, the Congress of the United States cut President
Reagan's budget every year except one. Every year except one, the
President's budget was cut up here.
The complaint that we heard from Mr. Reagan and then from Mr. Bush
was an interesting complaint. They complained that we were taking money
from defense and educating kids. They complained that we were taking
money from defense and other boondoggles.
Mr. Chairman, they complained that we were taking money from some
things like foreign aid and military expenditures and putting it into
health, or the needs of senior citizens, or research into health, or
into protecting the environment, or into doing things that were going
to make this country better.
Mr. Chairman, I would tell my colleagues, when I go to Europe and
talk to the Europeans, or when they come here to me, they say:

We do not understand you in the Congress, and we do not
understand your country. When we spend money to educate a
child or to build a college or university, or to build a
road, or to improve the country, or to build some kind of a
navigation project or something of that kind, or when we
spend money on research for health or for the betterment of
people, or to take care of our senior citizens, or to enable
our country to better compete, we regard that as an
investment.

In this country, according to what I have been hearing here lately,
this is pork. This is subject to a line-item veto. It is criticized.
Well, it is not. We are really the conservators of the well-being of
this country. It is our responsibility to see to it that we invest in
the future. We are not just spending the treasure that belongs to the
youngsters who are going to come. We are making investments on their
behalf in their education, in the infrastructure of their country. We
are building them roads and highways. We are doing other things that
are making this a better and richer place in which they will live.
Mr. Chairman, I would ask my colleagues here to recognize both the
constitutional responsibility of Members of this institution, but also
to understand what it is that we are doing here, and to try and look at
it in a little more expansive way. Do not look at the small end of the
telescope, look through the end that is going to reveal to you what the
future is, and what our goals and our purposes are.
The saddest thing about this first 30 days of this Congress has been
the small-mindedness and the small vision
[[Page H1130]] that I have seen on the part of my colleagues,
reluctance to do the things that are necessary to make this a better
country, to build, to take care of our young, to make a better
environment, and to do other things, and a concentration on minute
matters of small importance. Reject the amendment and reject the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs. Thurman].
The amendment was agreed to.

amendment offered by mr. skelton

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Skelton: At the end of section 2,
insert the following:
(d) Exception.--The President may not include in a special
message any rescission of more than $50,000,000 of
discretionary budget authority for any program, project, or
activity within the major functional category for national
defense (050).

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to momentarily
withdraw the amendment, subject to its being offered in a few moments.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the amendment is withdrawn.
There was no objection.
Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, while we have a break in the offering of amendments, I
wanted to rise in support of the idea, first of all, and the bill
providing for a line-item veto for the President of the United States
to reduce the deficits that are produced by the Congress of the United
States now and into the future.
Mr. Chairman, my good friend, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr.
Dingell], and I have a disagreement on this point, as Members can
readily understand from the speech he just gave and what I am about to
say. I deeply respect him and the incredible service he has rendered
this country in all the years that he has served in this Congress and
led the Committee on Energy and Commerce, on which I serve.
Our disagreement stems from the fact that while I believe, too, that
there have been mighty struggles between sovereigns and those with whom
they have contested over the years over the issues of who, indeed, has
the power to make the laws and the mandates that affect the common
welfare, but I believe that a revolution was fought in this country
over a very simple proposition called taxation without representation.
If there is a form of taxation without representation that is
insidious in this land today, it is the kind of taxation without
representation that we now permit for the future generations of
children who will be born in this country.
When we decide to spend their money and therefore raise their taxes
in the future, for whatever purposes we deem important, because we do
not have the money to spend ourselves in our time, we are taxing them
and they are not represented in this Chamber today, except among those
who are willing to speak for the unborn yet. That taxation without
representation is indeed institutionalized in the concept of a deficit.
Every time this body, every time a President signs a budget, signs
appropriation bills, rather, that appropriate more money than we have
to spend each year, we are in fact taxing future generations who are
not represented in this body today, and who deserve better treatment
than to be born into this country with a huge debt on their shoulders
for taxes that we have imposed upon them without their consent and
without their representation.
What does a line-item veto have to do with that concept? The line-
item veto as it is employed in all of the States where it is employed,
and my State is one which has a line-item veto, is used to enforce the
principle of a balanced budget. The line-item veto is exercised by
Governors across this land to strike from the budget appropriations
that exceed the revenue of that particular State.
States like mine with a requirement to balance the budget and a line-
item veto have a pretty good enforcement mechanism in place, because
the legislature is admonished if the legislature dares to appropriate
more money than the people have presented to it that year for
expenditures, then the legislature is subject to having the Governor of
that State strike from that budget whatsoever he or she may choose to
strike in order to bring that deficit down and balance the budget.
The line-item veto becomes an enforcing mechanism to enforce the
balanced budget. In short, if the legislature of Louisiana and the
legislature of the some 43 States which have a line-item veto
authority, if they are smart enough and wise enough and prudent and
responsible enough not to tax future generations
without representation, not to create a deficit in their accounts each
year, not to build the mountains of debt we have built here in America
through this congressional appropriation process, then the Governor of
that State does not line item anything.

{time} 1810

The legislature protects itself against the line-item veto by
balancing its budget each year. And if ever this Congress in the
history of our country needed something to enforce the will power of
this body to keep its books in balance, it is now and the line-item
veto is just that tool.
If the line-item veto is passed in this Congress and the President of
the United States, be he Democrat or Republican, has the capacity to
line item out of the budget expenditures we create in deficit accounts,
we are going to be much more careful about not sending him a deficit
budget. We are going to do our level best to balance that budget. We
are going to do our best to reach the goal of the balance budget
amendment we just passed, Mr. Stenholm, and sent over to the Senate
that will require us to reach a balanced budget by the year 2002.
A little later on in this debate, I hope to offer an amendment to
even perfect this theory a little further.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Riggs). The time of the gentleman from
Louisiana [Mr. Tauzin] has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Tauzin was allowed to proceed for 3
additional minutes.)
Mr. TAUZIN. You and I know something that the American public knows
and that has been admitted in the balanced budget debate and admitted
by Presidents who have served us now and have preceded us. That is, if
we tried today to produce a balanced budget in this fiscal year, it
would be practically impossible to do because we have committed
ourselves to so much entitlement funding.
Without massive changes in the way we fund entitlements in America,
we cannot deliver a balanced budget to the President this year. That
makes passing a line-item veto difficult, because it means for the
years we cannot balanced the budget, the President is going to enjoy
that extraordinary authority.
I am going to suggest a change in the bill that is before us. I am
going to suggest a change called the glide path amendment a little
later on. The glide path amendment says that if we are smart enough,
wise enough, and responsible to stay on the glide path that the CBO
predicts we need to stay on to reach the balanced budget by the year
2002, the line-item veto authority would be limited to expenditures in
excess of those numbers so that we can legitimately stay within the
numbers that take us to a balanced budget by the year 2002 and not give
the President this extraordinary authority because we cannot balance
the budget this year.
It would mean that the authority we give the President in line-item
authority would be used to enforce the will power of this body to stay
on schedule, to balance the budget as we have agreed to do in the
balanced budget amendment, and to give the President the authority to
strike any item that we appropriate in excess of those numbers until we
reach the year 2002.
When we have reached that touchdown goal of 2002 and we have balanced
the budget, therefore we would be under an obligation to keep the
budget in balanced or else the executive would have the authority, as
he has in every 50 States, to strike out any appropriation in excess of
that balanced budget.
I believe that change will be very important. I would ask you to
think about it now. I will be offering it later on to make this thing
work in the interim, while we are trying to get the
[[Page H1131]] balanced budget working and in fact to enforce our will
power to make it work in the year 2002.
Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. TAUZIN. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I say to the gentleman, ``I am supporting the line-item veto just
like you because in Louisiana you have that authority just like we do
in Texas. Although I also recognize to transfer this authority from the
legislative to the executive branch, which is what we are doing, it is
because of the budget that we are doing that.
But I am almost sure in having read some of the Louisiana papers over
the years and your current governor, oftentimes, the line-item veto is
used not only to balance the budget but also to get the attention of
those of us who serve in the legislative body and I am sure Governor
Edwards just like Governor Briscoe and Governor Clements and White and
all the rest of them in Texas have used it over the years to get the
attention of us, that is a possibility.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Louisiana
[Mr. Tauzin] has again expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Tauzin was allowed to proceed for 2
additional minutes.)
Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Chairman, I continue to yield to my friend, the
gentleman from Texas.
Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. I thank the gentleman from Louisiana.
It is used oftentimes by the executive either to punish or to get the
attention of the members of the legislative branch. But in the
meantime, they are also using it to try to get spending within check.
Mr. TAUZIN. Reclaiming my time, I am not sure what the balanced
budget of Texas requires nor what the line-item veto allows, but let me
tell you what it does in Louisiana, as I think it does in this bill.
The authority to the executive is only to strike out measures that end
up reducing the deficit. If there is no deficit, then the governor does
not have the line-item veto authority. He cannot use it to punish or
get anybody's attention. The only thing he can use it for is to get the
budget back in balance. So if the legislature does not want to get
punished, does not want to get yanked by the ears, the legislature
sends him a balanced budget each year. We badly need that kind of will
power here.
Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. I agree that would probably even be a
compromise on this bill, because in Texas we do not have that. When the
Governor vetoes the line items, whatever they do, that money, even if
it is below the projected revenue, that money just stays in the
treasury.
Mr. TAUZIN. Again reclaiming my time, my understanding is the bill we
have before us gives the President the authority to line-item any item
to reduce a deficit which, if my reading is correct, that means in
effect if we send him a balanced budget, he would not have the
authority to line-item anything. It is the same kind of procedure we
have in Louisiana.
So to the arguments of those who are concerned that this bill would
give the President some authority to punish Members, to extort a vote
from them on occasion, to yank them by the ears or the nose or whatever
it might be to do his will, let me assure you, if you adopt the
amendment I am going to suggest, and if we stay within the contours of
the path that takes us to a balanced budget, the glide path that gets
us there by the year 2002, the President would not have that authority,
and the legislature would be protected from that abuse.
amendment offered by mr. skelton

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The clerk will report the amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Skelton: At the end of section 2,
insert the following:
(d) Exception.--The President may not include in a special
message any rescission of more than 50,000,000 of
discretionary budget authority for any program, project, or
activity within the major functional category for national
defense (050).

Mr. SKELTON (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the
Record.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Missouri?
There was no objection.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment at this point which
would state that the President may not include in a special message any
rescission of more than $50 million of discretionary budget authority
for any program, project, or activity within the major functional
category for national defense.
I also wish to thank the following gentlemen: The gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon], the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Edwards], the
gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan], the gentleman from Texas [Mr.
Laughlin], and the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. Stump] for asking to be
cosponsors of this amendment.
A special thanks to my friend and colleague from Texas, that very
bright, able young Texas, Chet Edwards, for his excellent work on this
amendment.
This deals with national defense, I speak for the young men and young
women in uniform, so that what comes down from this legislature
reflecting our constitutional duty may not be undone by someone who
might in years or decades ahead sit in the White House and be against
the military.
Along that line, however, let me digress for a moment and compliment
the President for an announcement he made just a few moments ago. He
told our Nation that he is naming the aircraft carrier CVN-75, the
U.S.S. Harry Truman, and the aircraft carrier CVN-76, the U.S.S. Ronald
Reagan.
I compliment him on those choices for the famous Missourian who stood
so tall and so well as our President and the recent President, Ronald
Reagan, who was a patriot and strong for national defense.
Back to the amendment. This amendment, Mr. Chairman, reflects what we
ought to think about when it comes to legislation and our own powers.
This legislation reflects the purpose and the spirit of our
Constitution. If you go into the Committee on National Security room,
you will see in front of the podium a copy of the words from article I,
section 8 of our Constitution that gives us, the Congress, not only the
authority but the duty to raise and maintain the military and to
establish rules therefor.
{time} 1820

It is our responsibility. This amendment keeps that responsibility
here and does not allow the buck to be passed somewhere else.
There are those who might say what about those special projects,
those research projects that some might put into a defense bill? That
is taken care of, and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Edwards] came
through with this idea that we incorporate that anything under $50
million may be subject to the same veto message that anything else may
be subject to in this legislation.
Nothing is more important than the national defense of our Nation.
Securing our borders, the vital interests of our country, nothing is
better than that. I speak for the young men and young women, I speak
for this Congress, because it is our constitutional duty to raise and
maintain them. I intend for us to let the buck stop here, where it
should.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SKELTON. I gladly yield to my friend, the gentleman from
Washington.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman from
Missouri for his amendment. I notice he has adjusted it up to $50
million, so anything under $50 million, where we would get special
projects, things of that nature, can be struck out by the President if
he thinks that it is not necessary, or unnecessary.
But if we had a major thing, for example, let us say the Congress
decided that we needed to have another aircraft carrier which is, say,
a $3.5 billion matter, you have worked it out so you could put the
money in the budget to do that. The President would not be then in a
position to veto that because it is Congress, the gentleman is
absolutely right, under the Constitution that has the ultimate
responsibility.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Riggs). The time of the gentleman
[[Page H1132]] from Missouri [Mr. Skelton] has expired.
(At the request of Mr. Dicks and by unanimous consent, Mr. Skelton
was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SKELTON. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, it is the Congress that ultimately has the
responsibility for the common defense. So I think the gentleman has a
good amendment. The buck should stop here on this issue. It will get
rid of any kind of special interest problems but protect Congress'
prerogatives to maintain the common defense, and I want to commend the
gentleman who has been one of the most thoughtful experts on defense
policy in the House.
Mr. SKELTON. I thank the gentleman very much.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SKELTON. I yield to my friend and colleague, the gentleman from
California.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, by the gentleman's amendment he would
exempt all items above $50 million in the defense category of the
overall budget, is that correct?
Mr. SKELTON. Absolutely, absolutely.
Mr. DELLUMS. I am one that opposes the line-item veto, but it is
clear to me that the line-item veto is going to pass, and seems to me
if it is going to pass this is a question I would like to ask, then: By
this amendment if the President of the United States sought to knock
out what he perceived or in some event she perceived as cold war
relics, like the B-2 bomber, would the President not have the ability
to strike antiquated weapons systems that exceeded the $50 million?
Mr. SKELTON. If the gentleman would listen to my response, the
President would not be able to strike, under this legislation, anything
in excess of $50 million, which would of course include the category of
which the gentleman speaks, the very important B-2 stealth bomber.
Mr. DELLUMS. If the gentleman would further yield, then based upon
that explanation, this gentleman would be constrained to oppose the
amendment because it would seem to me if we are going to do this thing,
then the President of the United States ought to have all items before
him or her, and it would seem to me in that context if we are going to
make any exclusion in the military budget, that is counterproductive if
it does not allow the President to strike a weapons system.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Skelton]
has again expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Skelton was allowed to proceed for 2
additional minutes.)
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. DELLUMS. As I was saying, this gentleman would be constrained to
oppose the amendment, Mr. Chairman, because if we are going to have
this thing, I oppose it, but if we are going to have it, then give the
President the total prerogative. By establishing this limitation, why
not do it in other areas?
Mr. SKELTON. If I may reclaim my time, which is limited, there is
nothing more important than national defense. That is the purpose of a
Federal Government. That is why we are all here. Everything else is in
addition thereto.
Further, if carries out the spirit of the Constitution, the buck
stops with us here in Congress article I, section 8.
Further, the President still has the right to veto an entire bill. He
can still do that and come back and cause us to pass the entire bill.
We are losing nothing by passing this. We are keeping the
prerogatives of the U.S. Congress.
I think it should be passed. I would hope it would be passed
unanimously. But I appreciate the gentleman's comments.
Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the gentleman. Would the gentleman yield briefly
to me?
Mr. SKELTON. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. DELLUMS. I am simply saying I oppose the overall bill for the
very constitutional principles the gentleman articulates, and if we are
going to do it, give the President the full prerogatives. If you are
going to dive off the bridge, give the President the full capacity to
flap his wings.
I thank the gentleman.
Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of Ike Skelton's amendment and
I agree with him that the distinguished gentleman from Texas, Mr. Chet
Edwards, played a key, instrumental role in this amendment. I went with
these two gentleman to the Normandy 50-year commemoration, and many
times during those days, from the Cambridge Cemetery for all our K.I.A.
air crews from the terrible air war over Hitler's Nazi Germany, to
Omaha Beach, to Utah Beach, many times we discussed among ourselves,
Democrats and Republicans, exactly what the gentleman from Missouri
[Mr. Skelton] just said, that the principle purpose of our Government,
beyond anything else, is to defend our homeland.
To be precise, let's analyze that beautiful Preamble to our
Constitution, which I carry with me, that Preamble says: We the people
of the United States, in order to, 1, form a more perfect
union; 2, establish justice; 3, ensure domestic tranquility, do we ever
fail on that one; and 4, provide for the common defense, defense is a
priority after ``forming a more perfect union,'' which is ongoing and
never ending. It does come after justice. We need justice in our land,
we need domestic tranquility, but providing for the common defense is
something our Governors do not have to worry about.
Let me give some of my own personal history on this and why I was the
last Republican to sign the Contract With America. I was hung up over
line-item veto. I have been against it for most of my 16 years and one
month here.
Mickey Edwards of Oklahoma and I had a long colloquy on the floor
that a President in the White House, whether a flaky Republican or a
flaky Democrat, who knows nothing about providing for the common
defense could strike out, yes, the whole B-1, the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke
destroyers, the V-22, the B-2, or the F-22 fighter. He or she could
kill every modernization program, I said I cannot be for that. I am for
it for every Governor in the Union. And I slowly evolved to accepting
what on principle, like the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums], I
was against, because we are facing financial catastrophe and bankruptcy
by the turn of the century.
But then this idea comes forward from my distinguished colleagues
from Texas and from Missouri, and I said, yes, this is the answer, a
slightly amended line-item veto that protects the Preamble to the
Constitution, to provide for the common defense.
Look, Mr. Chairman, I get the honor today of announcing something
exciting. CVN-76 will be named the U.S.S. Ronald Reagan. And I am
expecting a call from the Secretary of the Navy. Some Democrats, every
California Republican, 104 of us sent a letter 2 weeks ago to Navy
Secretary Dalton, and he has accepted today the name Ronald Reagan,
Sec. Dalton is striking the name U.S.S. United States for CVN-75, which
will be christened in September of next year, 1996, to name it the
U.S.S. Harry S Truman. And I rather like that. My dad was Harry Dornan,
Battery D Commander, Captain, World War I. How can that be when Harry
Truman was Battery D Commander, World War I? Simply two different
divisions. U.S.S. Harry Truman next year, and in 2000 A.D. Ronald
Reagan. I have just had the pleasure of telling the Reagan Library that
news.
These are important things that we fund in defense. To have the
world's largest moving objects, the Nimitz class carriers, named after
Presidents is fitting and proper.
{time} 1830

We have a George Washington. We have an Abraham Lincoln. I just went
out and shot five landings and five catapults off the U.S.S.
Eisenhower, the first man-of-war with women on board, we have the
U.S.S. Teddy Roosevelt, one of my favorites. This naming of ships is
important.
I do not want a Republican or Democrat to take a pen and say no CVN-
76, U.S.S. Ronald Reagan, no CVN-75, Harry Truman, scrap it, do
something else with the money which is what they did with the Northrop
Flying
[[Page H1133]] Wing, the B-49, just line-itemed it out, and Congress
did not fight back.
Defense is our responsibility. We have to protect defense. This is a
dangerous world with a million poisonous snakes out there, although we
are happy to look at a dead evil empire Soviet dragon. I say we protect
defense, and for that, I am for the line-item veto with this amendment
for all of our future Republican, Democrat, or Prohibition Party
Presidents.
Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. I move to strike the requisite number of
words. Mr. Chairman, I rise to oppose the amendment simply because, and
I support the bill, by this amendment we are setting apart defense
spending, and I understand my colleague from California and my
colleague from Texas and from Missouri, their concern about defense
spending.
We have a mechanism in this bill to protect from an irrational
response or an action by whatever President, and, I say to the
gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan], I hoped we would also see a
carrier named the Lyndon B. Johnson since I am from Texas too, someday,
I support that also.
But to set aside this measure and not let it go through the procedure
that this bill creates for it to come back to Congress for us to vote,
and I think we would not have any trouble getting a majority vote in
the House or a two-thirds vote, depending on what amendments we
actually adopt to reauthorize that, and say, ``Mr. President, no matter
who you are, we want this program.'' By this amendment, we are saying,
``Mr. President, you cannot cut the large programs. We have a deficit
problem. You cannot cut $50 million or above. We can let you pick
around the edges, but we have a $4 trillion deficit, and we are not
going to talk about major programs.
I think it would be irrational for us to do that, even for national
defense.
Let me talk about what we are saying to the American people by doing
this. The national defense is our No. 1 reason for a government. But we
are also here to provide for that domestic tranquility, and obviously
we are not doing it. But if we set aside and cut nutrition programs
that are over $50 million for children, for school lunches, we cut
nutrition programs for senior citizens, then we are not providing for
that domestic tranquility any more than we are providing for the
national defense.
Let me remind this House that the reason we have nutrition programs
for our schools is because of national defense. Harry Truman in 1946
said that our service personnel were not up to standard, and we needed
to provide that as a national defense issue.
I think this amendment is wrong. We are setting it separate. It is so
important we do not send that message to our people.
Senior citizen programs are just as important, chapter 1 funding for
Federal funding for education is just as important, and it is much more
than $50
million. If we are going to start exempting out defense, and I agree
that we need to have those programs from this, then we need to also
exempt out education funding, senior citizens' food programs,
elementary school programs. I just think this is the wrong method,
because if a President does wrong, we can change it by this bill, and
we should not start picking out certain issues or we will come with
amendments up here today and do the same thing we did on the unfunded
mandates and say let us exempt certain programs.

This amendment was not considered in committee, never even discussed,
and we had a full day of not only markup but also a full day of
hearings, and this never came up.
So I urge a ``no'' vote.
Mr. KLECZKA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.
Mr. KLECZKA. Let me echo the sentiments of my colleague who has just
spoken.
If we are going to start the exclusion game, we are going to be on
this bill longer than the unfunded mandates game. I say to you right
now, and I told you earlier in the debate, I support H.R. 2 as drafted.
We did amend the bill with the Thurman amendment, which I thought was
a step in the right direction. If you adopt this amendment and take one
major portion of the budget, 20-some percent of the budget, off the
table for the most part, do not let the President get near that and not
do the same for education, health care for young and old alike, medical
research, I think what we are doing here, Mr. Chairman, we are
purporting a sham on the American people.
And I would like to tell my colleagues there will be a rollcall on
this, so if any of you are going to shout loud and run to the
Cloakroom, ``It ain't going to happen.''
But note, if you will, the precedent we are setting with this
amendment, if adopted, is terrible, terrible, and if you are serious
about passing this line, item veto legislation, do not start by putting
nonsense like this into the product.
I plead with my colleagues not to do so.
Ms. FURSE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. I yield to the gentlewoman from Oregon.
Ms. FURSE. Mr. Chairman, I want to say that this amendment truly
sends the wrong message to the American public. It says there are
certain things that are sacred cows, and we cannot preserve sacred cows
and be serious about line item veto.
If any program is exempt, then all programs are exempt, and we are
not putting forward true line-item veto legislation.
So I would oppose this amendment.
Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I urge a ``no'' vote on the
amendment.
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words. I do so to oppose this amendment.
I reluctantly oppose the amendment. I know there are many Members on
this side of the aisle and certain Members on the other side of the
aisle who feel this is an area that should be exempt, sacrosanct,
should be protected from what we are providing for the President with
the line-item veto. But I submit, Mr. Chairman, this amendment really
flies in the face of the purpose of what we are trying to accomplish in
H.R. 2, and would, in fact, restrict the President's rescission
authority even more greatly than does current law. It would go beyond
what we can do under existing law, and I think the amendment should be
defeated.
I think the gentleman's amendment would single out for special
treatment defense appropriations of more than $50 million, and I would
say to the gentleman and to the Members there are many programs,
nondefense-related programs, that rise to the level of pork or could
rise to the level of pork which would be exempted from even being
considered for a line-item rescission under this bill.
For example, we have active forces transition enhancement, disaster
relief, $70 million, disaster relief efforts $50 million, Philadelphia
Naval Shipyard economic conversion, one that would be very dear to my
heart, but some might consider that pork, $50 million. There are a lot
of programs here that would be put off the reservation, not permitted
to be touched or even considered for exemption or for line-item veto.
The other point is we have already in this debate over the last day
or two exempted or considered whether to expand the judiciary, and
there were very strong and powerful arguments made why the judiciary
should be protected, the separation of powers and so forth. We rejected
that argument and said that nobody, no program rose to the level where
it should be exempted from consideration.
What it really says is that we are willing to trust the President to
use his good judgment as the President elected by all the people to
make determinations with regard to every other program that we deal
with except defense.
I recognize that defense is certainly the No. 1 consideration, the
No. 1 priority, that we need to deal with here, but to say that it is
of such importance that we cannot even consider eliminating pork from
that program, I think, is the wrong thing.
We do trust the President to do this. I think we have to trust him in
this one as well, and I would also point out there are very few major
defense programs that are less than $50 million, so
[[Page H1134]] it seems to me there would be almost no opportunity to
really affect wasteful, outmoded, outdated, as the former chairman
said, outmoded weapons systems, we would not be able to touch.
It assumes there is no pork in DOD. I think that is clearly wrong.
There is pork in every program we deal with. So I must strongly resist
and oppose the gentlemen's amendment.
Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CLINGER. I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.
Mr. TAUZIN. As the gentleman knows, we plan later on to offer an
amendment that I think cures this problem, and that is if the
legislature, this Congress, stays within the glideslope projections
that take us to a balance budget, we are not going to have this problem
at all. It is only when we spend in excess that then the President
would have to exercise the line-item veto to keep us on line, in which
case every program ought to be examined to see if there is pork in it,
every single one.
I think the gentleman is correct in that view. I would urge that that
view prevail on this floor.

{time} 1840

Mr. FATTAH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I do so to make a couple of points. One is that it is
less then clear, I think, to the American public when we say the budget
becoming in balance as to what we mean in respect to the national debt
that has accumulated. We keep referring to a balanced budget as if just
the removal of the deficit would in fact bring the budget into balance.
But the real purpose of my remarks at this moment is to speak to the
amendment before us.
This amendment, seemingly, would restrict any line-item veto limited
to items of $25 million, to no more than $25 million. It would seem to
me that with some creative budgeting you could make a number of
budgets, programs not presently in the defense budget part of the
defense budget, and therefore protect them from the line-item veto. If
the majority is trying to legitimately pass a line-item veto, they
would not want to create this kind of creativity in the budget process.
Even though I do not degree with the notion of line-item veto, I have
talked about my experience with it in Pennsylvania where it has been
abused. But if the purpose is a pure one and a sincere one, it would
seem to me this amendment would be rejected.
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the
requisite number of words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment. And as I do so
I am thinking ``Here we go again.'' We appear to be right back on our
debate, about which we were speaking earlier this week, on unfunded
mandates.
You cam recall in that bill the sponsors exempted from the definition
of unfunded mandates laws dealing with national security. So we had
amendments to exempt other laws, like laws protecting the environment,
laws protecting children, and laws protecting workers. In each case the
proponents of the bill said ``No.'' They said it would open the
floodgates to more exemptions.
Here we are again. This amendment exempts defense spending from
rescissions. The President could not under the amendment cut defense
spending, like a missile system. At the same time there are no other
exemptions. There are no exceptions for spending for nutrition
programs, programs for the homeless, programs for the elderly,
children's programs, programs for the aged, programs for the disabled,
and education programs. It is the same set of priorities we saw the
last time.
Mr. Chairman, as Yogi Berra said, ``it is deja vu all over again.''
I urge we vote no on this amendment. It is not a good amendment.
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I have a great deal of respect for the authors of this
amendment. I think there are Members who are primarily responsible
about keeping our national defense capability at a very, vry high
level, which we all think is very important.
I reluctantly rise to oppose this amendment, though, because earlier
today we debated the issue of exempting the judiciary from this bill
and I think we rightfully did not exempt the judiciary.
I believe we should not exempt the Pentagon. Military spending should
not be sacrosanct in terms of budget scrutiny, scrutiny with regard to
pork-barrel spending. The President has a responsibility to look at all
spending, even as it relates to our national defense, and to decide
whether it is necessary. If indeed the President unwisely vetoes a
national defense expenditure, the Congress can override that if he
makes a serious mistake in judgment.
So I strongly oppose this amendment. I think as the gentlewoman from
Illinois said, if we start exempting all these areas we are going to
run into real problems.
Let us give the President a strong line-item veto authority and let
us get this budget deficit under control once and for all.

amendment offered by mr. gene green of texas to the amendment offered
by mr. skelton

Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the
amendment.

Amendment offered by Mr. Gene Green of Texas to the
amendment offered by Mr. Skelton of Missouri: Before the
period at the end of the proposed amendment insert the
following: ``and Medicare''.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order on the amendment
to the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The point of order is reserved.
Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Mr. Chairman, this amendment came up very
quickly. Again, our committee did not even have the opportunity to
discuss it or consider it in the public hearing or even in the markup.
And my concern is if we are talking on an important national issue, and
national defense is important, and setting up that anything over $50
million the President cannot line-item veto and send back to us for
consideration, why should we not also, if we are going to set up a
separate classification for important programs that our Government is
responsible for, why should not we also include Medicare for our
seniors?
Again, it is not necessarily the national defense is in the
Constitution, but I make a case I think for domestic tranquillity and
health care for seniors even though it was only since the 1965 under
President Johnson that this Congress passed it. I think we ought to be
able to set that up and send the same message that we do not want a
future President of the United States to make the determination that
our budget is so high that we are going to cut Medicare because it is
obviously over $50 million a year.
I think we need to set up--if we are going to set up a sacred cow,
and there are some that I have, and one is Medicare, I think a lot of
Members of Congress would recognize that. Even the majority said they
would not touch Social Security.
I would put an extension on that to say that we are not going to
touch Medicare. I would hope the Members of Congress would consider
this, say that if we are making national defense important, over $50
million, let us look at it and let us look at Medicare.
I would encourage Members to support this amendment.
point of order

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] insist on
his point of order?
Mr. GOSS. This gentleman from Florida does insist on his point of
order, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his objection.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the amendment
and ask to be heard on my point of order.
Mr. Chairman, the amendment violates clause 7 of rule XVI, the
germaneness rule, and introduces a new subject. It really does. We are
getting out of discretionary budget authority into entitlements,
mandatory spending, obviously. This is wildly beyond the territory, as
I believe the gentleman knows.
I want to assure everybody that that was not the intent. We are
talking about discretionary budget authority. I want to put the
gentleman's mind at ease that there is no attack on Social
[[Page H1135]] Security or anything else going on here. This is just,
unfortunately, out of bounds.
The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Gene Green, wish to
speak on the point of order?
Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Mr. Chairman, if I may be recognized, I
would like to speak.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas may proceed.
Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Mr. Chairman, obviously, I disagree with the
germaneness because it is talking about the line-item veto and setting
up a different program. Now, if we want to set up a different sacred
cow, so to speak, or protect a different program than we are going to
protect from the line-item veto, I think it is germane to the bill.
There may be a question about the amendment, but then we could run with
a separate amendment. But to save the time of Congress you may want to
consider it just as an amendment to the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Emerson). The Chair is prepared to
rule.
The amendment is not germane to the Skelton amendment, which relates
to national defense budget authority.
The point of order is sustained.
Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I am a prodefense Democrat. I believe that guaranteeing
a strong national defense is the first responsibility of the Federal
Government. It has been so for 200 years of our Nation's history.
Whether you are a Republican or a Democrat, if you believe truly in a
strong national defense, you should vote ``yes'' on Skelton amendment.
Let me be very clear: A vote against this amendment is a vote against
protecting our Nation's defense.
To my Democratic colleagues and to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr.
Skelton] for his leadership, to my Republican colleagues, the gentleman
from California [Mr. Dornan], the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. Stump],
the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon], who have cosponsored this
in a bipartisan fashion, I say thank you.
To my Republican colleagues who might be thinking about voting
against this amendment, let me have you ask yourself a question.
{time} 1850

Do you want a President, perhaps the President that you will least
like to see in the Oval Office, and only one-third of this House, or
only one-third of our Senate, to be able to veto ballistic missile
defense, or the B-2, or the V-22, or the F-22, or perhaps a military
operation in your district? Do you want that to happen?
Do you want this President that you would like not to see sitting in
the Oval Office and one-third of this House to be able to cut the size
of the Army by two divisions, and you would be helpless to stop it?
I say to my colleagues, if that's what you want, then oppose the
Skelton amendment.
To my colleagues, both Republican and Democratic who are very strong
in favor of national defense, I say, if you vote no on this amendment,
you are voting to make it easier to gut our national defense period. If
that happens, make no mistake about it. You will have done more to hurt
our defense programs than any liberal Democrat who believes our defense
budget genuinely should be cut in half. The choice is clear. If you
believe national defense is the most important responsibility of the
Federal Government, then you should vote aye on this amendment. If you
believe national defense is more important than the whims or the
political agenda of any one President of either party, then you should
support this amendment. If you vote no on this amendment, do not try to
defend your vote by saying you wanted a pure bill with no exemptions.
Mr. Chairman, defense deserves to be treated differently. If deserves
to be exempted because the lives of our young service men and women and
the national security of our Nation and our future are far more
important than some blind commitment to vote against all amendments.
I say, the choice is clear, my colleagues. If you want to protect a
strong national defense, the only vote on this amendment is a yes vote.
Mr. PETERSON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. EDWARDS. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. PETERSON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I want to compliment the
gentleman and the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Skelton] for their
comments on this issue.
I think the bewitching hour has arrived. We have had numerous
speeches on this floor over my tenure of 4 years of everyone saying,
``I'm for national defense, I'm for national defense, and I stand
squarely behind the military of our country.''
This is an opportunity to put really the mark on the way and say, ``I
truly believe it,'' by this vote. Absolutely a no vote on this
particular amendment will state it is not OK to protect national
defense of this country, and I applaud the works of the gentleman from
Missouri [Mr. Skelton] and others who have cosponsored this amendment.
I strongly stand in favor of this amendment to make sure that our
national defense remains strong under all circumstances.
Mr. EDWARDS. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Peterson]. I can think of no Member of this
House who can speak more sincerely and more genuinely and who has given
more to this country in its national defense than the gentleman from
Florida [Mr. Peterson].
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I listened with great intensity to this. This is a very
important subject, and I believe the people who have made this
amendment have done it out of the spirit of a very strong conviction
about the need for national defense, and we do not do anything here
that could possibly interfere with the best possible national security
we can provide for every American.
I think, however, that their effort has been a little misguided
perhaps because they are not familiar with what else is in this
legislation, and I reluctantly, as the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr.
Clinger] did, have to come to the conclusion that this is not a good
amendment and that there are perhaps other ways to achieve what is
being argued for, which I certainly support, which is the best possible
national defense, the most efficient cost.
In fact, Mr. Chairman, I am afraid this amendment, as it is reported,
as I understand it, may actually tend to undermine the intent of this
bill because it opens the door. We have not opened any other door, and
we heard the gentleman from Wisconsin has spoken very eloquently about
what will happen if we open the door: ``If you open one, they are all
going to open.''
Then there is talk a little bit further about what is going to happen
if we do not do this amendment. There is no other way to solve these
problems to protect the defense.
Well, we have just agreed to the amendment offered by the gentlewoman
from Florida [Mrs. Thurman] which I think will help. We have created an
expedited process in committee to make sure that we can deal with these
things quickly. We have guaranteed every Member a vote. We have gone
the extra length to make sure every Member can get out and get on this
concern, whatever it may be, and there will be only defense, and deal
with it, and I would even suggest to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr.
Skelton], for whom I have the deepest respect, there may even be better
ways outside the scope of H.R. 2 today that we are talking about, and I
would be happy to share those with him because in committee we did talk
about some of those things, and I think there are a number of other
options, and I think we only make exceptions of the magnitude that we
would have to make if we favored this that would open those doors that
the gentleman from Wisconsin has referred to if there are no other
choices, and it is clear there are other choices.
I am very concerned about the trigger that has been set. It is
arbitrary. If this is law, it becomes law for a long time. Is that the
right number for a long period of time? Will it be changed? Will it be
changed and abused after a period of time? Those kinds of questions
have be asked.
But perhaps the most serious concerns I have are what we would put
[[Page H1136]] under the, quote, defense umbrella, unquote, if we made
this exception.
Now, when I look at the appendix of some of the nondefense-related
programs funded by defense in 1993, I get into things like disaster
relief, disaster relief, legacy resource management, World Cup USA,
environmental impact on Indian lands, World University Games, breast
cancer research, AIDS research, prostate research, a whole bunch of
things that are critically important programs. I would not doubt that
for 1 minute, but wonder if they are really central and paramount to
the major defense mission of national security, and what I am concerned
about is, if we tried to create an exemption like this, that suddenly
everything will be defense related, there really will not be very much
else to talk about, and that concerns me very, very much, and I realize
that some of those programs, in an abundance of caution and fairness I
will say, would not reach the trigger today, but that does not mean
they would not reach the trigger tomorrow, as we get more and more into
these things, and I say AIDS research might be an area where we might
have that number go up dramatically.
But the other point that is perhaps more serious: It seems to me that
the gentleman or the gentlelady in the White House is our President,
and I wonder why we would exempt the Commander in Chief from
jurisdiction over a defense program. That is a puzzle.
Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I, too, am a pro-defense Member of the House of
Representatives. I would point out to my colleagues that with the
Thurman amendment any 50 of us that took umbrage with any decision that
has been made now in either bill, either the H.R. 2 or the substitute
that we will offer tomorrow, any 50 standing up may get a separate
vote. Therefore, we have covered a good part of the problem that has
been a concern by my colleagues who I formerly agreed with in total.
I choose to take a few minutes though to speak on behalf of why I
oppose H.R. 2, and my colleagues have just heard the best example of
why all of us in this body should be a little bit concerned before we
grant to any President one-third-plus-one minority override on
decisions of extreme importance to individual Members, whether it be on
defense or any other area of our budget.
I have opposed the real line-item veto ever since I first heard of
it. We are not discussing the real line-item veto because, if we were
doing the real line-item veto, we would have an amendment to the
Constitution of the United States for purposes of two-thirds vote in
the House, two-thirds vote in the Senate, sending it to the American
people to see whether or not three-fourths of the States want to see us
grant this tremendous change in power that we are about to do if we
adopt H.R. 2, power as defined by the Constitution, by the original
writers. That is why we have come to a conclusion that we need a
modified version of the line-item, a modified version even of the
modification called H.R. 2.

{time} 1900

I can no longer explain to my constituents why we do not give the
President the right to go into appropriation bills, into tax bills,
into any kind of a bill on this floor, and extract certain things that
are embarrassing to the entire House. I could not do that. So we came
up with the modified version in which we are perfectly willing, and I
say this in all sincerity, any President of the United States today or
in the future can go into any bill, any bill, and line-item Charlie
Stenholm's, i.e., 17th District of Texas, favorite program. Something
of benefit specifically to my constituency. I want them to have that
power. All I ask is that I have an opportunity to stand on this floor
and to argue with you, my colleagues. And if I can find 50-percent-
plus-one to agree with me, it stays in. If the President wins, it goes
out.
That is the significant part of the debate that we will spend today,
tomorrow, and Monday on. We will get further into this debate when we
talk to him about the specifics of the substitute that we offer.
I just have a difficult time believing that there is a majority of my
colleagues that want to grant one-third-plus-one minority override,
particularly now that we are talking about defense. But whatever the
area is, that is the fundamental question. And to all who we have
managed to muddle this so much, I want to repeat, I am perfectly
willing, and want to have the President to be granted new powers to go
in and extract those things in budgets that should not be there.
Period. The fundamental question you have to ask is: Do you want it to
be a minority override? Do you want one-third of the Senate to agree
with the President and it be done, one-third of the House to agree with
the House? Or do we want to stay with majority rule?
If you needed a good argument for the position of the substitute of
the Wise-Spratt-Stenholm amendment, you have just heard it tonight. And
to my colleagues who believe that you want it to be that other way, I
hope you will think twice overnight and reconsider your position. I
believe the substitute is the better way for us to go.
Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I reluctantly rise to oppose this amendment. At the
beginning, I thought this might be a pretty good amendment and it was
really important to make sure that under the Constitution we maintain a
common defense. But let me make two very real points.
To those that are purists, like I am, you cannot come out here on the
balanced budget amendment, on unfunded mandates, on this bill, the
line-item veto, and be pure about the philosophy that we are trying to
accomplish here with the Contract With America and exempt one program.
If we are going to exempt defense, then it is hypocritical not to
exempt child issues. It is hypocritical not to exempt education or any
other very favorite and solemn program that we are all for.
It disturbs me, first off, in this amendment that you have a
threshold of $50 million. It very well concerns me that what in
practice, in trying to avoid the President line iteming some of the
very favorite programs that do not cost $50 million, defense becomes
the welfare pot to throw all kinds of programs into.
Let me just show you some non-defense-related programs that I have. I
have two pages that are already put into the pot. Most of these are
under $50 million.
The National Guard civilian youth program; the National Guard
Outreach Los Angeles program; the Presidio of San Francisco is in this;
disaster relief is in this; the World University Games could be put in
this. It was put in the defense bill before. Summer Olympics in the
defense bill. AIDS research in the defense bill.
Now, most men in this House think it is very important, but in the
defense bill there is prostate disease research. I do not know if that
is really important to the defense, the common defense, of this
country.
I could go on and on. Historically black colleges and universities,
that may entice some that are against this amendment to be for it, but
it does not belong in the defense bill. United States-Japan management
training, and many other programs that could go into the defense bill
and seriously harm spending for defense.
Let me tell you, the present President, my President, decides to
start line-item vetoing things in the defense bill that are important
to pro-defense people, I guarantee you we have the votes in this House
right now to stop that President from doing so. I am not afraid to take
on the President if he wants to take on the strategic defense
initiative and other issues like that. We can take him on, we have the
votes, and we will defeat him.
I think you have to keep this line-item veto, and I agree with the
gentleman from Texas, I would much prefer to have a constitutional
amendment, but this is all we have. And it is a good, very well-
structured, worked-out bill, that we do not need to be exempting any
one program from another.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. DeLAY. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.
[[Page H1137]] Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the
gentleman from Texas. The gentleman makes my case. Every item that the
gentleman mentioned is under $50 million. Every item that the gentleman
mentioned could be vetoed under this amendment by the President of the
United States. I thank the gentleman for making the case and in essence
speaking for my amendment.
Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I disagree with the
gentleman. He is right there could be line-item veto, but there are
other items in here over $50 million that could not be vetoed. Disaster
relief, legacy resource management, Hawaiian volcano observatory, over
$50 million, Semetech research. University research grants. Some of
them may be pro-defense, but we all know many of them probably are not.
And there are many others.
The point that I am trying to make is that it leaves a loophole for
those that may want to have a favorite social program stuck into the
defense budget, something that many of us oppose.
Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. DeLAY. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman and I have
served many years together in the state house, and I am glad to see we
agree today on this issue.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. DeLay] has
expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. DeLay was allowed to proceed for 1
additional minute.)
Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Mr. Chairman, sometimes this aisle gets to
be a wall instead of a way we can cross. I am glad the gentleman spoke
today and talked about this. We could set up other programs just like
this if we wanted to, but this bill needs to be as pure as we can have
it. I agree, though, that we might need to look at an amendment later
to make it a majority of the House instead of two-thirds, because I do
not know if you could get two-thirds of the House to override a
Presidential line-item veto. We might look at a majority on a later
amendment.
Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Chairman, I am more than happy to work with the
gentleman on his suggestion, and we will look at it later. I was
willing to work on this amendment, but when I really looked at it, I
thought in order to be honest and straightforward about this, you
cannot exempt any one particular line item.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. DeLAY. I yield to the gentleman from Hawaii.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, as much as Hawaii was mentioned, and
volcanoes, this is a good point. It makes my case, I must say, I
believe why the line-item veto should not be used. We are dealing with
the Pohakaka training site. All the training for the Pacific Rim takes
place there. The reason for the appropriation is to see to it that our
forces are ready for any contingency that occurs out there. It is not
pork barrel. Just because it exists in Hawaii does not mean it is not
vital to the national interests.

amendment offered by mr. weldon of pennsylvania to the amendment
offered by mr. skelton

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the
amendment, which I have discussed with the initial offerer of the
amendment, and I assume he is willing to accept.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania to the
Amendment offered by Mr. Skelton: Strike out ``$50,000,000''
and insert ``$200,000''.

{time} 1910

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I rise to offer this
amendment, which I have discussed with my friends on the other side,
the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Skelton] and the gentleman from Texas
[Mr. Edwards].
Let me say at the outset, Mr. Chairman, we are all in agreement here.
The defense budget of this country has already become the cash cow. In
last year's defense bill, Mr. Chairman, the total amount of
unauthorized appropriations was $4.7 billion; $2 billion of that $4.7
billion was in the subcommittee that I now chair, the Subcommittee on
Research and Development.
I asked the staff to provide me a listing of those projects that were
included as unauthorized appropriations, and I have them here. There
are more than two pages. There are a whole series of pages. And, in
fact, Mr. Chairman, most of the projects are under $50 million, and
almost all of the projects are under $200 million.
We are in agreement that those projects that are taking dollars away
from the defense of this country should be subject to a Presidential
line-item veto,
which, if we feel strongly enough about, we can keep in the budget.
Many of these programs would not withstand that test. But we also agree
that there needs to be some limit.

The defense appropriation bill is the largest appropriation bill that
we act on each year. We want to make sure that as we go through major
weapons systems that some President down the road may not in fact wipe
out an entire weapons system that in fact has been fully debated
through the committee process.
What we are trying to get at are the add-ons that Members get through
the back door. I would say to my colleagues that I do not know of any
Member of this body, in the 9 years that I have been here, that has
gotten an add-on on the defense bill more than 200 million. I cannot
think of a thing. I went through this listing, and I cannot find one.
So I think it is important that we do in fact work to reduce that
$4.7 billion unauthorized appropriation level. I have said that in
committee. I have said it in subcommittee, and I say it on the House
floor.
But I also think it is important that we understand these bigger
items, which are important for our security, which are debated in our
authorization and Committee on Appropriations, also should not be
subjected to that kind of action without full and deliberate debate.
That is why the threshold is needed.
I would hope that my good friend and colleague would in fact accept
this amendment to his amendment. I would hope that our colleagues would
vote ``yes'' on the amendment.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend from Pennsylvania. His
proposed amendment to my amendment corrects the debate that we have
just heard. I gladly accept it, and the gentleman from Texas [Mr.
Edwards] tells me he also accepts it. We appreciate the gentleman's
hard work and the sincerity and the research that he has done and just
offered us on the floor. And we thank him.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I would hope that our colleagues would
support this, Mr. Chairman. I consider myself a fiscal conservative. I
have as many watchdogs in my office as any of my colleagues, but this
is also an issue involving our national security. Please vote ``yes''
on the amendment.
Mr. FATTAH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I yield to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania.
Mr. FATTAH. I know that the gentleman is sincere, but I wanted to ask
one question. What would prevent a group of projects that some might
call pork being put together to get over the 200 million mark? There
was some creative budgeting done back home where I come from, and I am
just trying to understand how would the gentleman guard against that in
this particular amendment.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I thank my colleague for the question, my
good friend from Philadelphia. And what I would say, I am not a member
of the Committee on Appropriations, but typically these items are added
on line by line. They are specific in nature, and, in fact, we would
have that opportunity. In fact, I would be happy to show this list to
any of my colleagues. Every one of the items in the R&D account of $2
billion of unauthorized appropriations are in fact individually listed.
They, in fact, are not lumped together. I do not think that would be a
problem. If it is, we will
[[Page H1138]] have to deal with that on a future legislative issue or
effort of this type.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon] to the amendment offered by
the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Skelton].
The amendment to the amendment was rejected.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Skelton].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.

recorded vote

Mr. KLECZKA. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 52,
noes 362, not voting 20, as follows:
[Roll No. 87]

AYES--52

Bateman
Bishop
Brewster
Browder
Burton
Callahan
Coleman
Cramer
Cubin
Danner
de la Garza
Dicks
Dornan
Edwards
Emerson
Everett
Fazio
Fowler
Frost
Hayes
Hefley
Hilleary
Hunter
Johnson, E. B.
Jones
Klink
Laughlin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
McKeon
McNulty
Metcalf
Mfume
Montgomery
Ortiz
Pastor
Peterson (FL)
Pickett
Scarborough
Scott
Sisisky
Skelton
Slaughter
Spence
Stump
Tanner
Taylor (MS)
Tejeda
Thornberry
Ward
Weldon (PA)
Wilson

NOES--362

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allard
Andrews
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Baldacci
Ballenger
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Barrett (WI)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Beilenson
Bentsen
Bereuter
Berman
Bevill
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonior
Bono
Borski
Boucher
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Brownback
Bryant (TN)
Bryant (TX)
Bunn
Bunning
Burr
Buyer
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Cardin
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chapman
Chenoweth
Christensen
Chrysler
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clinger
Clyburn
Coble
Coburn
Collins (IL)
Combest
Condit
Conyers
Cooley
Costello
Cox
Coyne
Crane
Crapo
Cremeans
Cunningham
Davis
Deal
DeFazio
DeLauro
DeLay
Dellums
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doolittle
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Durbin
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Engel
English
Ensign
Eshoo
Evans
Ewing
Farr
Fattah
Fawell
Fields (LA)
Fields (TX)
Filner
Flake
Flanagan
Foglietta
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fox
Frank (MA)
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frisa
Funderburk
Furse
Gallegly
Ganske
Gejdenson
Gekas
Geren
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gonzalez
Goodlatte
Goodling
Gordon
Goss
Graham
Green
Greenwood
Gunderson
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hamilton
Hancock
Hansen
Hastert
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefner
Heineman
Herger
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Holden
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hoyer
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Jackson-Lee
Jacobs
Jefferson
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, Sam
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kelly
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
Kim
King
Kingston
Kleczka
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaFalce
LaHood
Lantos
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lightfoot
Lincoln
Linder
Lipinski
Livingston
LoBiondo
Lofgren
Longley
Lowey
Lucas
Luther
Maloney
Manzullo
Markey
Martini
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McDermott
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKinney
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Meyers
Mica
Miller (CA)
Miller (FL)
Mineta
Mink
Molinari
Mollohan
Moorhead
Moran
Morella
Murtha
Myers
Myrick
Nadler
Neal
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Norwood
Nussle
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Orton
Owens
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Parker
Paxon
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Pryce
Quillen
Quinn
Rahall
Ramstad
Reed
Regula
Reynolds
Richardson
Riggs
Rivers
Roberts
Roemer
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Rose
Roth
Roukema
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Rush
Sabo
Salmon
Sanders
Sanford
Sawyer
Saxton
Schaefer
Schiff
Schroeder
Schumer
Seastrand
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Skaggs
Skeen
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (WA)
Solomon
Souder
Spratt
Stearns
Stenholm
Stockman
Stokes
Studds
Stupak
Talent
Tate
Tauzin
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thompson
Thornton
Thurman
Tiahrt
Torkildsen
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Traficant
Tucker
Upton
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmer
Vucanovich
Waldholtz
Walker
Walsh
Wamp
Waters
Watt (NC)
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Williams
Wise
Wolf
Woolsey
Wyden
Wynn
Yates
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer

NOT VOTING--20

Baesler
Barcia
Becerra
Bliley
Brown (CA)
Collins (GA)
Collins (MI)
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gilman
Harman
Manton
Martinez
Minge
Moakley
Radanovich
Rangel
Smith (TX)
Stark
Waxman

{time} 1931

Ms. JACKSON-LEE, Mr. BALDACCI, and Mr. HOLDEN changed their vote from
``aye'' to ``no.''
Mr. HILLEARY changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
personal explanation
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, during Rollcall Vote No. 87 on H.R. 2 I was
unavoidably detained. Had I been present I would have voted ``no.''
amendment offered by mr. deal of georgia

Mr. DEAL of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Deal of Georgia: At the end, add
the following new section:

SEC. 7. JUDICIAL REVIEW.

(a) Expedited Review.--
(1) Any Member of Congress may bring an action, in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on the ground
that any provision of this Act violates the Constitution.
(2) A copy of any complaint in an action brought under
paragraph (1) shall be promptly delivered to the Secretary of
the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives, and
each House of Congress shall have the right to intervene in
such action.
(3) Any action brought under paragraph (1) shall be heard
and determined by a three-judge court in accordance with
section 2284 of title 28, United States Code.
Nothing in this section or in any other law shall infringe
upon the right of the House of Representatives to intervene
in an action brought under paragraph (1) without the
necessity of adopting a resolution to authorize such
intervention.
(b) Appeal to Supreme Court.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, any order of the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia which is issued pursuant
to an action brought under paragraph (1) of subsection (a)
shall be reviewable by appeal directly to the Supreme Court
of the United States. Any such appeal shall be taken by a
notice of appeal filed within 10 days after such order is
entered; and the jurisdictional statement shall be filed
within 30 days after such order is entered. No stay of an
order issued pursuant to an action brought under paragraph
(1) of subsection (a) shall be issued by a single Justice of
the Supreme Court.
(c) Expedited Consideration.--It shall be the duty of the
District Court for the District of Columbia and the Supreme
Court of the United States to advance on the docket and to
expedite to the greatest possible extent the disposition of
any matter brought under subsection (a).

(Mr. DEAL of Georgia asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. DEAL of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is hopefully a
noncontroversial one that addresses the issue of expedited judicial
review. Since we are proceeding in a statutory form for a line item
veto and not a constitutional amendment, it should be obvious that
until that constitutionality is clarified, it will be under a cloud.
This would be an expedited process for allowing that issue to be
determined and allow this body, if it is determined unconstitutional,
to make necessary changes and, if not, to proceed with its use.
I urge the adoption of the amendment.

[[Page H1139]]

Mr. Chairman, this should be a non-controversial amendment that can
be supported by Members of both sides of the line-item veto issue. My
amendment will simply streamline and expedite judicial review of the
line-item veto authority in the bill. The amendment will ensure that
any questions regarding the constitutionally of line item veto
authority are resolved as rapidly as possible.
I endorsed the line-item veto in my campaign and have voted in favor
of the strongest possible line item veto at every opportunity since
coming to Congress. As a supporter of line-item veto, I believe that it
is important that any questions regarding the constitutionally of the
line item be resolved as quickly as possible. As long as legal
questions remain, the President may be reluctant to fully utilize the
line-item veto, and any spending cut through the line-item veto process
would certainly be challenged. The effectiveness of the line-item veto
will be severely handicapped until the legal questions are resolved. It
is in nobody's interest to leave the legal status of line-item veto
authority in limbo for an extended period of time.
Under my amendment, any Member of Congress may bring action in
Federal district court challenging the constitutionally of the line-
item veto. The decision of the district court would be appealed
directly to the Supreme Court. Both the district court and the Supreme
Court would be directed to advance any case challenging the line-item
veto on the docket and expedite consideration of the case.
Hopefully, the procedure established by my amendment will result in a
final resolution regarding the constitutionally of line-item veto
authority before the fiscal year 1996 appropriations bills are sent to
the President. If the courts uphold the constitutionally of line-item
veto authority, the President will be free to utilize the line-item
veto authority without any question. If the courts strike down the
line-item veto authority, Congress will have time to consider
legislation to take corrective action and pass legislation
strengthening the ability of the President to cut out wasteful items in
tax and spending bills that is consistent with the ruling of the court.
If my amendment for judicial review is not added to the bill, it is
unlikely that the courts would consider the issue until the President
exercises the line-item authority. Every rescission submitted by the
President under the line-item veto authority for fiscal year 1996 would
almost certainly be challenged and potentially blocked until the issue
worked its way through the court system. This will effectively prevent
the President from truly utilizing the line-item veto for fiscal year
1996.
Whether or not you support the line-item veto, I encourage you to
support the Deal judicial review amendment.
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, this is a good amendment which simply ensures that any
court challenge to H.R. 2 be considered on an expedited basis. Because
this bill affords a significant new power to the President, it almost
certainly will be challenged in court. Rather than permitting any such
challenge to linger on overcrowded court dockets, the Deal amendment
would provide for fast-track judicial consideration of any court
challenge.
The amendment is a significant enhancement to the bill and should be
adopted.
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the
requisite number of words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Deal amendment. It is one that
we should all be able to support whether we support the bill or oppose
the line-item veto bill. This amendment makes it possible for the
constitutionality of H.R. 2 to be brought before the courts on an
expedited basis.
Proponents of H.R. 2 should want to have the constitutional question
regarding this bill settled as soon as possible. Those of us who oppose
H.R. 2 for constitutional reasons also want the courts to look at this
bill as soon as possible.
This amendment says that the courts can go ahead and hear a test case
on this legislation constitutionally without having to wait for the
President to use the line-item veto authority this bill gives him.
Mr. Chairman, this bill gives the President authority to sign
measures into law that are in a form the Congress has never passed. To
me, that means we are giving the President authority to make laws,
authority that belongs to the Congress under the Constitution. To me
that raises serious constitutional questions.
On this point, I would note that in testimony before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary last week, Assistant Attorney General Walter
Dellenger challenged the constitutionality of H.R. 2. I am going to
read briefly from his statement in which he refers to the authority
H.R. 2 gives the President over targeted tax benefits:

It does so by purporting to authorize a President to
``veto'' target tax benefits after they become law thus
resulting in their repeal. The use of the term ``veto'' and
``repeal'' is constitutionally problematic. Article I, Clause
7 of the Constitution provides that the President only can
exercise his ``veto'' power before a provision becomes law.
As for the word ``repeal,'' it suggests that the President is
being given authorization to change existing laws on his own.
This arguably would violate the plain textual provision of
Article I, Clause 7 of the Constitution governing the manner
in which Federal laws are to be made and altered.

Mr. Chairman, I would urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
It makes good sense to do so.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Deal].
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, I do so only to give the Members a sense of where we
are.
It is our hope to be able to deal with one more amendment this
evening, an amendment to be offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania
[Mr. Kanjorski], and at that point we will hopefully conclude action on
that amendment tonight and rise.

{time} 1940

amendment offered by mr. kanjorski

Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Kanjorski: At the end, add the
following new section:

SEC. 7. TERMINATION DATE.

This Act shall cease to be effective on January 1, 2000.
Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this amendment of course
is to add another section indicating termination date; and it is the
purpose to sunset this act as of January 1 of the year 2000, the
principle being that we would enact extraordinary powers and transfer
of powers from the Congress to the Executive, some of which powers are
unknown or unreasonable or unthinkable right now as to what the
ramifications of this may be. And I think what it does is allows us the
opportunity to have a rein on the Executive, that if over the next 5
years there is abuse in the exercise of the line-item veto this
Congress would have an opportunity to oversight the use of the line-
item veto to either reform the amount of power that would be delegated
to the Executive and if the abuse is so excessive by the Executive, it
would terminate as of January 1 of the year 2000.
I have never been a supporter of the constitutional amendment of
changing the balance of powers between the executive branch of
government and the legislative branch of government insofar as the
legislative branch would pass over to the executive all of the
possibilities that could be used in the appropriation bills and in tax
bills. But apparently the will of the Congress is going to be, at least
the House of Representatives, is going to be quite firm, that this bill
will pass, and that is what the will of the majority is. There is
nothing wrong with that.
But now we have to look at the Constitution and we have to look at
the precedence that we are establishing and the potential abuse.
I had the pleasure of serving in this House in the 83d Congress as a
page. That is the last Congress that the Republican Party was in the
majority. When I look back at the history of the 83d Congress, I find
that it did some very successful things in America. It attacked clean
water for the first time in navigable rivers. It attacked and thought
about the Interstate Highway System. It was a Congress that when it
concluded did not have to be embarrassed with its operations.
Now we are faced with the 104th Congress and a new majority, and
perhaps a new wind in the land. The tool we are about to pass on to the
President is a very powerful tool. It does not only affect this
generation, but theoretically could affect all generations to come in
[[Page H1140]] America, because as we will get the opportunity to
reverse a veto by a majority of this House and the Senate, in order for
that to be effective the President will have the constitutional
authority to exercise his veto.
If he exercises his veto on any appropriation that this House and the
Senate do not agree upon, it will require a two-thirds vote of this
House and a two-thirds vote of the Senate to override that veto.
I have examined back as far as I can remember from the 83d Congress
until now and I have found no Congress where any single party or
coalition in this House or in the Senate ever at any particular time
commanded a coalition or a number that would exceed two-thirds of this
body or two-thirds of the Senate.
The likelihood that that will happen in the future is quite remote.
Historically, if we study the activities of the Parliaments of Europe
during the periods of the 1920's and the 1930's, it was not unusual for
the Fascist Party or the Communist Party to exercise a majority in
those Parliaments, above a third, but below a majority. If for some
reason the Executive authority fell into the hands of a party that has
a third, and one vote, falls into the hands of the party that captures
the Presidency, and a third and one vote of either the House or the
Senate, there will be no way that the Congress can capture its
constitutional responsibility to properly appropriate the will of the
people and in accordance with the first article of the American
Constitution.
That is a significant transfer of power.
As we go down this contract and as we go down the changes they want
to be made, I hope my colleagues on the Republican side and my
colleagues on the Democratic side recognize that what we are doing
today is not something that is superficial in any stretch of the
imagination, it is not something that can be educationally corrected in
the future. The only way we could be certain that the extraordinary
powers that this Congress is sending to the Executive, if abused could
be changed, is if we have this sunsetting provision that allows this
act to cease in 5 years, if an Executive who is now in office or the
next Presidency were to violate the trust of the American people and
this Congress.
In my time in life I remember only one period of time where excessive
Executive authority was used. It was the end of the first term of
President Nixon.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr.
Kanjorski] has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Kanjorski was allowed to proceed for 2
additional minutes.)
Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Chairman, it was in that period of time in the
early 1970's, at the end of the first term of the Nixon administration
and the beginning of the second term of the administration, and we are
all aware of all of the President's men, we are all aware that we have
a tarnished history where a President of the United States, as a result
of unconstitutional activity, resigned the office of President.
We have the experience that an Executive did exceed his
constitutional authority and indeed did abuse legislative authority
that was not in his hands. Why would we want to arm and provide for
that possibility to occur in the immediate future and ad infinitum
until two-thirds of this House or two-thirds of the Senate would be in
place to override that?
There are 18 Members of this House that have introduced legislation
to bring a 5-year sunset to every piece of legislation that is
introduced into the House. I call upon those 18 Members, 16 on the
majority side and 2 on the Democratic side, that if they are going to
be consistent today, there is not any reasons why they would not
support this amendment and start with the line-item veto to provide for
a reasonable protection of the constitutional values we all hold high,
and to protect the fact that if we delegate this authority to the
President and if it is abused, we have a built-in mechanism to stop
that unusual and extraordinary power or that extraordinary abuse.
I urge my colleagues on the Republican side and the Democratic side
to think in terms that we came here and took another oath of office to
the Constitution of the United States and not to a political party.
This is a time not to be a Republican, not to be a Democrat or not to
be an Independent, but to be an American, and first of all in American
that believes in the Constitution and a constitutionalist. I urge
Members to support this reasonable sunset provision.
Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, like most Americans, I support the line-item veto. Too
often wasteful spending has slipped into a statute, it has hitched a
ride into the statute books, and this is a way to try to prevent it.

{time} 1950

We need to seize on every tool that we can to oppose wasteful
spending. We have the line-item veto in Texas. It has worked up to a
point. I think that over the last several sessions Governors,
Republican and Democrat alike, have managed to veto through the line
item about one-quarter of 1 percent of the 2-year spending budget.
Of course, here, the line-item veto usage would be even more limited
since only about one-third of all spending actually occurs in the
annual appropriations bill.
We must be very careful with this type of reform. There is no
guarantee that, in fact, a line-item veto will be used as a intended,
and that is why we offer this amendment tonight. We believe it would be
prudent to sunset this legislation every 5 years and, indeed, we
believe it would be prudent to sunset every new initiative of this type
every 5 years so that the Congress focused on what it was passing and
we had a real sense of accountability.
That is why we have proposed sunset provisions for each of these
pieces of legislation that are moving through the Congress.
In Texas this has been a process that has led to the repeal of
statutes, to the abolition of programs, to the savings of significant
amounts of money for the State treasury and, of course, for the
taxpayer.
It can work in Washington also.
Mr. Chairman, we know what we hope this reform will accomplish, that
a President will be as diligent as the Members who have worked on this
legislation to see that wasteful spending is ferreted out and
eliminated. But we do not live in an ideal world. It is quite possible
that a future President will use the line-item veto for purposes other
than those which we intend this evening.
Indeed, Mr. Chairman, it does not take a great deal of imagination to
imagine a future President saying that ``If you will not vote for this
spending program, I will veto through the line item an expenditure
program that you want for your district.''
Mr. Chairman, this bill in fact could actually give a President a
most powerful tool to force members of Congress to vote to increase and
toe the line on his spending bill, not just to ferret out waste, but to
add spending where it is unnecessary.
It is at least arguable that this is the reason why the Founding
Fathers, when confronted with the notion of a line item veto, chose to
deny it to the President, to the Chief Executive. We ought to think a
long hard time about changing this process and this balance of power,
this separation of power.
One of the ways to do that is by sunsetting the procedure and
allowing for this Congress, forcing this Congress, to have to refocus
its attention on the whole concept in the next 5 years.
You know, the record since the Second World War of Presidents on the
question of appropriations is not necessarily a good one. In fact,
during that period of time, various Presidents of both parties have
requested more appropriations than this Congress has actually voted to
spend. Let us suppose, Mr. Chairman, that we had a President of this
Nation who could not submit a balanced budget, who came to this
Congress session after session after session proposing one unbalanced
budget after another, a President who engaged in the strongest rhetoric
against an unbalanced budget, who came up with tools to speak about at
campaign time, but never could produce a balanced budget. Such a
President we have had in this country. He is the very President for
whom the members of the majority wish to change the calendar of
[[Page H1141]] this House and dedicate this very bill to on his
birthday.
But it is arguable that such a President might not do such a fine job
with a line-item veto, that if he could not balance his spending, he
cannot cut spending of others. It is for this reason that we ought to
look to a sunset process to reviewing the whole concept of a line-item
veto rather than taking a blind leap of faith that a line-item veto
will actually help us cut the deficit rather than seeing it increased.
Mr. Chairman, virtually every reform has unintended consequences, but
there is a way to do something about it, and having the experience of
five full sessions of this congress before we review it is exactly what
we can accomplish through sunset.
I move adoption of the amendment.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number
of words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to this amendment.
It was suggested that an obtrusive, Socialist government or President
might arise and abuse the line-item veto.
It is our contention that every leadership over the last 40 years has
tried to prevent the line-item veto, and now they want to sunset it.
Second, it will affect future generations. A balanced budget
amendment, unfunded mandates, and line-item veto will keep this
Congress from spending our children's and children's children's future
away.
The other side has had 40 years to pass this, and in the next 40
years they may have, or the next thousand years, they may take the
majority again. We want to establish a line-item veto in which a
President is answerable to the American people for that line-item veto
on every item that he forces.
If he abuses it, he himself will be answerable at election time.
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the
requisite number of words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the gentleman from Pennsylvania's
amendment to sunset the rescission authority in H.R. 2 in the year
2000.
Anyone who has been listening to this debate can attest to the fact
that many of our colleagues really do not know what this bill does.
Members continue talking about all of the Governors who have this
authority, when in fact H.R. 2 is very different than the authority the
Governors have.
Many continue to believe this is a true line-item veto bill when in
fact it is not. By the proponents' own admission, this bill contains,
instead, the most powerful rescission authority imaginable. The
President can pick and choose elements of an appropriation to rescind.
He can be as specific or as general as he wants, and nothing can stop
him as long as he has the support of just one-third plus one of the
Members in either the House or the Senate.
Many seem to believe this authority will let the President run
roughshod over the Federal judiciary; others think that concern is
unwarranted.
In the Senate, Senator McCain supports taking the approach in H.R. 2,
while Senator Domenici advocates the expedited rescission authority
which our colleagues Mr. Wise, Mr. Spratt, and Mr. Stenholm also
support.
The one common theme that runs through this debate is uncertainty and
confusion. This confusion and uncertainty is not going to be settled
here on this floor, or in the Senate, or in conference. If this bill is
enacted into law, only time will tell what impact it will have.
I strongly urge my colleagues, therefore, to support the Kanjorski
amendment to sunset this authority in the year 2000. The amendment
would give this experiment 5 years to run. By then, we should know
whether it is a policy that we should continue or terminate, or whether
we need to modify it in some way.
If you are a proponent of line-item veto, I would think you would
want to see this amendment adopted. There is only one way to clear up
the questions and confusion that now surround this proposal, and that
is to revisit it in the future. That will only occur, if this sunset
amendment is adopted.
I urge my colleagues to support the Kanjorski sunset amendment.
Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania.

{time} 2000

Mr. KANJORSKI. It is important. I just want you to recall in 1973 the
President, having been dissatisfied with the investigation of the FBI
and the CIA in the Watergate scandal, all he had to do was use this
provision, if it were in law, and strike the appropriations and do away
with the FBI and the CIA. My memory escapes me as to what the
impeachment resolution vote on Nixon was in this House, But I highly
doubt it was more than two-thirds.
I just ask my colleagues on all sides, realize this is not just a
housekeeping vehicle we are talking about today, this is a delegation
of authority, legislative appropriation authority that is incredible,
and allows the chief executive to reach down and punish those elements
of the Government that oppose his views, whether his views are legal or
constitutional, because we are arming a future President with that
capacity.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words in opposition to the amendment. It will only take me about a
minute.
I just want to say, Mr. Chairman and Members, with all due respect to
the gentleman, we have great respect for him, there is no need for this
amendment. We have already reached a compromise. Those of us who wanted
a true constitutional amendment for a line item veto, we have
compromised on this statute. That is as far as we want to go.
Let me tell you what you are voting on here: What this line item veto
is, it reverses existing law that allows Congress to reject the
President's requests to cut pork-barrel spending without even taking a
vote. That is what the existing rule and law is today. In other words,
Congress can block the spending without doing anything. This line item
veto reverses that procedure by saying that the cuts go through unless
Congress votes to disapprove the spending cuts.
That is what we are voting on now. We need permanent law.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Kanjorski].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.

recorded vote

Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 153,
noes 258, not voting 23, as follows:
[Roll No. 88]

AYES--153

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Baldacci
Barrett (WI)
Beilenson
Bentsen
Berman
Bevill
Bishop
Bonior
Borski
Boucher
Browder
Brown (FL)
Bryant (TX)
Chapman
Clay
Clayton
Clyburn
Coleman
Collins (IL)
Condit
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
de la Garza
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Doyle
Durbin
Edwards
Engel
Evans
Fattah
Fazio
Fields (LA)
Filner
Flake
Foglietta
Ford
Frost
Furse
Gejdenson
Gonzalez
Green
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hastings (FL)
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Jackson-Lee
Jefferson
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
Kleczka
Klink
LaFalce
Lantos
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lincoln
Lipinski
Lofgren
Lowey
Maloney
Markey
Mascara
Matsui
McDermott
McKinney
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Mink
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moran
Murtha
Nadler
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Orton
Owens
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Pelosi
Peterson (FL)
Pickett
Rahall
Rangel
Reed
Reynolds
Rivers
Roemer
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sawyer
Schroeder
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skelton
Slaughter
Spratt
Stenholm
Stokes
Studds
Stupak
Tanner
Taylor (MS)
Tejeda
Thompson
Thornton
Thurman
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Traficant
Tucker
Velazquez
Vento
Volkmer
Ward
Waters
Watt (NC)
Williams
Wise
Woolsey
Wynn
Yates
[[Page H1142]] NOES--258

Allard
Andrews
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bereuter
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Brewster
Brown (OH)
Brownback
Bryant (TN)
Bunn
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Cardin
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Christensen
Chrysler
Clement
Clinger
Coble
Coburn
Combest
Cooley
Cox
Crane
Crapo
Cremeans
Cubin
Cunningham
Danner
Davis
Deal
DeLay
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dooley
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Ensign
Eshoo
Everett
Ewing
Farr
Fawell
Fields (TX)
Flanagan
Foley
Forbes
Fowler
Fox
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frisa
Funderburk
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Geren
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goodlatte
Goodling
Gordon
Goss
Graham
Greenwood
Gunderson
Hall (TX)
Hamilton
Hancock
Hansen
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Heineman
Herger
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Holden
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hoyer
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Jacobs
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kasich
Kelly
Kim
King
Kingston
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Laughlin
Lazio
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Lightfoot
Linder
Livingston
LoBiondo
Longley
Lucas
Luther
Manzullo
Martini
McCarthy
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
McNulty
Metcalf
Meyers
Mica
Miller (FL)
Molinari
Moorhead
Morella
Myers
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Norwood
Nussle
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Parker
Pastor
Paxon
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Pryce
Quillen
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Richardson
Riggs
Roberts
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Rose
Roukema
Royce
Salmon
Sanford
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer
Schiff
Seastrand
Sensenbrenner
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Skeen
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Stearns
Stockman
Stump
Talent
Tate
Tauzin
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Torkildsen
Upton
Visclosky
Vucanovich
Waldholtz
Walker
Walsh
Wamp
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wolf
Wyden
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zimmer

NOT VOTING--23

Baesler
Barcia
Becerra
Bliley
Brown (CA)
Collins (GA)
Collins (MI)
Frank (MA)
Gephardt
Gibbons
Hall (OH)
Harman
Manton
Martinez
Mfume
Minge
Moakley
Roth
Shuster
Stark
Waxman
Wilson
Zeliff

{time} 2018

The Clerk announced the following pairs.
On this vote:

Miss Collins of Michigan for, with Mr. Collins of Georgia
against.
Mr. Manton for, with Mr. Roth against.

So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Personal Explanation
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, during rollcall vote No. 88 on H.R. 2 I was
unavoidably detained. Had I been present I would have noted ``no.''
{time} 2020

Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I move the committee do now rise.
The motion was agreed to.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore. (Mr.
LaHood) having assumed the chair, Mr. Boehner, Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 2) to
give the President item veto authority over appropriation acts and
targeted tax benefits in revenue acts, had come to no resolution
thereon.

____________________